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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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MEMORANDUM
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Date: 19 December 2005
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Reply to: S02
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Subject: (U) CI-030-05 Close Out for "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without
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Courts" - ACTION MEMORANDUM
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To: NSA Office of General Counsel, Ariane Cerlenko
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S02L-030-05
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1. (U//FOUO) The following information is in response to CI-030-05 regarding the New
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York Times article, "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts" dated 16 December
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2005. S02 will update and supplement this CI if and when additional classified
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information is revealed.
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2. (S//SI) The Signals Intelligence Directorate has determined that the article contains a
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combination of accurate and inaccurate information about NSA activities. The article
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represents an unauthorized disclosure of classified NSA-related National Security
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Information as noted below. In particular, this article discloses sensitive intelligence
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sources and methods surrounding SIGINT-related missions and activities of the National
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Security Agency.
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3. (U//FOUO) Given that the article contains an unauthorized disclosure of NSA-related
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National Security Information, the following information and assessments are provided:
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* (S//SI) A copy of the article, "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers without Courts", which
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contains the specific unauthorized press disclosure is bracketed and highlighted, and its
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portion marked classifications are listed below and at the attachment A. Additionally, we
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have provided a copy of the entire article as attachment B.
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* (U) What is the date and identity of the article or release that is the subject of
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the unauthorized disclosure? The New York Times Company, The New York
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Times, " Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts", December 16, 2005
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* (U//FOUO) Is the disclosed information accurate? The article contains both
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accurate and inaccurate statements. Classified accurate statements are noted
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below.
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20041123
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Declassify On: 20291123
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SECRET//COMINT//STELLARWIND//NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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* (U) What are the specific statements that are classified? What is the
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classification of the statements? Classified statements within the article are at
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attachment A.
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* (S) What is the extent of official dissemination of the information that was
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disclosed? NSA retains the complete listing of all Executive Branch,
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Legislative Branch and Judicial Branch personnel who have been officially
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briefed on this program. The only dissemination of program information
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outside of this listing is as follows: In October 2004, the Administration
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directed the President's Adviser for National Security Affairs, Ms. Condoleezza
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Rice, and the Director of NSA, then Lt Gen Michael Hayden, to disclose certain
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details of the special program to select individuals from the New York Times to
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dissuade them from publishing a story on the program at that time. In
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November and December 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
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Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence General Michael Hayden
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disclosed, in an authorized manner as directed by the Administration, certain
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aspects of the NSA program to selected individuals of the New York Times in
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an attempt to again dissuade said individuals from disclosing National Security
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Information NSA is not aware of any other official release of information
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regarding this program beyond these limited scope discussions.
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* (U//FOUO) Has the disclosed information been the subject of a prior official
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release? No.
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* (U//FOUO) Has the disclosed information previously appeared in an open
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source publication? No.
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* (C) Have any requests for disclosure (official or unofficial) of the information
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been made? If yes, identify the requestor, date of the request, and disposition of
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the request. Other than the official disclosures noted above, NSA is not aware
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of other requests for disclosure.
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* (U//FOUO) Has the information, portions thereof, or enough background data
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been published (officially or unofficially) that would allow someone to arrive at
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the information subject to the unauthorized disclosure through speculation? No
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* (U//FOUO) Was the disclosure made to a foreign power or an agent of a
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foreign power? No.
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* (TS//SI) What are the possible short-term and long-term impacts of the
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unauthorized disclosure?
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* (TS//SI) Possible Short-term impacts: It is likely that international terrorist will
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implement communications denial techniques (use alternative communications
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means (use international mail or courier) or secure their communications (use
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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encryption, use codewords/codenames, use anonymous means of
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communication, etc.)) in an attempt to hide or make secure communications that
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would be otherwise readily exploitable by the U.S. Government. Additionally,
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international terrorists, suspecting the U.S. Government's capability to exploit
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communications entering the U.S., may implement deception techniques to
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mislead the U.S. Government in attempts to cause homeland security or military
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resources to either stop an action or divert forces against non-existent
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targets/activities.
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* (TS//SI) Possible long-term impacts: Given terrorist organizations' ability to
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adapt, especially Al Qaeda's ability to learn from past mistakes, as evident from
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interrogations of captured Al Qaeda leaders, the U.S. Government can expect
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terrorists, and perhaps other illegal or criminal elements, to use more secure
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communication means, or even cease to use electronic communications
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altogether as suspected with Osama Bin Laden himself. If and when this
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happens, three events will take place. 1) The U.S. Government will lose
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valuable intelligence, 2) the U.S. Government will need to seek alternative
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intelligence sources and methods at additional costs, and 3) the people of the
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United States and our allies will be even more vulnerable to surprise attacks
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because the ability to identify, track and disrupt terrorist related individuals,
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plans and activities is degraded.
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* (C) Have reactions to the unauthorized disclosure been noted in adversary
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communications? As of this date, no.
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* (S//SI) What degree of difficulty would an adversary have in putting
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countermeasure into place? Given all terrorist individuals and organizations use
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global commercial communications, they could implement cited above counter-
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measures at their will, with little difficulty and with very little notice.
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4. (U//FOUO) This is a first time disclosure of this information. The NSA Signals
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Intelligence Directorate recommends that the Director, NSA request a DoJ investigation.
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5. (U//FOUO) Questions or comments may be directed to [REDACTED]
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Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations & Support, Signals Intelligence Directorate, [REDACTED]
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Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Support
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Signals Intelligence Directorate
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2 Attachments: a/s
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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(TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) "President Bush secretly authorized the National Security
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Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the United States to search for
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evidence of terrorist activity.
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(TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) (NSA) "monitored the international telephone calls
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(communications to the U.S.) and international e-mail messages of hundreds, perhaps
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thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the past three years
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... to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al Qaeda..."
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(C) (The article) would alert would-be terrorists (inside the United States) that they might
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be under scrutiny.
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(TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) "NSA eavesdrops (under this program) without warrants on
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up to 500 people in the United States at any given time." ... the number monitored ... may
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have reached ... the thousands
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(S//SI) "Overseas, about 5,000 to 7,000 people suspected of terrorist ties are monitored
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(by NSA) at one time."
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(TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) (The NSA) "eavesdropping program had helped to uncover a
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plot by Iyman Faris, an Ohio trucker('s), (plan) to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge with
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blowtorches." "... an Qaeda plot, involving fertilizer bomb attacks on British pubs and
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train stations,..." "... an Iranian-American doctor in the South ... (with) dubious ties to
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Osama bin Laden."
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(C) (The NSA Program) (was a) " special collection program" which began soon after the
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Sept. 11 attacks,..."
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(C) (The NSA Program) (was used to exploit) "captured top Qaeda
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operatives'...computers, cellphones and personal phone directories..." "The N.S.A.
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surveillance was intended to exploit those numbers and addresses as quickly as possible."
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(TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) "In addition to eavesdropping on those numbers and reading
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e-mail message to and from the al Qaeda figures, the N.S.A. began monitoring others
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linked to them, creasing and expanding chain....hundreds were in the United States..."
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(S//SI) "... the N.S.A can target for interception phone calls or e-mail messages on
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foreign soil, even if the recipients of those communications are in the United States."
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(S//SI) ".... N.S.A.... seeks (FISA) warrants .... (on) foreign embassies and missions in
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Washington, New York and other (U.S.) cities..."
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(S//STLW) "...U.S. Government elements knowledgeable about the N.S.A. Special
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Program include... "congressional leaders, cabinet members, N.S.A., C.I.A. and the
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Justice Department..."
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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Attachment B to NSA Cryptologic Insecurity (CI-030-05) dated 19 December 2005
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Subject: (U) Close Out for the New York Times article, "Bush Lets U.S. Spy on
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Callers without Courts" dated 16 December 2005. - New York Times
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article.
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Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts - New York Times
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December 16, 2005
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By JAMES RISEN and ERIC LICHTBLAU
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WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 - Months after the Sept. 11 attacks, President Bush secretly
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authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others
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inside the United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without
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the court-approved warrants (TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) ordinarily required for domestic
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spying, according to government officials.
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Under a presidential order signed in 2002, the intelligence agency has monitored
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the international telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds,
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perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without warrants over the
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past three years in an effort to track possible "dirty numbers" linked to Al
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Qaeda, (TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) the officials said. The agency, they said, still seeks
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warrants to monitor entirely domestic communications.
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The previously undisclosed decision to permit some eavesdropping inside the
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country without court approval was a major shift in American
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intelligence-gathering practices, particularly for the National Security Agency,
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whose mission is to spy on communications abroad. As a result, some officials
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familiar with the continuing operation have questioned whether the surveillance
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has stretched, if not crossed, constitutional limits on legal searches.
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"This is really a sea change," said a former senior official who specializes in
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national security law. "It's almost a mainstay of this country that the N.S.A.
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only does foreign searches."
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Nearly a dozen current and former officials, who were granted anonymity because
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of the classified nature of the program, discussed it with reporters for The New
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York Times because of their concerns about the operation's legality and
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oversight.
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According to those officials and others, reservations about aspects of the
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program have also been expressed by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV, the West
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Virginia Democrat who is the vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee,
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and a judge presiding over a secret court that oversees intelligence matters.
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Some of the questions about the agency's new powers led the administration to
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temporarily suspend the operation last year and impose more restrictions, the
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20041123
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Declassify On: 20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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officials said.
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The Bush administration views the operation as necessary so that the agency can
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move quickly to monitor communications that may disclose threats to the United
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States, the officials said. Defenders of the program say it has been a critical
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tool in helping disrupt terrorist plots and prevent attacks inside the United
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States.
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Administration officials are confident that existing safeguards are sufficient
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to protect the privacy and civil liberties of Americans, the officials say. In
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some cases, they said, the Justice Department eventually seeks warrants if it
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wants to expand the eavesdropping to include communications confined within the
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United States. The officials said the administration had briefed Congressional
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leaders about the program and notified the judge in charge of the Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Court, the secret Washington court that deals with
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national security issues.
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The White House asked The New York Times not to publish this article, arguing
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that it could jeopardize continuing investigations and alert would-be terrorists
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that they might be under scrutiny. (C)After meeting with senior administration
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officials to hear their concerns, the newspaper delayed publication for a year
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to conduct additional reporting. Some information that administration officials
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argued could be useful to terrorists has been omitted.
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Dealing With a New Threat
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While many details about the program remain secret, officials familiar with it
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say the N.S.A. eavesdrops without warrants on up to 500 people in the United
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States at any given time. (TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) The list changes as some names are
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added and others dropped, so the number monitored in this country may have reached
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into the thousands (TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) since the program began, several officials
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said. Overseas, about 5,000 to 7,000 people suspected of terrorist ties are monitored at
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one time, according to those officials. (S/SI)
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Several officials said the eavesdropping program had helped uncover a plot by
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Iyman Faris, an Ohio trucker and naturalized citizen who pleaded guilty in 2003
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to supporting Al Qaeda by planning to bring down the Brooklyn Bridge with
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blowtorches. (TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) What appeared to be another Qaeda plot,
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involving fertilizer bomb attacks on British pubs and train stations,
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(TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC) was exposed last year in part through the program, the officials
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said. But they said most people targeted for N.S.A. monitoring have never been charged
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with a crime, including an Iranian-American doctor in the South who came under
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suspicion because of what one official described as dubious ties to Osama bin Laden.
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(TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC)
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The eavesdropping program grew out of concerns after the Sept. 11 attacks that
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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the nation's intelligence agencies were not poised to deal effectively with the
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new threat of Al Qaeda and that they were handcuffed by legal and bureaucratic
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restrictions better suited to peacetime than war, according to officials. In
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response, President Bush significantly eased limits on American intelligence and
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law enforcement agencies and the military.
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But some of the administration's antiterrorism initiatives have provoked an
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outcry from members of Congress, watchdog groups, immigrants and others who
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argue that the measures erode protections for civil liberties and intrude on
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Americans' privacy.
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Opponents have challenged provisions of the USA Patriot Act, the focus of
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contentious debate on Capitol Hill this week, that expand domestic surveillance
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by giving the Federal Bureau of Investigation more power to collect information
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like library lending lists or Internet use. Military and F.B.I. officials have
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drawn criticism for monitoring what were largely peaceful antiwar protests. The
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Pentagon and the Department of Homeland Security were forced to retreat on plans
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to use public and private databases to hunt for possible terrorists. And last
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year, the Supreme Court rejected the administration's claim that those labeled
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"enemy combatants" were not entitled to judicial review of their open-ended
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detention.
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Mr. Bush's executive order allowing some warrantless eavesdropping on those
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inside the United States - including American citizens, permanent legal
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residents, tourists and other foreigners - is based on classified legal opinions
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that assert that the president has broad powers to order such searches, derived
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in part from the September 2001 Congressional resolution authorizing him to wage
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war on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, according to the officials familiar
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with the N.S.A. operation.
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The National Security Agency, which is based at Fort Meade, Md., is the nation's
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largest and most secretive intelligence agency, so intent on remaining out of
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public view that it has long been nicknamed "No Such Agency." It breaks codes
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and maintains listening posts around the world to eavesdrop on foreign
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governments, diplomats and trade negotiators as well as drug lords and
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terrorists. But the agency ordinarily operates under tight restrictions on any
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spying on Americans, even if they are overseas, or disseminating information
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about them.
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What the agency calls a "special collection program" began soon after the Sept.
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11 attacks, (C) as it looked for new tools to attack terrorism. The program
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accelerated in early 2002 after the Central Intelligence Agency started
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capturing top Qaeda operatives overseas, including Abu Zubaydah, who was
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arrested in Pakistan in March 2002. The C.I.A. seized the terrorists' computers,
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cellphones and personal phone directories, said the officials familiar with the
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program. The N.S.A. surveillance was intended to exploit those numbers and
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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addresses as quickly as possible, they said. (C)
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In addition to eavesdropping on those numbers and reading e-mail messages to and
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from the Qaeda figures, the N.S.A. began monitoring others linked to them,
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creating an expanding chain. While most of the numbers and addresses were
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overseas, hundreds were in the United States, the officials said. (TS//SI//STLW//NF//OC)
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Under the agency's longstanding rules, the N.S.A. can target for interception
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phone calls or e-mail messages on foreign soil, even if the recipients of those
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communications are in the United States. (S//SI) Usually, though, the government can
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only target phones and e-mail messages in the United States by first obtaining a
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court order from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which holds its
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closed sessions at the Justice Department.
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Traditionally, the F.B.I., not the N.S.A., seeks such warrants and conducts most
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domestic eavesdropping. Until the new program began, the N.S.A. typically
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limited its domestic surveillance to foreign embassies and missions in
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Washington, New York and other cities, and obtained court orders to do so. (S//SI)
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Since 2002, the agency has been conducting some warrantless eavesdropping on
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people in the United States who are linked, even if indirectly, to suspected
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terrorists through the chain of phone numbers and e-mail addresses, according to
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several officials who know of the operation. Under the special program, the
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agency monitors their international communications, the officials said. The
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agency, for example, can target phone calls from someone in New York to someone
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in Afghanistan.
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Warrants are still required for eavesdropping on entirely domestic-to-domestic
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communications, those officials say, meaning that calls from that New Yorker to
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someone in California could not be monitored without first going to the Federal
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Intelligence Surveillance Court.
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A White House Briefing
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After the special program started, Congressional leaders from both political
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parties were brought to Vice President Dick Cheney's office in the White House.
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The leaders, who included the chairmen and ranking members of the Senate and
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House intelligence committees, learned of the N.S.A. operation from Mr. Cheney,
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Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden of the Air Force, who was then the agency's director
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and is now a full general and the principal deputy director of national
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intelligence, and George J. Tenet, then the director of the C.I.A., officials
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said.
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It is not clear how much the members of Congress were told about the
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presidential order and the eavesdropping program. Some of them declined to
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comment about the matter, while others did not return phone calls.
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Later briefings were held for members of Congress as they assumed leadership
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
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roles on the intelligence committees, officials familiar with the program said.
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After a 2003 briefing, Senator Rockefeller, the West Virginia Democrat who
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became vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee that year, wrote a
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letter to Mr. Cheney expressing concerns about the program, officials
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knowledgeable about the letter said. It could not be determined if he received a
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reply. Mr. Rockefeller declined to comment. Aside from the Congressional
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leaders, only a small group of people, including several cabinet members and
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officials at the N.S.A., the C.I.A. and the Justice Department, know of the
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program. (S//STLW)
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Some officials familiar with it say they consider warrantless eavesdropping
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inside the United States to be unlawful and possibly unconstitutional, amounting
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to an improper search. One government official involved in the operation said he
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privately complained to a Congressional official about his doubts about the
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program's legality. But nothing came of his inquiry. "People just looked the
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other way because they didn't want to know what was going on," he said.
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A senior government official recalled that he was taken aback when he first
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learned of the operation. "My first reaction was, 'We're doing what?' " he said.
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While he said he eventually felt that adequate safeguards were put in place, he
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added that questions about the program's legitimacy were understandable.
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Some of those who object to the operation argue that is unnecessary. By getting
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warrants through the foreign intelligence court, the N.S.A. and F.B.I. could
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eavesdrop on people inside the United States who might be tied to terrorist
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groups without skirting longstanding rules, they say.
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The standard of proof required to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence
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Surveillance Court is generally considered lower than that required for a
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criminal warrant - intelligence officials only have to show probable cause that
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someone may be "an agent of a foreign power," which includes international
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terrorist groups - and the secret court has turned down only a small number of
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requests over the years. In 2004, according to the Justice Department, 1,754
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warrants were approved. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can
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grant emergency approval for wiretaps within hours, officials say.
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Administration officials counter that they sometimes need to move more urgently,
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the officials said. Those involved in the program also said that the N.S.A.'s
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eavesdroppers might need to start monitoring large batches of numbers all at
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once, and that it would be impractical to seek permission from the Foreign
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Intelligence Surveillance Court first, according to the officials.
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The N.S.A. domestic spying operation has stirred such controversy among some
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national security officials in part because of the agency's cautious culture and
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longstanding rules.
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Widespread abuses - including eavesdropping on Vietnam War protesters and civil
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rights activists - by American intelligence agencies became public in the 1970's
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and led to passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which imposed
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strict limits on intelligence gathering on American soil. Among other things,
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the law required search warrants, approved by the secret F.I.S.A. court, for
|
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wiretaps in national security cases. The agency, deeply scarred by the scandals,
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|
adopted additional rules that all but ended domestic spying on its part.
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|
After the Sept. 11 attacks, though, the United States intelligence community was
|
|
criticized for being too risk-averse. The National Security Agency was even
|
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cited by the independent 9/11 Commission for adhering to self-imposed rules that
|
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were stricter than those set by federal law.
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Concerns and Revisions
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Several senior government officials say that when the special operation began,
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there were few controls on it and little formal oversight outside the N.S.A. The
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|
agency can choose its eavesdropping targets and does not have to seek approval
|
|
from Justice Department or other Bush administration officials. Some agency
|
|
officials wanted nothing to do with the program, apparently fearful of
|
|
participating in an illegal operation, a former senior Bush administration
|
|
official said. Before the 2004 election, the official said, some N.S.A.
|
|
personnel worried that the program might come under scrutiny by Congressional or
|
|
criminal investigators if Senator John Kerry, the Democratic nominee, was
|
|
elected president.
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|
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|
In mid-2004, concerns about the program expressed by national security
|
|
officials, government lawyers and a judge prompted the Bush administration to
|
|
suspend elements of the program and revamp it.
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|
|
|
For the first time, the Justice Department audited the N.S.A. program, several
|
|
officials said. And to provide more guidance, the Justice Department and the
|
|
agency expanded and refined a checklist to follow in deciding whether probable
|
|
cause existed to start monitoring someone's communications, several officials
|
|
said.
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A complaint from Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, the federal judge who oversees
|
|
the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court, helped spur the suspension,
|
|
officials said. The judge questioned whether information obtained under the
|
|
N.S.A. program was being improperly used as the basis for F.I.S.A. wiretap
|
|
warrant requests from the Justice Department, according to senior government
|
|
officials. While not knowing all the details of the exchange, several government
|
|
lawyers said there appeared to be concerns that the Justice Department, by
|
|
trying to shield the existence of the N.S.A. program, was in danger of
|
|
misleading the court about the origins of the information cited to justify the
|
|
warrants.
|
|
|
|
One official familiar with the episode said the judge insisted to Justice
|
|
Department lawyers at one point that any material gathered under the special
|
|
N.S.A. program not be used in seeking wiretap warrants from her court. Judge
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Kollar-Kotelly did not return calls for comment.
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|
A related issue arose in a case in which the F.B.I. was monitoring the
|
|
communications of a terrorist suspect under a F.I.S.A.-approved warrant, even
|
|
though the National Security Agency was already conducting warrantless
|
|
eavesdropping.
|
|
|
|
According to officials, F.B.I. surveillance of Mr. Faris, the Brooklyn Bridge
|
|
plotter, was dropped for a short time because of technical problems. At the
|
|
time, senior Justice Department officials worried what would happen if the
|
|
N.S.A. picked up information that needed to be presented in court. The
|
|
government would then either have to disclose the N.S.A. program or mislead a
|
|
criminal court about how it had gotten the information.
|
|
|
|
Several national security officials say the powers granted the N.S.A. by
|
|
President Bush go far beyond the expanded counterterrorism powers granted by
|
|
Congress under the USA Patriot Act, which is up for renewal. The House on
|
|
Wednesday approved a plan to reauthorize crucial parts of the law. But final
|
|
passage has been delayed under the threat of a Senate filibuster because of
|
|
concerns from both parties over possible intrusions on Americans' civil
|
|
liberties and privacy.
|
|
|
|
Under the act, law enforcement and intelligence officials are still required to
|
|
seek a F.I.S.A. warrant every time they want to eavesdrop within the United
|
|
States. A recent agreement reached by Republican leaders and the Bush
|
|
administration would modify the standard for F.B.I. wiretap warrants, requiring,
|
|
for instance, a description of a specific target. Critics say the bar would
|
|
remain too low to prevent abuses.
|
|
|
|
Bush administration officials argue that the civil liberties concerns are
|
|
unfounded, and they say pointedly that the Patriot Act has not freed the N.S.A.
|
|
to target Americans. "Nothing could be further from the truth," wrote John Yoo,
|
|
a former official in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, and his
|
|
co-author in a Wall Street Journal opinion article in December 2003. Mr. Yoo
|
|
worked on a classified legal opinion on the N.S.A.'s domestic eavesdropping
|
|
program.
|
|
|
|
At an April hearing on the Patriot Act renewal, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski,
|
|
Democrat of Maryland, asked Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales and Robert S.
|
|
Mueller III, the director of the F.B.I., "Can the National Security Agency, the
|
|
great electronic snooper, spy on the American people?"
|
|
|
|
"Generally," Mr. Mueller said, "I would say generally, they are not allowed to
|
|
spy or to gather information on American citizens."
|
|
|
|
President Bush did not ask Congress to include provisions for the N.S.A.
|
|
|
|
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|
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|
|
|
|
domestic surveillance program as part of the Patriot Act and has not sought any
|
|
other laws to authorize the operation. Bush administration lawyers argued that
|
|
such new laws were unnecessary, because they believed that the Congressional
|
|
resolution on the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization,
|
|
officials said.
|
|
|
|
The Legal Line Shifts
|
|
|
|
Seeking Congressional approval was also viewed as politically risky because the
|
|
proposal would be certain to face intense opposition on civil liberties grounds.
|
|
The administration also feared that by publicly disclosing the existence of the
|
|
operation, its usefulness in tracking terrorists would end, officials said.
|
|
|
|
The legal opinions that support the N.S.A. operation remain classified, but they
|
|
appear to have followed private discussions among senior administration lawyers
|
|
and other officials about the need to pursue aggressive strategies that once may
|
|
have been seen as crossing a legal line, according to senior officials who
|
|
participated in the discussions.
|
|
|
|
For example, just days after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York and the
|
|
Pentagon, Mr. Yoo, the Justice Department lawyer, wrote an internal memorandum
|
|
that argued that the government might use "electronic surveillance techniques
|
|
and equipment that are more powerful and sophisticated than those available to
|
|
law enforcement agencies in order to intercept telephonic communications and
|
|
observe the movement of persons but without obtaining warrants for such uses."
|
|
Mr. Yoo noted that while such actions could raise constitutional issues, in the
|
|
face of devastating terrorist attacks "the government may be justified in taking
|
|
measures which in less troubled conditions could be seen as infringements of
|
|
individual liberties."
|
|
|
|
The next year, Justice Department lawyers disclosed their thinking on the issue
|
|
of warrantless wiretaps in national security cases in a little-noticed brief in
|
|
an unrelated court case. In that 2002 brief, the government said that "the
|
|
Constitution vests in the President inherent authority to conduct warrantless
|
|
intelligence surveillance (electronic or otherwise) of foreign powers or their
|
|
agents, and Congress cannot by statute extinguish that constitutional
|
|
authority."
|
|
|
|
Administration officials were also encouraged by a November 2002 appeals court
|
|
decision in an unrelated matter. The decision by the Foreign Intelligence
|
|
Surveillance Court of Review, which sided with the administration in dismantling
|
|
a bureaucratic "wall" limiting cooperation between prosecutors and intelligence
|
|
officers, cited "the president's inherent constitutional authority to conduct
|
|
warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance."
|
|
|
|
But the same court suggested that national security interests should not be
|
|
grounds "to jettison the Fourth Amendment requirements" protecting the rights of
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
TOP SECRET//COMINT//ORCON/NOFORN//20291123
|
|
|
|
Americans against undue searches. The dividing line, the court acknowledged, "is
|
|
a very difficult one to administer."
|
|
|
|
Barclay Walsh contributed research for this article.
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|
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