493 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
493 lines
13 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Cyber Threat Detection
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* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
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* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
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* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
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* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
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* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
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* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
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* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
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* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
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Canada
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1
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
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```
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?
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Selection and Filtering
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A
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Communications Security Establishment
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Processing and Enrichment
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Protocol Analysis
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Crypt Attack
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Data Repositories
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Network Analysis
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Cyber Analysis
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GoC
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S.16
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Canada
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Internet
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GOC Intelligence
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CSIS Counter Intelligence
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TS SEYES Mitigation
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Knowledge Transfer
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1. IT Security
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2. COVENANT
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3. Special Source
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4. 5-Eyes Network
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5. CNE
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```
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
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* Globally pervasive threat
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* Covered by 5-Eyes network
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* Utilizing encryption
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* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
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* Abusing telecommunications protocols
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* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
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* Communicate using foreign languages
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* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
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* Constantly changing modus operandi
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* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
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* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
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* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
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* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
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* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
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* CSEC elements working as one...
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* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
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* monitors health and status of government networks
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* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
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```
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facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
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SEEDSPHERE
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is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
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and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
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Mini-Feed
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Today
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* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
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* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
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* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
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* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
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Yesterday
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* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
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Last Week
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* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
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### The Wall
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SIENNABLUE wrote:
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すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
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てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
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ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
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See All Photos of Me (230)
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See All Friends (23)
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Edit My Profile
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Share +
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I am online now
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Friends
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23 Friends
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See All
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DIESELRATTLE
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SIENNABLUE
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DOWNGRADE
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Places I've Been (125,234)
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See All
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Groups
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See All
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Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
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lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
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underground
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```
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
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* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
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* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
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* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
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```
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Cluster throughput (file system)
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400 Mb/s
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300 Mb/s
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200 Mb/s
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100 Mb/s
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06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
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Inbound Outbound
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CPU usage
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100%
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80%
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60%
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40%
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20%
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0%
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06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
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System User Total
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764.8 Mb/s
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611.9 Mb/s
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458.9 Mb/s
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305.9 Mb/s
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153 Mb/s
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06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
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* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
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* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
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* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
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* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
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```
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Joint Capability Development
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### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
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* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
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* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
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* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
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* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
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* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
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* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
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* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
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* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
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Canada
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5
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
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Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
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Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
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Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
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1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Joint Capability Development
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### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
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* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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Canada
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7
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Cyber Threat Detection
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* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
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* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
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* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
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* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
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* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
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* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
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* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
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* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
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Canada
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1
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
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|
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```
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?
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Selection and Filtering
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A
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|
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Communications Security Establishment
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Processing and Enrichment
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Protocol Analysis
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Crypt Attack
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Data Repositories
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Network Analysis
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Cyber Analysis
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S.16
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GoC
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Canada
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Internet
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GOC Intelligence
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CSIS Counter Intelligence
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TS SEYES Mitigation
|
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Knowledge Transfer
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|
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1. IT Security
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2. COVENANT
|
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3. Special Source
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4. 5-Eyes Network
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5. CNE
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```
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|
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Canada
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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|
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## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
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||
|
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* Globally pervasive threat
|
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* Covered by 5-Eyes network
|
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* Utilizing encryption
|
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* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
|
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* Abusing telecommunications protocols
|
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* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
|
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* Communicate using foreign languages
|
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* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
|
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* Constantly changing modus operandi
|
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* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
|
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* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
|
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* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
|
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* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
|
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* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
|
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|
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* CSEC elements working as one...
|
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* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
|
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* monitors health and status of government networks
|
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* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
|
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|
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```
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facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
|
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SEEDSPHERE
|
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is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
|
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and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
|
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|
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Mini-Feed
|
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|
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Today
|
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|
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* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
|
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* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
|
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* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
|
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* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
|
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|
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Yesterday
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|
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* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
|
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|
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Last Week
|
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|
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* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
|
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|
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### The Wall
|
||
|
||
SIENNABLUE wrote:
|
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すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
|
||
てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
|
||
ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
|
||
|
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See All Photos of Me (230)
|
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See All Friends (23)
|
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Edit My Profile
|
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Share +
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I am online now
|
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|
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Friends
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23 Friends
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||
See All
|
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DIESELRATTLE
|
||
SIENNABLUE
|
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DOWNGRADE
|
||
|
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Places I've Been (125,234)
|
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See All
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|
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Groups
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See All
|
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|
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Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
|
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lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
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underground
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```
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|
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Canada
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Speaker: [REDACTED]
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-Added the health and status of Government network bullet
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* Removed '4th party' and instead mention how it enhances our repositories (will introduce 4th party here)
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
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|
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## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
|
||
|
||
* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
|
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* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
|
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* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
|
||
|
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```
|
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Cluster throughput (file system)
|
||
|
||
400 Mb/s
|
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300 Mb/s
|
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200 Mb/s
|
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100 Mb/s
|
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06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
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Inbound Outbound
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|
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CPU usage
|
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|
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100%
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80%
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60%
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40%
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20%
|
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0%
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06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
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System User Total
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|
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764.8 Mb/s
|
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611.9 Mb/s
|
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458.9 Mb/s
|
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305.9 Mb/s
|
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153 Mb/s
|
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06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
|
||
|
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* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
|
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* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
|
||
|
||
* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
|
||
* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
|
||
---
|
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|
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
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Communications Security Establishment
|
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||
|
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## Joint Capability Development
|
||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||
|
||
* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
|
||
* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
|
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* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
|
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* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
|
||
* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
|
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* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
|
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* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
|
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* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
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|
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Canada
|
||
5
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||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||
|
||
## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
|
||
|
||
Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
|
||
Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
|
||
Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
|
||
|
||
1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||
|
||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||
|
||
* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
|
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* [REDACTED]
|
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* [REDACTED]
|
||
* [REDACTED]
|
||
* [REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
7
|