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TOR deanonymisation research (MIP) - GCWiki
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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate content.
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TOR deanonymisation research (MIP)
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From GCWiki
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Jump to: navigation, search
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OPC-MCR Mathematical Information Processing Research Task:
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TOR deanonymisation
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Customer: ICTR-NE
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Status: in pullthrough (started December 2010)
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MCR lead: [REDACTED]
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Team: [REDACTED]
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(ICTR-NE)
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Can we denonymise TOR? In other words, if given some traffic from a TOR exit node, can we find the IP address of the user associated with that traffic?
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[edit] Research
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A circuit tracing attack was first considered. However ICTR-NE signatures run by TDSD showed that our coverage of TOR is too low to have a reasonable chance of doing such an attack; on JTRIG paths we only saw 2 out of 8294 potential inter-TOR-node links.
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Instead we are now considering an entry-exit correlation attack. Data collected from ICTR-NE/JTRIG infrastructure showed that some timing structure is preserved between entry and exit node.
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Mathematical Information Processing Research
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* Home
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* Tasks:
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* active
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* all
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* in pullthrough, suspended, completed
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* Papers
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* Staff
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* Monthly notes:
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* Current (open access)
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* Pre-July 2011: web RSS
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* Notes (pre-2010 limited access)
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* Our processing user: brule
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* Seminars
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* Software
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v - d - e
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1 of 3
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TOR deanonymisation research (MIP) - GCWiki
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The successful outcome of this entry-exit correlation attack is documented in OPC-M/TECH.B/61. An R package implementing the attack is available: src, doc.
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The work was presented at SANAR11. The slides are here.
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We plan to prototype the technique in the REMATION II workshop. The introductory slides are here.
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Retrieved from '[REDACTED]
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Categories: OPC-MCR MIP task | OPC-MCR in pullthrough MIP task | OPC-MCR MIP task for ICTR-NE | Internet Anonymity | The Onion Router
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2 of 3
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TOR deanonymisation research (MIP) - GCWiki
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Go Search
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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate content.
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