115 lines
No EOL
5.8 KiB
Markdown
115 lines
No EOL
5.8 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
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National Security Agency
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Central Security Service
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April 2013
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Information Paper
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(U) Subject: NSA Intelligence Relationship with Australia
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(U) Executive Summary
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(S//REL) The mutually beneficial partnership between the United States and Australia
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continues to grow. Australia's Intelligence Community (AIC), which includes NSA's SIGINT
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partner, the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), looks to the U.S. Intelligence Community in
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general, and NSA specifically, for continued guidance as it expands its cyber capabilities. DSD
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continues to contribute in significant ways to efforts on China, cyber, and support to military
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operations (SMO) in Afghanistan. DSD has broken new ground in several operational areas
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and accelerated evolving cyber policies to meet the challenges of multiple operators in the
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cyber domain.
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(S//REL) Although budget cuts have constrained DSD's funding and personnel, DSD believes
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the cuts will be manageable. Most new personnel and investment at DSD are associated with
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cyber operations: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), Computer Network Attack (CNA),
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Computer Network Defense (CND) – DSD's three cyber authorities. There is no U.S. Cyber
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Command equivalent in Australia as DSD performs that function for the Australian Defence
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Force. Mr. Ian McKenzie has been Director DSD since 2007.
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(U) Key Issues
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(C//REL) In response to malicious cyber attacks, the Australian Government recently
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established the Australian Cyber Security Centre to improve partnerships between government
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agencies and with industry. By the end of 2013, the Government's most sophisticated cyber
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security capabilities—from across the national security community—will be located in one
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facility. This will create a more holistic picture of the cyber threat and facilitate faster and more
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effective responses to serious cyber incidents. There will be improved interaction with
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international and industry partners and will make Australia a harder target for malicious cyber
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activities.
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(TS//SI//REL) The AIC plans to further develop and maintain assessment and collection
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capabilities to provide more comprehensive intelligence coverage [REDACTED] China is changing the strategic balance in the Pacific by expanding its interests in the Asia-
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Pacific region and the Indian Ocean, modernizing its military, striking a more assertive
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strategic posture, and flaunting its power. Increased emphasis on China will not only help
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20320801
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
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ensure the security of Australia, but also synergize with the U.S. in its renewed emphasis on
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Asia and the Pacific.
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(U) What NSA Provides to the Partner
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(S//REL) NSA provides cryptologic products/services to the Government of Australia through
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DSD, on virtually all subjects, particularly those related to the Pacific Rim. NSA shares
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technology, cryptanalytic capabilities, and resources for state-of-the-art collection, processing
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and analytic efforts. NSA will continue to work closely with Australia to meet its commitments
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as the U.S reallocates efforts toward Asia and the Pacific.
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(U) What the Partner Provides to NSA
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(TS//SI//REL) NSA and DSD have agreed to specific divisions of effort, with the Australians
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solely responsible for reporting on multiple targets in the Pacific area, including Indonesia,
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Malaysia, and Singapore, based on their unique language capabilities and geographic
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accesses. In addition, DSD has primary reporting responsibility [REDACTED] regardless of geographic region. DSD provides access to commercial
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and foreign/domestic satellites from sites in Geraldton and Darwin, High Frequency (HF)
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collection and Direction Finding (DF) from three sites; and, manning of the operations floor at
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Joint Defense Facility at Pine Gap (RAINFALL), a site which plays a significant role in
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supporting both intelligence activities and military operations. In addition, DSD provides NSA
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with access to terrorism-related communications collected inside Australia.
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(U) Success Stories
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(TS//SI//REL) The close collaboration between NSA and DSD has been particularly useful in
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providing cryptologic insight into Chinese targets. A high-level framework for collaboration
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between DSD and NSA on understanding the life cycle of China [REDACTED] is in
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coordination. Australia's overall intelligence effort on China, as a target, is already significant
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and will increase in 2013, as it draws down its presence in Afghanistan. [REDACTED]
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(S//REL) Further evidence of DSD's close collaboration with NSA and the U.S. is DSD's
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membership in several coalitions, including SIGINT Seniors Pacific (SSPAC)¹, SIGINT Seniors
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Europe (SSEUR)², and the Afghanistan SIGINT Coalition (AFSC)³. DSD is chairing both the
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SSPAC Executive Board and Analytic Working Group, from 2012 to 2014.
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(TS//SI//REL) An example of Australia's support to international cyber security is DSD's
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SPARTA campaign, which dovetails with the U.S.-directed Operation DAYBREAK, a long-term
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¹ (S//REL) SSPAC - Australia, Canada, France, India, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, and
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United States
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² (S//REL) SSEUR - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
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Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States
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³ (S//REL) AFSC - Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
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Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
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effort to counter Chinese theft of sensitive business information and proprietary technology.
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SPARTA has already met with success since being rolled out in February 2013.
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(U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner
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(U) None.
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(U//FOUO) Prepared by: [REDACTED]
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Foreign Affairs Directorate
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Country Desk Officer, Australia
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
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