snowchive-meta/data/full-log-vs-http/full-log-vs-http.md
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
XKEYSCORE
# Full Log vs. HTTP
11 June 2009
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20291123
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20291123
08
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Full Log - Pros
* The Full Log search gives you access to all DNI sessions collected by X-KEYSCORE
* Data is indexed by the basic meta-data like IP Address, Country Codes Port, Casenotation, Application ID/Fingerprints etc
* If you're only interested in content, Full Log will give you access to everything
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Full Log - Cons
* However, in most cases there will be too many results in XKS to look through every piece of content by hand
* To be more efficient, it's important to utilize the meta-data contained in the other search forms (E-mail Addresses, HTTP Activity, Extracted Files, Document Meta-data etc.)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## HTTP Activity
* HTTP Activity is essentially all web-based activity from a user's internet browser (with some exceptions)
* It includes, web-surfing, Internet Searching (like Google), Mapping Website (Google Earth/Maps) etc.
* Most of this data will not contain a strong selector like E-mail address
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## HTTP Activity
* HTTP activity comes in two types:
Client-to-Server "requests"
cnn.com Server
Server-to-Client "responses"
User
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## HTTP Activity Client-to-Server
```
GET /search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=3&scope=urdu&link=next HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Referer: http://search.bbc.co.uk/search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=2&scope=urdu
Accept-Language: en-us
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1)
Host: search.bbc.co.uk
Cookie: BBC-UID=b479a5f4ad230a53063d513630203acb22684634a0e0b164c45f96efc054cf950Mozilla%2f4%2e0%20%28co
Cache-Control: max-stale=U
Connection: Keep-Alive
X-BlueCoat-Via: 66808702E9A98546
```
| Host | URL Path | URL Args |
| :--------------- | :------- | :------------------------------------------------- |
| search.bbc.co.uk | /search | tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=3&scope=urdu&link=next |
| Search Terms | Language | Browser | Via |
| :----------- | :------- | :------------------------------------- | :----------- |
| musharraf | en | Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) | 66808702E9A98546 |
Referer
http://search.bbc.co.uk/search?tab=urdu&order=sortboth&q=musharraf&start=2&scope=urdu
Cookie
BBC-UID=b479a5f4ad230a53063d513630203acb22684634a0e0b164c45f96efc054cf950Mozilla%2f4%2e0%20%28com
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Overlap
* Full log contains basic information on every single DNI session XKS processes.
* HTTP activity contains more detailed information on the subset of that data which is web-based (aka port 80 "internet browser" traffic)
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## How the Search Forms Fit Together
Full Log of all DNI sessions collected
Sessions from web based HTTP Activity
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Example #1
* Analysis of 14 May Internet session of PK based target started in MARINA
| TS | USERID | PHONE | USER_A | ACTIVITY | USER_B |
| :--------------- | :------| :---- | :-----------------------------------| :------------- | :------------- |
| 20090514 132353Z | | | [REDACTED]<yahoo> | logged in (im) | 119.[REDACTED] |
| 20090514 132416Z | | | [REDACTED]@hotmail.com<msnpassport> | logged in (im) | 119.[REDACTED] |
| 20090514 132419Z | | | [REDACTED]@hotmail.com<msnpassport> | logged in (im) | 119.[REDACTED] |
| 20090514 132834Z | | | [REDACTED]@hotmail.com<msnpassport> | logged in (im) | 119.[REDACTED] |
| 20090514 132843Z | | | [REDACTED]@hotmail.com<msnpassport> | logged in (im) | 119.[REDACTED] |
| 20090514 133517Z | | | [REDACTED]@hotmail.com<msnpassport> | logged in (im) | 119.[REDACTED] |
| 20090514 133522Z | | | [REDACTED]@hotmail.com<msnpassport> | logged in (im) | 119.[REDACTED] |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Understand what is behind the IP
* Ensure Activity on IP can be associated with Target
* Understand IP usage Dynamic/Static
* Research IP using Foxtrail/NKB
* Is it a Proxy, DVBLAN, Dial-Up, DSL, etc
* Is it Client to Server or Server to Client
* Still not sure? User Activity pull for 5 minute period on Foreign IP
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
Dated: 20070108
Declassify On: 20340601
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## HTTP with a Proxy
Request sent to Proxy
Request sent to Server
Response sent to Proxy
Response sent to User
* Performance: Proxy can cache responses for static pages
* Censorship: Proxy can filter traffic
* Security: Proxy can look for malware
* Access-Control: Proxy can control access to restricted content
Proxy can be run by
* a user
* an ISP
* a web-hosting company
* a content-delivery network (i.e. Akamai)
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---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Proxies on the Internet
Web-Server
Short-lived connections
Single-User
Web-Servers
Short-lived connections
Multiple-users multiplexed
Web-Servers
Long-lived connections
Multiple-users multiplexed
The Internet
Direct-Connect
Mixed-Gateway
National-Level Proxy
Proxy-to-Proxy
Cache
User-to-Proxy
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, A
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Example #1
* The analyst then did an HTTP activity query to find all web surfing from that IP address within the same rough timeframe.
```
Search: HTTP Activity
Query Name: 14_may_activity
Justification: PK based IP address used by CT target
Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-05-14 13:30 Stop: 2009-05-14 14:15
IP Address: 119.[REDACTED] Either
IP Address: To
Port: From
Port: To
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
## 14 May - Strange HTTP Activity
* HTTP meta-data indicated strange web-based activity
| Host | URL Path |
| :--------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------- |
| infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de | /mixcascadestatus/F30905FCD73B6B30CB5FEFD3250FD66EF4B32591 |
| infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de | /infoservices |
```
Browser
RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
GET /mixcascadestatus/F30905FCD73B6B30CB5FEFD3250FD66EF4B32591 HTTP/1.1
Host: infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de
Connection: Keep-Alive, TE
TE: trailers, deflate, gzip, compress
User-Agent: RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## 14 May - Strange HTTP Activity
* Indications from the HTTP activity
```
Browser
RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
```
Note the strange User Agent/Browser
```
GET /mixcascadestatus/F30905FCD73B6B30CB5FEFD3250FD66EF4B32591 HTTP/1.1
Host: infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de
Connection: Keep-Alive, TE
TE: trailers, deflate, gzip, compress
User-Agent: RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Tip off to possible anonymizer
* Open Source research indicated that this user agent was indicative of multi-cast traffic. likely tip off that this was some type of anonymizer
```
Browser
RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
GET /mixcascadestatus/F30905FCD73B6B30CB5FEFD3250FD66EF4B32591 HTTP/1.1
Host: infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de
Connection: Keep-Alive, TE
TE: trailers, deflate, gzip, compress
User-Agent: RPT-HTTPClient/0.4-dev
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## HTTP Results led to Full Log Query
* The two tu-dresden.de requests were the only HTTP activity seen within that timeframe, but given the open source research suggesting that the user agent was an anonymizing proxy a full log query was ran to identify all other traffic originating from that same IP address during the same time
| Datetime End | Fm IP |
| :------------------ | :---------- |
| 2009-05-14 13:47:33 | 119.[REDACTED] |
| 2009-05-14 13:48:07 | 119.[REDACTED] |
| Host | URL Path |
| :---------------------------- | :---------------------------------------------- |
| infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de | /mixcascadestatus/F30905FCD73B6B30CB5FEFD3250FD66EF4B32591 |
| infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de | /infoservices |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Full Log Results
| Datetime End | Fm IP | To IP | Fm Por | To Po | Application Type | Application |
| :------------------ | :------------- | :------------- | :----- | :---- | :----------------- | :-------------------- |
| 2009-05-14 13:47:33 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1495 | 80 | web | http/get |
| 2009-05-14 13:48:07 | 119.[REDACTED] | 65.5[REDACTED] | 1502 | 443 | network_encryption | network_encryption/https |
| 2009-05-14 13:48:07 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1494 | 80 | web | http/get |
| 2009-05-14 13:48:35 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1134 | 6544 | unknown | unknown/tcp |
| 2009-05-14 13:49:02 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1134 | 6544 | unknown | unknown/tcp |
Note the two HTTP activity (port 80) sessions were seen, but in addition there was one SSL (port 443) session and two unknown port 6544 sessions
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Full Log Results
| Fm IP | To IP | Fm Por | To Po | Application Type | Application | Data Length | Session Length |
| :------------- | :------------- | :----- | :---- | :--------------- | :---------- | :---------- | :------------- |
| 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1134 | 6544 | unknown | unknown/tcp | 6986 | 7803 |
| 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1134 | 6544 | unknown | unknown/tcp | 93088 | 93901 |
Of the unknown port 6544 traffic, the data length of the sessions indicated that a significant amount of data was leaving the Pakistan IP used by our target
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Full Log Results
The content appeared unreadable. Further analysis by CES and open source research showed that the content was encrypted
```
DNI Display | Raw Data | DNI Format
Services
No presentation available for this type of data. Try sending it to another service for a better view. Below is an attempt to display the document as plain text.
*bh00000-701&@MjKi80f1xSg1/-9001[F
li Elg?Kvp1OHO
POUsatdVq219010VZ) v100?~X;bbnUc8a+NCOr
"]
z.GFBnAsj<nh 40 E Ag/150161?piz/f4pFj10
Gj50K/4-UNqzCXjJQH14
TOXZeeeenetlemele Le80000/00elle..........00000000000
cwg/3日[8kzN?
X1.XkcYs
Hvj_3031!/UC5+X!p#0
NO M6K: 11,5XU2X2
*1ZY"fq:dR?:gRy2c+jtUVXJx4['3cAI/$13
ct❤❤❤❤❤[4+6-oswg_n2h+x+*$"z8|5:
*#VkOeyd $005/XdfDnH.5(+
-10
"C01r0+bfou-
oh_d❤❤❤❤❤❤+❤❤
ys:"bz4
<j614 C.UZ R099 500101
Ot+gWtP210/Ox-2 le<6C>5DN<44>i<EFBFBD>**=pY6D***********27(EIX-看
R
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## HTTP Results led to Full Log Query
* While we were ultimately unable to identify what was underneath the 150K of encrypted traffic, we were at the least able to identify that our target was using an anonymizing service to mask a portion of his Internet activity
```
SERI SERIAL: *3/00/513109-09
German Anonymizing Proxy (TS//SI/REL TO USA, FVEY)
(TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) During the 14, 16, and 18 May sessions on the [REDACTED] telephone, the user(s) were using a free German-based anonymizing proxy (http://infoservice.inf.tu-dresden.de), presumably to mask the source of Internet traffic. Use of the anonymizing proxy occurred primarily during the times in which [REDACTED] 's @hotmail.com and [REDACTED]@yahoo.com accounts were accessed.
COMMENT: (TS//SI//OC/REL TO USA, FVEY) The German-based proxy is a Java Anonymous Proxy (JAP), which was developed by the Technical University of Dresden as a free and open source anonymity tool. The proxy functions in a manner similar to The Onion Router (TOR) network. Given his background in computer science and networking, it is not surprising that [REDACTED] would use an anonymizing proxy to secure his Internet activity.
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Why not only use Full Log?
* If the Full Log query gave us the HTTP traffic in addition to the other non web based traffic, why don't we only use the Full Log query?
* Because the meta-data options in the full log table are limited
| Datetime End | Fm IP | To IP | Fm Por | To Po | Application Type | Application |
| :------------------ | :------------- | :------------- | :----- | :---- | :----------------- | :-------------------- |
| 2009-05-14 13:47:33 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1495 | 80 | web | http/get |
| 2009-05-14 13:48:07 | 119.[REDACTED] | 65.5[REDACTED] | 1502 | 443 | network_encryption | network_encryption/https |
| 2009-05-14 13:48:07 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1494 | 80 | web | http/get |
| 2009-05-14 13:48:35 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1134 | 6544 | unknown | unknown/tcp |
| 2009-05-14 13:49:02 | 119.[REDACTED] | 141.[REDACTED] | 1134 | 6544 | unknown | unknown/tcp |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Example #2
* Starting with MARINA results of a 20 May Internet session of an Iran based target
| TS | USERID | PHONE | USER_A | ACTIVITY | USER_B | COOKIE |
| :--------------- | :----- | :---- | :---------------- | :------------ | :------------ | :----------------------- |
| 20090520 092139Z | | | [REDACTED]<yahoo> | logged in (email) | 213.[REDACTED] | fuq8af14q5kjt<yahooBcookie> |
| 20090520 092139Z | | | [REDACTED]<yahoo> | used xforip | 192.[REDACTED] | fuq8af14q5kjt<yahooBcookie> |
| 20090520 092130Z | | | [REDACTED]<yahoo> | logged in (email) | 213.[REDACTED] | fuq8af14q5kjt<yahooBcookie> |
| 20090520 092130Z | | | [REDACTED]<yahoo> | used xforip | 192.[REDACTED] | fuq8af14q5kjt<yahooBcookie> |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Example #2
* The analyst then did a full log query based off the IP & X-Forwarded-IP pair
```
Classic A-M
ASF and WMV Metadata
Alert
BlackBerry
CNE
Call Logs
Category DNI
Cellular DNI
Cisco Passwords
DNS
Document Metadata
Document Tagging
Email Addresses
Extracted Files
Full Log DNI
HTTP Activity
IKE Parser
IRC Cafe Geolocation
Logins and Passwords
Microplugin Metadata
Search: Full Log
Query Name: iran_target
Justification: Iranian IP Address used by cyber target
Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-05-20 09:00 Stop: 2009-05-20 11:00
Client IP (X-Fowarded-For): 192.[REDACTED]
Username:
Attribute Info: [Field Builder]
IP Address: 213.[REDACTED] From
IP Address:
```
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Example #2
* Full Log table contains the standard DNI meta-data with some but not all information from other plug-ins included (ie. Username from User Activity and Application Info contains some HTTP activity)
| Application Info | Username | Fm | Fm City | To | To City (IP) | Datetime ▲ | Datetime End | Fm IP | To IP | Fm Por | To Po |
| :------------------------ | :--------- | :- | :------ | :-------- | :----------- | :----------------- | :----------------- | :---------- | :---------- | :----- | :---- |
| http://update.nai.com/Products/Cc | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | US | NEWYORK | 2009-05-20 10:05:16 | 2009-05-20 10:09:16 | 213.[REDACTED] | 72.[REDACTED] | 34847 | 80 |
| http://platform.ak.facebook.com/v | @gmail.com | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:06:54 | 2009-05-20 10:10:16 | 213.[REDACTED] | 212.[REDACTED] | 42806 | 80 |
| http://platform.ak.facebook.com/v | @gmail.col | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:06:54 | 2009-05-20 10:10:16 | 213.[REDACTED] | 212.[REDACTED] | 42806 | 80 |
| http://platform.ak.facebook.com/v | @gmail.com | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:06:54 | 2009-05-20 10:10:16 | 213.[REDACTED] | 212.[REDACTED] | 42806 | 80 |
| http://newsrss.bbc.co.uk/rss/new | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | GB | LONDON | 2009-05-20 10:07:43 | 2009-05-20 10:07:54 | 213.[REDACTED] | 212.[REDACTED] | 37459 | 80 |
| http://b.static.ak.fbcdn.net/inbox/i | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:08:31 | 2009-05-20 10:11:33 | 213.[REDACTED] | 212.[REDACTED] | 41092 | 80 |
| http://b.static.ak.fbcdn.net/rsrc.ph | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:08:31 | 2009-05-20 10:09:57 | 213.[REDACTED] | 212.[REDACTED] | 41092 | 80 |
| http://platform.ak.facebook.com/v | @gmail.com | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:09:39 | 2009-05-20 10:12:12 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 49648 | 80 |
| http://photos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/phot | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | NL | AMSTERDAM | 2009-05-20 10:09:56 | 2009-05-20 10:12:05 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 41696 | 80 |
| http://photos-d.ak.fbcdn.net/photo | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | NL | AMSTERDAM | 2009-05-20 10:09:56 | 2009-05-20 10:12:05 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 41696 | 80 |
| http://b.static.ak.fbcdn.net/inbox/i | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:09:57 | 2009-05-20 10:10:09 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 34400 | 80 |
| http://b.static.ak.fbcdn.net/images | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:09:57 | 2009-05-20 10:10:09 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 34400 | 80 |
| http://b.static.ak.fbcdn.net/images | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:09:57 | 2009-05-20 10:10:09 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 34400 | 80 |
| http://b.static.ak.fbcdn.net/images | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:10:00 | 2009-05-20 10:12:09 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 44898 | 80 |
| http://b.static.ak.fbcdn.net/inbox/i | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | DE | FRANKFURT | 2009-05-20 10:10:00 | 2009-05-20 10:12:09 | 213.[REDACTED] | 195.[REDACTED] | 44898 | 80 |
| http://newsrss.bbc.co.uk/rss/new | [REDACTED] | IR | TEHRAN | GB | LONDON | 2009-05-20 10:16:12 | 2009-05-20 10:16:24 | 213.[REDACTED] | 212.[REDACTED] | 48804 | 80 |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Example #2
* The analyst wanted to know if the From IP & X-Forwarded-For IP pair was representing a single computer or if there were multiple users on multiple computers in this data.
* Full log only provides the bare minimum meta-data to make this determination
| ID | Datetime | Application Info |
| :-- | :----------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 70 | 2009-05-20 10:21:45 | http://us.mg1.mail.yahoo.com/dc/rs?log=ActivityMaxIdleTime:High&&.gx=1/login_webmail |
| 61 | 2009-05-20 10:22:17 | http://0.channel31.facebook.com/x/3023227576/false/p_1406565350=0/login_webmail |
| Fm IP | To IP | Fm Port | To Po | Application Type | Application | Data Length | Session Length |
| :---------- | :------------ | :------ | :---- | :--------------- | :--------------- | :---------- | :------------- |
| 213.[REDACTED] | 209.191.106.109 | 55828 | 80 | mail | mail/webmail/yahoo | 1446 | 1968 |
| 213.[REDACTED] | 69.63.176.213 | 55435 | 80 | social | social/facebook | 3402 | 3922 |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Example #2
* MARINA provided this information:
| TS | USERID | PHONE | USER_A | ACTIVITY | USER_B | COOKIE |
| :--------------- | :----- | :---- | :----------- | :---------------- | :------------- | :----- |
| 20090520 102145Z | | | [REDACTED]<yahoo> | previously logged in | 213.[REDACTED] | fuq8af14q5kjt<yahooBcookie> |
| 20090520 102145Z | | | [REDACTED]<yahoo> | previously logged in | 213.[REDACTED] | fuq8af14q5kjt<yahooBcookie> |
| 20090520 102145Z | | | 213.[REDACTED] | used xforip | 192.168.36.1 | fuq8af14q5kjt<yahooBcookie> |
| 20090520 102217Z | | | [REDACTED]<facebook> | used xforip | 192.168.36.1 |
| 20090520 102217Z | | | [REDACTED]<facebook> | registered with | [REDACTED]@gmail.com<google> |
| 20090520 102217Z | | | [REDACTED]<facebook> | logged in (forum) | 213.[REDACTED] | |
* The Yahoo and Facebook activity came from the same proxy IP and the same X-Forwarded-For-IP and around the same time but was it from the same computer?
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## HTTP Activity Query
* Let's query that same date time range and IP and XFF IP pair in the HTTP Activity query to see what we get
```
Classic A-M
ASF and WMV Metadata
Alert
BlackBerry
CNE
Call Logs
Category DNI
Cellular DNI
Cisco Passwords
DNS
Document Metadata
Document Tagging
Email Addresses
Extracted Files
Full Log DNI
HTTP Activity
IKE Parser
IRC Cafe Geolocation
Logins and Passwords
Microplugin Metadata
Search: HTTP Activity
Query Name: iran_target_http
Justification: Iranian IP address used by NTOC target
Datetime: Custom Start: 2009-05-14 13:30 Stop: 2009-05-14 14:15
X Forwarded For: 192.168.36.1
IP Address: 213.[REDACTED] From
IP Address: To
```
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Now view the HTTP Activity results
* We saw this meta-data in the Full Log results:
| ID | Datetime | Application Info |
| :-- | :----------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 70 | 2009-05-20 10:21:45 | http://us.mg1.mail.yahoo.com/dc/rs?log=ActivityMaxIdleTime:High&&.gx=1/login_webmail |
| 61 | 2009-05-20 10:22:17 | http://0.channel31.facebook.com/x/3023227576/false/p_1406565350=0/login_webmail |
| Fm IP | To IP | Fm Port | To Po | Application Type | Application | Data Length | Session Length |
| :---------- | :------------ | :------ | :---- | :--------------- | :--------------- | :---------- | :------------- |
| 213.[REDACTED] | 209.191.106.109 | 55828 | 80 | mail | mail/webmail/yahoo | 1446 | 1968 |
| 213.[REDACTED] | 69.63.176.213 | 55435 | 80 | social | social/facebook | 3402 | 3922 |
* And then these three fields are among the unique (and valuable) fields only found in the HTTP activity table:
| Cookie | Referer | Browser |
| :--------------------------------------- | :------------------------------------- | :------ |
| YM[REDACTED]fpwidth=165&suc=3 | http://us.mg1.mail.yahoo.com/dc/launc | Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10 |
| datr=1242109330-dc7046de296a31363cbe218f6 | http://0.channel31.facebook.com/ifrarr | Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.2; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10 |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Now view the HTTP Activity
* Of interest, note the differences between the two user agents
Browser
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 Firefox/3.0.10
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.2; en-US; rv:1.9.0.10) Gecko/2009042316 Firefox/3.0.10
* This indicates different versions of Windows, so unless they did an upgrade within the 1 minute difference of activity, there were at least two different computers behind that Proxy and XFF IP pair
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Moral of the story
* You should be use both the HTTP activity and Full Log queries to help discover everything your target does when he's online
* HTTP Activity will give you great meta-data for quick analysis of "web-based" (port 80) activity
* But not all DNI is done through an Internet Browsers, so it's important to look at the Full Log query results for indications of the use of other applications
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Moral of the story
* The Multi-Search page gives you the ability to search full log and HTTP activity based on an IP address at the same time
Simply enter in an IP address, choose any or all "roles" (ie. from/to/xff) and then choose what search forms you want.
```
IP Address: 119.[REDACTED]
IP Role:
From
To
X-Forwarded-For
Search Forms:
User Activity
Phone Number Extractor
Email Addresses
Extracted Files
HTTP Activity
Full Log
Web Proxy
```
```
Search
Classic
MultiSearch
IP Addresses
Mac Addresses
Username
Classic A-M
Alert
BlackBerry
CNE
Call Logs
Category DNI
Cellular DNI
Cisco Passwords
DNS
Document Metadata
Document Tagging
Email Addresses
Extracted Files
Full Log DNI
HTTP Activity
IKE Parser
IRC Cafe Geolocation
Logins and Passwords
Microplugin Metadata
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
## Moral of the story
* It will submit the multiple searches at the same time, you can either view the results separately or view them as a merged table
My Recent Results
| Datetime Submitted | Query Name | Status | Num Results | Query Type |
| :------------------- | :---------- | :-------- | :---------- | :---------- |
| 2009-06-08 14:33:40 | pk_ip_16_may | finished | 605 | full_log |
| 2009-06-08 14:33:40 | pk_ip_16_may | finished | 475 | http_parser |
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL