first commit

This commit is contained in:
libroot 2026-11-19 04:39:11 +02:00
commit 0d90363116
Signed by: libroot
GPG key ID: 2AC68C029EBE9ACE
6510 changed files with 679146 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
{
"title": "Tor Hidden Services - How Hidden is 'Hidden'?",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A TOP SECRET GCHQ presentation analysing the security of Tor hidden services — covering the hidden service protocol architecture, possible exploitation vectors including the Coil Attack against introduction points, a beaconing pattern discovered in idle hidden services, and the HOMING TROLL bridge discovery capability — concluding that hidden services are \"near impossible\" to deanonymise but noting several research avenues including PRESTON integration.",
"long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ Applied Research presentation produced by ICTR Network Exploitation. The presenter describes their Tor research portfolio including HOMING TROLL (a bridge discovery capability), hidden services analysis, deanonymisation techniques, work with JTRIG and MCR (Maths and Crypt Research), and support to OP SUPERIORITY.\n\nThe presentation covers the Tor hidden services protocol in detail through an eight-step animated diagram showing how a hidden service establishes and maintains anonymity: the hidden service selects random Introduction Points and uploads its descriptor to Hidden Service Directories; a client learns of the service, requests the descriptor, selects a random Rendezvous Point, contacts an Introduction Point; the hidden service replies to the Rendezvous Point which then relays traffic between client and service. Both client and server remain anonymous to each other and to any observer.\n\nThe exploitation analysis systematically evaluates each component. Owning a Rendezvous Point yields only single-layer encrypted content with no knowledge of client or hidden service identity, and clients select RPs randomly making deliberate targeting unlikely. Taking down a Hidden Service Directory is ineffective as many remain. Acting as a Hidden Service Directory could allow collection of onion domains. Introduction Points are listed in the hidden service descriptor and are therefore known — a \"Coil Attack\" against the IPTs could disrupt connections, though hidden services can select new IPTs and can encrypt their IPT list in their descriptor. Direct exploitation of the hidden service itself is identified as the most promising vector: GCHQ identified a beaconing pattern from idle hidden services that could potentially allow identification of the IP address behind a hidden service, described as \"great for PRESTON\" — the targeted interception system. The beacon graphs show regular periodic patterns at approximately 100-minute intervals from both idle clients and idle hidden services.\n\nThe presenter's summary is candid: hidden services are \"near impossible\" to figure out in terms of who is talking to whom, but the beaconing discovery and other research avenues are noted. The final slide notes \"Until then... Doesn't stop us from using them\" — a remark whose meaning is ambiguous in context, potentially referring to GCHQ continuing to access or monitor hidden services for targeting purposes, to GCHQ operating its own hidden services as covert infrastructure, or simply to continued use of the Tor network for research while the harder deanonymisation problems are worked on. The document does not clarify which.",
"tags": [
"Tor",
"ICTR",
"ICTR-NE",
"network exploitation",
"Applied Research",
"JTRIG",
"MCR",
"Maths and Crypt Research",
"OP SUPERIORITY",
"hidden services",
"guard node",
"exit node",
"bridge discovery",
"Coil Attack",
"beaconing",
"traffic analysis",
"de-anonymization",
"anonymity",
"packet timing"
],
"document": {
"creator": "GCHQ",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"UK TOP SECRET",
"STRAP 1",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [],
"banner": "UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"HOMINGTROLL",
"JTRIG",
"SUPERIORITY",
"PRESTON"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2014-12-28",
"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Grothoff, Christian",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Sontheimer, Michael",
"Stöcker, Christian"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/6e98f79b-0001-0014-0000-000000035539/media-35539.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "6471c8cc6e3fd20cf83aff483a1575d4c6c41355ec6aada09dedf254d3d54113",
"pages": 26
}

View file

@ -0,0 +1,699 @@
APPLIED RESEARCH
# Tor Hidden Services
## How Hidden is 'Hidden'?
[REDACTED] - ICTR Network Exploitation
© This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 1
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## What is Tor?
* Tor is an implementation of 2nd generation onion routing
* Originally sponsored by the US Naval Research Laboratory
* Later became an Electronic Frontier Foundation project
* Helps to prevent network traffic analysis & surveillance
* Open network with over 2000 nodes
* Anonymity tool
* Uses multiple layers of encryption
* Multi-hop proxy
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 2
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## What I have done on Tor
* General Tor research
* HOMING TROLL
* Bridge discovery capability
* Hidden Services
* Helped with a few deanonymisation techniques
* Worked with JTRIG & MCR (Maths & Crypt research)
* Provided support to OP SUPERIORITY
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 3
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
```
Encrypted
TOR
Encrypted
Clear-text
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 4
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
```
Alice
Ka(Kb(Kc(m
sg))) Entry (Guard
A )
Kb(Kc(msg
))
B
Middle
Node
Kc( msg )
C
Exit
Nod
e
Messa
ge
Bob
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 5
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## What is it used for?
* The Good
* People living in oppressive countries (circumvent firewalls)
* Access to free media instead of state propaganda
* People can say what they want without it being linked to their public profile
* The Bad
* Bot herders use Tor to give instructions to their bots
* Allows paedophiles access content without linking themselves to it
* State actors can launch attacks without being attributable
* "Anonymous" & LULZSec
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 6
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## What do we see?
* Any traffic between the client & tor is heavily encrypted.
* We can only really see traffic from an exit node to a website
* But we don't know where this traffic originated from
* Still could link up aliases though
* 'Somebody' could still visit a dodgy forum and log in with an alias, or even send an email using a known target email address (Assuming they don't use SSL).
* Phew... at least there is some intelligence gain.... Right?
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 7
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Hidden Services
* Hides the IP address of a web service
* Protects content providers by anonymously hosting content
* Publication of undesirable content
* Both client and server are anonymous to an observer and to each other
### Normal Tor
User ? <-> Website Naughty Site
Clear text
### Hidden Services
User ? <-> Website ?
Encrypted
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 8
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## So what do we see now?
* Not much...
* All Hidden Service traffic is heavily encrypted.
* Most we can gather is that one Tor node talks to another (IP level)
* Hiding in the crowd at its best!
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 9
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## The dot ~com~ onion BOOM
* What's this .onion business?
* TLD Tor uses to initiate a connection to a hidden service
* Example onion domain
* 16 characters in base32 (few characters are actually missing)
* oqznfi3tdo6nwg3f.onion
* DNS?
* Tor uses something similar to DNS to resolve an onion domain
* Onion domains 'resolve' to 3+ IP addresses called Introduction Points (IPT)
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 10
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Pieces of the Jig-Saw
* The actual Hidden Service (HS)
* Where the service actually originates from
* User
* The user who wishes to access the Hidden Service
* Hidden Service Directory (HSDir)
* A directory server that hold information on a Hidden Service
* Introduction Point (IPT)
* Hidden Service's 'front door' / relay
* Rendezvous Point (RP)
* Client's 'front door' / relay
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 11
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. **HS selects random IPTs**
2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
3. Client finds out about HS
4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
5. Client selects a random RP
6. Client contacts one IPT
7. HS replies to RP
8. RP relays between client and HS
```
IPT
^
|
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 12
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. HS selects random IPTs
2. **HS uploads descriptor to HSDir**
3. Client finds out about HS
4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
5. Client selects a random RP
6. Client contacts one IPT
7. HS replies to RP
8. RP relays between client and HS
```
HSDir
^ IPT
\ ^
\|
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 13
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. HS selects random IPTs
2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
3. **Client finds out about HS**
4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
5. Client selects a random RP
6. Client contacts one IPT
7. HS replies to RP
8. RP relays between client and HS
```
Client
HSDir
^ IPT
\ ^
\|
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 14
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. HS selects random IPTs
2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
3. Client finds out about HS
4. **Client requests descriptor from HSDir**
5. Client selects a random RP
6. Client contacts one IPT
7. HS replies to RP
8. RP relays between client and HS
```
|-- Client
v
HSDir
^ IPT
\ ^
\|
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 15
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. HS selects random IPTs
2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
3. Client finds out about HS
4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
5. **Client selects a random RP**
6. Client contacts one IPT
7. HS replies to RP
8. RP relays between client and HS
```
Client
/ \
v v
HSDir IPT RP
^ ^
\ |
\|
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 16
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. HS selects random IPTs
2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
3. Client finds out about HS
4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
5. Client selects a random RP
6. **Client contacts one IPT**
7. HS replies to RP
8. RP relays between client and HS
```
Client
/ | \
v v v
HSDir IPT RP
^ ^ |
\ | |
\| v
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 17
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. HS selects random IPTs
2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
3. Client finds out about HS
4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
5. Client selects a random RP
6. Client contacts one IPT
7. **HS replies to RP**
8. RP relays between client and HS
```
Client
/ | \
v v v
HSDir IPT RP
^ ^ | ^
\ | | /
\| vv
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 18
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Fitting it together
1. HS selects random IPTs
2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
3. Client finds out about HS
4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
5. Client selects a random RP
6. Client contacts one IPT
7. HS replies to RP
8. **RP relays between client and HS**
```
Client
/ | ^
v v v
HSDir IPT RP
^ ^ | ^
\ | | /
\| vv
HS
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 19
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Possible Exploits?
* Rendezvous Point (RP)
* What if we owned the RP?
* Traffic still encrypted, although only a single layer of encryption
* Still only content, don't know who the user is or where the HS is located
* Clients randomly select their RP so unlikely to be picked anyway
* Hidden Service Directory (HSDir)
* If we take a HSDir down, there are still many left
* Could potentially collect onion domains if we acted as a HSDir
* Client
* No real way to distinguish between a Tor user accessing the web or a HS
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 20
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
* Introduction Points (IPT)
* All Hidden Service IPTs are listed on its descriptor (the thing that's stored on a HSDir)
* Potential for an attack on IPTs to stop them accepting connections for the HS
* This could be done using a 'Coil Attack'
* Doesn't stop a HS selecting another set of IPTs
* HS can encrypt their IPTs in their descriptor (but not many do)
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 21
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
* Hidden Service (HS)
* What about exploiting the HS directly?
* Potential to identify the IP addresses hidden services
* But cant really say which one
* Identified a beaconing pattern from HS
* Dependant on collection posture
* Great for PRESTON
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 22
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Idle Client Beacons
```
500
|
| /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\ 250
| / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \
| / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \
|/ | \/ | \/ | \/ | \/ | \/ | \
+------------------------------------------------------- 0
0m 200m 400m 600m 800m 1000m 1200m
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 23
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Idle HS Beacons
```
2000
|
| /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\ /|\ 1000
| / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \
| / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \ / | \
|/ | \/ | \/ | \/ | \/ | \/ | \
+------------------------------------------------------- 0
0m 200m 400m 600m 800m 1000m 1200m
```
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 24
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Summary
* Tor helps people become anonymous
* Very naughty people use Tor
* Hidden Services hide the fact web content even exits!
* Near impossible to figure out who is talking to who
* Its complicated
* Some areas for further research
* Until then... Doesn't stop us from using them
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 25
---
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
## Questions?
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
APPLIED RESEARCH
Slide 26