96 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
96 lines
6.1 KiB
Markdown
UK SECRET
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Kurdistan Regional Government
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The Kurds
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Those individuals who collectively could be called the Kurdish People
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<https://wikipedia.gchq/index.php/Kurdish_People> are split across a series of countries. Ethnic
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Kurdish populations exist in varying numbers in Turkey, Iran, Iraq </index.php/Iraq> and Syria.
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The overall size of this group is estimated to number somewhere between 20-25 million. The largest
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grouping resides in south-eastern Turkey, where the estimated Kurdish population is around 15
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million. In Iran, there are another four to six million Kurds and, in Iraq, three to four million.
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However, it is only in Iraq where the ethnic Kurds currently have any significant degree of
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autonomy The Kurdish military forces known as peshmerga played a key role in the overthrow of
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the former Iraqi government.
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Kurdistan
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The current as well as historical strength of the nationalist impulse amongst the Kurds, generally,
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and those in Iraq specifically, should not be underestimated. The dream of a wider Kurdish nation
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has been an aspiration of ethnic Kurds for generations. A geographical area called Kurdistan was
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first noted in the 13th Century, but the Kurds have never really formed a coherent and unified state,
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having lived independently as tribes. Over their history, numerous foreign powers (up to and
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including Saddam) have used the Kurds for their own devices. This has led two ideas to become
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entrenched in the Kurdish psyche - the continual disunity arising from tribalism and a perception of
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perpetual foreign betrayal of Kurdish aspirations. These are still relevant even today when
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considering Kurdish aspirations towards statehood.
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Status of the
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KRG
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The Iraqi constitution declares that the Republic of Iraq has a federal system made up of a
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decentralised capital, regions and governorates, and local administrations. The status of the
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---
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"Kurdistan Regional Government" (KRG) as an autonomous region is already defined in the
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document (and provides a possible model for Iraq’s future). The region has its own flag and national
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anthem. Under the constitution, certain powers remain the exclusive preserve of the federal
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government; foreign policy and negotiation, national defence policy,financial and customs
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policies,standards, naturalization, the radio spectrum, and the mail. Various other powers and
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‘competences’ are shared between the federal government and both the regional and provincial
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authorities. These include: the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields; formulating
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the “necessary strategic policies to develop the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest
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benefit to the Iraqi people”; organising customs; and formulating policy on health, the environment,
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and education. The two main Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the
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Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have united to form an alliance with several smaller parties, and
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the Kurdish alliance has 53 deputies in the new Baghdad parliament, while the Kurdish Islamic
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Union has 5. PUK-leader Jalal Talabani has been elected President of the new Iraqi administration,
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while KDP leader Massoud Barzani Massoud Barzani is President of the Kurdistan Regional
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Government.
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Article 140
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and the Disputed Areas
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In January 2008 the UN Special Representative to Iraq, Steffan de Mistura, persuaded the Kurds to
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agree to extend the deadline for the Article 140 referendum to June 2008. As the new deadline
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approaches and prospects for a referendum remain highly unlikely, de Mistura reportedly
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announced in April in Arbil a three-stage plan for an alternative solution to the Kirkuk and disputed
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areas issue. This involves settling the status of less contested disputed areas by district level
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consensus. The outcome will be used as a model for dealing with the more contentious Kirkuk
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status, without having to stage a referendum.
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Problems of
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Regionalism
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The constitutional privileging of regional legislation makes it more difficult for Baghdad to impose
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its will on regions. In the absence of a nationally-agreed hydrocarbons law, local authorities have
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the opportunity to strengthen de facto control. The KRG is already using its autonomous status to
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further its interests, passing its own Oil and Gas Law on 6 August 2007 which will enable the KRG
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to opt out of any future national oil contract and revenue-sharing agreements. In the absence of
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robust national hydrocarbons legislation, a new oil-rich region in the south could gain substantial
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control over its natural resources at the expense of the centre (and, therefore, provinces or regions
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which lack these resources). The constitution’s specificity with regards to “oil and gas extracted
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from current fields” could also create problems over the exploration and exploitation of fields which
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have either not been discovered yet, or which do not yet produce oil or gas.
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Kurdish leaders are keen supporters of federalism; whilst they will not be directly affected by the
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law on region formation, they are mindful of the indirect effects. The KRG currently stands alone as
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an autonomous region. By promoting regionalism in Arab areas of Iraq the Kurds hope to end the
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KRG’s exceptional status, thereby cementing and even strengthening its autonomy. This, in turn,
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could be useful in gaining greater control over northern Iraq’s oil wealth.
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However, the regionalisation of predominantly Sunni provinces in central and western Iraq will
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depend on developing political and tribal dynamics, economic pressures, and the outcome of Article
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140 and other territorial disputes. It is unclear at present how Article 140 and the region formation
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law will affect these disputed northern areas. Provincial boundaries may be redrawn, either formally
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or de facto, to take different regional solutions into account. If areas of Ninawah and Tamim
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---
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(including Kirkuk) are formally incorporated into the KRG we assume that provincial boundaries
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would have to be changed or some other solution devised to prevent populations regionalised within
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the KRG from obstructing the regionalisation of the remainder of these provinces. Provincial
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elections could play an important role, especially if aligned Sunni tribal movements perform well in
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neighbouring provinces.
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