64 lines
3.9 KiB
JSON
64 lines
3.9 KiB
JSON
{
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"title": "GALLANTWAVE",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "NSA presentation describing GALLANTWAVE — a LONGHAUL capability for VPN decryption — specifically its scaling architecture to handle increased collection volumes and a peering mechanism allowing partner agencies to share single-sided VPN key exchange events so that LONGHAUL can complete decryption attempts that would otherwise fail due to one-sided collection.\n",
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"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL presentation from NSA's Digital Network Crypt Applications (DNCA) division describing the scaling and volume requirements for GALLANTWAVE, a VPN decryption capability operating within the LONGHAUL attack orchestration framework.\n\nThe document addresses two parallel development tracks. The @Scale track focuses on deploying GALLANTWAVE more widely through a peering mechanism between partner agencies — the architecture showing KPS (Key Processing System) communicating with LONGHAUL — allowing agencies to share copies of VPN key exchange events that have only been seen on one side of the connection. This is a direct response to one of the fundamental challenges of passive cable collection for VPN decryption: IPSec requires both sides of an IKE key exchange to recover the session key, but a given cable tap may only see traffic flowing in one direction. The peering architecture allows LONGHAUL to identify which events have not paired locally, request the missing side from a partner agency, and complete the key recovery process that would otherwise be impossible. The @Volume track addresses the hardware scaling challenge, with plans to increase system capacity from 10 gigabits to 40 and then 100 gigabits per second, and to increase target volumes under a programme called CORNERKICK.\n\nThe architecture diagrams illustrate two scenarios. Single-sided collection shows how LONGHAUL requests a missing B-to-A event from a peer's Key Processing System when it has only seen the A-to-B direction, receiving the event and completing the attack via the GW (GALLANTWAVE) component and MVR. The filtered pairing diagram shows a more complex multi-site scenario with two GALLANTWAVE nodes (GW-1 and GW-2) exchanging need and event messages to complete pairings across geographically distributed collection points, with an SF component mediating between them — the nature of SF is not defined in the document.",
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"tags": [
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"VPN decryption",
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"IPSec",
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"IKE",
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"key recovery",
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"peering architecture",
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"Digital Network Crypt Applications",
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"DNCA",
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"Key Processing System",
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"single-sided collection",
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"partner peering",
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"encryption breaking",
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"cable collection",
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"passive collection",
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"scaling"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "NSA",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"TOP SECRET",
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"COMINT"
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],
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"dissemination": [
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"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
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],
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"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
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"genre": "slides",
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"programs": [
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"GALLANTWAVE",
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"CORNERKICK",
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"LONGHAUL",
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"MVR"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
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"date_published": "2014-12-28",
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"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
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"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
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"reporters": [
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"Appelbaum, Jacob",
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"Gibson, Aaron",
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"Grothoff, Christian",
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"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
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"Poitras, Laura",
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"Sontheimer, Michael",
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"Stöcker, Christian"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/221fe9a4-0001-0014-0000-000000035514/media-35514.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "8a53be36db1d732ff63d29ac9fcff6e6952025ec74bcbe5bb1e96f445eb98cbf",
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"pages": 5
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}
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