158 lines
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6.6 KiB
Markdown
158 lines
No EOL
6.6 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET STRAP 1
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What’s the worst that could happen?
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This document contains examples of specific risk which may affect operations and
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which may need to be considered when writing submissions. This is not an
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exhaustive list: any operation could involve new risks. It is also not a pick and mix
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list. It is here to help you think about the sorts of risk that might need to be included
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in a submission to ensure that the Secretary of State has all the relevant information
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available when deciding whether or not to approve the submission.
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Are you the most appropriate person to assess the risk of your operation? Are you
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capable of looking at all the areas of risk (eg, reputational, technical, legal)? If not,
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ask someone who is (eg, an IPT expert, PTD, OPP-LEG respectively).
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Risks to Personnel
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* discovery/compromise of personnel involved in installation
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* risks to personnel associated with housing operation if operation is compromised
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* risk to collaborators / enabling agents
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* adequacy of plausible cover leading to compromise of individuals
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* Risk of false attribution and dire consequences (if there were a risk of reprisals
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against SIS agents or Embassy staff, then an assessment from the relevant SIS
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Controller or Ambassador might be appropriate)
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Technical Risk
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Appropriate technical colleagues are best placed to provide this information, eg PTD,
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NDIST, GTE, JTRIG.
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* Compromise of technique leading to loss of capability
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* Definite technical attribution leading to loss of capability
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* Compromise of equity leads to loss of capability and discovery of other operations
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(eg by FIS)
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* Novel capabilities have unknown effects outside of lab testing conditions
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Political or Reputational Risk
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If you think that any of the following risks are significant in your operation, you should
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consider whether or not you have adequate operational planning and mitigation in
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place.
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* attribution to HMG
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* attribution to UK
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* attribution to GCHQ
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* presumed attribution to UK (the target knows it's been the subject of an attack
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and assumes the UK is responsible)
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* mistaken attribution (the target mistakenly blames a UK ally, who in turn attributes
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an effect to the UK)
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1 of 3
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET STRAP 1
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TOP SECRET STRAP 1
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* Political fallout with foreign governments or intelligence partners
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* Media exposure
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* Compromise of commercial partners
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Humint
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* Talk to Humint partners if you think you have a significant Humint risk.
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* Risk of false attribution and dire consequences (if there were a risk of reprisals
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against SIS agents or Embassy staff, then an assessment from the relevant SIS
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Controller or Ambassador might be appropriate)
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* Vulnerability of collaborators and enabling agents
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Risks to Relationships
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* Discovery or attribution could adversely impact on working relationships and/or
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sharing arrangements with sister agencies and/or second parties
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* Discovery or attribution could adversely impact on working relationships with
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commercial suppliers and ultimately restrict GCHQ's sigint cability
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* Potential to compromise a partner's operation
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* See also Political or Reputational Risk section
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Operational Phase
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* See also Discovery
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* Compromise of operation during installation, the course of the operation itself or
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egress of traffic
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* Inadequate personnel security controls
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* Operation does not succeed because the installed hardware/software does not
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function as planned
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* Operation does not success because the installed hardware/software works, but
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is neutralized (eg because the target network/system is upgraded or replaced)
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* Operation does not succeed because the target system is not used in the
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expected way (eg expected commercial usage does not occur)
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* Operation does not succeed because of reliance on an uncertain supply chain or
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other risky dependence.
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* Proportionality - the operation is not specific in its targeting
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* Who will have direct access to the data resulting from the operation and do we
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have any control over this? Could anyone take action on it without our
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agreement, eg could we be enabling the US to conduct a detention op which we
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would not consider permissible?
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Discovery
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Discovery is a risk itself, which can lead to almost all of the other risks featured here.
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What follows is a list of circumstances which can lead to discovery.
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* Compromise of operation during installation
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2 of 3
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET STRAP 1
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TOP SECRET STRAP 1
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* Inadequate personnel security controls and subsequent information leak
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* Discover of installed hardware (including post-operation)
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* Forensic discovery of installed software
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* Discovery of a suspicious audit trail/logs/registry
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* Discovery of suspicious RF energy
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* Suspicious profile caused by hardware/software malfunction
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* Discovery of egressed traffic
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* Discovery through other IT leakage
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* Vulnerability to HIS or other monitoring
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* Inadequate monitoring of profile generated by operation
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* Inadequate review of risks during the lifetime of the operation
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* Reliance on an uncertain supply chain or other risky dependencies
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* Failure by operators to cover tracks, including clearing logs/changing read status
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of emails
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* Novel capabilities and techniques having unknown effects outside of lab testing
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conditions
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* Unforeseen changes to hardware or software leading to compromise of
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techniques or installation
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* Hardware/software malfunctions leading change in target behaviour, potentially
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including forensic investigation (and potential discovery) and/or loss of target
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access
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Legality
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Any risks relating to legality of operation or of subsequent actions enabled by the
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operation will usually be addressed by lawyers in legal section of submission, but
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may include the following issues:
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* liability of enabling commercial partners
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* the principle of non-intervention in a sovereign country's affairs
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* Could the Law of Armed Conflict apply?
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* Who will have direct access to the data resulting from the operation and do we
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have any control over this? Could anyone take action on it without our
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agreement, eg could we be enabling the US to conduct a detention op which we
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would not consider permissible?
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3 of 3
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET STRAP 1 |