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55 KiB
Markdown
1313 lines
No EOL
55 KiB
Markdown
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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QICR
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Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review
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FINAL REPORT
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April 2009
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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Office of the Director of National Intelligence
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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Derived From: ODNI POL-08
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Declassify On: 20340306
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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QICR
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Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review
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FINAL REPORT
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April 2009
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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(U) FOREWORD
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(U) If one does not consider the long-range future, one will never cease to be surprised. The Director of
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National Intelligence (DNI) has an annualized planning/programming process to guide short-term (1-5 years)
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perspectives. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) and Vision 2015 provide mid-term (5-10 years) perspec-
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tives. The Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR) provides an essential long-term piece, looking
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out between 10 and 20 years. This longer term view complements shorter term assessments, challenges basic
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assumptions, exposes the potential risks of extrapolating tomorrow's needs from today's conditions, and
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examines missions and capabilities in light of alternative futures.
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(U) This report describes the results of the 10-month QICR. Building on the National Intelligence Council's
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Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, experts from across the Intelligence Community (IC), other U.S.
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departments and agencies, academia, think tanks, and industry assessed the implications of the year 2025 for
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the IC.
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(U) QICR 2009 developed alternative future scenarios based on Global Trends 2025 to explore concepts and
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capabilities the IC may need to fulfill critical missions in support of U.S. national security. It does not purport
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that any one future will materialize, but rather outlines a range of plausible futures so that the IC can best
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posture itself to meet the range of challenges it may face.
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(S//REL) This Final Report summarizes six concepts for how the IC may need to operate by 2025. Of particular
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note, QICR 2009 identifies three concepts that are critical to the success of the IC across a wide range of future
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scenarios ("safe bets") and suggests that these concepts merit attention in the IC's longer term planning
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efforts, including the NIS, Intelligence Planning Guidance, and other guidance documents. The first concept
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is the development of a sensing and learning environment capable of handling massive amounts of infor-
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mation (Sentient Enterprise). The second is the adoption of a more dynamic and tailored customer-services
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model (Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services). The third is the adoption of an expeditionary mindset
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that can project operational capability and enhanced analytic connectivity in both physical and virtual
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venues (Responsive Presence).
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(U) We hope this report will stimulate spirited debate and rigorous thinking as to how the IC can best posture
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and prepare for a range of future environments.
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David R. Shedd
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Deputy Director of National Intelligence
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Policy, Plans & Requirements
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April 21, 2009
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Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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(U) Introduction. The Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review (QICR) 2009 used scenario-based analysis to help the Intel-
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ligence Community (IC) consider how to best minimize strategic surprise and manage institutional risk to meet challenges that
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may emerge by 2025.
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(C//REL) Drawing on the National Intelligence Council's Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed, QICR made three key assump-
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tions about the future landscape for intelligence. First, other actors will increase in power and relevance relative to the United
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States. Second, the information environment will radically transform in scope, complexity, and intensity, with intelligence targets
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operating seamlessly and simultaneously between the physical and virtual worlds. Third, customers and the IC workforce will be
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"digital natives" with different operating models and expectations for how to perform and leverage the business of intelligence.
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(U) Concepts for Intelligence in 2025. In this landscape, certain organizing principles for performing intelligence functions-
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"concepts" in this report-could help turn future challenges into opportunities. QICR identified three concepts ("safe bets") that
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appear critical to the success of the IC across a wide range of possible futures and therefore merit consideration in today's long-
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term planning activities.
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* (C//REL) Sentient Enterprise is an IC that creates a sensing and learning environment for humans and intelligent machines to
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analyze "exabytes" of data in near-real time to generate and test hypotheses, autonomously process and evaluate insights to
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cue collection, and self-update/self-correct.
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* (C//REL) Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services envisions an IC postured to provide more customized tools, products,
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and services to an expanding set of customers with different styles and end uses.
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* (C//REL) In Responsive Presence, the IC has an expeditionary intelligence capacity to deploy small teams to hostile (physical or
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virtual) environments with minimal infrastructure, while readily drawing on more diverse and instantly collaborative analytic
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expertise to guide operations and directly leverage the insights gained.
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(U) "Strategic hedges" are concepts deemed highly relevant in some possible futures but less relevant in others, which the IC may
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need to develop as circumstances warrant.
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* (C//REL) Technology Acquisition by All Means envisions the IC aggressively employing a mix of overt means, clandestine
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penetration, and counterintelligence tactics to address severe U.S. technological erosion vis-à-vis near-peer competitors and
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global corporations.
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* (C//REL) In Human Terrain in the Virtual World, the IC confronts environments dominated by non-state actors, requiring uncon-
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ventional human collection methods with more flexible sets of analytic partners to track highly empowered, cyber-immersed
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individuals and groups.
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* (C//REL) Money Mastery describes an operating concept that requires the IC to compensate for the possible loss of access to
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reliable financial and economic data (at the global, national, and sector levels) by penetrating corporations, foreign finance
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ministries, central banks, and market participants to create an "economic operating picture."
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(S//REL) Conclusion. Four broader implications arise from the QICR 2009. First, the IC will have to manage highly fluid relation-
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ships to deal with the dynamism of a more competitive national security environment. Second, it will need to manage a singular
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operational architecture to deal with the new ways that a greater volume of information will flow. Third, the IC will need to main-
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tain strong information and identity assurance to address the likely erosion in its technological advantage and the new dynamics
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of the digital medium. Fourth, the IC will need to change the role of the intelligence officer to deal with a dynamic external envi-
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ronment and adapt to new customer needs. To posture the IC to deal with these implications, QICR suggests the value of further
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study by appropriate IC elements in the areas of policy, regulation, and law; organization and structure; workforce management;
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and information and identity assurance.
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ii
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(U) TABLE OF CONTENTS
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(U) INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................1
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(U) Methodology...............................................................................................................1
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(U) Key Assumptions........................................................................................................2
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(U) CONCEPTS FOR INTELLIGENCE IN 2025...................................................5
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(U) Safe Bet: Sentient Enterprise......................................................................................6
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(U) Safe Bet: Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services..........................................8
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(U) Safe Bet: Responsive Presence..................................................................................10
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(U) Strategic Hedge: Technology Acquisition by All Means...........................................12
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(U) Strategic Hedge: Human Terrain in the Virtual World..............................................14
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(U) Strategic Hedge: Money Mastery..............................................................................16
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(U) CONCLUSION ........................................................................................19
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Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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iii
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Q
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(U) INTRODUCTION
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(U) Every 4 years, the Intelligence Community (IC)
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assesses the most challenging issues it could face
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beyond the standard planning cycle. This process is
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known as the Quadrennial Intelligence Community
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Review (QICR).
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(U) QICR 2009 was a scenario-based strategic planning
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activity that looked out to the year 2025 and consid-
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ered alternative future environments (i.e., "scenarios"),
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missions the IC might be called on to perform, and the
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concepts and some illustrative capabilities that would
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be needed to fulfill those missions. This Final Report
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summarizes the key findings and recommends next
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steps to help position the IC to address the challenges
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of the future.
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(U) Methodology
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(U) The QICR 2009 applied best practices of scenario
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planning used in both industry and government. Using
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as a starting point Global Trends 2025: A Transformed
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World, produced by the National Intelligence Council
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(NIC), QICR developed four scenarios that were de-
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signed to be divergent, plausible, challenging, and rel-
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evant to the IC. These scenarios are not predictive, but
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illustrate the range of possible challenges we might
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confront. QICR organized the scenarios along two key
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dimensions of uncertainty-the relative importance
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of the nation-state and the extent of global coop-
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eration-and then incorporated additional relevant
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features of possible future environments gleaned
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from seven recognized geo-strategic scenario sets
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developed by public, private, U.S., and foreign sources.
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(See the QICR Scenarios Report, January 2009, for a full
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discussion of the scenarios.)
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(U) The scenarios served as the basis for analysis of
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missions the IC might be asked to perform in support
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of national objectives and the concepts and capabili-
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ties the IC would need to perform these missions. (The
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four scenarios are summarized in the figure on page
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2.) Each scenario implied a core set of missions for the
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IC that was not exhaustive but highlighted the key de-
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mands customers would likely place on the IC in 2025
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beyond the array of established intelligence activities:
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* (C//REL) World Without the West: Although a coali-
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tion of four well-armed competitor states calls for
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continued robust military analysis, understanding
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energy, natural resources, and technological inno-
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vation emerges as a critical mission for the IC.
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* (C//REL) BRIC's* Bust-Up: As the United States
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struggles to maintain its world standing amidst
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competing and insular blocs, the IC is predomi-
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nantly focused on economics and commercial
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science and technology (S&T) missions.
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* (C//REL) Politics Is Not Always Local: With non-state
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affinity groups driving international politics, the
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IC is focused on transnational threats, particularly
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crime and cyber attack.
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\* (U) The acronym BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and
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China, or more generally, the big developing economies.
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Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
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1
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(U) QICR Scenarios
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STATE DOMINATED
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ALIGNED
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GLOBAL COOPERATION
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NON-STATE DOMINATED
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KEY PLAYERS
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FRAGMENTED
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A China/Russia/India/Iran-centered bloc challenges U.S. supremacy and sets the pace for innovation in key technologies
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WORLD WITHOUT THE WEST
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Identity-based groups supplant the authority of nation-states, competing with one another for influence in a
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chaotic political environment
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POLITICS IS NOT ALWAYS LOCAL
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BRIC'S BUST-UP OCTOBER SURPRISE
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Locked in multi-polar competition, states jockey for resources and adopt mercantilist trade policies in a precarious balance of power
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Power shifts to corporations and megacities, allowing global ills (climate change to international crime) to spiral out of control
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* (C//REL) October Surprise: Amidst the rise of mega-
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corporations as the purveyors of traditional state
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functions, the IC focuses on uncovering economic,
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financial, and corporate ground truth, as well as on
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providing early warning on outbreaks of infectious
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disease and natural disasters.
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(U) QICR developed concepts to illustrate how today's
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operating model will have to change for the intel-
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ligence enterprise to remain effective. QICR identified
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two sets of concepts. Concepts that were critical to the
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success of the IC across all the scenarios were labeled
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"safe bets," indicating that we should begin planning
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for their eventual adoption. Concepts that were critical
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to only one or two scenarios were deemed "strategic
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hedges," implying that we should experiment with
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them and consider long-lead development of essential
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elements, while monitoring ongoing events to assess
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whether more aggressive action is appropriate.
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(U) The QICR process also delineated sample capabili-
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ties to clarify the intent and impact of these concepts
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for activities, people, technology, etc. These capabilities
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are not meant to be either definitive or exhaustive, but
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rather serve as a starting point for further analysis.
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(U) Key Assumptions
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(C//REL) Based on the NIC's Global Trends 2025 study,
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the QICR identified three key assumptions that set
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the context for the future posture of the IC. First, the
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United States will remain among the most prominent
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2
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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forces in world politics, but the relative ascent of
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other state and non-state actors across the full range
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of power dimensions-military, economic, technologi-
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cal, and social-will place new and different demands
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on the IC.
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* (C//REL) The proliferation, differentiation, and
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sophistication of actors in global politics will
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make it far more difficult to access targets
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(whether in the physical or virtual world),
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maintain a consistent and continuous presence,
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and influence populations.
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* (S//REL) With more tenuous U.S. technological
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leadership in key sectors such as biotechnology,
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nanotechnology, and computing, the IC may have
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less unilateral advantage in critical intelligence
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capabilities (e.g., penetrating encrypted informa-
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tion networks).
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* (S//REL) The IC will increasingly rely on information
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and communication technology that is at least
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partly of foreign origin, rendering critical IC func-
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tions more vulnerable to attack or manipulation in
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increasingly hard-to-detect ways.
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(C//REL) The second key assumption about the world in
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2025 is the transformation in the information (and
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thus cyber) environment, specifically in the volume,
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velocity, and variability with which information flows
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between and among individuals, groups, and states.
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This new environment will be enabled by two paral-
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lel and reinforcing phenomena: the incorporation of
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sensors and processors into many more items (from
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weaponry to foodstuffs) and almost universal access to
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inexpensive networked computing and communica-
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tions technologies. As such, there will be an exponen-
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tial increase in the amount of data of all types poten-
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tially available to the IC, its U.S. Government customers,
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hostile governments, and adversary non-state actors.
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Information will also move at ever increasing speeds,
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and it will exist in greater ranges of formats that
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change more frequently.
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* (C//REL) Most intelligence targets will increasingly
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operate simultaneously in the physical and virtual
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worlds, requiring the IC to adopt a seamless ap-
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proach between the two domains as well.
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* (C//REL) Balancing intelligence with the protection
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of privacy and civil liberties will be even more chal-
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lenging in 2025. The IC will need socially, constitu-
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tionally, and politically acceptable ways to handle
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exponentially more information no matter what
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future comes to pass. In many cases, meeting the
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challenge will come down to more effective data
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management. Automated analysis of "anonymized"
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data could detect threats much earlier without
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infringing upon privacy. Role-based access could
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help mitigate the risk of abuse.
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(C//REL) The third key assumption about the operating
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environment of 2025 is that IC customers and part-
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ners will be "digital natives" and will have a signifi-
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cantly different set of expectations of the IC. They will
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tend to behave in two fundamentally different ways,
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both of which contravene current orthodoxy.
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* (U) Having grown up with the likes of Wikipedia,
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Facebook, Flickr, and Google Earth, customers will
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be accustomed to building their own context, un-
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derstanding, and in many cases, technical details.
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* (U) Customers will be much less reliant on official
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intermediaries and much more comfortable reach-
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ing out directly to networks of experts and data
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(whether or not they are inside the IC).
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Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
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3
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(U) CONCEPTS FOR INTELLIGENCE IN 2025
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(U) To cope with the challenging missions emerging from the four scenarios summarized in the figure on page 2,
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QICR developed six concepts (see figure below) that point to a need for further exploration and potential investment.
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Some of these concepts will be critical across the full spectrum of possible futures and thus are termed "safe bets"
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because they merit the most urgent attention for further development and investment. Other concepts will be highly
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relevant in a narrower range of future operating environments, although aspects of the concept may have wider ap-
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plication. These concepts are termed "strategic hedges," and merit further exploration for investment in the event
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that future developments point toward their increasing importance. Together, these concepts and their associated
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sample key capabilities highlight how the management, organization, and practice of intelligence must evolve to
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cope with the range of alternative futures the IC may confront. The IC will need to develop innovative approaches,
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potentially including some adaptation of the legal and/or policy framework under which the IC operates.
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(U) Sentient Enterprise
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(U) Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services
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(U) Responsive Presence
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(U) Technology Acquisition by All Means
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(U) Human Terrain in the Virtual World
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(U) Money Mastery
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Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
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SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
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5
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(U) Safe Bet:
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Sentient Enterprise
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(U) In 2025, electronic data will have increased ex-
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ponentially as massive amounts of stored data have
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accumulated and access to mobile communications
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and networked sensors have become ubiquitous.
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The volume, velocity, and variability of data will pose
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enormous search and knowledge-management chal-
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lenges, driving the IC toward non-linear processing
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and autonomous organization of critical information.
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Virtual interactions will be integral to daily communica-
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tions for millions of benign purposes, but hostile actors
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will also use this medium as a means to build ideologi-
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cal and financial support and for planning and execu-
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tion of operations. In addition, signals of threats may
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be few, weak, or conflicting because of the ability to
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shelter activity from domains that require a signature.
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(C//REL) The concept of Sentient Enterprise postures the
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IC for this circumstance, creating a sensing and learn-
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ing environment capable of identifying and respond-
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ing to voluminous, simultaneous, and continuous
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inputs. The Sentient Enterprise will track and manage
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thousands of exabytes of data every day (1 exabyte is
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the equivalent of 100,000 times the Library of Con-
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gress, which holds 19 million books), enabling iterative
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assessments in real time, not days or weeks. The data
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it manages will be universally discoverable, accessible,
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and usable by humans and machines equally. Indeed,
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the human-machine interface will allow the individual
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to interact directly with a unified information architec-
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ture. The enterprise will be able to continuously and
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autonomously process, evaluate, and act on new data
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without regard to structure or format. The enterprise
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will log expert users' interactions with the data, while
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gleaning new insights from more generalist users. By
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so doing, the entire enterprise will create, share, and
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advance corporate knowledge in a rich and seamless
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interplay where machines and humans learn together.
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(U//FOUO) The Sentient Enterprise will have the ad-
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ditional benefit of freeing intelligence professionals
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from mundane tasks so that they can focus on activi-
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ties reliant on human judgment. Analysts will be able
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to allocate much more of their time to the front and
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back ends of the intelligence cycle, focusing much
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more energy on scoping problems with customers,
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driving collection, and helping customers understand
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the implications of different courses of action. More
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seasoned officers will be able to more ably mentor
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novices, collaborate with other experts, and influence
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decision-makers.
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(U) Sample Key Capabilities
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* (C//REL) Automation. The IC would emplace
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sensors and monitor applications that run autono-
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mous collection of the most relevant data, trigger
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pattern recognition sequences, and process raw
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|
feeds. This would require supercomputer-like
|
|
capabilities at every "computational point-of-pres-
|
|
ence," from computer terminal to digital handheld
|
|
device. Automation (e.g., in language translation,
|
|
gisting, relational analysis, and trend assessment)
|
|
would allow verification and validation of the ac-
|
|
curacy of information.
|
|
* (U) Artificial Intelligence (AI). Application of
|
|
advanced AI techniques would make it possible to
|
|
continuously improve understanding of complex
|
|
threat environments, discern the relative impor-
|
|
tance of data, and adapt quickly to changes indi-
|
|
cated by sensor data and automated analysis (thus
|
|
providing indication and warning). This would
|
|
allow the experts to focus on translating critical
|
|
information to decision-makers in an effective and
|
|
time-efficient manner.
|
|
|
|
6
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
* (S//REL) Self-Learning. The institutional knowl-
|
|
edge of the Sentient Enterprise would increase the
|
|
user's ability to recall events and significant facts
|
|
to build relational awareness. Simultaneously, the
|
|
human-machine interface would enable the user
|
|
to continuously refine the "algorithms" that trans-
|
|
late human judgments into machine language so
|
|
that the system actively learns.
|
|
* (U) Human Interface. The Sentient Enterprise
|
|
would employ dashboards and similar interfaces
|
|
to provide continuous, real-time visualization of
|
|
the operational environment. Interfaces would in-
|
|
clude interactive touch-screen mapping of a large
|
|
variety of data types that enables zoom and pan
|
|
capabilities to scan the physical, virtual, and social
|
|
environments.
|
|
* (U) Collaborative Features. The Sentient Enter-
|
|
prise would employ social-networking tools and
|
|
virtual models of the real world to monitor the
|
|
threat environment, enable collaboration, and
|
|
test alternative hypotheses. This would include
|
|
social-networking tools that allow outside experts
|
|
to be tapped quickly so they could make contribu-
|
|
tions in a crisis and provide input into the analytic
|
|
process.
|
|
* (S//REL) Protection. The continuously updated,
|
|
multilayered, and changing boundaries of Sentient
|
|
Enterprise would be selectively permeable, requir-
|
|
ing innovative system or data-specific protection
|
|
capabilities for flow of data into and out of the
|
|
data stream.
|
|
|
|
Illustrative Example
|
|
(U) Sentient Enterprise
|
|
|
|
1. (S//REL) Through pervasive sensors, the
|
|
Sentient Enterprise discovers an anomalous
|
|
pattern of influenza in a remote Chinese
|
|
province. Analysts' queries automatically
|
|
trigger human collection in Hong Kong and
|
|
Bangkok and remote technical collection in
|
|
less permissive environments.
|
|
2. (S//REL) The reporting, when combined with
|
|
flight schedules, passenger manifests, and
|
|
public health data, yields near-real-time under-
|
|
standing of the likely transmission vectors to
|
|
the United States. The sensitivity of environ-
|
|
mental sensors at U.S. ports of entry adjusts
|
|
accordingly, allowing the quarantine of infected
|
|
travelers.
|
|
3. (S//REL) Immunologists access the reporting and
|
|
analysis to determine that the strain of influenza,
|
|
while dangerous, is controllable. This informa-
|
|
tion is broadcast to international public health
|
|
organizations. Underlying models, algorithms,
|
|
and collection strategies self-update to anticipate
|
|
future outbreaks.
|
|
|
|
China
|
|
Hong Kong
|
|
Thailand
|
|
Bangkok
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
7
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(U) Safe Bet:
|
|
Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services
|
|
|
|
(U) The expectations of digitally native users and a
|
|
much more diverse set of partners will drive a differ-
|
|
ent conceptualization of the customer. First, the IC will
|
|
engage its customers with greater responsiveness,
|
|
employing highly iterative customer segmentation,
|
|
requirements, and satisfaction analyses to understand
|
|
their working styles and decision-making needs.
|
|
Second, the IC will focus its efforts on more tailored
|
|
services (e.g., visualization techniques and tabletop
|
|
role-play exercises), vice products, to meet the full
|
|
spectrum of customer needs. Third, the IC will provide
|
|
data and analyses anywhere (in U.S.-based offices or
|
|
in the field), in more dynamic ways (from interactive
|
|
streams available via wireless devices to immersive,
|
|
three-dimensional presentations), and at multiple clas-
|
|
sifications.
|
|
|
|
(U) The concept of Segmented Customers, Differentiated
|
|
Services synthesizes these conclusions with a construct
|
|
of three categories of customers. These categories are
|
|
not dissimilar to today, but their needs will be met with
|
|
different capabilities. At one end of the spectrum, "do-
|
|
it-yourself" customers will want data and analytic tools
|
|
from the IC so they can answer their own questions. In
|
|
the middle of the spectrum are users of analytic prod-
|
|
ucts who will expect to see-and work with-the un-
|
|
derlying data and models, frequently in collaboration
|
|
with the IC. At the other end of the customer spectrum
|
|
are users who will turn to analysts for tailored analy-
|
|
sis and products that they can apply without further
|
|
refinement or context.
|
|
|
|
(U) Sample Key Capabilities
|
|
|
|
* (C//REL) Interactive Visualization. The IC would
|
|
deploy dashboards, datastreams, and other
|
|
interfaces that allow customers to continuously
|
|
monitor the operational environment, rather than
|
|
rely on static judgments.
|
|
* (C//REL) Interactive Tools. Interactive decision-
|
|
support tools would allow customers to conduct
|
|
their own sensitivity analyses, test hypotheses, and
|
|
discover new insights from underlying data, either
|
|
with or without an intelligence officer assisting.
|
|
* (C//REL) Customization. Customer interfaces
|
|
would enable users to enter specific requirements,
|
|
update them dynamically, and build tailored prod-
|
|
ucts in various forms and for various media.
|
|
|
|
8
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
Illustrative Example
|
|
(U) Segmented Customers, Differentiated Services
|
|
|
|
1. (C//REL) With global tensions on the rise
|
|
as a Middle Eastern state says it will "go
|
|
nuclear" absent United Nations (UN)
|
|
concessions, a senior weapons of mass
|
|
destruction (WMD) intelligence analyst
|
|
maintains robust and differentiated support to
|
|
three key customers.
|
|
2. (C//REL) The National Security Council director for
|
|
counterproliferation (A) looks to the analyst to ensure
|
|
the latest operational data goes directly to his secure
|
|
laptop (a). The State Department's top arms-control
|
|
negotiator (B) calls on the analyst to help her prepare
|
|
for an upcoming session by walking her through an im-
|
|
mersive simulation using the latest intelligence (b). The
|
|
commander of a multi-national task force in the Indian
|
|
Ocean (C) asks the analyst for a tailored, releaseable
|
|
intelligence product (c).
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
9
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(U) Safe Bet:
|
|
Responsive Presence
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) In 2025, the United States will face much
|
|
greater difficulty penetrating key states that suddenly
|
|
emerge as areas of national security interest. It may
|
|
have neither an extensive forward military presence
|
|
nor much of a physical diplomatic and intelligence
|
|
presence, depriving it of an understanding of the
|
|
socio-cultural environment. Adding to the challenge,
|
|
despite the transformation in the information environ-
|
|
ment, nation-states in some scenarios may try to cor-
|
|
don off their information infrastructures into national
|
|
intranets. In such a world, the IC will need a way to
|
|
rapidly deploy suites of intelligence capability (collec-
|
|
tion, analysis, security, communications, etc.) over the
|
|
horizon to theaters of political-military competition
|
|
where U.S. Government presence and infrastructure
|
|
are minimal or have been withdrawn. In addition, the
|
|
IC will need to be prepared to deploy its resources in
|
|
cyberspace to meet quickly emerging challenges.
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) Responsive Presence addresses this challenge
|
|
by applying the expeditionary model developed in the
|
|
military context, bringing the capability of an overseas
|
|
station to bear when and where necessary. It builds on
|
|
today's deployable organizational models and rests on
|
|
several principles: development of small tactical teams
|
|
capable of rapid deployment and long, autonomous
|
|
operation in a variety of environments; a small logisti-
|
|
cal and communications footprint that is largely carry-
|
|
in/carry-out; and a robust, self-sufficient communica-
|
|
tions capability. Similarly, the intelligence enterprise
|
|
will need a cyber architecture that can rapidly move
|
|
into IT network "clouds" undetected and maintain that
|
|
presence with few additional resources.
|
|
|
|
(U) Sample Key Capabilities
|
|
|
|
* (S//REL) Data Exfiltration and Covert Communi-
|
|
cations. Exfiltrating intelligence from non-permis-
|
|
sive environments will be crucial. A critical enabler
|
|
would be covert communications with a negligible
|
|
forward footprint. U.S. intelligence officers and
|
|
sensitive sources will need to move data in an
|
|
unattributable and undetected way, sometimes
|
|
from within commercial entities possessing great
|
|
technical prowess and robust cyber and electronic
|
|
security protective procedures. Although the likely
|
|
advent of transnational, high-bandwidth wireless
|
|
communications services will offer an environ-
|
|
ment with "lots to hide behind," it will also contain
|
|
many highly competent, and potentially antago-
|
|
nistic, actors.
|
|
* (S//REL) Expanded Reachback. Deployed units
|
|
would have ready reachback to a heterogeneous
|
|
set of expert analysts from IC elements, other
|
|
U.S. Government departments, academia, and
|
|
non-governmental organizations. They would
|
|
have trusted and secure means to communicate
|
|
with these partners that would enable real-time
|
|
exchange while protecting the most sensitive
|
|
operational details.
|
|
|
|
10
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
Illustrative Example
|
|
(U) Responsive Presence
|
|
|
|
1. (S//REL) The Caucasus region be-
|
|
comes a flashpoint after the discovery
|
|
of vast new energy reserves under the
|
|
Caspian Sea. As China, Russia, Iran,
|
|
the European Union, and the United
|
|
States jostle for political influence,
|
|
ethnic hostilities draw them toward
|
|
armed conflict.
|
|
2. (S//REL) The United States quickly
|
|
deploys multidisciplinary teams to the
|
|
region, making heavy use of non-official
|
|
cover. These teams carry in highly
|
|
secure data exfiltration gear, erect a
|
|
signals intelligence capability, and build
|
|
a human collection network.
|
|
3. (S//REL) Deployed teams access IC
|
|
and non-U.S. Government experts who
|
|
augment their cultural and linguistic
|
|
expertise and provide real-time analysis
|
|
to improve field operations and shape
|
|
policy.
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
11
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(U) Strategic Hedge:
|
|
Technology Acquisition by All Means
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) QICR identified two scenarios in 2025 in which
|
|
the United States' technological and innovative edge
|
|
slips-despite our countervailing efforts and shifts
|
|
to denied areas. Under one scenario, a bloc of states
|
|
actively seeking to undermine U.S. geostrategic leader-
|
|
ship could deny access to key emerging technologies.
|
|
Another possibility is that the technological capacity
|
|
of foreign multinational corporations could outstrip
|
|
that of U.S. corporations. The IC would be challenged
|
|
to understand technological innovation outside its
|
|
traditional competencies (e.g., weapons systems) and
|
|
in domains where it traditionally has focused less effort
|
|
(e.g., commercial research and development (R&D)).
|
|
Because technological advancement tends to be ex-
|
|
ponential rather than linear, either development could
|
|
put the United States at a growing-and potentially
|
|
permanent-disadvantage in crucial areas such as
|
|
energy, nanotechnology, medicine, and information
|
|
technology.
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) To offset risk in these particular futures, the IC
|
|
would need to deploy a set of entrepreneurial tactics
|
|
to maintain a technological advantage. This concept
|
|
rests on a multi-pronged, systematic effort to gather
|
|
open source and proprietary information through
|
|
overt means, clandestine penetration (through physi-
|
|
cal and cyber means), and counterintelligence.
|
|
|
|
(U) Sample Key Capabilities
|
|
|
|
* (S//REL) S&T Analysis. The IC would monitor sci-
|
|
entific and trade journals, patent filings, and other
|
|
"gray material" datastreams, enabled by technolo-
|
|
gies associated with Sentient Enterprise, to discover
|
|
latent patterns that precede technological innova-
|
|
tion. Thus, the IC would be better able to manage
|
|
the problem of "tens of analysts" sifting through
|
|
"thousands of pages."
|
|
* (S//REL) "Thousands of Conversations." The
|
|
IC would need the ability to access proprietary
|
|
sources of information in permissive environ-
|
|
ments such as foreign universities, industry trade
|
|
shows, and government conferences. This could
|
|
include cooperating U.S. students, professors, and
|
|
researchers reporting bits of non-public informa-
|
|
tion that by themselves are not sensitive, but
|
|
in aggregate could help the IC make inferences
|
|
about breakthrough technological innovations.
|
|
The key challenge would be working closely with
|
|
the academic and scientific communities (which
|
|
would include non-U.S. persons), gaining trust,
|
|
and monitoring potential "threats" while continu-
|
|
ing to advance U.S. scientific progress.
|
|
* (S//REL) Direct Penetration. In denied or more
|
|
restrictive environments such as state-supported
|
|
R&D centers, the IC would continue to apply hu-
|
|
man intelligence (HUMINT) tradecraft and employ
|
|
HUMINT-enabled close access collection. This
|
|
would include recruitment of sources and assets,
|
|
and provision of appropriate technical means to
|
|
acquire and exfiltrate sensitive information.
|
|
|
|
12
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
* (S//REL) Cyber Operations. The IC would sustain
|
|
close-access collection, frequently by second and
|
|
third parties, to non-public and/or covert centers
|
|
of innovation by implanting applications (i.e., bots)
|
|
that run automated tasks and sensors in software
|
|
and hardware used by foreign researchers and
|
|
manufacturers, and by conducting computer-
|
|
network exploitation of foreign R&D intranets. In
|
|
select instances, this could also involve develop-
|
|
ment of long-term sources.
|
|
* (C//REL) S&T Counterintelligence. Counterintel-
|
|
ligence in both the public and private sectors
|
|
would not rely solely upon defensive measures,
|
|
but would also undertake proactive measures to
|
|
detect, identify, and degrade or neutralize foreign
|
|
efforts to illegally acquire U.S. technology in areas
|
|
where we retain a leadership position. Counter-
|
|
intelligence would actively seek out and engage
|
|
foreign entities involved in illicit intelligence col-
|
|
lection operations using offensive methods and
|
|
become as effective in the cyber sphere as in the
|
|
physical sphere.
|
|
|
|
Illustrative Example
|
|
(U) Technology Acquisition by All Means
|
|
|
|
1. (S//REL) India and Russia are pursuing high-
|
|
temperature superconductivity, which would
|
|
yield a significant economic advantage to the
|
|
first adopter. But four separate streams of
|
|
intelligence, when put together, yield a new
|
|
insight-the two countries are working together.
|
|
2. (S//REL) Sustained reporting from open and
|
|
clandestine sources enables a team of experts
|
|
from the IC, academia, and industry to assess
|
|
the likelihood-moderate-and impact-high-of
|
|
a breakthrough by India and Russia. Counterin-
|
|
telligence reporting suggests the two countries
|
|
are not very interested in U.S. superconductivity
|
|
efforts, which may indicate they believe they
|
|
have a secure lead.
|
|
3. (S//REL) The IC makes separate clandestine
|
|
approaches to India and Russia to break up the
|
|
partnership. It conducts cyber operations against
|
|
research facilities in the two countries, as well as the
|
|
intellectual "supply chain" supporting these facilities.
|
|
Finally, it assesses whether and how its findings
|
|
would be useful to U.S. industry.
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
13
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(U) Strategic Hedge:
|
|
Human Terrain in the Virtual World
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) In 2025, non-state identity and affinity groups
|
|
operating seamlessly across physical and virtual worlds
|
|
could be the key players in global politics. Some of
|
|
these groups could pose a grave challenge to U.S. po-
|
|
litical legitimacy and physical security. In virtual worlds,
|
|
individuals could tailor multiple personas for different
|
|
settings, and both individuals and groups could have
|
|
many overlapping or non-obvious relationships. There-
|
|
fore, understanding the different roles an individual or
|
|
group might play in multiple contexts would represent
|
|
the central challenge around which the IC would be
|
|
oriented.
|
|
|
|
(S//REL) In this circumstance, the IC would increasingly
|
|
need to employ a virtual presence to complement
|
|
its physical presence. That presence would include
|
|
maintaining a forward position inside unconventional
|
|
partner and target entities by routinely embedding
|
|
officers not only in foreign intelligence services, as it
|
|
does today, but also in cooperative non-state groups.
|
|
The IC would also routinely employ private citizens
|
|
as proxies for sensitive analytic and collection tasks.
|
|
Academics, business people, and others would form an
|
|
IC-led standing dialogue, participating in collaborative
|
|
analytic teams when and as their expertise warranted.
|
|
|
|
(U) Sample Key Capabilities
|
|
|
|
* (S//REL) The Virtual IC. The IC would require
|
|
collection approaches and counterintelligence
|
|
capabilities such as online techniques for human
|
|
collection. Developing and protecting online cover
|
|
personas and authenticating the identity of online
|
|
sources and data would continue to be critical
|
|
elements of HUMINT and counterintelligence
|
|
tradecraft.
|
|
* (S//REL) Bridging Domains. An automated cross-
|
|
cueing of collection platforms, including distrib-
|
|
uted sensors, would maintain a seamless approach
|
|
to monitoring and understanding individuals and
|
|
groups as they move between and operate across
|
|
the physical and virtual worlds.
|
|
* (S//REL) Identity Assurance. As it builds a web of
|
|
complex and shifting partnerships, the IC would
|
|
need fail-safe means to authenticate its partners'
|
|
identities, conduct counterintelligence, and con-
|
|
trol access to its most sensitive intelligence, which
|
|
will be more challenging in 2025 than today due
|
|
to the proliferation of key technologies.
|
|
* (S//REL) Counterintelligence. The IC would de-
|
|
velop increasingly effective methods for detecting,
|
|
deterring, and exploiting hidden foreign manipu-
|
|
lation of IC activities, and recognizing the trusted
|
|
insiders who are threats. Offensively, the counter-
|
|
intelligence target of choice would shift to persons
|
|
|
|
14
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
who have access to identity or affinity groups
|
|
assessed as a threat to U.S. national security. These
|
|
targets would be more likely to be located in com-
|
|
mercial or private establishments and might have
|
|
no discernible affiliation with a nation-state actor.
|
|
|
|
* (C//REL) Trusted, Deployable, Diverse Work-
|
|
force. Organizationally, the IC would need to more
|
|
aggressively recruit and maintain a more diverse
|
|
workforce capable of penetrating and analyzing
|
|
affinity-based groups. In many cases, this would
|
|
require hiring from such groups-and dealing
|
|
creatively with the counterintelligence challenges
|
|
presented by the multiple loyalties that such
|
|
recruits would be likely to have.
|
|
|
|
Illustrative Example
|
|
(U) Human Terrain in the Virtual World
|
|
|
|
1. (S//REL) Rapid but unevenly shared
|
|
advances in human enhancement have
|
|
spawned transnational interest groups
|
|
focused on medical ethics. Some question
|
|
limiting human enhancement to the wealthy
|
|
few; others reject it altogether. These
|
|
communities use virtual environments to
|
|
form and proselytize, although some form
|
|
physical communes to live "unenhanced"
|
|
lifestyles.
|
|
2. (S//REL) Although most groups focus
|
|
on peaceful political change, U.S. law
|
|
enforcement and the IC become aware
|
|
of an extremist subcurrent, which they
|
|
are concerned could lead to "medical
|
|
terrorism."
|
|
3. (S//REL) IC and law enforcement agencies
|
|
conduct human intelligence in both physical
|
|
and virtual environments. Automated software
|
|
tools help concatenate commercial, sensor,
|
|
and open-source data to verify targets using
|
|
multiple online personas. Academic experts
|
|
help IC analysts better understand how online
|
|
interest groups self-organize, grow, and splin-
|
|
ter into extremist elements.
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
15
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(U) Strategic Hedge:
|
|
Money Mastery
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) If corporations, megacities, and foreign
|
|
governments were to limit access to data critical to
|
|
the provision of global public goods such as macro-
|
|
economic stability, U.S. policymakers could come to
|
|
rely on the IC to assist in efforts to collect and analyze
|
|
this closely held financial and economic information
|
|
and create an "economic operating picture" similar to
|
|
the "common operating picture" the military strives for
|
|
today. Basic elements of today's financial intelligence
|
|
(e.g., international datasets maintained by the Interna-
|
|
tional Monetary Fund and others, government reports,
|
|
and industry analyses) would be unavailable, unreli-
|
|
able, or misleading.
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) In this case, the IC would need a concept of
|
|
Money Mastery to penetrate corporations, markets, for-
|
|
eign central banks, and foreign finance ministries and
|
|
organizations so that it could gather and analyze pro-
|
|
prietary data. The IC also would need to track critical
|
|
commodities markets in much greater detail as well as
|
|
the full range of illicit financial markets and economies.
|
|
This concept would far exceed today's approach to
|
|
financial and economic intelligence in scale and scope
|
|
and would require increasingly sophisticated targeting
|
|
expertise, even more aggressive HUMINT collection,
|
|
and processing tools.
|
|
|
|
(U) Sample Key Capabilities
|
|
|
|
* (S//REL) "White/Grey/Black” Literature Exploita-
|
|
tion. Overtly, the IC would monitor open markets
|
|
in stocks, commodities, and currencies. To acquire
|
|
non-public but unprotected data such as propri-
|
|
etary business information, it would use two-way
|
|
information sharing with trusted and cooperative
|
|
corporations and foreign governments. Clan-
|
|
destinely, the IC would use human and technical
|
|
means, including sophisticated tracking soft-
|
|
ware, to access closely held market, financial, and
|
|
business data, be it inside corporations, foreign
|
|
governments, or other institutions.
|
|
* (C//REL) Geoeconomic Analysis. Intelligence pro-
|
|
fessionals would monitor the stability of the global
|
|
economic system (not just single nation-state
|
|
economies) for early warning of disruptions and
|
|
would help policymakers understand the implica-
|
|
tions of different policy interventions.
|
|
* (S//REL) Verify and Validate. The IC would assume
|
|
an even greater validation function to discern the
|
|
truth in official economic data issued by nation-
|
|
states and multilateral organizations. To do this,
|
|
the IC would employ a standing collaborative
|
|
network of economic experts-drawn from many
|
|
sectors of the economy, business, and governmen-
|
|
tal bodies, foreign and domestic-while mitigat-
|
|
ing the potential insider threat.
|
|
|
|
16
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
Illustrative Example
|
|
(U) Money Mastery
|
|
|
|
1. (S//REL) A handful of international
|
|
city-states and mega-corporations have by-
|
|
passed multilateral forums to establish their
|
|
own carbon cap-and-trade regime. Most
|
|
trading of carbon credits occurs through
|
|
private channels that are opaque to financial
|
|
regulators (U.S. or otherwise).
|
|
2. (S//REL) Concerned that this burgeoning
|
|
market could trigger a global financial crisis,
|
|
a network of IC and non-IC government
|
|
agencies overtly partners with U.S. energy
|
|
and carbon-abatement corporations to
|
|
acquire non-public information about the
|
|
carbon-credit market.
|
|
3. (S//REL) Covertly, IC agencies form
|
|
front corporations to participate directly
|
|
in the market and emplace spyware that
|
|
detects speculative trading-a leading
|
|
indicator of systemic risk in this market.
|
|
The findings help the United States
|
|
build international support for stronger
|
|
oversight.
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
17
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
Q
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(U) CONCLUSION
|
|
|
|
(U) QICR 2009's charge was to build on and distill the
|
|
implications of the NIC's Global Trends 2025 so that IC
|
|
leadership could begin to manage the risks associated
|
|
with plausible alternative future environments chal-
|
|
lenging to the nation and the IC. This Final Report high-
|
|
lights six concepts (three "safe bets" and three "strategic
|
|
hedges") and identifies a number of illustrative capa-
|
|
bilities that would enable these concepts. IC elements
|
|
are strongly encouraged to deepen and broaden the
|
|
discussion of safe bets and strategic hedges begun
|
|
here, and to begin to consider whether and how stron-
|
|
ger foundations for these concepts might be laid into
|
|
the next several planning and programming cycles.
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) Collectively, these findings imply four broader
|
|
implications for how to posture the IC to deal with the
|
|
range of uncertainty in 2025. First, the IC will have to
|
|
manage highly fluid relationships to deal with the
|
|
dynamism of a more competitive security environment
|
|
and the fluidity among partners, sources, and targets.
|
|
This will require the IC to accept more risk despite
|
|
increasingly complex counterintelligence and security
|
|
challenges.
|
|
|
|
* (C//REL) Varying Patterns. The IC will need to
|
|
maintain both enduring partnerships grounded in
|
|
deep trust and shared interests as well as marriag-
|
|
es of convenience that are ephemeral and ad hoc.
|
|
Relationships with foreign partners, in particular,
|
|
will have to be much more variegated and extend
|
|
to unorthodox allies, be they states or non-state
|
|
actors.
|
|
* (C//REL) Range of Partners. The IC will need to
|
|
more aggressively leverage outside expertise
|
|
(foreign and domestic, governmental and non-
|
|
governmental) across all facets of the intelligence
|
|
enterprise (from collection to security to technol-
|
|
ogy development). Reliance on outside expertise
|
|
will require a commensurate level of vigilance
|
|
in the form of effective counterintelligence to
|
|
ensure the integrity of information and systems
|
|
are protected. Equally important, the IC will have
|
|
to recruit, train, educate, mentor, and retain a suf-
|
|
ficiently sized cadre of intelligence professionals
|
|
capable of sustaining a rigorous dialogue with ex-
|
|
ternal experts. Finally, the IC will need to continue
|
|
developing products and services for state, local,
|
|
and tribal governments as well as the private sec-
|
|
tor, recognizing that these customers have special-
|
|
ized information needs and generally do not have
|
|
access to classified information systems.
|
|
* (C//REL) Changing Roles, Unknown Attributes.
|
|
The IC will need ways to deal with partners whose
|
|
roles vis-à-vis U.S. security interests change rapidly.
|
|
Partners or sources in one dimension may very
|
|
well be intelligence targets in another. Addition-
|
|
ally, the IC will have to deal with actors who more
|
|
actively conceal their physical locations, nationali-
|
|
ties, true identities, and true purposes. The IC's
|
|
operating and management model (to include
|
|
tradecraft) will have to work across jurisdictions
|
|
and domains to deal with these challenges, which
|
|
probably will mandate a more robust collection
|
|
and analytic posture inside the United States.
|
|
|
|
(S//REL) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the
|
|
IC should conduct a policy, regulatory, and legal review to
|
|
ensure the IC can meet the challenges of highly fluid rela-
|
|
tionships in ways that respect the desire of the American
|
|
people for privacy and civil liberty.
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
19
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(S//REL) Second, the IC will need to manage a singular
|
|
operational architecture that allows for the discov-
|
|
ery and tracking of targets across domains, be they
|
|
physical or virtual, foreign or domestic, in order to deal
|
|
with the new ways that a greater volume of informa-
|
|
tion will flow. Continued access to, and effective use
|
|
of, space will likely serve as a critical enabler to provide
|
|
important collection and communication capability to
|
|
work across this divide, although it may be challenged
|
|
in scenarios where states or corporations compete for
|
|
primacy in space. Achieving such an architecture will
|
|
be more difficult if and when U.S. rivals attempt to mili-
|
|
tarize space and/or endeavor to increase significantly
|
|
the risk to U.S. space-based intelligence assets. At the
|
|
same time, the IC will need to maintain visibility into
|
|
"off-the-grid" activity that has no digital signature or
|
|
a very ambiguous physical signature but that can still
|
|
have disproportionately large effects.
|
|
|
|
* (C//REL) Dynamic Interaction. The IC will need an
|
|
architecture capable of adapting quickly as threats
|
|
and issues emerge and readily cueing collection
|
|
and operations, often across the physical and
|
|
virtual domains.
|
|
* (C//REL) Few, Conflicting, or Weak Signals. The IC
|
|
will need to synthesize data from multiple, often
|
|
novel, sources to identify threats or opportunities.
|
|
In particular, the IC will need to anticipate, detect,
|
|
understand, and place into context digital signals
|
|
that have few, if any, physical manifestations.
|
|
|
|
(S//REL) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the
|
|
IC should assess the organization and structure of the
|
|
intelligence enterprise to ensure it will support the kind
|
|
of operational architecture necessary to deal with the
|
|
transformed information environment of 2025.
|
|
|
|
(U) Third, the IC will need to change the role of the
|
|
intelligence officer to deal with a dynamic external
|
|
environment and adapt to new customer needs. The
|
|
IC will need officers trained in multiple fields, from
|
|
technology to methodology to all-source analysis,
|
|
with many filling multiple roles at the same time. The
|
|
workforce model will need profound reassessment in
|
|
at least two dimensions:
|
|
|
|
* (C//REL) Building Well-Rounded Experts. IC
|
|
personnel will still need specialized training, in-
|
|
cluding in languages, but they will require deeper
|
|
understanding of context to perform their jobs.
|
|
Initiatives like joint duty will need to be greatly
|
|
expanded and complemented with an array of de-
|
|
velopmental, educational, and training activities.
|
|
* (C//REL) Cross-Training. The IC will need to
|
|
prepare intelligence professionals for careers in
|
|
which the distinction between analyst and collec-
|
|
tor is increasingly irrelevant, particularly in virtual
|
|
worlds. At the same time, the IC will need to build
|
|
teams to bring a range of skills to bear on complex
|
|
problems, because some degree of individual
|
|
specialization will persist.
|
|
|
|
(U) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the IC
|
|
should review how to adapt the workforce management
|
|
model to promote flexibility, responsiveness, collabora-
|
|
tion, and appropriate incentives and rewards.
|
|
|
|
(S//REL) Fourth, the IC will need to maintain strong
|
|
information and identity assurance to address the
|
|
likely erosion in our technological advantage and
|
|
the new dynamics of the digital medium, which will
|
|
introduce new risks to our IT infrastructure and new
|
|
methods of denial, deception, and misdirection.
|
|
|
|
20
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
* (S//REL) Declining IT Security. The IC will have to
|
|
operate in an environment where computing infra-
|
|
structure is more difficult to secure, advanced en-
|
|
cryption is far more pervasive, and our cryptologic
|
|
advantages may persist only in niches where we
|
|
have focused resources to achieve breakthroughs.
|
|
Indeed, the IC may not be able to provide compre-
|
|
hensive security for its entire IT infrastructure and
|
|
may have to use such offsetting strategies as "hide
|
|
in plain sight."
|
|
* (S//REL) Digital Deception. The IC will need to op-
|
|
erate in an increasingly virtual operational environ-
|
|
ment where denial, deception, disinformation, and
|
|
hostile collection will intensify the risks posed to
|
|
collection systems and analytical methodologies.
|
|
Recognizing the difference between clandestine
|
|
adversaries and non-threatening interlocutors will
|
|
require new sets of knowledge, skills, and abilities
|
|
from our HUMINT, security, and counterintelli-
|
|
gence cadres.
|
|
* (S//REL) Identity Assurance. The IC will need ro-
|
|
bust ways to discover, manage, and protect identi-
|
|
ties as many more people use multiple online
|
|
personas and leverage increasingly sophisticated
|
|
anonymizing techniques. It will need approaches
|
|
to mitigate this challenge by taking advantage of
|
|
linked identities and entities providing a web of
|
|
potentially identifying information to cue social-
|
|
network analysis.
|
|
|
|
(C//REL) Recommendation: Appropriate elements of the
|
|
IC should assess the information and identity assurance
|
|
capabilities of the IC to ensure it will be able to meet the
|
|
digital challenges of 2025.
|
|
|
|
(U) In conclusion, QICR 2009 highlights the urgency to
|
|
begin developing new approaches to prepare for an
|
|
uncertain future. Elements of the National Intelligence
|
|
Program, foreign intelligence services, state, local,
|
|
and tribal governments, and industry are encouraged
|
|
to consider these insights in conducting their own
|
|
long-term planning efforts. The rigor with which QICR
|
|
2009 developed these ideas to mitigate strategic and
|
|
institutional risk must now be translated into meaning-
|
|
ful agenda items for the IC and its partners to carry
|
|
forward.
|
|
|
|
Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Final Report 2009
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
21
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
(U) For additional reading:
|
|
|
|
* (U) National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, December 2008, available at
|
|
http://www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html.
|
|
* (U) Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Quadrennial Intelligence Community Review Scenarios:
|
|
Alternative Futures the IC Could Face, January 2009.
|
|
|
|
22
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
|
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
|
|
|
|
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
|
|
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
|
|
|
|
Office of the Director of National Intelligence
|
|
|
|
09065903
|
|
SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY |