124 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
124 lines
8.2 KiB
Markdown
(S//SI//REL) Is There a Sustainable Ops Tempo in S2? How Can Analysts Deal with the Flood of Collection? -- An Interview with [REDACTED] (conclusion)
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FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
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Run Date: 04/06/2011
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(U//FOUO) Editor's note: Here's the conclusion of our interview with SID's Deputy Director for
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A&P [REDACTED] (pictured). (If you missed part one, you can find it HERE.) In this segment
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[REDACTED] comments on Analytic Modernization and why it is taking center stage...
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6. Q: (U) When we last interviewed you in August 2009 -- you were Assistant DDAP
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at the time -- you spoke of the importance of creating a sustainable ops tempo in S2.
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Have you succeeded?
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A: (U). No. No, I haven't... And it's not just because there's so much happening in the world. Here's
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the thing: we have to take a fundamentally different approach to how we do business. The volume
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and quality of access we have now gives us an unprecedented capability to produce some of the
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best intelligence we ever have, but the fact is that we are only getting to a fractional portion of what
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we have access to. I can't tell you for sure that as good as what we produce is, that it's the absolute
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best we can do. It's not sustainable for the workforce or the mission to keep working in the way we
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always have.
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(U//FOUO) We've embarked on Analytic Modernization. In the past there have been
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transformations... modernizations... renovations... it gets tiring! But to a large degree those efforts
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have represented supercharging existing capabilities -- doing more with less. We need to
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fundamentally change how we interact with SIGINT.
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(U//FOUO) This is a big deal, because for decades we've trained our workforce -- and took pride in
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the fact -- that we had the unique responsibility within the IC to manage this information in
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accordance with the 4th Amendment. To that extent we thought of SIGINT as "radioactive" and it
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was our job to render the information safe for others. Our process was about managing the
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information in a manner consistent with the privacy rights of U.S. persons.
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(U//FOUO) I believe we have developed an awareness of the information and an understanding of
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our authorities that allows us to think differently about that relationship... and in so doing, to create
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an increased capacity and recover more time for the analysts. I don't mean only analysts in SID, but
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also analysts in IAD, in NTOC, etc. The key is to better leverage the Intelligence Community and
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our partner relationships for the exploitation of SIGINT, which is something in the past we would
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not have done to the degree we're proposing -- it was considered our domain (and "radioactive").
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(U//FOUO) We must take advantage of the expertise and capabilities in the IC and our customer
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base to enhance discovery and capacity, and to make the actionable information available almost as
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soon as we encounter it. This is not about turning NSA into a collection resource for others
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(although collection is in fact one of our great strengths and one we are uniquely qualified to
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undertake) -- it's about making sure we don't expend cryptologic resources doing work that is not
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uniquely cryptologic in nature -- work that others can do.
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(U) Q: Can you give an example?
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A: (S//SI//REL) If NSA discovers a pathway into an adversary's information space and we extract a
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terabyte of CAD [computer-aided design] drawings of weapon designs, is it of best value for the IC
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to have talented NSA analysts work their way through this 1 terabyte of data? Is it uniquely
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cryptologic? Or is it of better benefit to the nation that we expose it immediately to the best and
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brightest weapon designers in the US government to work on in a collaborative space, to triage,
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assess and exploit the value of that information?
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(U//FOUO) In so doing we are not precluding NSA analysts from continued access to the data, any
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more than a published SIGINT product report isn't available for future reference. We are just
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leveraging the power and expertise of others so that we can turn our attention to that that which
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only we can exploit by virtue of our unique talents.
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Q: (U) Isn't it possible that our customers won't want to devote their own people
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and time to analyzing the data?
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A: (U//FOUO) If we get access to the best information on a topic, the value will speak for itself and
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the customers will make the resources available. It's like YouTube videos -- they "go viral" when
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people with good reputations recommend a video to others. If we put the information out there and
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monitor the customer response to it, we'll know when to recommend specific items they might
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want to take a close look at. Amazon does the same thing by looking at how you react to the
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products you've looked at. We can figure out what the communities of interest are for that topic... If
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the material is in a foreign language, we have tools they can use to get the gist of it, and if it looks
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promising, they can use the National Virtual Translation Center to get it translated. We want our
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language analysts focused on uniquely cryptologic problems that rarely boil down to a
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straightforward translation.
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(U//FOUO) So what does this approach accomplish? We've exposed the intelligence to people who
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can interpret it and use it, and we've created opportunities for collaboration. We've also off-loaded
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the responsibility to manage the data in our respositories and own the compliance responsibility. If
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data is stored in the Library of National Intelligence, someone else is paying for it.
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(U//FOUO) In the end, we exist to produce information. The only way to go more deeply into
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targets is to avoid getting stuck on production that others can do for themselves. Our challenge is to
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be always out looking for something new. We need to think about problems, not just about
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production.
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(U//FOUO) The collaborative component means it's not an NSA view, a DIA view, etc... Rather, it's
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opened up to all on A-Space. I would like to see people log onto A-Space and announce "I want to
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share traffic and create a multi-seal report based on joint input." Why not collaborate at the point of
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discovery?
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Q: 7. (U//FOUO) Various pushes for analytic modernization have been going on
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for decades at NSA, but now the issue really seems to be taking center stage. In
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fact, the number one "SIGINT Goal for 2011-2015" is to "revolutionize analysis."
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What's different now?
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A: (S//SI//REL) We live in an Information Age when we have massive reserves of information and
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don't have the capability to exploit it. I was told that there are 2 petabytes of data in the SIGINT
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System at any given time. How much is that? That's equal to 20 million 4-drawer filing cabinets.
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How many cabinets per analyst is that?? By the end of this year, we'll have 1 terabyte of data per
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second coming in. You can't crank that through the existing processes and be effective.
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Q: (U) ...So it's a matter of volume?
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A: (S//SI//REL) Not volume alone, but also complexity. We need to piece together the data. It's
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impossible to do that using traditional methods. Strong selectors -- like phone numbers -- will
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become a thing of the past. It used to be that if you had a target's number, you could follow it for
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most of your career. Not anymore. My daughter doesn't even make phone calls, and many targets
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do the same. Also, the commercial market demands privacy, and this will drive our targets to go
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encrypted, maybe into unexploitable realms. Our nation needs us to look for patterns surrounding a
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particular spot on Earth and make the connections -- who can do that if not us? And we can't do it
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using traditional methods.
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8. Q: (U) Looking into the future, is there anything that especially worries
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you? ...An eventuality (internal or external) that would make it hard for A&P to
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continue to put out quality intelligence?
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A: (U//FOUO) I'm worried that we have so much good stuff that we could lock down analysts and
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have them just producing product, and something would jump out and surprise us. So we need the
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discipline to invest in the wild and the unknowns.
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9. Q: (U) Is there anything else you'd like to say to the SIGINT workforce?
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A: (U) At the risk of being melodramatic, as hard as the work is and as challenging as the work
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environment can be, we should never forget how lucky we are to have a job where we can have so
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much impact for the nation. Don't let the turkeys get you down!
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