98 lines
No EOL
2.8 KiB
Markdown
98 lines
No EOL
2.8 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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# Special Collection Service
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## Pacific SIGDEV Conference
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## March 2011
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The Overall Classification of this Briefing:
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20360301
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---
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## The SCS Cyber Advantage
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SIGINT prowess provides cyber advantage
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* Unified operations provides holistic approach
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* The right intelligence delivered to the right customer
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Home field advantage in adversary's space
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* Where our customers want us and our adversaries do not
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* Capitalizing on the "element of surprise"
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Signal access for collection, exfil, and infil
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* Microwave, WiFi, WiMAX, GSM, CDMA, Satellite, etc.
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Living in the environment
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* Insights on infrastructure and configurations
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* Discovery of targets, signatures, and behavior
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Tailored intelligence products
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* Diverse products driven by national objectives and
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local needs through formal reporting, target packages,
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analytic insights, situational awareness, threat warning
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Unique platform for conducting and enabling IC operations
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* Fully leveraging 30-years of experience within the NSA and
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CIA enterprises and using existing authorities
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Broad Spectrum of Capability
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* Geographic Advantage
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* Signal Access
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* Analysis
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* Dissemination
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* Unique Platform for IC Operations
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Integrated Mission
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Human enabled SIGINT
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Employ all the capabilities of the SCS to gain access to the targets – Maybe use a SIGINT focused mission to highlight how it can easily contribute to a cyber focus in the CNE/CNA/ CND world? Make the use of SIGINT information operations a liability for our adversaries in cyber operations
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Unique place within the Intelligence Community where we can and do blend CIA and NSA operations to further IC intelligence needs
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---
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## 80 Points of Presence
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## 1000s of Opportunities on the Net
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SCS lives on the Net at worldwide Points of Presence
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SCS PoPs provide opportunities for access, enabling, and analysis
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Large Networks: 3,000 – 5,000
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WLANs: 10,000 – 30,000
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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Need to know how to better survey, populate databases, and understand what accesses we have 1 guy – 4 systems
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Significant diversity in the parts of the network that we see, not just fiber and router access
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---
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TOP SECRET // COMINT // REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## SCS Opportunities
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* TERRORISTS
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* CRIMINAL GROUPS
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* SATELLITE
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* SUPPLY CHAIN
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* FOREIGN INTEL AGENTS
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* CELL PHONE
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* HACKERS
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* TROJAN
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* BOTNET DDOS
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SCS PoPs provide opportunities for access, enabling, and analysis
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Look at what we are doing with a cyber viewpoint, not just SIGINT |