143 lines
6 KiB
Markdown
143 lines
6 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||
|
||
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
|
||
|
||
15 APR 2013
|
||
|
||
Information Paper
|
||
|
||
Subject: (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Turkey –
|
||
Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish
|
||
SIGINT Intelligence Directorate (SIB)
|
||
|
||
(U) Introduction
|
||
|
||
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA’s 50-plus year SIGINT relationship with the Government
|
||
of Turkey (GOT) includes cooperation with the civilian SIGINT service within the Turkish
|
||
National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Turkish military SIGINT Intelligence
|
||
Directorate (SIB). Of note, the GOT decided in 2011 that the military SIB would be made
|
||
subordinate to the civilian MIT. SIGINT collaboration with MIT and SIB provides NSA
|
||
access to military targets of interest in [REDACTED] Russia and Georgia, as well as counter-
|
||
terrorism (CT) targets such as the Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel, aka KGK,
|
||
formerly PKK), the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) and radical
|
||
Islamic terrorist elements. Also, NSA’s Information Assurance (INFOSEC) Directorate has a
|
||
relationship with the Turkish General Staff/J6 as well as with the Turkish National Research
|
||
of Electronics and Cryptology (UEKAE).
|
||
|
||
(U) Key Issues
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The Counter Terrorism (CT) SIGINT exchange with Turkey
|
||
was expanded by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in July 2002 to include
|
||
actionable intelligence. In May 2007, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) modified the
|
||
guidance to include actionable intelligence against KGK leadership in Northern Iraq.
|
||
Additional CT targets worked with the GOT include the DHKP/C and radical Islamic terrorist
|
||
elements such as al-Qa’ida (AQ) and its affiliated groups.
|
||
|
||
(S//SI//REL TO USA, TUR) A Memorandum of Agreement between the National Security
|
||
Agency and the Republic of Turkey, represented by the Turkish General Staff Electronic
|
||
Systems Command (now SIGINT Intelligence Directorate - SIB) was signed 04 April 1995.
|
||
The purpose of this agreement was to ensure mutual exchange and cooperation for
|
||
enhancing, supporting, and developing the SIGINT capabilities of the Turkish Military
|
||
|
||
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||
Dated: 20070108
|
||
Declassify On: 20320108
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||
|
||
SIGINT organization with GES (now SIB) and NSA in order that we may more effectively
|
||
carry out their missions against mutually agreed upon targets. This agreement between
|
||
NSA and MIT/SIB updates and further implements the U.S.-Turkish SIGINT arrangements
|
||
entered into in 1980. NSA will propose a review of the 1995 agreement during a Strategic
|
||
Planning Conference at NSA Washington in May 2013.
|
||
|
||
(S//SI//NF) NSA is working to re-establish cooperation with the MIT on Project SEA
|
||
SENTRY II, [REDACTED] for U.S.
|
||
customers in exchange for geographical access and regional monitoring capabilities for the
|
||
Turks.
|
||
|
||
(U) Discussion
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
(U) What NSA Provides to the Partner
|
||
|
||
- (S//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA provides equipment, technology, training, and U.S. SIGINT
|
||
requirements and reporting to the Turkish partner to better assist NSA in fulfilling U.S.
|
||
intelligence requirements.
|
||
|
||
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) In terms of equipment and technology NSA provides both
|
||
collection and cryptographic equipment. A Cryptographic Modernization program is under
|
||
way with both partners to upgrade encryption on all shared and some non-shared
|
||
communications links. A High Frequency Direction Finding (HFDF) collection site is
|
||
[REDACTED] NSA also provides
|
||
decryption of DHKP/C internet traffic the Turks collect.
|
||
|
||
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) U.S. SIGINT requirements and reporting cover military and
|
||
paramilitary targets in [REDACTED] and the KGK. This reporting is a mixture
|
||
of near-real time and product “Tear Line” reports and analysis.
|
||
|
||
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA provides daily interaction and actionable intelligence on
|
||
foreign fighter Sunni extremists, against both Turkish and non-Turkish individuals. NSA
|
||
provides regional Tactical [REDACTED] reporting in two hour increments.
|
||
|
||
(U) What the Partner Provides to NSA
|
||
|
||
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The partner provides near real time reporting on military air,
|
||
naval, ground, and paramilitary targets in Russia, [REDACTED] Georgia, Ukraine, and on KGK
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||
|
||
targets, as well as daily summary reporting of Black Sea and CIS Naval and Air activity and
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA enjoys joint operational access to the HFDF site in [REDACTED]
|
||
which, in turn, functions as a node on NSA’s world-wide CROSSHAIR HFDF geolocation
|
||
service. The U.S. and 2nd Parties receive approximately 400,000 fixes yearly utilizing Lines-
|
||
of-Bearing from the [REDACTED] site while the Turks receive approximately 5000 fixes yearly from
|
||
its regional usage of CROSSHAIR, an 80 to 1 ratio in FVEY’s favor.
|
||
|
||
- (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) NSA receives Turkish transcripts of KGK voice collection.
|
||
Cooperation on the KGK target by the U.S. Intelligence Community in Ankara has increased
|
||
across the board since the May 2007 DNI Memorandum encouraged all to do so.
|
||
|
||
(U) Success Stories
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
(U) Problems/Challenges with the Partner
|
||
|
||
(S//SI//NF) Turkey is both a SIGINT partner and an intelligence target. This dynamic
|
||
between partner and target surfaces when conducting risk-benefit analysis to determine
|
||
what technologies can be shared with the Turkish partners.
|
||
|
||
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) MIT/SIB continues to be a cooperative partner working with
|
||
NSA to fulfill joint intelligence requirements and has the potential to become a significantly
|
||
more productive partner if Turkish-U.S. relations were to improve. Turkey’s unique
|
||
geographic access offers collection potential to fill additional SIGINT requirements.
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||
|
||
(TS//SI//NF) U.S. intelligence reporting in recent years indicates possible Iranian
|
||
connections with Dr. [REDACTED], the head of the MIT/SIB. The possible impact of these
|
||
connections to the U.S. SIGINT relationships is unknown at this time.
|
||
|
||
(U//FOUO) Prepared by: [REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|