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{
"title": "INTOLERANT – Who Else Is Targeting Your Target? Collecting Data Stolen by Hackers – SIDtoday",
"type": "SIDTODAY",
"description": "A TOP SECRET SIDToday article from Menwith Hill Station describing how NSA and CSEC discovered and began exploiting INTOLERANT — a sophisticated email-stealing hacking operation targeting Indian diplomats, Central Asian diplomats, Chinese human rights defenders, Tibetan pro-democracy activists, Uighur activists and European officials — by intercepting the stolen emails as they transited satellite links, a technique internally called \"fourth party collection\" or \"outsourcing SIGINT.\"",
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL SIDToday article originally published in Menwith Hill Station's Horizon newsletter in March 2010 and reprinted on SIDToday on June 2010. The article describes INTOLERANT, an email-stealing intrusion set discovered jointly by CSEC and Menwith Hill Station, and the practice of \"fourth party collection\" — intercepting data as it transits the internet from a hacking victim's computer to the attacker's infrastructure.\n\nINTOLERANT is described as a sophisticated operation in which unknown hackers targeted email accounts across seven victim categories: Indian diplomatic and Indian Navy (Category A), Central Asian diplomatic (B), Chinese human rights defenders (C), Tibetan pro-democracy personalities (D), Uighur activists (E), the European Special Representative to Afghanistan and Indian photo-journalism (F), and the Tibetan Government in Exile (G). The victim set is explicitly described as \"target-rich\" for the Intelligence Community — nearly half of observed traffic contained category hits against existing NSA targets. New victims' entire inboxes were exfiltrated going back months or years, followed by ongoing collection of new emails, with hundreds of emails observed on an average day.\n\nThe technical sophistication of INTOLERANT was considerable. The hackers' programmes split each stolen email into pieces, obfuscated each piece, assigned different spoofed source IP addresses and sent each to a different destination IP address routed across separate channels (PIDs — Packet Identifiers) of a satellite signal. The channels used carried large amounts of legitimate traffic, allowing the stolen data to hide as background noise. Collaboration between CSEC, MHS, GCHQ and NSAW was required to reassemble and transform the fragmented, obfuscated INTOLERANT data into readable SMTP email. The fact that data transited satellite links made it collectible at Menwith Hill Station, NSA's primary FORNSAT facility in the UK.\n\nAttribution was described as difficult. The level of sophistication and victim set pointed toward a likely state sponsor, but which state could not be determined. The satellite beam footprint was too large to narrow the attribution — the culprit needed to be within the beam's coverage to receive the stolen data, but the footprint covered a vast geographic area. The victim categories — Indian military and diplomats, Central Asian diplomats, Tibetan and Uighur activists, Chinese human rights defenders — are consistent with Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage, though the article does not name China.\n\nThe article introduces the NSA terminology for this collection method: 4PXFIL stands for \"fourth party exfil\" — collecting intelligence that a third party (the hacker) has already stolen from a second party (the victim), making the NSA effectively the fourth party in the chain. The case notation format E9BDJ4PXFILtargetNumber was used to flag INTOLERANT-derived emails in SIGINT databases, so analysts reviewing their targets' intercepted communications could recognise when an email was available because someone else had hacked the target rather than through direct NSA collection. The article notes OPSEC concerns where US and UK authorities had contact with individuals in the victim set — particularly Indian diplomats and the European Special Representative — and states that NTOC was being informed.",
"tags": [
"MHS",
"Menwith Hill",
"CSEC",
"GCHQ",
"NSAW",
"fourth party",
"4PXFIL",
"outsourcing SIGINT",
"cyber exploitation",
"email theft",
"state sponsored hacking",
"Indian Navy",
"diplomats",
"Indian diplomats",
"Central Asian diplomats",
"Chinese human rights",
"Tibet",
"Tibetan Government in Exile",
"Uighur",
"European Special Representative",
"FORNSAT",
"satellite interception",
"PID",
"packet identifier",
"SMTP",
"obfuscation",
"spoofed IP",
"attribution",
"NTOC",
"OPSEC",
"Horizon newsletter"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2010-05-06",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"SI"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL"
],
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
"genre": "newsletter",
"programs": [
"INTOLERANT"
],
"countries": [
"India",
"China",
"Afghanistan",
"Canada"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2015-02-04",
"title": "Western Spy Agencies Secretly Rely on Hackers for Intel and Expertise",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/02/04/demonize-prosecute-hackers-nsa-gchq-rely-intel-expertise/",
"reporters": [
"Greenwald, Glenn"
],
"contributors": [
"Marquis-Boire, Morgan"
],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/02/04/intolerant-else-targeting-target-collecting-data-stolen-hackers/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1588694/who-else-is-targeting-your-target-collecting.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "9e1b1ff46b222483bd699a40aeb3d41211f3828f9fa233345970ca1174767e4b",
"pages": 1
}

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DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET//SI/TK// REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
SID Today
archives feedback
Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
* SIDtoday Article
* Letter to the Editor
* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
(TS//SI//REL) Who Else Is Targeting Your Target? Collecting Data Stolen by Hackers
FROM: (U//FOUO) Menwith Hill Station (F77)
Run Date: 05/06/2010
(TS//SI//REL) Hackers are stealing the emails of some of our targets... by collecting the hackers' "take," we 1) get access to the emails themselves and 2) get insights into who's being hacked.
(TS//SI//REL) People who open attachments from unknown senders (gasp) or respond to "Nigerian" money laundering emails aren't the only individuals on the internet being hacked. Some of *our* targets are also being targeted by outside forces, both by state-sponsored and freelance hackers. Could your target's communications be the target of other countries or groups?
(TS//SI//REL) Recently, Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) and Menwith Hill Station (MHS) discovered and began exploiting a target-rich data set being stolen by hackers. The hackers' sophisticated email-stealing intrusion set is known as INTOLERANT. Of the traffic observed, nearly half contains category hits because the attackers are targeting email accounts of interest to the Intelligence Community. Although a relatively new data source, **TOPIs** have already written multiple reports based on INTOLERANT collect.
(U) Technique
(TS//SI//REL) To the analyst using SIGINT databases, collected INTOLERANT data looks like Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) mail. In this case, though, the traffic fairy has been hard at work... To hide the traffic, the hackers' programs split a victim's email into pieces. Each piece is then obfuscated, given a different, spoofed, source IP address and sent to a different destination IP address. Having different destination IP addresses serves to route the pieces across separate channels¹ of a satellite signal. The channels being used carry large amounts of traffic, allowing INTOLERANT data to hide as background noise. Much collaboration between CSE, MHS, GCHQ and NSAW has brought about the transformation of INTOLERANT data we collect into "readable" SMTP mail.
(U//FOUO) Victim Set
(TS//SI//REL) INTOLERANT traffic is very organized. Each event is labeled to identify and categorize victims. Cyber attacks commonly apply descriptors to each victim - it helps herd victims and track which attacks succeed and which fail. Victim categories make INTOLERANT interesting:
A = Indian Diplomatic & Indian Navy
B = Central Asian diplomatic
C = Chinese Human Rights Defenders
D = Tibetan Pro-Democracy Personalities
E= Uighur Activists
F = European Special Rep to Afghanistan and Indian photo-journalism
G = Tibetan Government in Exile
(TS//SI//REL) New victims appear to flood out their entire inbox, going back months or, even, years. Then only new mail is transmitted. Hundreds of emails are seen on an average day.
(U) Attribution
(TS//SI//REL) Within the world of cyber exploitation, attribution is always difficult and INTOLERANT is no exception. Initial analysis points toward a likely state sponsor based on the level of sophistication and the victim set. Determining which state is sponsoring the activity has yet to be done. Since the traffic is traveling over satellite, the culprit must be within the satellite beam's footprint to receive the stolen emails. There was hope the footprint would point to which state was responsible, but that hope was not realized as shown in the image.
(TS//SI//REL) *Attribution of INTOLERANT data is difficult, since the satellite beam footprint is so large. Eventually, the virtual team working this effort would like to know who is hacking whom.*
(U) Way Forward
(TS//SI//REL) Analysis continues with the goal of learning more about the attacks as well as improving attribution. Efforts are also being made to inform relevant parties, including NTOC, due to the obvious operations security (OPSEC) concerns where US and UK authorities have contact with Indian diplomats or the European Special Representative, for instance.
(TS//SI//REL) So the next time you scan your target's email, pay special attention to the case notation. If it contains 4PXFIL² (E9BDJ4PXFILtargetNumber in the case of INTOLERANT), then the email is likely available because somebody else has hacked your target. For additional details, send an email to mhsindex@nsa.ic.gov.
(U//FOUO) POCS: [REDACTED]; INDEX team (MHS)
(U) Notes:
1. (U//FOUO) Packet Identifiers, PIDs are used in satellite hub signals to designate sub-channels.
2. (TS//SI//REL) 4PXFIL stands for "fourth party exfil" or "out-sourcing SIGINT." These terms are used within the SIGINT community to refer to the practice of collecting data as it transits the Internet going from the victim's computer to the attacker's.
(U//FOUO) SIDtoday editor's note: This article is reprinted from MHS's Horizon newsletter, March edition.
Comments/Suggestions about this article?
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of [REDACTED] ([REDACTED])."
Information Owner. [REDACTED] Page Publisher: [REDACTED]
Last Modified: 11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/10/2012
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
TOP SECRET //SI/TK //REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108