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269 lines
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TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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FY 2013
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Congressional Budget Justification
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Volume I
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM SUMMARY
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FEBRUARY 2012
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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Access to the information in this document is restricted to US citizens with active SCI accesses for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE and TALENT-KEYHOLE information.
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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
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NOFORN - Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
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This Component Budget of the National Intelligence Program is produced pursuant to provisions of Executive Order 12333, as amended by Executive Order 13470, and section 102A(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
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TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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National Intelligence Program
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FY 2013
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Congressional Budget Justification
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Volume I
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM SUMMARY
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FEBRUARY 2012
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DRV FROM: FIN 4-03
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DECL ON: 20370206
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TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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(U) MISSION OBJECTIVE 2 - COUNTER WMD PROLIFERATION
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(U) Counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
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and their means of delivery by state and non-state actors.
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This Exhibit is SECRET//NOFORN
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| | FY 2011¹ Actual | FY 2012 Enacted | | | FY 2013 Request | | | FY 2012 – FY 2013 | |
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| :---------------- | :-------------- | :------ | :---- | :------ | :------ | :---- | :------ | :------ | :---- |
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| | | Base | OCO | Total | Base | OCO | Total | Change | % Change |
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| Funding ($M) | 7,007.3 | 6,774.0 | 108.0 | 6,882.0 | 6,596.7 | 88.4 | 6,685.1 | 196.9 | 3 |
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| Civilian FTEs | 10,004 | 10,291 | | 10,291 | 10,490 | | 10,490 | 199 | 2 |
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| Civilian Positions | 10,207 | 10,327 | | 10,327 | 10,530 | | 10,530 | 203 | 2 |
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| Military Positions | 2,685 | 2,648 | | 2,648 | 2,380 | | 2,380 | 268 | 10 |
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¹Includes enacted OCO funding.
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Totals may not add due to rounding.
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(S//NF) The U.S. National Security Strategy asserts "there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states." To focus the IC's work, the National Intelligence Strategy and the Unifying Intelligence Strategy for Counterproliferation (UIS-CP) highlight five enduring policy objectives on the advancement of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by state and non-state actors: **dissuade interest, prevent acquisition, roll back programs, deter use, and manage consequences**. The National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) provides oversight and leadership for the IC to sustain CP intelligence initiatives. Furthermore, because of the nexus between CP and counterterrorism, NCPC and the National Counterterrorism Center will continue their careful coordination of the IC's response to non-state WMD threats.
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(U) FY 2013 Budget Request and Highlights
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(S//NF) The FY 2013 request enhances IC integration and sustains capabilities in support of CP. The CP mission continues to support a variety of actions to deter, disrupt, and prevent proliferation. This includes improving our understanding of Pakistani nuclear weapons and dangerous nuclear material security; furthering intelligence on proliferators such as Iran and North Korea to roll back and block weapons programs; increasing our ability to ascertain global chemical and biological threats; and better integrating multidiscipline coverage of WMD targets such as chemical weapons in Libya and Syria. The CP capabilities are decreased primarily due to the transition of COBRA KING (formerly the COBRA JUDY Replacement) to a final acquisition phase and completion of the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC) radiochemistry laboratory and facility. The decrease is offset by an increase for FBI's new Counterproliferation Center (CPC). In addition, military positions are transferred to the MIP for COBRA BALL and CONSTANT PHOENIX, while civilian positions are increased in support of proliferation monitoring activities, primarily focused on Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea.
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(U) Following are examples of the IC's expected support to the five enduring CP policy objectives in FY 2013. (Contributing NIP Components and the associated budget projects are indicated in parenthesis for each example).
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(U) Dissuade Interest in WMD
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(S//NF) To better serve policymakers, the budget request advances efforts to identify vulnerabilities, opportunities, and levers of influence to discourage state and non-state interest in WMD, including their desire to develop weapons for chemical and biological warfare (CBW). In FY 2013 the IC will:
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(U) Manage Consequences of WMD Use
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(S//NF) The requested budget enables the IC to further its critical role in identifying and characterizing the signatures and capabilities of CBRN weapons and their delivery systems and in exercising against crisis scenarios, thus increasing the ability of the U.S. Government to appropriately react and respond to the use of WMD by state and non-state actors. In FY 2013 the IC will:
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* (U) Preserve its ability to detect, assess, and classify WMD.
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* (TS//SI/TK//NF) DIA and CIA will collaborate on the collection, analysis, and exploitation of likely CBRN and toxic materials obtained from captured terrorists/insurgents and their suspected laboratories, worldwide, in response to requirements to determine attribution. CIA will operate the Biological Analysis Center, a bio-safety level-3 laboratory that analyzes samples potentially containing BW agents and toxins. NGA will improve collection collaboration processes with NSA and NRO to enhance tasking and collection against c-WMD targets. NRO will further its research and development on innovative technologies to detect WMD-associated production, storage, and transportation signatures. (GDIP: WMD; CIAP: Transnational, Special Activities and Platforms; NGP: Source Tasking, Operations and Management; NRP: Research and Technology Development; CCP: Military Forces Weapons Analysis, Transnational)
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* (U) Boost analysis in support of U.S. efforts to mitigate the use of WMD.
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* (S//NF) CIA will enhance capabilities for processing foreign weapons signals to better model weapons-effects and to better assess activity at WMD-related facilities. (CIAP: Clandestine Weapons Technical Collection)
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* (S//NF) FBI's CPC plans to sponsor, co-facilitate, and participate in training exercises to improve U.S. Government WMD response capabilities (DOJ: Transnational)
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* (S//NF) [REDACTED]
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* (U) DIA's National Center for Medical Intelligence will expand its warning capability for health and biological events that have strategic implications by fielding more sophisticated analytic tools to forecast, detect, prepare, and respond to foreign health threats, emphasizing models for infectious disease spread and toxic and radiological contaminant dispersion. (GDIP: Medical)
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* (S//NF) DHS will produce CBRN-related intelligence products that provide indicators of suspicious activity for law enforcement, first responders, hazardous materials teams, and fusion centers. (DHS: Homeland Security)
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(S//NF) Funding to Counter WMD Proliferation
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This Exhibit is TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN
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Dollars in millions
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FY 2013 Base +OCO Funding
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| PROGRAM | EXPENDITURE CENTER | PROJECT | Mission Specific (M) Foundational Mission (F) Enabling (E) | Percent of Project Funding | Requested Project Funding |
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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| GDIP | Analysis | Medical | F | 1 | 0.1 |
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| NGP | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| NRP | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| SRP | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| State | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| Treasury | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| Total | | | | | 6,685.1 |
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Note: Totals may not add due to rounding.
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25
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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(S//NF) Goal: Make Quantitative and Qualitative Progress Against CW and BW Gaps
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(TS//SI//NF) While not reaching the aggressive FY 2011 target to make progress on six gaps associated with offensive development of non-traditional CBW agents, the IC did partially fill three of the gaps. For FY 2012 and 2013, the number of gaps associated with BW and CW remains the same; however, the questions are against different countries and are reflected in the change to the targets.
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This table is SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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Outcome 1 / Performance Goal 3 - Progress Against CW and BW Gaps
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| Indicator | Fiscal Year | Target | Results |
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| :-------------------------------------------------------- | :---------- | :----- | :------- |
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| | 2013 | 3 of 11 | |
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| | 2012 | 3 of 11 | |
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| Outcome measure Number of priority CW and BW gaps partially filled | 2011 | 3 of 8 | 3 of 8 |
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| | 2010 | 1 of 8 | 3 of 8 |
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| | 2009 | 6 of 56 | 4 of 56 |
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| | 2013 | 5 of 11 | |
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| | 2012 | 4 of 11 | |
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| Outcome measure Number of priority CW and BW gaps against which progress is made | 2011 | 5 of 8 | 2 of 8 |
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| | 2010 | 5 of 8 | 0 of 8 |
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| | 2009 | 11 of 56 | 2 of 56 |
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(S//NF) Following are highlights of IC accomplishments against CW and BW gaps:
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* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) To identify technologies and approaches that could further U.S. defensive posture, NSA initiated a project to collect on Russian chemical warfare countermeasures. Although still in its early stages, this effort has resulted in published intelligence reports on medical antidote research, personnel protection, and detection systems.
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* (TS//NF) NGA expanded work to characterize the security status of biological and chemical laboratories in Pakistan. This initiative served as the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to engage liaison partners on biosecurity
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issues and improve U.S. Government awareness of biosecurity vulnerabilities. It also informed traditional
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intelligence work to prevent terrorist acquisition of biological materials.
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(U) Outcome 2: Increasing Support Across Five CP Policy Objectives to Reduce Threat
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(S//NF) IC efforts included identifying WMD decisionmakers, assessing leadership plans, identifying facilities,
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and pinpointing proliferation agents and activity. To review performance, NCPC examined indicators for two
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goals.
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(S//NF) Goal: Increase Support to Dissuasion and Rollback CP Policy Objectives
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(S//NF) Providing actionable intelligence to decisionmakers to dissuade interest in WMD or to roll back
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existing programs continued to be a difficult challenge for the IC in FY 2011. When compared to the intelligence used for preventing acquisition, the IC lagged the targets; however, the results are largely explained by increased interdiction efforts, such as those highlighted under the next Goal. Most of the success in this area is compartmented.
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This table is SECRET//SI//NOFORN
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Outcome 2 / Performance Goal 1 - Support to Dissuasion & Rollback Relative to Prevention
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| Indicator | Fiscal Year | Target | Results |
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| :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :---------- | :-------------------- | :------------------ |
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| | 2013 | Dissuade: 14% Roll Back: 34% | |
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| | 2012 | Dissuade: 14% Roll Back: 34% | |
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| Outcome measure Ratio of IC support activities focused on the dissuasion and rollback CP policy objectives relative to the prevention objective. | 2011 | Dissuade: 14% Roll Back: 34% | Dissuade: 1% Roll Back: 13% |
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| | 2010 | Dissuade: 12% Roll Back: 32% | Dissuade: 8% Roll Back: 27% |
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| | 2009 | Dissuade: 10% Roll Back: 30% | Dissuade: 8% Roll Back: 24% |
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(S//NF) Following are highlights of IC accomplishments in support of dissuasion and rollback:
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* (S//NF) NGA provided insight into Russia's compliance with their obligation to eliminate their CW
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stockpile as required by membership in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. NGA
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also monitored Russian operations and security at a CW destruction site and a depot.
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* (S//NF) [REDACTED]
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(S//NF) Goal: Improve Actionable Intelligence for Each Weapon Type
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(S//NF) NCPC categorizes and tracks CP intelligence reporting for weapon types as advancing knowledge or
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being actionable. An actionable report is one that results in U.S. Government engagement or identifies a specific opportunity for engagement, even when it is not known whether the information is acted upon. When comparing the actionable CP intelligence to all CP intelligence by weapon type, performance exceeded expectations in FY 2011, primarily due to the high level of interdiction enabled by the SIG and other IC elements.
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Resource Exhibit No. 13 (continued)
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National Intelligence Program
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Budget Authority by Program, Expenditure Center, and Project
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FY 2011 - FY 2013
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This Exhibit is SECRET//NOFORN
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(Dollars in Thousands)
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| Program | Expenditure Center | Project | FY 2011 | FY 2012 | FY 2013 | FY 2012- FY 2013 Change |
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| :------ | :----------------- | :----------------------------- | --------: | --------: | --------: | ---------------------: |
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| | Counterintelligence | CI Operations | 57,838 | 60,411 | 45,848 | -14,563 |
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| | **Counterintelligence Total** | | **57,838** | **60,411** | **45,848** | **-14,563** |
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| **Energy Total** | | | **163,700** | **186,699** | **188,619** | **1,920** |
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| GDIP | Analysis | Analytic Integrity & Standards | 1,081 | 1,592 | - | -1,592 |
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| | | C4ISR Analysis | 98,071 | 100,670 | 133,051 | 32,381 |
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| | | Medical | 19,791 | 21,689 | 20,218 | -1,471 |
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| | | Military Forces & Weapons Analysis | 136,704 | 126,135 | 127,647 | 1,512 |
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| | | Regional | 164,595 | 170,533 | 154,064 | -16,469 |
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| | | S&T Analysis | 303,337 | 273,389 | 272,155 | -1,234 |
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| | | Transnational | 228,118 | 247,175 | 210,191 | -36,984 |
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| | | Warning | 15,319 | 17,725 | 17,370 | -355 |
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| | **Analysis Total** | | **967,016** | **958,908** | **934,696** | **-24,212** |
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| | Analysis Enabling | Analytic Tools | 86,927 | 130,671 | 154,132 | 23,461 |
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| | | Education & Training | 12,423 | 14,292 | 19,654 | 5,362 |
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| | | Mission Support | 72,624 | 83,894 | 74,228 | -9,666 |
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| | **Analysis Enabling Total** | | **171,974** | **228,857** | **248,014** | **19,157** |
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| | Enterprise IT Systems | Connectivity | 253,578 | 246,141 | 212,087 | -34,054 |
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| | | Enterprise Architecture & Planning | 40,793 | 44,046 | 44,594 | 548 |
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| | | Information Assurance | 22,943 | 42,238 | 44,184 | 1,946 |
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| | | Management & Support | 189,018 | 169,135 | 147,293 | -21,842 |
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| | | Platforms | 458,876 | 428,516 | 385,254 | -43,262 |
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| | **Enterprise IT Systems Total** | | **965,208** | **930,076** | **833,412** | **-96,664** |
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| | Enterprise Management | Acquisition Management | 16,755 | 18,590 | 18,594 | 4 |
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| | | COOP | 4,683 | 4,926 | 5,438 | 512 |
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| | | Education & Training | 62,849 | 66,190 | 74,278 | 8,088 |
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| | | Finance | 60,478 | 66,589 | 74,315 | 7,726 |
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| | | Foreign Relations & Liaison | 9,232 | 10,316 | - | -10,316 |
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| | | HQ Management | 52,128 | 53,609 | 52,095 | -1,514 |
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| | | Human Resources | 59,347 | 52,720 | 68,170 | 15,450 |
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| | | Security | 86,005 | 87,659 | 108,791 | 21,132 |
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| | **Enterprise Management Total** | | **351,477** | **360,599** | **401,681** | **41,082** |
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| | Facilities & Logistics | Facilities | 287,110 | 311,386 | 181,221 | -130,165 |
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| | | Logistics | 164,068 | 126,974 | 93,699 | -33,275 |
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| | **Facilities & Logistics Total** | | **451,178** | **438,360** | **274,920** | **-163,440** |
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| | HUMINT Enabling | Cover Services | 30,453 | 32,460 | 41,932 | 9,472 |
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| | | Education & Training | 50,450 | 45,519 | 46,034 | 515 |
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| | | Mission IT | 19,679 | 8,490 | 8,936 | 446 |
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| | | Mission Support | 258,833 | 303,126 | 310,263 | 7,137 |
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| | **HUMINT Enabling Total** | | **359,415** | **389,595** | **407,165** | **17,570** |
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| | HUMINT Operations | Non Traditional | 208,226 | 214,606 | 175,599 | -39,007 |
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| | | Special Mission Unit | 76,180 | 72,683 | - | -72,683 |
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| | | Traditional | 109,835 | 114,395 | 129,037 | 14,642 |
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| | **HUMINT Operations Total** | | **394,241** | **401,684** | **304,636** | **-97,048** |
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| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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