snowchive-meta/data/spiegel_-_media-35521/spiegel_-_media-35521.md
2026-11-19 04:39:11 +02:00

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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

NETWORK EXPLOITATION

PROFILING SSL AND ATTRIBUTING PRIVATE NETWORKS

An introduction to FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY

[REDACTED]

ICTR - Network Exploitation GCHQ

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

TR

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

GCHQ


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Outline

  • Two separate prototypes – FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY
  • Both are cloud analytics which work on bulk unselected data
  • FLYING PIG is a knowledge base for investigating TLS/SSL traffic
  • HUSH PUPPY is a tool for attributing private network traffic

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

FLYING PIG - TLS/SSL Background

  • TLS/SSL (Transport Layer Security / Secure Sockets Layer) provides encrypted communication over the internet
  • Simple TLS/SSL handshake:
Client                                 Server
       ------ Client hello ---------->
       <----- Server hello -----------
       <----- Certificate ------------
       <----- Server hello done ----->
       ------ Client key exchange --->
       ------ Change cipher spec ---->
       ------ Handshake finished ---->
       <----- Change cipher spec -----
       <----- Handshake finished -----
       <----- Application data ------>

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Motivations for FLYING PIG

  • More and more services used by GCHQ targets are moving to TLS/SSL to increase user confidence, e.g. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail, etc.
  • Terrorists and cyber criminals are common users of TLS/SSL to hide their comms (not necessarily using the big providers).
  • A TLS/SSL knowledge base could provide a means to extract as much information from the unencrypted traffic as possible.

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

FLYING PIG implementation

  • Federated QFD approach
    • Multiple separate cloud analytics, each of which produce a QFD (Query Focussed Dataset).
    • Analytics are run once a week, on approximately 20 billion events.
    • A single query in the web interface results in calls to multiple QFDs, which are returned to the user in separate panels.
    • Results in: (a) fast queries, (b) easy-to-maintain modular code, and importantly (c) easy to add future TLS/SSL QFDs.

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Query by certificate metadata

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
Prototype owner: [REDACTED] ICTR-NE

Query FLYING PIG
IP/network/certificate field: %mail.ru
Query as:
  Client IP Server IP Both
  or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
  or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]

Server certificate fields to search within:
Subject common name
Subject organisation name
Issuer common name
Issuer organisation name
RSA modulus

Run Query!

Certificate field search: %mail.ru
All HTTP requests matching your query (?)

1-5 of 500 items
Server IP Host name First seen Last seen Count w/e 25th Nov Count all time
184.105 swa.mail.ru 2011-10-13 16:05:53.0 2011-11-25 21:11:59.0 6085663 42640739
184.104 swa.mail.ru 2011-10-13 17:29:18.0 2011-11-25 21:11:55.0 6073183 36825411
134.201 fc.ef.d4.cf.bd.a1.top.mail.ru 2011-10-13 21:43:10.0 2011-11-25 21:10:49.0 4049743 19360920
135.13 top5.mail.ru 2011-10-14 20:00:00.0 2011-11-25 21:12:05.0 3006868 14168963
135.12 top3.mail.ru 2011-10-14 20:00:00.0 2011-11-25 21:10:48.0 2480950 12386999
All certificates matching your query (?)
Tip 1: Right click on a row to find all server IPs that serve that certificate!
Tip 2: Click on the disk icon in the title bar to download data in CSV format!
Tip 3: Double-click on a field to enable copy and paste!
Tip 4: Change displayed columns ('Basic' is default; 'Advanced' adds RSA Modulus and cipher suite distribution columns): Basic columns Advanced columns

1-10 of 70 items   10 | 25 | 50 | 100   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Full Certificate First seen Last seen Count w/e 25th Nov Count all time Valid from Valid to Subject common name Subject country Subject org name Issuer common name Issuer country Issuer org name Self signed
308203CD308212011-09-22 2011-09-22 13:17:32 2011-11-25 19:01:59 2952729 16638958 2011-01-31 00:00:00 2012-03-27 23:59:59 *.mail.ru ru llc mail.ru thawte ssl ca us thawte, inc. N
308203613082(2011-09-22 2011-09-22 14:05:50 2011-11-25 15:40:05 249926 1085232 2010-01-21 00:00:00 2011-02-20 23:59:59 *.mail.ru ru llc mail.ru thawte premium server ca za thawte consulting cc N
308203D33082(2011-10-07 2011-10-07 20:29:55 2011-11-25 18:53:40 10059 30520 2011-09-25 00:00:00 2013-11-23 23:59:59 *.money.mail.ru ru llc mail.ru thawte ssl ca us thawte, inc. N
308203513082(2011-09-23 2011-09-23 17:01:58 2011-11-25 15:42:05 976 8517 2010-01-25 18:12:59 2012-01-27 18:12:59 mail.ru.is is mail.ru.is equifax us equifax N
308202083082(2011-08-22 2011-08-22 08:14:21 2011-09-06 06:15:36 0 1482 2011-03-04 06:42:12 2012-03-03 06:42:12 mail.ru-sib.ru us mail.ru-sib.ru us Y
308204383082(2011-10-17 2011-10-17 14:09:52 2011-11-25 18:50:10 22 1236 2011-05-27 00:00:00 2012-07-25 23:59:59 mail.ru-com.ru mail.ru-com.ru thawte dv ssl ca us thawte, inc. N
308203043082(2011-10-08 2011-10-08 00:05:24 2011-11-25 17:04:02 301 1150 2010-02-13 14:19:06 2012-11-08 14:19:06 mx1.shogo-mail.ru ru shogo shogo.ru ru shogo N
308204153082(2011-11-01 2011-11-01 07:36:53 2011-11-25 14:26:29 246 693 2011-09-15 11:47:51 2012-09-14 11:47:51 limgs.mail.ru ru isp.cegedim.fr cegedim fr cegedim N
308202E43082(2011-10-14 2011-10-14 08:07:34 2011-11-21 18:20:34 201 306 2011-10-05 08:07:34 2014-10-04 08:07:34 moder.foto.mail.ru ru mail.ru moder.foto.mail.ru ru mail.ru Y
308204153082(2011-10-31 2011-10-31 15:45:50 2011-11-25 05:13:34 99 259 2011-09-15 11:47:51 2012-09-14 11:47:51 auth.mail.ru ru isp.cegedim.fr cegedim fr cegedim N
Server IPs (?):
Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it further!

1-25 of 500 items

Explore this server IP further!
Server IP Cert count w/e 25th Nov Cert count all time
177.1 333592 1052618
191.213 330212 1388617
184.16 308599 2496916
184.17 297282 2226133
184.15 294437 2395012
189.160 168414 659037
184.77 120533 560336
184.98 113555 515169
184.74 113555 515169
184.75 112574 538512
184.76 110325 690098
135.55 3779 6023
135.56 3740 7358
134.151 3564 8498
63.121 2532 4887
136.43 2523 9226
134.98 2360 9165
179.89 2227 7600
179.90 2051 7320
136.84 1981 8442

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Query by server IP

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD

Prototype owner: [REDACTED] ICTR-NE

Query FLYING PIG
IP/network/certificate field: [REDACTED]184.14
Query as:
  Client IP Server IP Both
  or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
  or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]

General IP info:
Top 10 SSL client geos
Top 10 SSL server ports
Top 10 SSL case notations
SSL Traffic stats

Server IP-specific panels:
SSL Server certificates seen on this IP
SSL Pattern of life
HTTP requests to this IP
Top 100 SSL clients

Run Query!

Certificate field search: %mail.ru
General IP info for server IP: [REDACTED]184.14

Geolocation (?):
Country: RU (M)
City: MOSCOW (L)
WHOIS info (?):
Network: [REDACTED]76.0/20. Network type: No results.
Company: Mail.Ru. Domain: mail.ru.
AS info (?):
Advertised by AS: 47764. Found within network: [REDACTED]76.0/20.
AS name: MAILRU-AS Limited liability company Mail.Ru.

DNS (?): No results
Tor node (?): No matches

Top 10 SSL client geos (?)
Top 10 SSL server ports (?)
Top 10 SSL case notations (?)

SSL Traffic stats (?):
For week ending 2011-12-23:
No. unique clients = 104317.
% client-server IPs with traffic seen in both directions = 14.7%.

- Unique clients with client-server traffic only
- Unique clients with server-client traffic only
- Unique clients with bidirectional traffic

SSL Certificates seen on this IP (?)
Tip 1: Right click on a certificate to explore it further!
1-3 of 3 items   10 | 25 | 50 | 100   1
First seen on this IP Last seen on this IP Count w/e 25th Nov Count all time Valid from Valid to Subject common name Issuer common name
2011-09-22 13:31:06 2011-11-25 19:01:47 357643 2359179 2011-01-31 00:00:00 2012-03-27 23:59:59 *.mail.ru thawte ssl ca
2011-08-08 12:23:45 2011-11-25 07:50:07 1441 1447304 2011-01-31 00:00:00 2012-03-27 23:59:59 *.mail.ru thawte ssl ca
2011-11-16 14:13:03 2011-11-16 14:13:03 0 1 2011-08-05 18:34:19 2014-08-05 18:34:19 *.vkontakte.ru go daddy secure certification authority
Average pattern of life for a client (seeded around SSL events to this server IP) (?)
Tip 1: Filter by min. % occurrences of event: 1% Apply filtering
1 - 8 of 233 items    10 | 25 | 50 | 100   1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Correlated event Event IP Event port Percentage occurrences of event
GET request to top3.mail.ru [REDACTED]35.12 80 28.1
GET request to top5.mail.ru [REDACTED]35.13 80 15.1
GET request to d0.c1.bf.a1.top.mail.ru [REDACTED]34.253 80 14.2
GET request to my.mail.ru [REDACTED]84.40 80 13.2
HTTP requests to this IP (top 100) (?)
Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it as an SSL server!
1-10 of 226 items    10 | 25 | 50 | 100    1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Server IP Host name requested First seen Last seen Count last week Count all time
[REDACTED]84.14 e.mail.ru 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 1989215 13992636
[REDACTED]84.14 m.mail.ru 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 89268 664189
[REDACTED]84.14 [REDACTED]184.14 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 17426 108536
[REDACTED]84.14 auth.mail.ru 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 11738 70020
[REDACTED]84.14 tel.mail.ru 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 8994 65540

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Query by server IP

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD

Prototype owner: [REDACTED]ICTR-NE

Query FLYING PIG
IP/network/certificate fiel: [REDACTED]84.14
Query as:
  Client IP Server IP Both
  or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
  or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]

General IP info:
Top 10 SSL client geos
Top 10 SSL server ports
Top 10 SSL case notations
SSL Traffic stats

Server IP-specific panels:
SSL Server certificates seen on this IP
SSL Pattern of life
HTTP requests to this IP
Top 100 SSL clients

Run Query!

Certificate field search: %mail.ru
Server: [REDACTED].184.14 (?)
GET request to top3.mail.ru [REDACTED]135.12 80 28.1
GET request to top5.mail.ru [REDACTED]135.13 80 15.1
GET request to d0.c1.bf.a1.top.mail.ru [REDACTED]134.253 80 14.2
GET request to my.mail.ru [REDACTED]184.40 80 13.2
GET request to my.mail.ru [REDACTED]184.41 80 12.9
GET request to stat.my.mail.ru [REDACTED]184.40 80 10.8
GET request to stat.my.mail.ru [REDACTED]184.41 80 10.5
GET request to mrimraker1.mail.ru [REDACTED]189.183 80 10.4
[REDACTED]184.14 m.mail.ru 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 89268 664189
[REDACTED]184.14 94.100.184.14 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 17426 108536
[REDACTED]184.14 auth.mail.ru 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 11738 70020
[REDACTED]184.14 tel.mail.ru 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 8994 65540
[REDACTED]184.14 e. 2011-10-15 2011-11-25 307 616
[REDACTED]184.14 e.mai 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 155 1101
[REDACTED]184.14 e.mail. 2011-10-14 2011-11-25 119 705
[REDACTED]184.14 mail.ru 2011-10-24 2011-11-23 110 367
[REDACTED]184.14 e.m 2011-10-15 2011-11-25 107 400
Top 100 SSL clients of server: [REDACTED]84.14 (?)
Tip 1: Filter by country of client IP (e.g. enter nothing to avoid filtering or PK,IR,IQ to filter by multiple countries): GB,US,CA,NZ,AU
( ) Only show clients in these countries (o) Remove clients in these countries
[x] Remove clients that also act as servers
Number of results returned: 100
Filter! RESET

Tip 2: Right click on a client or server IP to explore it further!
1-20 of 100 items    10 | 25 | 50 | 100   1 2 3 4 5
Client IP Client country (conf) Client company info (from GEOFUSION export) First seen Last seen Count w/e 25th Nov Count all time Pairing status w/e 25th Nov Pairing status all time
[REDACTED].212 ES(V) Telefonica_de_Espana_SAU; rima-tde.net 2011-10-16 2011-11-19 1415 50136 Server -> Client only Both directions
[REDACTED].139 ES(H) R_Cable_y_Telecomunicaciones_Galicia_S.A.; mundo-r.net 2011-10-24 2011-11-25 424 726 Client -> Server only Client -> Server only
[REDACTED].111 DE(V) Bertelsmann_ZI_GmbH; mediaways.net 2011-11-23 2011-11-23 417 417 Server -> Client only Server -> Client only
[REDACTED].56 NO(V) Telenor_Nextel_AS; telenor.net 2011-11-21 2011-11-24 403 403 Server -> Client only Server -> Client only
[REDACTED].38 IE(V) Vodafone_ISP; UNKNOWN 2011-11-23 2011-11-23 330 330 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].114 DE(V) Bertelsmann_ZI_GmbH; mediaways.net 2011-11-23 2011-11-23 329 329 Server -> Client only Server -> Client only
[REDACTED].127 KR(M) Korea_Telecor 2011-09-04 2011-11-25 325 2266 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].250 (-)(-) [REDACTED] 2011-11-18 2011-11-18 296 296 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].152 EC(H) Ecuadortelecom_S.A.; ecutel.net.ec 2011-11-10 2011-11-25 290 291 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].186 IE(V) Vodafone_ISP; UNKNOWN 2011-11-20 2011-11-20 196 196 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].9 MY(H) TMNET; holcim.net 2011-09-03 2011-11-24 189 383 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].153 KR(M) QRIXNET; UNKNOWN 2011-10-20 2011-11-25 181 198 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].53 MY(H) CORE_IP_DEVELOPMENT; dancom.com.my 2011-11-19 2011-11-25 179 179 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].121 IR(V) Static-Pool-TP3; pol.ir 2011-11-21 2011-11-21 177 177 Client -> Server only Client -> Server only
[REDACTED].41 IE(V) UTV_PLC; utvinternet.net 2011-11-19 2011-11-20 167 167 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].237 KR(M) KRNIC; ktcu.or.kr 2011-09-03 2011-11-25 150 1007 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].38 BR(M) Comite_Gestor_da_Internet_no_Brasil; ampernet.com 2011-11-23 2011-11-25 145 145 Server -> Client only Server -> Client only
[REDACTED].87 KR(H) Korea_Telecom; postman.co.kr 2011-10-16 2011-11-25 143 161 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].155 KR(H) Korea_Telecom; kornet.net 2011-10-24 2011-11-24 138 583 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].1 IE(V) Vodafone_ISP; UNKNOWN 2011-11-18 2011-11-18 137 158 Client -> Server only Both directions

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Query by client IP

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD

Prototype owner: ICTR-NE

Query FLYING PIG
IP/network/certificate field: [REDACTED].127
Query as:
  Client IP Server IP Both
  or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
  or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]

Client IP-specific panels:
General IP info
SSL Servers visited

Run Query!

Certificate field search: %mail.ru
Server IP: [REDACTED].184.14
Client IP: [REDACTED].127

General IP info for client IP: [REDACTED].127
Geolocation (?):
Country: KR (M)
City: SEOUL (L)
WHOIS info (?):
Network: [REDACTED].0/20. Network type: No results.
Company: Korea Telecom. Domain: groupon.kr.
AS info (?):
Advertised by AS: 4766. Found within network: [REDACTED].0.0/13
AS name: KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom.
DNS (?): No results
Tor node (?):

Top 100 SSL servers visited by [REDACTED].127 (?):
Tip 1: Filter by country of server IP (e.g. enter PK to filter by Pakistan only or PK,IR,IQ to filter by multiple countries): Only show servers in these countries Remove servers in these countries RESET
Tip 2: Right click on a client or server IP to explore it further!

1-8 of 8 items    10 | 25 | 50 | 100    1
Client IP Server IP Server country (conf) Server company info (from GEOFUSION export) First seen Last seen Count w/e 25th Nov Count all time Pairing status w/e 25th Nov Pairing status all time
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]184.14 RU(M) Mail.Ru;mail.ru 04-09-11 02:23:55 25-11-11 13:47:52 325 2266 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]184.17 RU(M) Mail.Ru;mail.ru 04-09-11 02:13:48 25-11-11 13:23:36 299 2207 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]184.16 RU(M) Mail.Ru;mail.ru 03-09-11 05:18:48 25-11-11 10:15:23 269 2240 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]184.15 RU(M) Mail.Ru;mail.ru 03-09-11 03:20:27 25-11-11 11:49:27 213 2354 Both directions Both directions
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]2.131.207 DE(M) BBBK91667, rapi 14-11-11 02:39:15 14-11-11 02:39:15 0 1 No traffic w/e 25th Nov Client -> Server only
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]213.87 NL(L) Mozilla_Corporatio 09-10-11 05:07:48 06-11-11 22:38:50 0 8 No traffic w/e 25th Nov Server -> Client only
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]181.127 RU(M) Mail.Ru;mail.ru 16-10-11 19:05:16 13-11-11 21:31:31 0 13 No traffic w/e 25th Nov Client -> Server only
[REDACTED].127 [REDACTED]191.213 RU(M) Mail.Ru;mail.ru 24-10-11 17:53:21 24-10-11 17:53:21 0 1 No traffic w/e 25th Nov Client -> Server only

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED] CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.


TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Query by network range

FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE

HRA Justification | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD

Prototype owner: [REDACTED] ICTR-NE

Query FLYING PIG
IP/network/certificate field: [REDACTED].0/24
Query as:
  Client IP Server IP Both
  or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
  or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]

Network-specific panels:
General network info
SSL Clients present in network
SSL Servers present in network
HTTP requests to IPs in network

Run Query!

Certificate field search: %mail.ru
Server IP: [REDACTED].181.14
Client IP: [REDACTED].127
Network: [REDACTED].0/24

General network info for: [REDACTED].0/24
Geolocation (?):
Country: KR (M)
City: SEOUL (L)
WHOIS info (?):
Network: No results. Network type: No results.
Company: No results. Domain: No results.
AS info (?):
Advertised by AS: No results. Found within network: No results.
AS name: No results.
DNS (?):

SSL clients in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?):
Tip 1: Right click on a client IP to explore it further!
1-20 of 57 items    10 | 25 | 50 | 100    1 2 3
Client IP Client company info (from GEOFUSION export) First seen Last seen Total SSL traffic w/e 25th Nov Total SSL traffic all time Num. unique servers contacted w/e 25th Nov Num. unique servers contacted all time
[REDACTED].9 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-09-04 2011-09-04 0 1 0 1
[REDACTED].23 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-26 2011-11-23 1 7 1 3
[REDACTED].29 Korea_Telecom 2011-10-22 2011-10-22 0 1 0 1
[REDACTED].32 Korea_Telecom 2011-11-16 2011-11-18 1 2 1 2
[REDACTED].36 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-11-19 2011-11-22 7 7 1 1
[REDACTED].38 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-14 2011-11-16 0 21 0 5
[REDACTED].41 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-24 2011-10-26 0 2 0 2
[REDACTED].42 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-21 2011-10-21 0 1 0 1
[REDACTED].57 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-11-09 2011-11-11 0 3 0 2
[REDACTED].62 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-09-09 2011-09-09 0 1 0 1
[REDACTED].64 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-12 2011-10-12 0 1 0 1
[REDACTED].70 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-08 2011-10-31 0 18 0 5
[REDACTED].76 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-14 2011-11-07 0 14 0 1
[REDACTED].82 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-11-15 2011-11-15 0 2 0 1
[REDACTED].86 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-11-18 2011-11-18 1 1 1 1
[REDACTED].87 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-11-12 2011-11-12 0 1 0 1
[REDACTED].93 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-11-04 2011-11-04 0 2 0 1
[REDACTED].99 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-10-25 2011-11-21 3 12 2 5
[REDACTED].103 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-09-05 2011-09-05 0 1 0 1
[REDACTED].105 Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr 2011-11-03 2011-11-03 0 1 0 1

`` All SSL servers in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?) Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it further! 1-3 of 3 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1


| Server IP      | Server company info (from GEOFUSION export) | Last week seen: | % Paired clients that week | Num. unique clients that week | Num. unique clients all time |
| :------------- | :------------------------------------------ | :-------------- | :------------------------- | :---------------------------- | :--------------------------- |
| [REDACTED].18  | Korea_Telecom;mailplug.co.kr                | 2011-11-11      | 0.0                        | 1                             | 1                            |
| [REDACTED].205 | test                                        | 2011-12-09      | 0.0                        | 1                             | 1                            |

HTTP requests to IPs in network: [REDACTED].0/24 (top 100) (?) Tip 1: Right click on a server IP to explore it as an SSL server! 1-1 of 1 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100 1


| Server IP     | Host name requested | First seen          | Last seen           | Count last week | Count all time |
| :------------ | :------------------ | :------------------ | :------------------ | :-------------- | :------------- |
| [REDACTED].40 | [REDACTED].40       | 2011-10-30 20:00:00 | 2011-10-30 20:00:00 | 0               | 5              |

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## Cyber applications

* Diginotar certificate authority compromise :
   - Private keys of legitimate certificate authority, Diginotar, stolen by hacker.
   - FLYING PIG was used to identify a FIS using them to launch a MITM against their own citizens.


### How the attack was done:

                       ┌───────────────────┐                         
                       │                   │                         
                       │ Legitimate Google │◄────────────────┐       
                       │       server      │                 │       
                       │                   │                 │       
                       └────────▲──────────┘                 │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                        ┌───┴───┐   
                                │                        │       │   
                         Non-target traffic              │ MITM  │   
                                │                        │       │   
                                │                        └───▲───┘   
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       
                                │                            │       

─────Google request────────────►┌───┴────┐ │
│ │ │
─────Google request────────────►│ Router ├─────────────────Target traffic │ │
─────Google request────────────►└───▲────┘
│
│
│
[REDACTED].242
Logs into router and adds static route for target traffic │
│
│


FLYING PIG screenshot showing fake certificate:



|                 |                     |                     |     |      |                     |                     |               |     |            |                           |     |                 |     |
| :-------------- | :------------------ | :------------------ | :-- | :--- | :------------------ | :------------------ | :------------ | :-- | :--------- | :------------------------ | :-- | :-------------- | :-- |
| 308204303082039 | 2011-09-16 20:54:29 | 2011-10-20 17:14:05 | 0   | 3154 | 2011-09-05 06:05:49 | 2012-09-05 06:15:49 | *.google.com  | us  | google inc | zscaler                   | us  | www.zscaler.com | Y   |
| 3082052A3082049 | 2011-10-11 16:56:45 | 2011-11-25 15:41:29 | 5   | 1214 | 2011-09-20 06:07:12 | 2012-09-20 06:17:12 | *.google.com  |     |            | google internet authority |     |                 | N   |
| 308204523082038 | 2011-11-11 02:30:27 | 2011-11-25 06:20:50 | 26  | 572  | 2011-11-02 21:08:36 | 2012-11-02 21:18:36 | *.google.com  | us  | google inc | zscaler                   | us  | www.zscaler.com | Y   |
| 308202DA3082024 | 2011-11-01 01:23:06 | 2011-11-25 17:48:58 | 71  | 547  | 2010-09-02 07:56:28 | 2011-09-02 08:06:28 | *.google.com  | us  | google inc | sfibluecoat.sficorp.com   | us  | is              | N   |
| 308204303082039 | 2011-08-25 13:03:12 | 2011-10-13 07:51:24 | 0   | 467  | 2011-08-12 03:49:02 | 2012-08-12 03:59:02 | *.google.com  | us  | google inc | zscaler                   | us  | www.zscaler.com | Y   |
| 308205283082041 | 2011-08-19 21:04:42 | 2011-08-26 19:51:50 | 0   | 441  | 2011-07-10 19:06:30 | 2013-07-09 19:06:30 | google.com    | us  | google inc | diginotar public ca 2025  | nl  | diginotar       | N   |
| 308204AA3082039 | 2011-11-08 09:35:22 | 2011-11-25 15:00:37 | 173 | 440  | 2011-09-20 06:07:12 | 2012-09-20 06:17:12 | *.google.com  | us  | google inc | lorealinternetbrowsing    | fr  | loreal          | N   |
| 30820464308203C | 2011-11-17 14:14:12 | 2011-11-25 05:13:34 | 436 | 438  | 2011-11-10 11:47:51 | 2012-11-10 11:47:51 | *.google.com  | us  | google inc | zscaler                   | us  | www.zscaler.com | Y   |

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## Cyber applications

* Other Cyber applications:
    - Multiple examples of FIS data exfiltration using SSL have been found using FLYING PIG.
    - In particular, certificates related to LEGION JADE, LEGION RUBY, and MAKERSMARK activity were found on FLYING PIG using known signatures
    - These were then used to find previously unknown servers involved in exfiltration from US companies.
    - FLYING PIG has also been used to identify events involving a mail server used by Russian Intelligence.

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## Identification of malicious TLS/SSL

- Can identify malicious TLS/SSL using signatures if known
- However this approach generally does not allow discovery of new threats
- Alternative is to use “behavioural” features to automatically identify potentially malicious traffic
- Features currently being investigated include:
    - Certificates with same subject but different issuers – may be indicative of Diginotar-style attack
    - Beaconing in TLS/SSL (indicative of botnets/FIS implants)
    - Number of client cipher suites offered
    - Repeated identical random challenges

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## HUSH PUPPY – motivation

* Much private network traffic seen but previously discarded
* If traffic could be attributed, potential high value – close access
* HUSH PUPPY is a bulk private network identification Cloud analytic
* Basic idea is to look for the same TDI being seen coming from a private address and then from a public address within a short time
* The private traffic can then be attributed to the owner of the public address
* Works for SSE & COMSAT

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION.
REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ.
THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
GCHQ

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## HUSH PUPPY – example

Yahoo
Internet
1.2.3.4
Y cookie: fred@yahoo.com
NAT or proxy
request to Yahoo
Private network
Y cookie: fred@yahoo.com
192.168.0.2

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## Other HUSH PUPPY datasets

* HUSH PUPPY also makes use of Yahoo T-cookies to do correlations
* A T-cookie contains the IP address of the client as Yahoo sees it
* Hence a T cookie coming from a private IP can give the public IP of the NAT or proxy
* In addition, HUSH PUPPY uses the following data to help verify results
    * Kerberos & Lotus Notes: Domains, organisations, departments, countries, machine names, user names
    * HTTP: Heuristic detection of Intranet web servers
    * SSL: Issuers, subjects, countries
    * SMTP: From & to domains

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## Results – what do we find?

* Foreign government networks
* Airlines
* Energy companies
* Financial organisations

* In cases of good collection, 50-80% of collected private network traffic has been attributed
* Some false positives can arise if few events correlated, due to factors such as TDIs not being completely unique and public internet proxies giving misleading public IP results
* Results can frequently be verified using Kerberos etc data

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## Examples of operational successes

* A large private network related to the Afghan government was identified, with ~800,000 events correlated.
* Examination of the case notations suggested it belonged to the Afghan MOD
    - A Kerberos domain mod.local
    - HTTP servers *.mod.local & mail
    - SSL certificates with the subject "Ministry of Defense" and the geo "AF"
* Results confirmed by analysis of content on XKEYSCORE
* A VSAT private network belonging to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs was identified
* NOSEY PARKER events were correlated with SSE

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.

---

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

## Contacts

- FLYING PIG – [REDACTED]
- HUSH PUPPY – [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON [REDACTED]
CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.