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{
"title": "Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) Classification Guide / 2-59",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A NSA/TAO classification guide establishing the precise classification level for 41 categories of information about computer network exploitation operations — covering remote and physical subversion methods, CNE tools and techniques, supply chain operations, hardware implants, off-net field operations, zero-day vulnerabilities, and cryptographic material acquired through CNE.",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY classification guide for Computer Network Exploitation, guide number 2-59, effective 1 March 2010, issued by Tailored Access Operations (S32). The guide establishes classification levels across four sections covering general CNE facts, partnering and collaboration, tools and techniques, and operations and targeting.\n\nThe general section establishes the classification baseline. The bare fact of TAO performing CNE is unclassified, as is the fact of targeting computers and networks without reference to specific targets. The fact of remote subversion is Secret//REL FVEY. Identification of specific remote subversion methods — endpoint access, on-net operations, software implants and accessing data at rest — is Secret//SI//REL FVEY. Physical subversion — including close access operations, off-net operations, supply chain intervention and hardware implants — is Secret//SI//REL FVEY with details potentially requiring ECI protection. The fact of off-net field operations to develop, deploy or maintain intrusive access is Top Secret//SI//REL FVEY, and off-net activities at locations other than NSA facilities is Top Secret//SI with foreign releasability handled case by case.\n\nThe partnering section establishes that collaboration with Second Party partners on CNE is Confidential//REL FVEY, collaboration with unspecified Third Parties is Secret//REL FVEY, and collaboration with specified Third Party partners is Top Secret//SI. Collaboration with specific US Government and IC entities on specific ECIs is Confidential//REL FVEY.\n\nThe tools and techniques section is notable for its treatment of zero-day vulnerabilities: publicly known software vulnerabilities exploited for CNE are Unclassified//FOUO, while non-publicly known vulnerabilities are Top Secret//SI — the classification that protects NSA's stockpile of undisclosed software flaws. Tool cover names with no context are unclassified, but details of remote subversion tools including type, purpose, capabilities, concealment techniques and electronic signatures are Secret//SI at minimum, rising to Top Secret//SI for physical subversion tool details.\n\nThe operations and targeting section covers the most operationally sensitive material. Targeting a specific country is Secret//SI//REL FVEY at minimum. Individual details of CNE activities including target network, vulnerability being exploited and target infrastructure are Top Secret//SI. The location and details of hardware or software implants on a target's systems are Top Secret//SI. The combination of specific target and specific capability sufficient to allow a target to take countermeasures is Top Secret//SI. Item 41 — the fact that NSA acquires cryptographic enabling information through CNE — is Top Secret//SI, with details potentially protected by ECI and HCS, directly connecting TAO's CNE operations to the PAWLEYS ECI covering clandestine acquisition of cryptographic material.\n\nThe definitions section provides the clearest published official definitions of key TAO operational concepts. Remote subversion is defined as subversion without physical access, encompassing endpoint access, on-net operations, software implants and data-at-rest exploitation. Physical subversion is defined as subversion with physical access, encompassing close access, off-net, supply chain and hardware implant operations. Supply Chain Operations are defined specifically as interdiction activities modifying equipment in a target's supply chain — the operation type documented in the New York Times reporting on NSA intercepting Cisco equipment shipments.\n\nIn plain terms this document is the rulebook telling TAO staff how secret to treat different facts about their hacking operations. Its significance is that it reveals the full taxonomy of TAO's operational methods in a single table — remote hacking, physical break-ins, supply chain interception, hardware implants, zero-day exploits and cryptographic material theft — and establishes that all of these are considered routine TAO activities requiring only classification protection rather than denial of existence.",
"tags": [
"classification guide",
"Computer Network Exploitation",
"Tailored Access Operations",
"Computer Network Attack",
"Computer Network Defense",
"Computer Network Operations",
"remote exploitation",
"physical subversion",
"off-net",
"supply chain",
"hardware implants",
"software implants",
"implants",
"endpoint access",
"on-net operations",
"zero-day exploits",
"intrusive access",
"close access",
"ECI",
"HCS",
"cryptographic enabling",
"tools and techniques",
"cover names",
"military targets",
"information operations"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2010-03-01",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"SI"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "guide",
"programs": [],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2014-10-10",
"title": "Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/10/10/core-secrets/",
"reporters": [
"Maass, Peter",
"Poitras, Laura"
],
"contributors": [
"Brown, Alleen",
"Williams, Margot"
],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/computer-network-exploitation-classification-guide/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1312012/cne-declass-guide.pdf",
"version": "cne-declass-guide"
},
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2015-01-17",
"title": "The Digital Arms Race: NSA Preps America for Future Battle",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-snowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Guarnieri, Claudio",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Rosenbach, Marcel",
"Ryge, Leif",
"Schmundt, Hilmar",
"Sontheimer, Michael"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/aa3bf3d5-0001-0014-0000-000000035656/media-35656.pdf"
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "d3af2fe9139eea9fddf7104af2b14fbd0cdfff4521cf4888d0c03b1d379e70e9",
"pages": 8,
"versions": {
"cne-declass-guide": {
"pdf_sha256": "d94a4480f43cc5c4bd37ba3f77f538ea396ecbaaa33eba915ef44abab042545c",
"changed_pages": [
1
]
}
}
}

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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TITLE/NUMBER: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) Classification Guide / 2-59
(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 1 March 2010
(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Tailored Access Operations (TAO)/S32
(U) POC: TAO Classification Advisory Officer
(U) PHONE: 961-6794s
(U//FOUO) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: SIGINT Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations and Support, [REDACTED]
| Description of Information | Classification/Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
| :------------------------- | :---------------------- | :----- | :------ | :------ |
| **A. (U) GENERAL** || | | |
| 1. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO performs computer network exploitation (CNE) | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 2. (S//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, performs remote subversion | SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level and/or require compartmentation. (U) Foreign releasability decisions on specific details relating to remote subversion are handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
| 3. (S//SI//REL) Identification of specific remote subversion methods used by NSA/CSS or TAO, to include: - Endpoint access, exploitation, or operations - On-net access, exploitation, or operations - Software implant access, exploitation, or operations - Accessing or exploiting data at rest | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level and/or require compartmentation. (U) Foreign releasability decisions on specific details relating to remote subversion are handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 4. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, performs physical subversion, to include: | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification and|
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| - Close access enabling, exploitation, or operations - Off-net enabling, exploitation, or operations - Supply chain enabling, exploitation, or intervention operations - Hardware implant enabling, exploitation, or operations || | | require ECI protection. (U) Foreign releasability decisions on specific details relating to physical subversion are handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 5. (U) The association of any specific ECI name or trigraph, with NSA/CSS, ECI, SIGINT, or intelligence | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA 3| N/A | |
| 6. (U) The association of a specific TAO ECI name or trigraph with CNE and/or TAO | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec. 1.4(c) | N/A | |
| 7. (U) The fact that a specific individual is cleared for a specific TAO ECI, when there is no association between the ECI and TAO | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | | | (U) If the details of the association reveal the fact that the ECI is TAO's, then it would be CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY, in accordance with entry 5. |
| 8. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO conducts CNE for foreign intelligence collection. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
| 9. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, performs CNE to support U.S. Government CNA efforts | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 10. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, trains, equips, and organizes the U.S. Cryptologic System to support the CNE, CNA, and CND requirements needs of its customers | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 11. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, provides CNO-related military targeting support | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 12. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, provides intelligence gain/loss assessments in response to Combatant Commander (COCOM) CNO targeting | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 13. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, develops and supports analytic modeling and simulation techniques to support CNE/CNA efforts | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 14. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, targets, collects and processes computers, computer networks and computer-to-computer (C2C) communications without reference to a specific operation, activity or target | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 15. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA or TAO, as part of CNE operations, targets, collects and processes specific computer protocols (such as email, instant messaging, file transfer protocols) | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN).|
| 16. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, remotely introduces code into target computer networks to facilitate foreign intelligence collection | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN).|
| 17. (TS//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, conducts off-net field operations to develop, deploy, exploit, or maintain intrusive access, without further detail | TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN).|
| 18. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, conducts off-net activities at specified locations other than NSA/CSS facilities | TOP SECRET//SI | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by an ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 19. (U) TAO project names, in association with CNE or TAO, with no amplifying details | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA (3)| N/A | |
| **B. (U) PARTNERING/COLLABORATION** || | | |
| 20. (C//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with Second Party Partners to conduct CNE activities | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c, d) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more |
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
||||| ECIs. |
| 21. (C//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with specific Second Party partners on specific ECIs | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY See remarks for foreign releasability. | | | ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 22. (C//REL) Details of the CNE collaboration between NSA/CSS or TAO and Second Party partners | SECRET//SI at a minimum See remarks for foreign releasability.| | | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET//SI. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
| 23. (S//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with unspecified Third Party Partners in support and conduct of CNE activities | SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY| Sec 1.4(c, d) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by an ECI. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 24. (S//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with specified Third Party Partners in support and conduct of CNE activities | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c, d) | *25 years | (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. (U) Details may also be protected by an ECI. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
| 25. (U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with a specific US Government/IC entity | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA (3)| N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). |
| 26. (C//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with a specific US Government/IC entity on a specific ECI | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY| Sec. 1.4(c) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). |
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **C. (U) TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES** | | | | |
| 27. (U) The existence of CNE tools, with no further details/context | UNCLASSIFIED| N/A | N/A | |
| 28. (U) Cover names of CNE tools, with no details/context | UNCLASSIFIED| N/A | N/A | |
| 29. (S//SI//REL) When associated with remote subversion, details/descriptions concerning CNE tools, to include: - Specific type (i.e. hardware/software, etc.) - Purpose - Capabilities - Concealment Techniques - Electronic signatures - Combination(s) of the above | SECRET//SI at a minimum See remarks for foreign releasability.| Sec. 1.4(c) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 30. (S//SI//REL) When associated with physical subversion, details/descriptions concerning CNE tools, to include: - Specific type (i.e. hardware/software, etc.) - Purpose- - Capabilities - Concealment Techniques - Electronic signatures - Combination(s) of the above | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability| Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 31. (U//FOUO) Technical details concerning specific software vulnerabilities, when publicly known, and that are exploited for CNE activities | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA (3)| N/A | |
| 32. (S//SI//REL) Technical details concerning specific software vulnerabilities, when not publicly known, and that are exploited for CNE activities | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may be protected as NOFORN on a case-by-case basis. (U) Some tools may be protected under an ECI and/or additional handling caveats. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **D. (U) OPERATIONS and TARGETING** || | ||
| 33. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, targets a specific country or international organization | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY at a minimum | Sec. 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). (U) Contact TAO CAO for further guidance on levels of success as well as for more specific targeting details such as individual(s), specific government entity(ies), etc. |
| 34. (S//SI//REL) Association of cover names for off-net operations (i.e., physical subversion activities) with amplifying details (e.g., specific electronic components, systems, their host facilities, etc) | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 35. (S//REL) Association of cover names for on-net operations (i.e., remote subversion activities) with amplifying details (e.g., specific electronic components, systems, their host facilities, etc) | SECRET//SI at a minimum See remarks for foreign releasability.| Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 36. (S//SI//REL) Individual details of CNE activities, such as: - Target information including intended target network and/or device - Vulnerability being targeted - Target infrastructure | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 37. (TS//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, is attempting to exploit or has succeeded in exploiting a specific vulnerability (e.g., in a firewall, operating system, software application, etc.), and a specific entity or facility within a target's IT/computer structure | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 38. (S//SI//REL) Facts related to the description of U.S. hardware or software implants and location (e.g., specific organization and Internet Protocol Device/Address, etc.) on a target's IT/communications system | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 39. (S//SI//REL) Facts related to the exact timing, location, | TOP SECRET//SI at a minimum.| Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more|
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| participants, off-net or on-net operations, CNE command, control and data exfiltration tools/capabilities and locations, used to exploit or maintain intrusive access to a target's IT/computer structure | See remarks for foreign releasability.|| | ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 40. (S//SI//REL) Combination of details of individual aspects of CNE activities, that would allow a specific target to take specific counter-measures, such as: - Specific target network or device and - Specific capability, tool or technique used for exploitation of vulnerability | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 41. (TS//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS (or TAO) acquires cryptographic enabling information through CNE activities. | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U//FOUO) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI and/or HCS. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
(U) *25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later.
ACRONYMS/DEFINITIONS:
(U) Computer Network Exploitation (CNE): intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Computer Network Attack (CNA): operations to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Computer Network Defense (CND): efforts to defend against the CNO of others, especially that directed against U.S. and allied computers and networks. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Computer Network Operations (CNO): CNE, CNA, and CND collectively. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Information Operations (IO): actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO is an integrating strategy. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
(S//SI//REL) Intrusive Access: Refers to CNE operations involving remote manipulation, hardware/software modifications, or sensing of environment changes in a computer device or system, and/or occasionally the facilities that house the systems.
(S//SI//REL) Off-Net Operations: Refers to covert or clandestine field activities of personnel carried out in support of CNE activities.
(S//SI//REL) Physical subversion: Subverts with physical access to a device or host facility. Other terms sometimes used to connote physical subversion are close access enabling, exploitation, or operations; off-net enabling, exploitation, or operations; supply-chain enabling, exploitation, or operations; or hardware implant enabling, exploitation, or operations.
(S//SI//REL) Remote subversion: Subverts without physical access to a device or host facility; obtains unauthorized permission. Other terms sometimes used to connote remote subversion are computer network exploitation; endpoint access, exploitation, or operations; on-net access, exploitation, or operations; software implant access, exploitation, or operations; or accessing or exploiting data at rest.
(S//SI//REL) Supply Chain Operations: Interdiction activities that focus on modifying equipment in a target's supply chain.
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY

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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
(U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDE TITLE/NUMBER: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) Classification Guide / 2-59
(U) PUBLICATION DATE: 1 March 2010
(U) OFFICE OF ORIGIN: Tailored Access Operations (TAO)/S32
(U) POC: TAO Classification Advisory Officer
(U) PHONE: [REDACTED]
(U//FOUO) ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
| Description of Information | Classification/Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
| :------------------------- | :---------------------- | :----- | :------ | :------ |
| **A. (U) GENERAL** || | | |
| 1. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO performs computer network exploitation (CNE) | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 2. (S//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, performs remote subversion | SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level and/or require compartmentation. (U) Foreign releasability decisions on specific details relating to remote subversion are handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
| 3. (S//SI//REL) Identification of specific remote subversion methods used by NSA/CSS or TAO, to include: - Endpoint access, exploitation, or operations - On-net access, exploitation, or operations - Software implant access, exploitation, or operations - Accessing or exploiting data at rest | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level and/or require compartmentation. (U) Foreign releasability decisions on specific details relating to remote subversion are handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 4. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, performs physical subversion, to include: | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification and|
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| - Close access enabling, exploitation, or operations - Off-net enabling, exploitation, or operations - Supply chain enabling, exploitation, or intervention operations - Hardware implant enabling, exploitation, or operations || | | require ECI protection. (U) Foreign releasability decisions on specific details relating to physical subversion are handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 5. (U) The association of any specific ECI name or trigraph, with NSA/CSS, ECI, SIGINT, or intelligence | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA 3| N/A | |
| 6. (U) The association of a specific TAO ECI name or trigraph with CNE and/or TAO | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec. 1.4(c) | N/A | |
| 7. (U) The fact that a specific individual is cleared for a specific TAO ECI, when there is no association between the ECI and TAO | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | | | (U) If the details of the association reveal the fact that the ECI is TAO's, then it would be CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY, in accordance with entry 5. |
| 8. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO conducts CNE for foreign intelligence collection. | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | |
| 9. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, performs CNE to support U.S. Government CNA efforts | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 10. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, trains, equips, and organizes the U.S. Cryptologic System to support the CNE, CNA, and CND requirements needs of its customers | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 11. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, provides CNO-related military targeting support | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 12. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, provides intelligence gain/loss assessments in response to Combatant Commander (COCOM) CNO targeting | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 13. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, develops and supports analytic modeling and simulation techniques to support CNE/CNA efforts | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 14. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, targets, collects and processes computers, computer networks and computer-to-computer (C2C) communications without reference to a specific operation, activity or target | UNCLASSIFIED | N/A | N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities remain classified.|
| 15. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA or TAO, as part of CNE operations, targets, collects and processes specific computer protocols (such as email, instant messaging, file transfer protocols) | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN).|
| 16. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, remotely introduces code into target computer networks to facilitate foreign intelligence collection | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN).|
| 17. (TS//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, conducts off-net field operations to develop, deploy, exploit, or maintain intrusive access, without further detail | TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN).|
| 18. (S//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, conducts off-net activities at specified locations other than NSA/CSS facilities | TOP SECRET//SI | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by an ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 19. (U) TAO project names, in association with CNE or TAO, with no amplifying details | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA (3)| N/A | |
| **B. (U) PARTNERING/COLLABORATION** || | | |
| 20. (C//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with Second Party Partners to conduct CNE activities | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY | Sec 1.4(c, d) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more |
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
||||| ECIs. |
| 21. (C//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with specific Second Party partners on specific ECIs | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY See remarks for foreign releasability. | | | ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 22. (C//REL) Details of the CNE collaboration between NSA/CSS or TAO and Second Party partners | SECRET//SI at a minimum See remarks for foreign releasability.| | | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET//SI. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
| 23. (S//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with unspecified Third Party Partners in support and conduct of CNE activities | SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY| Sec 1.4(c, d) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by an ECI. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 24. (S//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with specified Third Party Partners in support and conduct of CNE activities | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c, d) | *25 years | (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. (U) Details may also be protected by an ECI. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
| 25. (U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with a specific US Government/IC entity | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA (3)| N/A | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). |
| 26. (C//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, collaborates with a specific US Government/IC entity on a specific ECI | CONFIDENTIAL//REL TO USA, FVEY| Sec. 1.4(c) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). |
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **C. (U) TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES** | | | | |
| 27. (U) The existence of CNE tools, with no further details/context | UNCLASSIFIED| N/A | N/A | |
| 28. (U) Cover names of CNE tools, with no details/context | UNCLASSIFIED| N/A | N/A | |
| 29. (S//SI//REL) When associated with remote subversion, details/descriptions concerning CNE tools, to include: - Specific type (i.e. hardware/software, etc.) - Purpose - Capabilities - Concealment Techniques - Electronic signatures - Combination(s) of the above | SECRET//SI at a minimum See remarks for foreign releasability.| Sec. 1.4(c) | *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 30. (S//SI//REL) When associated with physical subversion, details/descriptions concerning CNE tools, to include: - Specific type (i.e. hardware/software, etc.) - Purpose- - Capabilities - Concealment Techniques - Electronic signatures - Combination(s) of the above | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability| Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details indicating specific targets, level of success or capabilities may raise the classification level to TOP SECRET. (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs and/or a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 31. (U//FOUO) Technical details concerning specific software vulnerabilities, when publicly known, and that are exploited for CNE activities | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | FOIA (3)| N/A | |
| 32. (S//SI//REL) Technical details concerning specific software vulnerabilities, when not publicly known, and that are exploited for CNE activities | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may be protected as NOFORN on a case-by-case basis. (U) Some tools may be protected under an ECI and/or additional handling caveats. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **D. (U) OPERATIONS and TARGETING** || | ||
| 33. (U) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, targets a specific country or international organization | SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY at a minimum | Sec. 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by a different level of foreign releasability (including NOFORN). (U) Contact TAO CAO for further guidance on levels of success as well as for more specific targeting details such as individual(s), specific government entity(ies), etc. |
| 34. (S//SI//REL) Association of cover names for off-net operations (i.e., physical subversion activities) with amplifying details (e.g., specific electronic components, systems, their host facilities, etc) | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 35. (S//REL) Association of cover names for on-net operations (i.e., remote subversion activities) with amplifying details (e.g., specific electronic components, systems, their host facilities, etc) | SECRET//SI at a minimum See remarks for foreign releasability.| Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 36. (S//SI//REL) Individual details of CNE activities, such as: - Target information including intended target network and/or device - Vulnerability being targeted - Target infrastructure | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECIs. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 37. (TS//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS or TAO, as part of CNE operations, is attempting to exploit or has succeeded in exploiting a specific vulnerability (e.g., in a firewall, operating system, software application, etc.), and a specific entity or facility within a target's IT/computer structure | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 38. (S//SI//REL) Facts related to the description of U.S. hardware or software implants and location (e.g., specific organization and Internet Protocol Device/Address, etc.) on a target's IT/communications system | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 39. (S//SI//REL) Facts related to the exact timing, location, | TOP SECRET//SI at a minimum.| Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more|
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
| | | | | |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| participants, off-net or on-net operations, CNE command, control and data exfiltration tools/capabilities and locations, used to exploit or maintain intrusive access to a target's IT/computer structure | See remarks for foreign releasability.|| | ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 40. (S//SI//REL) Combination of details of individual aspects of CNE activities, that would allow a specific target to take specific counter-measures, such as: - Specific target network or device and - Specific capability, tool or technique used for exploitation of vulnerability | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4 (c) | *25 years | (U) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance.|
| 41. (TS//SI//REL) The fact that NSA/CSS (or TAO) acquires cryptographic enabling information through CNE activities. | TOP SECRET//SI See remarks for foreign releasability. | Sec 1.4(c)| *25 years | (U//FOUO) Details may also be protected by one or more ECI and/or HCS. (U) Foreign releasability decisions handled on a case-by-case basis. Contact TAO CAO for further guidance. |
(U) *25 years: Declassification in 25 years indicates that the information is classified for 25 years from the date a document is created or 25 years from the date of this original classification decision, whichever is later.
ACRONYMS/DEFINITIONS:
(U) Computer Network Exploitation (CNE): intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Computer Network Attack (CNA): operations to manipulate, disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Computer Network Defense (CND): efforts to defend against the CNO of others, especially that directed against U.S. and allied computers and networks. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Computer Network Operations (CNO): CNE, CNA, and CND collectively. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
(U) Information Operations (IO): actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. IO is an integrating strategy. (Per DCID 7/3, Information Operations and Intelligence Community Related Activities, effective 01 July 1999, administratively changed 5 June 2003)
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
(S//SI//REL) Intrusive Access: Refers to CNE operations involving remote manipulation, hardware/software modifications, or sensing of environment changes in a computer device or system, and/or occasionally the facilities that house the systems.
(S//SI//REL) Off-Net Operations: Refers to covert or clandestine field activities of personnel carried out in support of CNE activities.
(S//SI//REL) Physical subversion: Subverts with physical access to a device or host facility. Other terms sometimes used to connote physical subversion are close access enabling, exploitation, or operations; off-net enabling, exploitation, or operations; supply-chain enabling, exploitation, or operations; or hardware implant enabling, exploitation, or operations.
(S//SI//REL) Remote subversion: Subverts without physical access to a device or host facility; obtains unauthorized permission. Other terms sometimes used to connote remote subversion are computer network exploitation; endpoint access, exploitation, or operations; on-net access, exploitation, or operations; software implant access, exploitation, or operations; or accessing or exploiting data at rest.
(S//SI//REL) Supply Chain Operations: Interdiction activities that focus on modifying equipment in a target's supply chain.
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY