183 lines
8.8 KiB
Markdown
183 lines
8.8 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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BULLRUN CoI - Briefing Sheet
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Introduction
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1. The ability to exploit targets' encrypted communications is extremely fragile and is
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often enabled through sensitive ECI programmes. The need to take additional
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measures to protect that capability has long been recognised. Currently, virtually
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all decryption is carried out by PTD (ARTHUR) processing with decrypts going to
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the IIB in the NOCON CoI; some decrypts are placed in the ENDUE CoI due to
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the sensitivity or fragility of the exploitation capability.
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2. In recent years there has been an aggressive effort, lead by NSA, to make major
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improvements in defeating network security and privacy involving multiple
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sources and methods, all of which are extremely sensitive and fragile. These
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include: Computer Network Exploitation (CNE); collaboration with other
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Intelligence Agencies; investment in high-performance computers; and
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development of advanced mathematical techniques [REDACTED]
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3. Making the best use of these new capabilities requires that decryption processing
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be widely deployed beyond PTD and the results of that processing be available to
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a wide range of analysts. This inevitably makes it harder to protect this sensitive
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and fragile capability and we need to counterbalance this by introducing
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measures to control access to this material and heighten awareness of the
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sensitivities amongst those who have access.
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4. To achieve this, NSA has introduced the BULLRUN CoI to protect our abilities to
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defeat the encryption used in network communication technologies. This covers
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both the "fact of" a capability against a specific technology and resulting decrypts
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(which may be either plaintext or metadata (events). GCHQ is also introducing
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BULLRUN. (CSEC, DSD and GCSB are expected to do likewise.)
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Control Authority
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5. The BULLRUN CoI is owned by the Deputy Director for Penetrating Target
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Defences (PTD). Authority to manage the CoI is delegated to the PTD Lead for
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Special Operations and Policy (currently [REDACTED]) and the PTD Security
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and Release Authority (OPC-SEC, currently [REDACTED]).
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BULLRUN Sensitivity and Coverage
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6. It is imperative to protect the fact that GCHQ, NSA and their Sigint partners have
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capabilities against specific network security technologies as well as the number
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and scope of successes. These capabilities are among the Sigint community's
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most fragile, and the inadvertent disclosure of the simple "fact of" could alert the
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adversary and result in immediate loss of the capability. Consequently, any
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admission of "fact of" a capability to defeat encryption used in specific network
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communication technologies or disclosure of details relating to that capability
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must be protected by the BULLRUN COI and restricted to those specifically
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1 of 4
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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indoctrinated for BULLRUN. The various types of security covered by BULLRUN
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include, but are not limited to, TLS/SSL, https (e.g. webmail), SSH, encrypted
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chat, VPNs and encrypted VOIP. The specific instances of these technologies
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that can be exploited will be published in a separate Annexe (available to
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BULLRUN indoctrinated staff).
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7. In addition to the specific technologies that GCHQ or its Sigint partners are able
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to exploit, the methods used to achieve the exploitation must also be protected.
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These include support from other organisations, both internal and external to
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GCHQ. Access to BULLRUN does NOT imply any "need-to-know" the details of
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sources and methods used to achieve exploitation and, in general, there will be
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NO "need-to-know". Requests for access to information on sources and methods
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should be sent to OPC-SEC; if considered appropriate, this access may require
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clearance for certain ECIs.
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8. BULLRUN material, data, and details must be protected with the use of the
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BULLRUN CoI and be marked with the label "BULLRUN," in addition to the
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required privacy marking and other descriptors. Use of the BULLRUN marking
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is restricted to GCHQ and its Sigint 2nd Parties.
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Access and Security
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9. Requests for access to the CoI must be sponsored by a GC8 or above and must
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be accompanied by a business case outlining the "need-to-know". Access for
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contractors will be limited and will require a strong business case; such requests
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should be discussed with the CoI Authority's delegates before submission.
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Requests for access are to be sent by email to PTDAccesses.
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10. Knowledge of BULLRUN information and access to the BULLRUN CoI will only
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be granted to indoctrinated individuals.
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11. It is the responsibility of sponsors (or their successors) to notify OPC-SEC (via
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PTDAccesses) when an individual no longer require access to BULLRUN.
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Handling Procedures
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12. Owners of BULLRUN materials are responsible for correctly marking the
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information and for ensuring that it is handled according to guidelines for
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protecting classified or COI information.
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13. Reports derived from BULLRUN material shall not reveal (or imply) that the
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source data was decrypted. The network communication technology that carried
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the communication should not be revealed.
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14. Further dissemination, other than in product reports, of any data or information
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derived from BULLRUN data must be thoroughly justified and receive prior
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approval from OPC-SEC.
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2 of 4
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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15. All questions or concerns regarding BULLRUN material and information should
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be directed to OPC-SEC.
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Protective Marking Guidance
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The following offers some guidance on Protective Markings (PM) for BULLRUN
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material. Questions regarding PMs can be directed to the CoI Authority's delegates.
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At SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
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The fact that GCHQ has unspecified capabilities against network security
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technologies eg TLS/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, VPNs, IPSec. NB capability does not
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necessarily equate to decryption capability.
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At TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
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The fact that GCHQ or its 2nd Party partners has some capability against the
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encryption used in a class or type of network communications technology. For
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example, VPNs, IPSec, TSL/SSL, HTTPS, SSH, encrypted chat, encrypted VoIP.
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At TOP SECRET STRAP2 COMINT BULLRUN AUSCANZUKUS EYES :
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The fact that GCHQ or a 2nd Party partner has a capability against a specific
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encrypted network security technology - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum,
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specific capabilities may be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)
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The fact that GCHQ or its partners exploits specific encrypted network
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communications - see Annexe for details. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may
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be protected by additional ECIs and restriction on "Eyes".)
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Decrypts (plaintext or derived events / metadata) obtained from BULLRUN
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capabilities. (At a minimum, specific capabilities may be protected by additional
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restriction on "Eyes" and, in a few cases, additional ECIs.)
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GLOSSARY
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(U) HTTPS - HTTP traffic secured inside an SSL/TLS session, indicated by the
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https:// URL, commonly using TCP port 443
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(U) IPSEC -- IPSec, or IP Security, is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
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standard for layer 3 real-time communication security. IPSec allows two hosts (or two
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gateways) to establish a secure connection, sometimes called a tunnel. All traffic is
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protected at the network layer.
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(U) SSH - Secure Shell. A common protocol used for secure remote computer
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access
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3 of 4
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
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(U) SSL - Secure Sockets Layer. Commonly used to provide secure network
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communication. Widely used on the internet to provide secure web browsing,
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webmail, instant messaging, electronic commerce, etc.
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(U) TLS - Transport Layer Security. The follow-on to SSL, SSLv3 and TLSv1.0 are
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nearly identical.
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(U) VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol. A general term for the using IP networks to
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make voice phone calls. The application layer protocol can be standards-based (e.g.,
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H.323, SIP), or proprietary (e.g., Skype).
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(U) VPN - Virtual Private Network. A private network that makes use of the public
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telecommunications infrastructure, maintaining privacy via the use of a tunneling
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protocol and security procedures that typically include encryption. Common protocols
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include IPSEC and PPTP.
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4 of 4
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
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other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] or email [REDACTED]
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