449 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
449 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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# A potential technique to deanonymise users of the TOR network
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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OPC-MCR, GCHQ
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Outline
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* TOR and the need for deanonymisation
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* Data transformation
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* Scoring
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* Results
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* Current status
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* Software
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## What is TOR?
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* "The Onion Router"
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* Hides source of traffic by passing encrypted versions of your internet traffic between multiple TOR routers
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* Notation:
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* "Client" – the initiator of communication
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* "Guard node" – the TOR router the client contacts
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* "Exit node” – the TOR router that relays your traffic to the final destination (with no extra encryption so this link can be exploited by SIGINT system)
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## What is TOR?
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```
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Client
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Guard Node
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Onion Router A
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Onion Router
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Onion Router B
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Onion Router
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Onion Router C
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Exit Node
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Server
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```
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Who uses TOR?
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* TOR was created by the US government and is now maintained by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
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* EFF will tell you there are many pseudo-legitimate uses for TOR
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* We're interested as bad people use TOR, in particular:
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* Terrorists
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* Paedophiles
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Aim
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* Find client IP address associated with TOR exit node traffic
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* Attack based on externals – specifically packet timings
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* Strong crypt is being used
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Aim
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* We'll make our task easier by assuming we own the exit node being used
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* Allows us to see all the traffic associated with a TOR circuit
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* Demultiplex traffic by (unknown) user
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Side note: Circuit tracing
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* One suggestion was to track packets through each hop in the TOR network
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* We experimented with spotting all links in circuits created by GCHQ
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* Visibility was too low to be a sensible approach
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* 13 out of 8294 potential inter-TOR-router links were seen
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* We will directly correlate:
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* exit node traffic, and
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* traffic between client and guard node
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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# UK SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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```
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Client
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Collect through SIGINT
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Onion Router A
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Guard Node
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Onion Router B
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Onion Router C
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Exit Node
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Own this node
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Server
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```
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Test data collection
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* Used the standard "TOR button" web-browser package to access TOR
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* Made minor changes to ensure we could collect exit node traffic
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1. "News": Search for news, visit news websites
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2. "TOR": Browse the TOR website and then use a privacy checking website
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* Split into 2a and 2b as TOR changed circuit mid-way through
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1. "Download": visit to SlashDot followed by downloading a large PDF file.
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2. "Forum”: Search on Google followed by browsing a PC technical help forum.
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Flattening of timing patterns
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* [REDACTED] (ICTR-NE) observed that TOR can flatten out timing patterns
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* TOR uses a rate-limiting store-and-forward procedure at each TOR router
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* Graph shows bytes of exit node traffic in green and client traffic in red whilst downloading a 1MB file (figure from [REDACTED])
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```
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50000
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25000
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0
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0s
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50s
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100s
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150s
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200s
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```
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Cumulative packet counts
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* Our new insight is to use cumulative packet counts
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* Hope packets are approximately preserved
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* Approximate as TOR repacketises data
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* See strong correlation
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```
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Exit
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Guard
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Cumulative packet count
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CtoS 1
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15:46 15:48 15:50 15:52 15:54 15:56
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StoC 1
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15:46 15:48 15:50 15:52 15:54 15:56
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CtoS 2a
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16:02 16:04 16:06
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StoC 2a
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16:02 16:04 16:06
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CtoS 2b
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16:02 16:04 16:06 16:08
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StoC 2b
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16:02 16:04 16:06 16:08
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CtoS 3
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16:12 16:14 16:16 16:18
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StoC 3
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16:12 16:14 16:16 16:18
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CtoS 4
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16:22 16:24 16:26 16:28
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StoC 4
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16:22 16:24 16:26 16:28
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Time (hh:mm)
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```
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Scoring: basic idea
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* An idea of [REDACTED]
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* Bin time into intervals
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* For each interval get a pair (Ei, Gi)
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* Cumulative exit node packets upto time i
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* Cumulative guard node packets upto time i
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* Measure the correlation between these pairs
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* We use 1s time-windows
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* Easy for the SIGINT system
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* Seems to work
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Scoring: refinements
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* We also expect counts to be similar
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* Fit a linear model
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* G = α+ βEᵢ
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* Only accept sessions where ½ < β < 2
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Scoring: refinements
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* There may be an unknown time-offset
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* Traffic takes time to relay through the TOR network
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* SIGINT clocks may not be synchronised
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* We slide the traces against each other and find the best match
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* Truncate to exit node trace (we know that it is a complete TOR circuit)
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Self-comparison
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* We show how the score behaviour as a function of time slide
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* See high correlation (pink) at small time offset
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* Also generally see β (blue) in a sensible range
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```
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beta
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r^2
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-500 0 500
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CtoS 1
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2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0
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StoC 1
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CtoS 2a
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StoC 2a
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2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0
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CtoS 2b
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StoC 2b
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2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0
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CtoS 3
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StoC 3
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2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0
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CtoS 4
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StoC 4
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2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0
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-500
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0
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500
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Time offset / s
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```
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## False positives
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* Want an algorithm with very low false positive rate
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* Used 2 hours of (timestamp, source IP, destination IP) tuples captured from 4 10G internet bearers
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* Filtered to tuples between a guard node and a non-TOR node
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* Allow time to arbitrarily slide +/- 2 hours
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* In real redeployment one would restrict this slide
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* Allow us to plot ROC curves for the technique
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## False positives
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* Linear – log ROC curve plot
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* Server-to-client good
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* We miss the very short "2a" session with no false-positives
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* Threshold r²=0.998
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* High as comparing increasing functions
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* Client-to-server direction – many false positives
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* There's less structure in data as less data flows in this direction when web-browsing
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```
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Server to client
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1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0
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True positive rate
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1e-06 1e-04 1e-02 1e+00
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False positive rate
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Client to server
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1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0
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True positive rate
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1e-06 1e-04 1e-02 1e+00
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False positive rate
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```
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## A larger experiment
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* We want to find some false hits to understand worst case accuracy for the server-to-client direction
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* Let's open the aperture very wide
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* 2027 bearer hours of logs with any time slide
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* Filter to all traffic involving a TOR node
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* Not just likely guard-to-client traffic as before
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* We find some false hits (540) but rate is assessed to be low enough.
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* 92% of false hits are against the big download session which has little structure
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## The next step
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* We are collecting the required logs of packet times with TOR guard nodes in SIGINT
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* GTE / JTRIG have adapted some TOR exit nodes we own to collect the required exit node data
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* We are keen to engage with others with exit nodes too
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* Then run the attack
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* Expect to basically work
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* Some extra work might be required to only allow queries on sessions with enough structure
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* Need the bulk data first to progress this question
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## R package
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* An R package can be downloaded from [REDACTED]
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* Includes algorithm and the collected web-browsing data
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* Recommend R packages for sharing analytics, can contain:
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* R / C / Fortran code
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* Example data
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* Runnable examples and documentation
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* Unit tests
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Conclusion
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* Have shown a potential externals-based deanonymisation attack for TOR
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* Requires SIGINT collection of guard-to-client packet times
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* Requires TOR collection from exit nodes we own
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* Hope to get this running live at GCHQ soon
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* Full paper and software available from [REDACTED]
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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---
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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## Questions?
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1st
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* Work by [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
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© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
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