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data/xks-logos-embedded-in-docs/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "XKS Logos Embedded in Docs",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "A TOP SECRET XKeyscore how-to written by a Booz Allen Hamilton consultant, explaining how analysts can track a document across the internet by the hash of a logo or image embedded inside it — extracting the 32-character hash of a company logo from an intercepted spreadsheet, then searching XKeyscore's document metadata for every other file containing that same image, revealing communications between people the analyst has never heard of.",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL XKeyscore technique guide authored by a consultant from Booz Allen Hamilton (unit ADET-E92), published by The Intercept as part of the XKeyscore document release. It is a short, practical tutorial demonstrating one specific capability referenced in the broader XKeyscore overview presentations: tracking documents by the hashes of images embedded inside them.\n\nThe technique works in stages. When XKeyscore processes a document such as a Microsoft Office file or Outlook email, it parses out embedded images — logos, attachments and inline graphics — and treats each as a separate attachment. The worked example uses an intercepted financial spreadsheet (\"NEW_DAILY_REPORTING_06.04.2009.xls\") captured on 7 April 2009, containing a logo alongside deposit and cash figures. Opening the session's Attachments window reveals the document was decomposed into 21 separate attachments including JPEG, PNG and WMF images, XML metadata files, HTML fragments and document body text. Each extracted image is named with its hash — for example image-6a476b2cedccb34946f5e9c76103d0f2.png.\n\nThe analyst takes the 32-character hash of the embedded image and pastes it into a Document Metadata search under the File/Embedded Image Hash field. Because every document containing that same image produces the same hash, this returns every other intercepted document containing the identical logo or graphic — even documents sent between people the analyst has no prior knowledge of. The guide notes this reveals \"actual files that were sent to and from people you've never HEARD OF.\"\n\nThe document includes a USSID-18 compliance warning specific to this technique: before submitting, the analyst must consider whether the logo could be used by Five Eyes-protected entities, since a common corporate or organisational logo could return large volumes of protected US or allied traffic. The suggested mitigation is ANDing the hash search with a country filter — the worked example uses Afghanistan (Country: AF) to constrain results to foreign traffic.\n\nThe technique is significant because it enables tracking of documents and identification of associated persons purely through the visual content embedded in files, with no email address, name or other strong selector required. A shared letterhead, organisational logo or reused graphic becomes a fingerprint linking together everyone who handled a document.",
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"tags": [
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"Booz Allen Hamilton",
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"hashes",
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"embedded images",
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"logo recognition",
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"document metadata",
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"document tracking",
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"attachment extraction",
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"image hash",
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"target discovery",
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"SIGDEV"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "2009",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "manual",
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"programs": [
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"XKEYSCORE"
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],
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"countries": [
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"Afghanistan"
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],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-07-01",
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"title": "XKEYSCORE: NSA’s Google for the World’s Private Communications",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/07/01/nsas-google-worlds-private-communications/",
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"reporters": [
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"Marquis-Boire, Morgan",
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"Greenwald, Glenn",
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"Lee, Micah"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/07/01/xks-logos-embedded-docs/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2116375/xks-logos-embedded-in-docs.pdf"
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}
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],
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"aka_id": [],
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"pdf_sha256": "e2533e9af795afbf41176d68ec58b682c55e9ea1a686f38733ec9adbf4d886d0",
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"pages": 2
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}
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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[REDACTED]
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Booz Allen | Hamilton
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ADET-E92
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Using XKS to find and search for logos embedded in documents
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XKEYSCORE will parse out the logos inside of documents like MS Office and Outlook emails. If you're traffic hasn't aged of, load it into a session viewer and hopefully you'll see where there's a logo or attachment. See here, this spreadsheet has a logo in it.
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```
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DEPOSITS
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ACTUAL
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USD
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CASH
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CASH INSURANCE UNIT CASH ON PREMIS
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```
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(TS//SI//REL) XKEYSCORE takes that logo and calls it an attachment. Click on Attachments to see all of the attachments.
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```
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Datetime | Case Notation
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2009-04-07 06:23:14 | E9DCK00900M0000
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Session | Header (3) | Attachments (21) | Meta (18)
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Formatter: AUTO | Send to: Downloa
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```
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(U//FOUO) In the Attachments window, look for ones with jpg or png.
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```
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image_summary_montage.jpeg unknown_884.plain document_body.1.bat unknown_882.plain image-f909de2e9589585d6dc03f3cB16f5ac1.wmf document_body.0.txt
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new_daily_reporting_06.04.2009.1.xls_1.metadata.xml unknown_886.plain document_body.0_D.txt image-6a476b2cedccb34946f5e9c76103d0f2.png
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NEW_DAILY_REPORTING_06.04.2009.1.xls unknown_887.disposition-notification unknown_883.html image-108cdf8c2afa1c1cc0584cc0875a14bc.png
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document_body.1_D.txt image-1d999c6f11lc34ee070Bfad155ff5cf1.wmf document_body.0_1.txt document_body.3a39f1led1be7e419b94b521b04848fe.txt
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new_daily_reporting_06.04.2009.1.xls_0.metadata.xml 1665040.jpg unknown_885.html
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```
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20340401
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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(U//FOUO) Notice the hash of the jpg
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```
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image-6a476b2cedccb34946f5e9c76103d0f2.png
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Virus scan results
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sing IMAGE formatter
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````
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(TS//SI//REL) Now you take the 32-character hash (e.g. `6a476b2cedccb34946f5e9c76103d0f2`) and paste that into a Document Metadata search under the File/Embedded Image Hash field:
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```
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Search: Document Metadata
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Query Name: kmkeith_7
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Justification:
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File/Embedded Image Hash [fulltext]: 6a476b2cedccb34946f5e9c76103d0f2
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```
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(TS//SI//REL) Before you hit submit, you MUST think if the logo could be used by 5-EYES protected entities. It should go without saying, but take extra precaution if you think it could bring back 5-EYES traffic. What would you do to ensure it's foreign? Maybe AND that with a country?
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```
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File/Embedded Image Hash [fulltext]: 6a476b2cedccb34946f5e9c76103d0f2
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Metadata Name:
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Metadata Value [fulltext]:
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IP Address: From
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IP Address: To
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Port: From
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Port: To
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Country: AF Either
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```
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(TS//SI//REL) Then hit submit and check your results. Your results MAY show you actual files that were sent to and from people you've never HEARD OF (how cool is that?)
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Happy hunting..[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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