snowchive-meta/data/spiegel_-_media-35539/spiegel_-_media-35539.md
2026-11-19 04:39:11 +02:00

22 KiB

APPLIED RESEARCH

Tor Hidden Services

How Hidden is 'Hidden'?

[REDACTED] - ICTR Network Exploitation

© This information is exempt under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and may be exempt under other UK information legislation. Refer any FOIA queries to GCHQ on [REDACTED]

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 1


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

What is Tor?

  • Tor is an implementation of 2nd generation onion routing
  • Originally sponsored by the US Naval Research Laboratory
  • Later became an Electronic Frontier Foundation project
  • Helps to prevent network traffic analysis & surveillance
  • Open network with over 2000 nodes
  • Anonymity tool
  • Uses multiple layers of encryption
  • Multi-hop proxy

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 2


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

What I have done on Tor

  • General Tor research
  • HOMING TROLL
    • Bridge discovery capability
  • Hidden Services
  • Helped with a few deanonymisation techniques
  • Worked with JTRIG & MCR (Maths & Crypt research)
  • Provided support to OP SUPERIORITY

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 3


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Encrypted

TOR
Encrypted

Clear-text

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 4


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Alice

Ka(Kb(Kc(m
sg))) Entry (Guard
A )

Kb(Kc(msg
))

B
Middle
Node

Kc( msg )

C
Exit
Nod
e

Messa
ge

Bob

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 5


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

What is it used for?

  • The Good
    • People living in oppressive countries (circumvent firewalls)
    • Access to free media instead of state propaganda
    • People can say what they want without it being linked to their public profile
  • The Bad
    • Bot herders use Tor to give instructions to their bots
    • Allows paedophiles access content without linking themselves to it
    • State actors can launch attacks without being attributable
    • "Anonymous" & LULZSec

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 6


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

What do we see?

  • Any traffic between the client & tor is heavily encrypted.
  • We can only really see traffic from an exit node to a website
    • But we don't know where this traffic originated from
  • Still could link up aliases though
    • 'Somebody' could still visit a dodgy forum and log in with an alias, or even send an email using a known target email address (Assuming they don't use SSL).
  • Phew... at least there is some intelligence gain.... Right?

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 7


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Hidden Services

  • Hides the IP address of a web service
  • Protects content providers by anonymously hosting content
  • Publication of undesirable content
  • Both client and server are anonymous to an observer and to each other

Normal Tor

User ? <-> Website Naughty Site Clear text

Hidden Services

User ? <-> Website ? Encrypted

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 8


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

So what do we see now?

  • Not much...
  • All Hidden Service traffic is heavily encrypted.
  • Most we can gather is that one Tor node talks to another (IP level)
  • Hiding in the crowd at its best!

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 9


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

The dot com onion BOOM

  • What's this .onion business?
    • TLD Tor uses to initiate a connection to a hidden service
  • Example onion domain
    • 16 characters in base32 (few characters are actually missing)
    • oqznfi3tdo6nwg3f.onion
  • DNS?
    • Tor uses something similar to DNS to resolve an onion domain
    • Onion domains 'resolve' to 3+ IP addresses called Introduction Points (IPT)

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 10


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Pieces of the Jig-Saw

  • The actual Hidden Service (HS)
    • Where the service actually originates from
  • User
    • The user who wishes to access the Hidden Service
  • Hidden Service Directory (HSDir)
    • A directory server that hold information on a Hidden Service
  • Introduction Point (IPT)
    • Hidden Service's 'front door' / relay
  • Rendezvous Point (RP)
    • Client's 'front door' / relay

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 11


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
IPT
^
|
HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 12


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
HSDir
  ^  IPT
   \ ^
    \|
     HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 13


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
        Client
HSDir
  ^  IPT
   \ ^
    \|
     HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 14


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
     |-- Client
     v
HSDir
  ^  IPT
   \ ^
    \|
     HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 15


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
      Client
     /      \
    v        v
HSDir   IPT   RP
     ^  ^
      \ |
       \|
        HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 16


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
      Client
     /   |  \
    v    v   v
HSDir   IPT   RP
     ^  ^ |
      \ | |
       \| v
        HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 17


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
      Client
     /   |  \
    v    v   v
HSDir   IPT   RP
     ^  ^ |  ^
      \ | | /
       \| vv
        HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 18


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Fitting it together

  1. HS selects random IPTs
  2. HS uploads descriptor to HSDir
  3. Client finds out about HS
  4. Client requests descriptor from HSDir
  5. Client selects a random RP
  6. Client contacts one IPT
  7. HS replies to RP
  8. RP relays between client and HS
      Client
     /   |  ^
    v    v   v
HSDir   IPT   RP
     ^  ^ |  ^
      \ | | /
       \| vv
        HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 19


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Possible Exploits?

  • Rendezvous Point (RP)
    • What if we owned the RP?
    • Traffic still encrypted, although only a single layer of encryption
    • Still only content, don't know who the user is or where the HS is located
    • Clients randomly select their RP so unlikely to be picked anyway
  • Hidden Service Directory (HSDir)
    • If we take a HSDir down, there are still many left
    • Could potentially collect onion domains if we acted as a HSDir
  • Client
    • No real way to distinguish between a Tor user accessing the web or a HS

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 20


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

  • Introduction Points (IPT)
    • All Hidden Service IPTs are listed on its descriptor (the thing that's stored on a HSDir)
    • Potential for an attack on IPTs to stop them accepting connections for the HS
    • This could be done using a 'Coil Attack'
    • Doesn't stop a HS selecting another set of IPTs
    • HS can encrypt their IPTs in their descriptor (but not many do)

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 21


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

  • Hidden Service (HS)
    • What about exploiting the HS directly?
    • Potential to identify the IP addresses hidden services
      • But cant really say which one
    • Identified a beaconing pattern from HS
    • Dependant on collection posture
    • Great for PRESTON

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 22


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Idle Client Beacons

                                                         500

|
|   /|\      /|\      /|\      /|\      /|\      /|\     250
|  / | \    / | \    / | \    / | \    / | \    / | \
| /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \
|/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \
+------------------------------------------------------- 0
0m   200m   400m   600m   800m   1000m  1200m

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 23


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Idle HS Beacons

                                                         2000

|
|   /|\      /|\      /|\      /|\      /|\      /|\     1000
|  / | \    / | \    / | \    / | \    / | \    / | \
| /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \  /  |  \
|/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \/   |   \
+------------------------------------------------------- 0
0m   200m   400m   600m   800m   1000m  1200m

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 24


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Summary

  • Tor helps people become anonymous
  • Very naughty people use Tor
  • Hidden Services hide the fact web content even exits!
  • Near impossible to figure out who is talking to who
  • Its complicated
  • Some areas for further research
  • Until then... Doesn't stop us from using them

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 25


UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

Questions?

© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] Contains Intellectual Property owned and/or managed by Ownership GCHQ. The material may be disseminated throughout the recipient organisation, but GCHQ permission must be obtained for dissemination outside the organisation

UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT

APPLIED RESEARCH

Slide 26