299 lines
No EOL
6.5 KiB
Markdown
299 lines
No EOL
6.5 KiB
Markdown
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
# Hackers are Humans too
|
||
|
||
## Cyber leads to CI leads
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
1
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Introductions
|
||
|
||
* [REDACTED]
|
||
* Cyber-counter intelligence
|
||
* My primary focus is MAKERSMARK (Russia)
|
||
* CSEC – Covert Network Threat (CNT) group
|
||
* New name, same Cyber/CI group you know and love
|
||
* Cyber and traditional CI sitting side by side
|
||
* Focused on Foreign Intelligence, not Information Assurance
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
2
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Goals
|
||
|
||
* How do we attribute cyber intrusion sets?
|
||
* How do we go beyond the hacking face of a CNE program?
|
||
* Expose management structure, operators
|
||
* Requirements, technological advances
|
||
* This presentation portrays only one method
|
||
* Passive infrastructure tasking/contact chaining
|
||
* Many other are available
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
3
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Initial Seed
|
||
|
||
* Infrastructure tasking
|
||
* Mostly exposed through malware/content delivery
|
||
* Careful and manual monitoring of anomalous network sessions
|
||
* Nothing fancy
|
||
* Not Web 2.0, but it works
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
4
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Overview
|
||
|
||
* MAKERSMARK
|
||
* Misuse of Operational Infrastructure
|
||
* Poor OPSEC practices
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
5
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## MAKERSMARK (Russian CNE)
|
||
|
||
Designed by geniuses
|
||
Implemented by morons
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
6
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## MAKERSMARK
|
||
|
||
* The MAKERSMARK less attributed (LA) systems are really well designed
|
||
* This has not translated into security for MAKERSMARK operators
|
||
* Personal browsing through LA systems
|
||
* Workshops, ORBs, and controllers
|
||
* Development shop infected by crimeware
|
||
* 4th party collection
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
7
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## MAKERSMARK: Less Attributed Overview
|
||
|
||
```
|
||
Downlink is collected by MM
|
||
Satellite
|
||
SIGINT Intercept
|
||
Packet Returned to Attack Station
|
||
Spoofed Source IP
|
||
MAKERSMARK
|
||
IP Routes to a Satellite Customer
|
||
Satellite ISP Transmitter
|
||
Response to Spoofed IP
|
||
Destination Server
|
||
```
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
8
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## MAKERSMARK: Misuse of Infrastructure
|
||
|
||
* Less Attributable infrastructure used for highly attributable purposes:
|
||
* Hosting implant callback servers
|
||
* Live testing of new implant protocols
|
||
* Collecting exfiltration
|
||
* This is not CNE best practices
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
9
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## MAKERSMARK: Misuse of LA Systems
|
||
|
||
* Personal Social Networking
|
||
* Vkontakt
|
||
* (mail/inbox/bk).ru accounts
|
||
* Personal Email
|
||
* Webmail/POP
|
||
* Personal retrieval through masquerading infrastructure
|
||
* Personal web browsing
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
10
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## MAKERSMARK: 4th party collection
|
||
|
||
* Implant development shop infected by GUMBLAR botnet
|
||
* Crimeware
|
||
* Sends pharmaceutical spam
|
||
* Exfiltration to Canadian "bullet proof" host
|
||
* HTTP/FTP logins
|
||
* Collection of MM operator browsing habits
|
||
* MM LiveJournal accounts included in collection
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
11
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Closing Remarks
|
||
|
||
* You have to keep an eye out
|
||
* A lot of value can be lost by not following leads
|
||
* Typically the window to exploit information is short
|
||
* Knowing what to look for is half the battle
|
||
* These exploitation opportunities don't last forever
|
||
* As a CNE program matures, so will its OPSEC
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
24
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
|
||
|
||
Communications Security
|
||
Establishment Canada
|
||
|
||
Centre de la sécurité
|
||
des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Questions?
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
25 |