1421 lines
No EOL
42 KiB
Markdown
1421 lines
No EOL
42 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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# CSEC ITS/N2E
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# Cyber Threat Discovery
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DISCOCON 2010
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A CND Perspective
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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1
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## N2E Cyber Threat Discovery
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* CSEC/ITS Discovery: Context & Sitrep
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* Current Capabilities
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* CND Metadata Analysis at Scale
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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2
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## N2E Context
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* Within CSEC/ITS, CND operations concentrated in N2
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- Core: incident response team (alerts -> analysis -> mitigation advice)
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- Malware/RE & VR teams
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* Discovery has always been a required activity within N2
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- IR often takes precedence
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* N2E established to focus effort on discovery
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- Hunting vs. firefighting: new threats, techniques, tradecraft
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- Iterations of hypothesis based research/analysis
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* What evidence is there in the data of compromised systems?
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* What new threats or techniques can we find operating against us?
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- Development of effective anomaly detection/heuristic techniques
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* How can we better detect these new threats in the future?
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* Shape capability development priorities
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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3
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## N2E Sitrep
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* Team formally established earlier this year
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- Growing to 7; hiring underway, strong candidates in pipeline
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* Excellent access to full take data
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* Analytical environment improving
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* Progress on policy support
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- Use of intercepted private communications
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- Sharing mechanisms
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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4
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Our Haystack
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* Three individual clients
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- 10's - low 1000's of signature based alerts each day (majority false positive)
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* Soon: "official" Internet gc.ca aggregation point
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* Full pcaps (retention: days to months)
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- 1's - 10's TB of passively tapped network traffic each day
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* Metadata (retention: months to years)
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- 10's - 100's GB of non-indexed, textual, network metadata / day (descript e)
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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5
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Toolset
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* Homemade wrappers for heuristic detection tools
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* Popquiz/Slipstream for metadata
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* And…
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$ find | xargs | grep | sed | cut | awk | sort | uniq -c | perl | python
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
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Canada
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6
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Homemade Wrappers: PonyExpress
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## SMTP processing
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8Ball wrapper to process all email attachments
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* Cuts and re-rebuilds SMTP session from full packet captures
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* Extracts and logs metadata from SMTP and RFC822
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* Extracts attachments and sends it to a cluster of 8Ball services
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- Wrapper able to manage other deep scan tools (e.g. AV)
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- Aggregates results from scans asynchronously
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* Generates alerts for analysts to look at with full SMTP pcap
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* Catches new implants or first stage delivered using attachments
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
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7
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Homemade Wrappers: Stripsearch
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Automated binary analysis
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* Recursively runs binary through the following tools:
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[REDACTED]
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* Correlation with file repository and reports
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* Future: greater degree of automation
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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8
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Metadata
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* Standard Flows (with protocol guessing)
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* DNS
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- Queries / Answers and beaconing
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* SMTP
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- RFC 788 (SMTP), RFC 822 (2822, 5322) Internet Message Format
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* HTTP
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- All server-side headers
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- User-Agent summary
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- List of POST without a GET, URLs and PE downloads
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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9
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Metadata::findmask
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[REDACTED]
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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10
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Noteworthy Catches
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WMI-based implant
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* Trend Micro has a good report this type of implant
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http://us.trendmicro.com/imperial/md/content/us/trendwatch/researchanda
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* Uses WMI for persistence instead of Registry or Boot sector
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- Reside in ActiveScriptEventConsumer
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- First seen in September 2009
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See RFI_20091023_280_1 and IXR_20100909_732_1
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- Caught with Pony Express
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- Stripsearch fuzzy correlation linked it with previous reports
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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11
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Noteworthy Catches
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Google IP addresses used as a sleep command
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* From DNS metadata
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- When call back domain was queried, a Google IP was used as a sleep command. Searching for Google IPs in DNS metadata revealed new TROPPUSNU domains and infected workstations.
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Suspicious RDP and TOR sessions
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* From Flow metadata we identified:
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RDP
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- Incoming RDP sessions from various locations to the RDP service (uses the same certificate)
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- Still under investigation
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TOR
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- Was picked-up as a suspicious burst of outgoing SSL connections going to several locations from a single source
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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12
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Noteworthy Catches: TOR…
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* Most likely a breach of Internet usage policy
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* All SSL CERTS were:
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- Self-signed
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- Certificate has a validity window of just 2 hours (e.g. 101017152421Z to 101017172421Z)
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- Issuer name appears to be a randomly generated fully qualified domain name (FQDN), unique for each destination IP (e.g. www.b2wwzduvdc5jyty3s7.net)
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- Common Name (CN) field appears to be a randomly generated FQDN unique for each session (e.g. www.xehzhl3cip.net)
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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13
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Noteworthy Catches: TOR…
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* All sessions for October 17 extracted from pcap using the following ngrep HEX string:
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$ ngrep -I pcap -tq -X 0x5A170D313031303137
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T 2010/10/17 15:49:00.699087 [REDACTED] -> X.X.X.43:61469 [AP]
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(…
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✂…)[REDACTED]..101017152421Z..101017172421Z0%1#0!..U....www.b2wwzdu
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vdc5jyty3s7.net0(…✂…)
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- The string is the end of validity period (Date only)
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* Snort signature could be generated for looking at CERTS with validity period starting/ending same day
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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||
14
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## CND Metadata Analysis at Scale
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## Selected SAWUNEH Results
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Found It!!!
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Congratulations, it only took you 65298 seconds
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www.jolyon.co.uk
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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15
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## General Problem: Information Overload
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* What is 'at scale' for CSEC CND?
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* Problem: too much data
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- Acquired, retained, summarized, analyzed, presented to analysts
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* Opportunities at all tiers of system. Selected SAWUNEH topics help in one or more of these areas
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
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Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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16
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## What is SAWUNEH?
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* Literally: 'Summer Analytic Workshop Up North EH'
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- Annual data analysis workshop hosted at CSEC by crypt-math shop
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- 2010 thrust was CND
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- Reps from each of the 5 eyes + cleared researchers
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* Helps fill the (sparsely inhabited) plane that often exists between OpsDev and R&D
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* Special Assets: Netezza, Cray XMT
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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17
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---
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TOP SECRET
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Topic 1: Correlating 'E-Mail, Web, Flow' Metadata
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* E-mail based content delivery attacks against GC *very* common
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* CND capability rapidly developed & deployed; heavily relies on attachment scanning
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* The inevitable evasion
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- Attacks now commonly use email as inducement to URL visit, instead of direct content delivery.
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* Too many benign hyperlinks delivered over email
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- Need to reduce metadata presented to front line analysts
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
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Canada
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||
18
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---
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TOP SECRET
|
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
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## Topic 1: Correlating 'E-Mail, Web, Flow' Metadata
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Reducing Email URL metadata volume delivered to front line analysts
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* Select highly suspicious subset of Email URL metadata based on correlation
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* Only present 'Email URL' metadata if:
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- Email was inbound
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- Contained one or more hyperlinks
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- Hyperlink nominated as suspicious
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- Hyperlink was actually visited by a recipient.
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- Provide flow and http metadata for resulting HTTP session
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
19
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---
|
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TOP SECRET
|
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
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## Topic 1: Correlating 'E-Mail, Web, Flow' Metadata
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## SAWUNEH approach
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* Import EMAIL, URL, FLOW metadata into separate tables on the NETEZZA appliance (distributed db)
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* Single SQL Query to fill requirement:
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[REDACTED]
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|
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
20
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||
|
||
---
|
||
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TOP SECRET
|
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
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## 'Email + Web' attack detection
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## SAWUNEH Style
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**Findings**:
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* 50% of the unique results were malicious
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* Significantly lower false positive rates compared to URL inspection only
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* Result provides anomaly tip but also context at fingertips for analyst
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**Next Steps:**
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* Better definition of 'suspicious' URL
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* Automate extraction of web content from session for analysts
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* Automate feeding of web payloads into content scanning system = partial mitigation of the original evasion. Higher analyst productivity
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
21
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|
||
---
|
||
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TOP SECRET
|
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Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Topic 2: Malicious Attachment Prediction
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**Problem:**
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* Our current email scanning system **fully** processes **every** email it sees in a modular fashion
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* Works very well today, but we can't afford to scale this approach 'as-is' to meet future requirements.
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* Large proportion of time spent in *late* stages of processing.. especially deep scan
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**Possible Approach:**
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* Can we predict which emails will score in the deep scan based only on metadata extracted during earlier processing phases?
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* If so, can we drop those that have low probability of deep scan success?
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|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
22
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|
||
---
|
||
|
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TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
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|
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## Malicious Attachment Prediction
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* Given metadata from each processing phase, build a predictive model to selectively promote emails with high probably of non-zero scoring in 8-ball based on features extracted early in processing
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* Choice of Predictive Model
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- Random Forests: decision tree based classifier (Brieman 2001)
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* Take a feature set (X1…. Xp) and a corpus of training samples with *known* classification as input. Generate *Random Forest* of decision trees to be used to prediction classification
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* New samples pass through previously trained forest which yields probability that deepscan will be nonzero
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|
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
23
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|
||
---
|
||
|
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TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
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## Malicious Attachment Prediction
|
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## Data Reduction vs. 'Interesting' Data Loss
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Data Reduction
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100
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80
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60
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40
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20
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0
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0 20 40 60 80
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All Features
|
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Meta Features
|
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Random
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|
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Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
24
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|
||
---
|
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TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
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## Malicious Attachment Prediction
|
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**Result:**
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* 85% data reduction with 1-3% loss of 'interesting' emails
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- Can discard majority of emails with minimal loss in positive hits
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* Prediction with model is relatively cheap (10,000s features per second)
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**Next steps:**
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* Extract those features which contribute most to prediction and incorporate appropriate filters in each stage of email processing system with aim to discard early and often
|
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|
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* There are likely a few simple features contributing disproportionally to predictive power: flow size, attachment size, attachment type etc
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
25
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||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
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Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## (Mini) Topic 3: PE Masquerade Detection
|
||
|
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* Multiple threat actors observed masquerading Windows PE downloads using 'benign' filename extensions (jpg, gif, htm etc)
|
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|
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* We log metadata on HTTP sessions containing a PE header in content of first packet (modules available in both SLIPSTREAM and POPQUIZ)
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- Exclude entries with suffixes common to PE downloads (exe, bin, php, asp)
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- Provide analysts contextual metadata & 1 click access to payloads
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* Easy to see entries that jumped out: file extensions such as .jpg, .gif highly suspicious, often malicious
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|
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* Also filter by 'uniqueness' over time to eliminate AV / OS updates
|
||
|
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* Next Step: automate extraction of pe masquerades and push through content scanning system
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
26
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||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
27
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||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
28
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Final Notes
|
||
|
||
**SAWUNEH outcomes made a few things clearer to us**
|
||
|
||
* Our days of plain old **grep** as primary search tool are nearing an end
|
||
|
||
* Relational DB's provide us with a few key benefits:
|
||
- Simple indexing of existing metadata (sub second searches)
|
||
- ability to correlate easily across 'primary' metadata outputs
|
||
- significantly faster hypothesis testing
|
||
|
||
* Depending on scale, DB over head may be too costly
|
||
- In such cases, still very useful tool for discovery work on finite snapshots
|
||
- Case be used to test correlation hypothesis on finite data sets before spending significantly more cycles implementing a streaming / on-line version.
|
||
|
||
* Simple correlation techniques can provide high yield metadata to analysts
|
||
- Islands of primary metadata are becoming unwieldy
|
||
- Post processing of primary metadata (correlation, newness, uniqueness, reduction techniques etc) becoming a requirement to mitigate information overload.
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
29
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Thanks
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
30
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
# CSEC ITS/N2E
|
||
# Cyber Threat Discovery
|
||
|
||
DISCOCON 2010
|
||
A CND Perspective
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
1
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## N2E Cyber Threat Discovery
|
||
|
||
* CSEC/ITS Discovery: Context & Sitrep
|
||
* Current Capabilities
|
||
* CND Metadata Analysis at Scale
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
2
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## N2E Context
|
||
|
||
* Within CSEC/ITS, CND operations concentrated in N2
|
||
- Core: incident response team (alerts -> analysis -> mitigation advice)
|
||
- Malware/RE & VR teams
|
||
* Discovery has always been a required activity within N2
|
||
- IR often takes precedence
|
||
* N2E established to focus effort on discovery
|
||
- Hunting vs. firefighting: new threats, techniques, tradecraft
|
||
- Iterations of hypothesis based research/analysis
|
||
* What evidence is there in the data of compromised systems?
|
||
* What new threats or techniques can we find operating against us?
|
||
- Development of effective anomaly detection/heuristic techniques
|
||
* How can we better detect these new threats in the future?
|
||
* Shape capability development priorities
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
3
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## N2E Sitrep
|
||
|
||
* Team formally established earlier this year
|
||
- Growing to 7; hiring underway, strong candidates in pipeline
|
||
* Excellent access to full take data
|
||
* Analytical environment improving
|
||
* Progress on policy support
|
||
- Use of intercepted private communications
|
||
- Sharing mechanisms
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
4
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Our Haystack
|
||
|
||
* Three individual clients
|
||
- 10's - low 1000's of signature based alerts each day (majority false positive)
|
||
* Soon: "official" Internet gc.ca aggregation point
|
||
|
||
* Full pcaps (retention: days to months)
|
||
- 1's - 10's TB of passively tapped network traffic each day
|
||
* Metadata (retention: months to years)
|
||
- 10's - 100's GB of non-indexed, textual, network metadata / day (descript e)
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
5
|
||
|
||
Notes on gc.ca:
|
||
* System capacity at 400TB per month
|
||
* Expected to start at 150TB per month (68 departments) but expected to grow to capacity the next 2 years (>100 departments)
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Toolset
|
||
|
||
* Homemade wrappers for heuristic detection tools
|
||
* Popquiz/Slipstream for metadata
|
||
* And…
|
||
|
||
$ find | xargs | grep | sed | cut | awk | sort | uniq -c | perl | python
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
6
|
||
|
||
We have a bunch of heuristic tools which are good at detecting unknown malware. They are mainly wrappers around tools like 8Ball and metadata produced out of raw network traffic.
|
||
|
||
Detection from wrappers handled through alert management system but metadata analyzed manually.
|
||
|
||
Using good old unix text filters!!!
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Homemade Wrappers: PonyExpress
|
||
## SMTP processing
|
||
|
||
8Ball wrapper to process all email attachments
|
||
|
||
* Cuts and re-rebuilds SMTP session from full packet captures
|
||
* Extracts and logs metadata from SMTP and RFC822
|
||
* Extracts attachments and sends it to a cluster of 8Ball services
|
||
- Wrapper able to manage other deep scan tools (e.g. AV)
|
||
- Aggregates results from scans asynchronously
|
||
* Generates alerts for analysts to look at with full SMTP pcap
|
||
* Catches new implants or first stage delivered using attachments
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
7
|
||
|
||
* Currently processes 400,000 emails per day
|
||
* These are all emails that were previously filtered by Anti-SPAM, Anti-Virus softwares
|
||
* Out of these, 400 gets promoted to the alert system
|
||
* 1% of these alerts are worthy of reporting to client
|
||
|
||
* With gc.ca coming
|
||
* PonyExpress will be in front of Anti-Virus, Anti-SPAM due to location of collection points.
|
||
* Looking at deploying appliances in front of PonyExpress
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Homemade Wrappers: Stripsearch
|
||
|
||
Automated binary analysis
|
||
|
||
* Recursively runs binary through the following tools:
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
* Correlation with file repository and reports
|
||
* Future: greater degree of automation
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
8
|
||
|
||
* Modules are run in parallel and some sequentially: Filters are run first to exclude known good
|
||
* Each module can be selectively disabled or enabled
|
||
* Recursive means when 8Ball finds an embedded file, it extracts it and runs it through stripsearch independently
|
||
* Currently processes our malware repository (~1500 samples) in 1h30 minutes.
|
||
* Capable of processing folders and subfolders
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Metadata
|
||
|
||
* Standard Flows (with protocol guessing)
|
||
* DNS
|
||
- Queries / Answers and beaconing
|
||
* SMTP
|
||
- RFC 788 (SMTP), RFC 822 (2822, 5322) Internet Message Format
|
||
* HTTP
|
||
- All server-side headers
|
||
- User-Agent summary
|
||
- List of POST without a GET, URLs and PE downloads
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
9
|
||
|
||
SMTP comes from PonyExpress
|
||
All others from popquiz
|
||
|
||
HTTP server headers and User-Agent summary are based on the first payload packet so when headers are using more than one packet data gets truncated. Sorting yelds strange side effects like showing nice staircase-like output
|
||
|
||
User-Agent: b
|
||
User-Agent: bla
|
||
User-Agent: blab
|
||
User-Agent: blabl
|
||
User-Agent: blabla
|
||
|
||
Found some SQL injection attempts in Server String: 'DROP TABLE servertypes; --
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Metadata::findmask
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
10
|
||
|
||
When we have more than 7 – 10 unique known strings in the same flow its usually worth investigating. Anything less is most likely a false positive.
|
||
|
||
Looks for XORed strings such as:
|
||
* Windows API calls
|
||
* Part of Registry keys
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Noteworthy Catches
|
||
|
||
WMI-based implant
|
||
|
||
* Trend Micro has a good report this type of implant
|
||
http://us.trendmicro.com/imperial/md/content/us/trendwatch/researchanda
|
||
|
||
* Uses WMI for persistence instead of Registry or Boot sector
|
||
- Reside in ActiveScriptEventConsumer
|
||
- First seen in September 2009
|
||
See RFI_20091023_280_1 and IXR_20100909_732_1
|
||
- Caught with Pony Express
|
||
- Stripsearch fuzzy correlation linked it with previous reports
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
11
|
||
|
||
Since first version, we saw increase in sophistication
|
||
At first WMI event created through a script run by CSCRIPT.EXE
|
||
Now, is able to create the WMI event from the binary
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Noteworthy Catches
|
||
|
||
Google IP addresses used as a sleep command
|
||
* From DNS metadata
|
||
- When call back domain was queried, a Google IP was used as a sleep command. Searching for Google IPs in DNS metadata revealed new TROPPUSNU domains and infected workstations.
|
||
|
||
Suspicious RDP and TOR sessions
|
||
* From Flow metadata we identified:
|
||
RDP
|
||
- Incoming RDP sessions from various locations to the RDP service (uses the same certificate)
|
||
- Still under investigation
|
||
TOR
|
||
- Was picked-up as a suspicious burst of outgoing SSL connections going to several locations from a single source
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
12
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Noteworthy Catches: TOR…
|
||
|
||
* Most likely a breach of Internet usage policy
|
||
* All SSL CERTS were:
|
||
- Self-signed
|
||
- Certificate has a validity window of just 2 hours (e.g. 101017152421Z to 101017172421Z)
|
||
- Issuer name appears to be a randomly generated fully qualified domain name (FQDN), unique for each destination IP (e.g. www.b2wwzduvdc5jyty3s7.net)
|
||
- Common Name (CN) field appears to be a randomly generated FQDN unique for each session (e.g. www.xehzhl3cip.net)
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
13
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Noteworthy Catches: TOR…
|
||
|
||
* All sessions for October 17 extracted from pcap using the following ngrep HEX string:
|
||
|
||
$ ngrep -I pcap -tq -X 0x5A170D313031303137
|
||
|
||
T 2010/10/17 15:49:00.699087 [REDACTED] -> X.X.X.43:61469 [AP]
|
||
(…
|
||
✂…)[REDACTED]..101017152421Z..101017172421Z0%1#0!..U....www.b2wwzdu
|
||
vdc5jyty3s7.net0(…✂…)
|
||
|
||
- The string is the end of validity period (Date only)
|
||
* Snort signature could be generated for looking at CERTS with validity period starting/ending same day
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
14
|
||
|
||
The easiest signature would be to have snort look at starting end ending in the same month. However, the signature will have to be changed every month.
|
||
|
||
A search for October only looking at CERTs ending in October (1010) resulted in a lot of false positives but easily managed by greping start date of October. Only one false positive left.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## CND Metadata Analysis at Scale
|
||
## Selected SAWUNEH Results
|
||
|
||
Found It!!!
|
||
|
||
Congratulations, it only took you 65298 seconds
|
||
|
||
www.jolyon.co.uk
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
15
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## General Problem: Information Overload
|
||
|
||
* What is 'at scale' for CSEC CND?
|
||
|
||
* Problem: too much data
|
||
- Acquired, retained, summarized, analyzed, presented to analysts
|
||
|
||
* Opportunities at all tiers of system. Selected SAWUNEH topics help in one or more of these areas
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
16
|
||
|
||
**Today:**
|
||
1-10's TB pcap retained each day
|
||
10's-100's GB of metadata retained each day
|
||
|
||
**Future:**
|
||
metadata continues to increase linearly with new access points
|
||
attempt to hold pcap steady at current rates through smarter retention policies
|
||
|
||
**Tiers:**
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## What is SAWUNEH?
|
||
|
||
* Literally: 'Summer Analytic Workshop Up North EH'
|
||
- Annual data analysis workshop hosted at CSEC by crypt-math shop
|
||
- 2010 thrust was CND
|
||
- Reps from each of the 5 eyes + cleared researchers
|
||
|
||
* Helps fill the (sparsely inhabited) plane that often exists between OpsDev and R&D
|
||
|
||
* Special Assets: Netezza, Cray XMT
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
17
|
||
|
||
Many researchers but focus is 'applied'
|
||
Netezza: distributed data appliance made available to facilitate workshop
|
||
OpsDev vs R&D rather than Ops vs R&D
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Topic 1: Correlating 'E-Mail, Web, Flow' Metadata
|
||
|
||
* E-mail based content delivery attacks against GC *very* common
|
||
|
||
* CND capability rapidly developed & deployed; heavily relies on attachment scanning
|
||
|
||
* The inevitable evasion
|
||
- Attacks now commonly use email as inducement to URL visit, instead of direct content delivery.
|
||
|
||
* Too many benign hyperlinks delivered over email
|
||
- Need to reduce metadata presented to front line analysts
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
18
|
||
|
||
PonyExpress:
|
||
Yields many detections with low false positive rates
|
||
Commercial sector has responded in similar fashion
|
||
|
||
Email as inducement
|
||
Delivery of HTTP URL over E-mail, exploit is delivered via HTTP
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Topic 1: Correlating 'E-Mail, Web, Flow' Metadata
|
||
|
||
Reducing Email URL metadata volume delivered to front line analysts
|
||
|
||
* Select highly suspicious subset of Email URL metadata based on correlation
|
||
|
||
* Only present 'Email URL' metadata if:
|
||
- Email was inbound
|
||
- Contained one or more hyperlinks
|
||
- Hyperlink nominated as suspicious
|
||
- Hyperlink was actually visited by a recipient.
|
||
- Provide flow and http metadata for resulting HTTP session
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
19
|
||
|
||
Initial definition of 'suspicious' was naive: suffix dictionary
|
||
Have actual visit helps by:
|
||
more likely to be successful attack
|
||
means analyst likely has access to related web traffic to assist with triage
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Topic 1: Correlating 'E-Mail, Web, Flow' Metadata
|
||
## SAWUNEH approach
|
||
|
||
* Import EMAIL, URL, FLOW metadata into separate tables on the NETEZZA appliance (distributed db)
|
||
|
||
* Single SQL Query to fill requirement:
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
20
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## 'Email + Web' attack detection
|
||
## SAWUNEH Style
|
||
|
||
**Findings**:
|
||
|
||
* 50% of the unique results were malicious
|
||
* Significantly lower false positive rates compared to URL inspection only
|
||
* Result provides anomaly tip but also context at fingertips for analyst
|
||
|
||
**Next Steps:**
|
||
|
||
* Better definition of 'suspicious' URL
|
||
* Automate extraction of web content from session for analysts
|
||
* Automate feeding of web payloads into content scanning system = partial mitigation of the original evasion. Higher analyst productivity
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
21
|
||
|
||
Possible 'suspicious' definitions: URLs tagged with 'ObfJavaScript, FlashContent, LedToDownload' etc
|
||
Correlated on URL 'trees' not isolated URLS (otherwise redirects, remote hrefs etc defeat scanning).. But somewhat expensive (not sure if this is solved in feasible way ?)
|
||
|
||
primary metadata sources too large for discovery… need value-add reductions
|
||
reduced 'working sets' of metadata = higher yield for analyst time.
|
||
|
||
They evade by moving payload delivery to different session. We follow them and (attempt) to close evasion.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Topic 2: Malicious Attachment Prediction
|
||
|
||
**Problem:**
|
||
|
||
* Our current email scanning system **fully** processes **every** email it sees in a modular fashion
|
||
* Works very well today, but we can't afford to scale this approach 'as-is' to meet future requirements.
|
||
* Large proportion of time spent in *late* stages of processing.. especially deep scan
|
||
|
||
**Possible Approach:**
|
||
|
||
* Can we predict which emails will score in the deep scan based only on metadata extracted during earlier processing phases?
|
||
* If so, can we drop those that have low probability of deep scan success?
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
22
|
||
|
||
Fully process = sessionize, smtp, rfc822, mime, deep scan(8Ball) of all attach…etc
|
||
|
||
Optimization axiom: find your hotspot
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Malicious Attachment Prediction
|
||
|
||
* Given metadata from each processing phase, build a predictive model to selectively promote emails with high probably of non-zero scoring in 8-ball based on features extracted early in processing
|
||
|
||
* Choice of Predictive Model
|
||
- Random Forests: decision tree based classifier (Brieman 2001)
|
||
|
||
* Take a feature set (X1…. Xp) and a corpus of training samples with *known* classification as input. Generate *Random Forest* of decision trees to be used to prediction classification
|
||
|
||
* New samples pass through previously trained forest which yields probability that deepscan will be nonzero
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
23
|
||
|
||
Phases: (ip, tcp, smtp, rfc822, mime etc)
|
||
|
||
Classifier:
|
||
Based on probability of scoring non-zero in deep scan
|
||
Example features include: [REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
In our case: email metadata types + > 10000 previously scanned samples with full metadata including overall scan score used to build the Forest
|
||
|
||
Note: Only build/train forest once. Subsequently you are just passing metadata through and getting an P(email scores non-zero)
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Malicious Attachment Prediction
|
||
## Data Reduction vs. 'Interesting' Data Loss
|
||
|
||
Data Reduction
|
||
|
||
100
|
||
80
|
||
60
|
||
40
|
||
20
|
||
0
|
||
|
||
0 20 40 60 80
|
||
|
||
All Features
|
||
Meta Features
|
||
Random
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
24
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Malicious Attachment Prediction
|
||
|
||
**Result:**
|
||
|
||
* 85% data reduction with 1-3% loss of 'interesting' emails
|
||
- Can discard majority of emails with minimal loss in positive hits
|
||
* Prediction with model is relatively cheap (10,000s features per second)
|
||
|
||
**Next steps:**
|
||
|
||
* Extract those features which contribute most to prediction and incorporate appropriate filters in each stage of email processing system with aim to discard early and often
|
||
|
||
* There are likely a few simple features contributing disproportionally to predictive power: flow size, attachment size, attachment type etc
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
25
|
||
|
||
Could be used either permanently, or simply as a learning tool to find which features you might want to filter on.
|
||
|
||
Emphasis on feature predictors available early in processing (flow, smtp, 822 header rather than MIME content etc)
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## (Mini) Topic 3: PE Masquerade Detection
|
||
|
||
* Multiple threat actors observed masquerading Windows PE downloads using 'benign' filename extensions (jpg, gif, htm etc)
|
||
|
||
* We log metadata on HTTP sessions containing a PE header in content of first packet (modules available in both SLIPSTREAM and POPQUIZ)
|
||
- Exclude entries with suffixes common to PE downloads (exe, bin, php, asp)
|
||
- Provide analysts contextual metadata & 1 click access to payloads
|
||
|
||
* Easy to see entries that jumped out: file extensions such as .jpg, .gif highly suspicious, often malicious
|
||
|
||
* Also filter by 'uniqueness' over time to eliminate AV / OS updates
|
||
|
||
* Next Step: automate extraction of pe masquerades and push through content scanning system
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
26
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
27
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
28
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Final Notes
|
||
|
||
**SAWUNEH outcomes made a few things clearer to us**
|
||
|
||
* Our days of plain old **grep** as primary search tool are nearing an end
|
||
|
||
* Relational DB's provide us with a few key benefits:
|
||
- Simple indexing of existing metadata (sub second searches)
|
||
- ability to correlate easily across 'primary' metadata outputs
|
||
- significantly faster hypothesis testing
|
||
|
||
* Depending on scale, DB over head may be too costly
|
||
- In such cases, still very useful tool for discovery work on finite snapshots
|
||
- Case be used to test correlation hypothesis on finite data sets before spending significantly more cycles implementing a streaming / on-line version.
|
||
|
||
* Simple correlation techniques can provide high yield metadata to analysts
|
||
- Islands of primary metadata are becoming unwieldy
|
||
- Post processing of primary metadata (correlation, newness, uniqueness, reduction techniques etc) becoming a requirement to mitigate information overload.
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
29
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET
|
||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||
|
||
## Thanks
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
|
||
|
||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||
Canada
|
||
30 |