610 lines
No EOL
25 KiB
Markdown
610 lines
No EOL
25 KiB
Markdown
# What is HACIENDA?
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* Data reconnaissance tool developed by the CITD team in JTRIG
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* Port Scans entire countries
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* Uses nmap as port scanning tool
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* Uses GEOFUSION for IP Geolocation
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* Randomly scans every IP identified for that country
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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## Countries
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* Completed full scans of 27 countries including
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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* [REDACTED]
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* Completed partial scans of 5 additional countries
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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## Tasking & Access
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* To task HACIENDA with a Country or Subnet
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* [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk)
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* CITD alias [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk)
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* Access to the Data
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* At GCHQ, request a GLOBAL SURGE account from [REDACTED]@gchq.gov.uk)
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* At CSEC, contact [REDACTED]
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* At NSA, contact [REDACTED]
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* At DSD, contact [REDACTED]
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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## Ports
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* Pulls back hostname, banners, application names and port status
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* Gathers additional information for...
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* 21 (ftp): directory listing
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* 80 (http): content of main page
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* 443 (https): content of main page
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* 111 (rpc): results of rpcinfo
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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Host 1 -> SYN (SEQ = x) -> Host 2
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Host 2 -> SYN (SEQ = y, ACK = x + 1) -> Host 1
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Host 1 -> (SEQ = x + 1, ACK = y + 1) -> Host 2
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---
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Host 1 -> SYN (SEQ = x) -> Host 2
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Host 2 -> RST (SEQ = y, ACK = x + 1) -> Host 1
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---
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## The Results...
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* All stored in JTRIG's internal database
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* Available in GLOBAL SURGE
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* NAC's Network Knowledge Base Prototype
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* Transferred by MAILORDER to
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* CSEC
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* DSD
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* NSA NTOC
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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## How is it used?
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* CNE
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* ORB Detection
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* Vulnerability Assessments
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* SD
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* Network Analysis
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* Target Discovery
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UK TOP SECRET STRAP1
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## The Hacking Process
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1. (R)econnaissance
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2. (I)nfection
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3. (C)ommand And Control
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4. (E)xfiltration
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Reconnaissance
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Publicly Available Information
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(Email Address, Location, Network Info, Passwords, etc.)
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Research
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Hacker
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* Enumerate (Network)
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* Scan (Services)
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* Operating Systems
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* Versions
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* Domain Names
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Victim
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**Reconnaissance** Infection Command and Control Exfiltration
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Infection
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Hacker
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Email with Attachment or Link
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Victim
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Special Packets to Exploit Services
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Use Login Credentials
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Bad Web Site
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Reconnaissance **Infection** Command and Control Exfiltration
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Command and Control
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Hacker
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Push Tools and Send Commands (Tasking, Survey, etc.)
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Victim
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Beacons and Responses
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Reconnaissance Infection **Command and Control** Exfiltration
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Exfiltration
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Exfil using known and custom protocols (Known: HTTP, SMTP, ICMP, FTP, etc)
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Victim
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Hacker
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Reconnaissance Infection Command and Control **Exfiltration**
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Reconnaissance
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```
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This system is audited for USSID 18 and Human Rights Act compliance
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CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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X-KEYSCORE C2C Session Viewer
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Datetime Case Notation From IP To IP From Port To Port Protocol
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2012-05-16 13:03:20 2CBAB00000M0210 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] 01701 01701 icmp
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Session | Header (3) | Meta (7) | GENESIS | Contexts (1)
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Formatter: WIRESHARD | Send to: Download Session | Mode: Snippet | Options | Search Content: Enter text to search
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Quick Clicks
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* Session
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* One-Click Searches
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* Find fingerprint
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* selector/cadence/task
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* udp/tunnel/ipv4
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* netmanagement/icmp/e
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* Find traffic on
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* Find application
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* netmanagement/icmp
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Internet Protocol, Src: 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8), Dst: 192.168.0.83 (192.168.0.83)
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Version: 4
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Header length: 20 bytes
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Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
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0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
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.... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
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.... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
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Total Length: 60
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Identification: 0x2d3c (11560)
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Flags: 0x00
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0... = Reserved bit: Not set
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.0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
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..0. = More fragments: Not set
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Fragment offset: 0
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Time to live: 51
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Protocol: ICMP (0x01)
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Header checksum: 0x897a [correct]
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[Good: True]
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[Bad: False]
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Source: 8.8.8.8 (8.8.8.8)
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Destination: 192.168.0.83 (192.168.0.83)
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Internet Control Message Protocol
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Type: 0 (Echo (ping) reply)
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Code: 0
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Checksum: 0x51ec [correct]
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Identifier: 0x0001
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Sequence number: 623 (0x026f)
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Data (32 bytes)
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0000 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 6a 6b 6c 6d 6e 6f 70 abcdefghijklmnop
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0010 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 qrstuwwabcdefghi
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```
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**Reconnaissance** Infection Command and Control Exfiltration
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Password Guessing
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```
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USER Administrator
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PASS #mafiavafute197532@%!?*
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USER Administrator
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PASS sh3l5l1k3p4rty3v3r
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USER Administrator
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PASS Sh3I5Lik3P4rtY@v3r
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USER Administrator
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PASS Sh5I8LiK6P8rtY6v5r
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USER Administrator
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PASS kalimero4cappy
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USER Administrator
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PASS P@ssword
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USER Administrator
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PASS P@sswOrd
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USER Administrator
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PASS P@ssw0rd
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```
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Iraqi Ministry of Finance
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Reconnaissance **Infection** Command and Control Exfiltration
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Windows cmd.exe
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```
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C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
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Microsoft Windows XP [Version 5.1.2600]
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(C) Copyright 1985-2001 Microsoft Corp.
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U:\>_
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```
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Reconnaissance Infection **Command and Control** Exfiltration
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## Presentation Outline
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* LANDMARK – automated tradecraft to further expand CNE covert infrastructure
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* [REDACTED]
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Canada
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2
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## LANDMARK
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* CSEC's Operational Relay Box (ORB) covert infrastructure used to provide an additional level of non-attribution; subsequently used for exploits and exfiltration
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* 2-3 times/year, 1 day focused effort to acquire as many new ORBs as possible in as many non 5-Eyes countries as possible
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Canada
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3
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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## LANDMARK – the recent past....
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* February 2010
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* Operation encompassing the whole of LONGRUN solely using OLYMPIA (CSEC's network knowledge engine with automated tradecraft)
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* 8 teams of 3 network exploitation analysts busy for 5-8 hours
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* A list of 3000+ potential ORBs
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Canada
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5
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT
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Communications Security Establishment
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Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
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```
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Olympia version 0.5.0
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File Tools Window Help
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Olympia | Gimme all you got
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Gimme all you got | Gimme all you got by Country
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Search
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Continent: africa
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Country: kenya
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Date Range: Last 30 Days
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Start Date:
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End Date:
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Commands
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☐ Show VPNs
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☐ Show Toygrippe Range Events
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☐ Show CND Event Summaries
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☐ Show User Online Events on IP
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☐ Show router configuration information (TIDAL SURGE)
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☐ Show IP Communications
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☐ Show Geolocation Information
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☐ Show Network Information
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☐ Show SIGINT Observable Feature Information
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☐ Show Survey Information
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☐ Show Geolocation Map
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☐ Reverse DNS Lookup
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☑ Show Port Scans on IP
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Africa View (JPA) (10000)
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Showing page 1
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```
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| Source | System | First Seen | Last Seen | Hostname | IP | Port | Protocol | Status | TTL | Product | Version | Banner Information |
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| ------ | -------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------- | ---------------------------------- | ---------- | ---- | -------- | ----------- | --- | ---------------------------- | ------------- | ----------------------- |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 08:11:03 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 500 | tcp | filtered | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 07:07:29 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 07:07:29 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | open | 0 | Kerio MailServer POP3 Server | 6.3.2 | 4152.1242730171@kcv_svr |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | open | 0 | Kerio MailServer Webmail | 6.3.2 | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 25 | tcp | open | 0 | Microsoft ESMTP | 6.0.3790.3959 | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | open | 0 | Microsoft IIS webserver | 6.0 | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 21 | tcp | open | 0 | Microsoft ftp | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 22 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:15:01 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 21 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 22 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 25 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:28 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 443 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 21 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 22 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 25 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 80 | tcp | open | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 110 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 111 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 161 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | Tue May 26 04:17:40 GMT 2009 | | [REDACTED] | 162 | tcp | closed | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:34 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
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| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:33 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:33 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:12:49 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:12:49 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:50 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:50 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:13:59 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:13:59 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:00:29 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:00:29 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:03:13 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:03:13 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 07:01:12 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 07:01:12 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:30:40 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:13:34 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-41.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:20 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:14:55 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-42.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:31:23 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:15:34 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-43.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:11 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:12:30 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-42.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:30:20 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:15:11 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-44.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:14 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:13:15 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-45.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:32:13 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:13:15 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-46.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 06:49:57 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:14:00 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-46.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:47:17 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 11:14:06 GMT 2010 | 80-247-147-47.reverse.newskies.net | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jul 07 07:06:18 GMT 2009 | Wed Feb 03 12:02:07 GMT 2010 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:30:20 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:30:20 GMT 2008 | pool2-gw.emperion.net | [REDACTED] | 23 | tcp | open | 0 | Cisco router | unknown | unknown |
|
||
| GCHQ | Hacienda | Tue Jun 17 00:06:36 GMT 2008 | Tue Jun 17 00:06:36 GMT 2008 | | [REDACTED] | 0 | unknown | unreachable | 0 | unknown | unknown | unknown |
|
||
|
||
BUT, network analysis still manual!
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
6
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||
|
||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||
|
||
## LANDMARK today...
|
||
|
||
* Network analysis tradecraft to determine vulnerable devices has been encoded within OLYMPIA
|
||
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
7
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||
|
||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||
|
||
* [REDACTED] GSM provider
|
||
* NSA TAO requested assistance gaining access to the network
|
||
* Network analysis using OLYMPIA:
|
||
* DNS query to determine IP address
|
||
* IP address to network range
|
||
* Network range to port scan
|
||
* Are there any vulnerable devices in that range?
|
||
* Duration: < 5 minutes
|
||
|
||
Canada
|
||
8
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
UK TOP SECRET STRAP I
|
||
|
||
## Use Case 1: Finding Orbs
|
||
|
||
* Combine Harvester
|
||
* Mugshot QFD
|
||
* Etc..
|
||
* Hacienda
|
||
|
||
* DNS
|
||
* Geo Fusion
|
||
|
||
* CNE Orbs
|
||
|
||
* Mugshot Control
|
||
|
||
**MUGSHOT CORE – Q/A Framework**
|
||
|
||
* Vulnerability Profile
|
||
|
||
* Potential Orbs
|
||
* Highnote
|
||
* Orbs
|
||
GCHQ
|
||
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
UK TOP SECRET STRAP I
|
||
|
||
## Benefits
|
||
|
||
* Automated Vulnerability Assessment
|
||
* Using Vulnerability Profiles for Remote and Content Delivery vectors
|
||
* Automated Target Development and Monitoring**
|
||
* Identify and characterise target machines
|
||
* Profiles machines, including:
|
||
* Browser, OS, PSP, Patch History
|
||
* Activity
|
||
* Download
|
||
* Automated Target Technology Tracking (Stats & Trends)
|
||
* Browsers, OS, PSP etc
|
||
* ORB Identification
|
||
* Initial ten fold increase in Orb Identification rate over manual process
|
||
|
||
GCHQ
|
||
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
UK TOP SECRET STRAP I
|
||
|
||
## Defining Attributes
|
||
|
||
Attribute Definition
|
||
|
||
* Name
|
||
* Description
|
||
* Type
|
||
* Data sources
|
||
|
||
Machine Attributes
|
||
|
||
* Open port (25, 80, 443)
|
||
* Server banner (Server: Apache)
|
||
* PSP fingerprint (Kaspersky v7.01)
|
||
* XFF (192.168.2.1)
|
||
* Web Request (test.exe, file.pdf)
|
||
* DNS Name (webhost.com)
|
||
* SNMP sysname
|
||
|
||
Machine Communication Attributes
|
||
* FTP login
|
||
* DNS Request
|
||
* HTTPS connection
|
||
|
||
GCHQ
|
||
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
UK TOP SECRET STRAP I
|
||
|
||
## MUGSHOT GOALS
|
||
|
||
* Automated Target Characterisation and Monitoring
|
||
* Automatically understand everything important about CNE target networks from passive and active sources.
|
||
* Automated Un-Targeted Characterisation
|
||
* Automatically understand everything important about all machines on the Internet from passive and active sources.
|
||
|
||
GCHQ
|
||
© Crown Copyright. All rights reserved. |