6.5 KiB
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NETWORK EXPLOITATION
PROFILING SSL AND ATTRIBUTING PRIVATE NETWORKS
An introduction to FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY
ICTR - Network Exploitation GCHQ
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
TR
THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
GCHQ
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Motivations for FLYING P
- More and more services used by GCHQ targets are moving to TLS/SSL to increase user confidence, e.g. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmai
- Terrorists and cyber criminals are common users of TLS/SSL to hide their comms (not necessarily using the big providers).
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Query by certificate metadata
FLYING PIG
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Query by certificate metadata
FLYING PIG
FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Query by server IP
FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Query by server IP
FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
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Query by client IP
FLYING PIG
TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
Query by ne
YING PIG
SL KNOWLEDGE BASE
cation | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
LYING PIG
ork/certificate field: [REDACTED].0/24
Client IP Server IP Both
or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]
Network-specific panels:
General network info
SSL Clients present in network
SSL Servers present in network
HTTP requests to IPs in network
ery!
e field search: %mail.ru
Server IP: 94.100.184.14
Client IP: [REDACTED].127
Network:
etwork info for: [REDACTED].0/24
ion (?):
R (M)
UL (L)
WHOIS info (?):
Network: No results. Network type: No results.
Company: No results. Domain: No results.
AS info
Advertis
AS name
s in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?):
iht click on a client IP to explore it further!
57 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100
Client company info (from GEOFUSION export) First se
2011-0
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Cyber app
iginotar certificate authority compromise :
- Private keys of legitimate certificate authority, Diginotar, stolen by hacker
- FLYING PIG was used to identify a FI to launch a MITM against
How the attack was done:
┌───────────────────┐
│ │
│ Legitimate Google │◄────────────────┐
│ server │ │
│ │ │
└────────▲──────────┘ │
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ ┌───┴───┐
│ │ │
Non-target traffic │ MITM │
│ │ │
│ └───▲───┘
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ │
─────Google request────────────►┌───┴────┐ │
│ │ │
─────Google request────────────►│ Router ├─────────────────Target traffic
│ │
─────Google request────────────►└───▲────┘
│
│
│
[REDACTED].242
Logs into router and adds static route for target traffic
│
│
│
ation using SSL have been fou EGION JADE, LEGION RUBY, n FLYING PIG using known sig
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Results – what do we find?
-
Foreign government networks
-
Airlines
-
Energy companies
-
Financial organisations
-
In cases of good collection, 50-80% of collected private network traffic has been attributed
-
Some false positives can arise if few events correlated, due to factors such as TDIs not being completely unique and public internet proxies giving misleading public IP results
-
Results can frequently be verified using Kerberos etc data
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