55 lines
No EOL
3.2 KiB
Markdown
55 lines
No EOL
3.2 KiB
Markdown
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
|
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
|
|
|
SIDtoday
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT
|
|
|
|
FROM: Adolf Cusmariu, HLT Operational Technologies (S24211), and
|
|
[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, Levant Sunni Extremism (S2I24)
|
|
Run Date: 03/22/2007
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) Use of voice-masking devices complicate efforts to "voice ID" SIGINT targets.
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) Earlier this month, Counterterrorism (S2I) Levant Sunni Extremism language
|
|
analysts noticed that the intercepts of two prominent Al-Qai'da associated extremists in the
|
|
Levant contained voice masking; the audio either sounded far too high, or too low in pitch.
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) In one instance Saudi-based senior extremist financier Abu-Ubaydah used the
|
|
voice-masking tool throughout his conversation dealing with his financing the travel of Yemeni
|
|
suicide bombers to both Lebanon and Iraq. In another instance, Syria-based senior foreign
|
|
fighter and facilitator Abu-Ghadiyah began in masked mode, went unrecognized by the
|
|
recipient, turned the masking device off, and both had a good laugh.
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) Of course, this is no laughing matter, since all efforts to identify any speaker -
|
|
both human and automated - will fail when voice alteration is used. But why would a caller do
|
|
this at all? Surely the recipient would also fail to recognize the speaker, so absence of this very
|
|
human method of sound identification would only induce suspicion and mistrust. Disturbingly,
|
|
could some terrorists be aware of efforts by SIGINT agencies to identify them by their voices and
|
|
thus have begun to resort to masking?
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) The devices used to alter voices in the few cases intercepted so far may not have
|
|
been all that sophisticated. Simple changes in sampling rates done in mathematical software
|
|
made the digital audiofiles sound more normal; in fact, two specific intercepts may have
|
|
contained the same speaker. Still, automated detection of such anomalies will be difficult.
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) A way to undo masking for an intended recipient would be to use the same device
|
|
and agree on settings prior to each transmission, so that unmasking could be done near-real
|
|
time. For example, if the sampling rates were increased by 25% to make the speaker's pitch
|
|
sound far too low, sampling rate reduction by the same amount at the other end would return a
|
|
normal voice. Even simpler, if only voice messaging is used, the masked recorded audio could
|
|
be undone after playback through an (un)masking device.
|
|
|
|
(TS//SI//REL) Because speaker identification services will continue to provide a key piece of the
|
|
puzzle in tracking and capturing terrorists, voice-masking techniques need to be understood
|
|
early. Tools developed for other intelligence applications are available and will be acquired to
|
|
study this emerging problem.
|
|
|
|
(U//FOUO) Do you have any comments on this topic? Post them on the SID today blog .
|
|
|
|
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
|
|
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
|
|
|
|
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
|
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
|
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108 |