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{
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"title": "Cryptographic Modernization (CryptoMod) Classification Guide 3-9",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A partial NSA/CSS classification guide for the Cryptographic Modernisation (CryptoMod) programme — establishing classification levels for information about NSA's transition of US cryptographic products to modern algorithms, Positive Access Control parameters, software signing, and the association of specific algorithms with critical year and life-of-use assessments.",
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"long_description": "This is an NSA/CSS classification guide for the Cryptographic Modernisation (CryptoMod) programme, guide number 3-9, effective 1 February 2010, issued by the Director of Information Assurance. The document covers the B and C sections of the guide — crypto-algorithm classification and Positive Access Control — with a partial D section on miscellaneous items.\n\nThe crypto-algorithm section establishes that the use of Suite A and Suite B algorithm names, the fact of NSA migrating products to modern algorithms under CMI (Cryptographic Modernisation Initiative), and the use of public crypto-algorithms in NSA-certified products are all unclassified. Program planning information showing when the entire US cryptographic inventory will transition to modern algorithms is Secret, normally releasable to Five Eyes but not for Nuclear Command and Control or Space systems. Documentation defining symmetric key lengths for classified algorithms before operational use is Secret, dropping to Confidential after operational use.\n\nThe Positive Access Control section covers EnPAC and DePAC parameters — the access control mechanisms embedded in cryptographic products to verify software integrity. US-generated operational EnPAC parameters are Top Secret and \"not releasable under any circumstances.\" DePAC parameters in production equipment are Secret//REL FVEY, but once installed in a fielded product they become Unclassified//FOUO on the grounds that \"once installed, there is no inherent sensitivity to these values.\"\n\nThe miscellaneous section contains two particularly significant entries. Item D.1 classifies the use of named public crypto-algorithms — not part of Suite B — with an NSA-certified product at Secret//REL FVEY, with the remark that \"the use of public cryptographic algorithm names can be used as cover for any classified algorithm\" and giving the example that using PGP for protection of classified information within a KG-series device would be classified Secret. Item D.3 classifies any list associating crypto-algorithms and equipment with Critical Year (CY) data at Top Secret//REL FVEY — the Critical Year being the point at which a cryptographic system is assessed to become vulnerable to adversarial attack. The \"Assessment of Type 1 Cryptographic Products\" document is mentioned as the compiled listing of algorithms and equipment with LYOU (Life of Use) and CY data.\n\nThe document is notable in the context of the Der Spiegel investigation because it reveals the classification structure protecting NSA's own assessment of when its cryptographic systems become breakable — information that would be as valuable to adversaries as NSA's knowledge of when others' systems can be broken.\n\nIn plain terms this is an internal rulebook telling NSA staff how secret to treat different types of information about US government encryption products — covering which facts about the algorithms used, the security controls built into devices, and the timeline for upgrading them need to be protected and at what level. The most striking entry is the classification of information about when specific US government encryption systems are expected to become vulnerable, which NSA treats as among its most sensitive secrets.",
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"tags": [
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"Information Assurance",
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"IAD",
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"CryptoMod",
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"Cryptographic Modernisation",
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"CMI",
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"software signing",
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"Life of Use",
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"LYOU",
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"classification guide"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2010-02-01",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "guide",
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"programs": [],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/21d9615c-0001-0014-0000-000000035549/media-35549.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "d9d585cf3376d69878deaf1260c77d043f54ff7bfba4ca5162ddd880727072ed",
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"pages": 4
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}
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