358 lines
No EOL
9 KiB
Markdown
358 lines
No EOL
9 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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# Tor Stinks (U)
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[REDACTED]
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CT SIGDEV
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[REDACTED]
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JUN 2012
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20370101
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Tor Stinks... (U)
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* We will never be able to de-anonymize all Tor users all the time.
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* With manual analysis we can de-anonymize a **very small fraction** of Tor users, however, **no** success de-anonymizing a user in response to a TOPI request/on demand.
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## REMATION II (U)
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* Joint NSA GCHQ counter-Tor workshop
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* Week one at MHS focus on analytics
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* Week two at GCHQ focus on exploitation
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https://wiki.gchq/index.php?title=REMATION
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Laundry List (U)
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* Analytics to de-anonymize users
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* Circuit reconstruction (21)
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* Goes inta goes outta/low latency (2)
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* Cookie leakage
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* Dumb users (EPICFAIL)
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* Node Lifespan (17)
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* DNS
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* Technical Analysis/Research
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* Hidden services (4, 5, 6, 7)
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* Timing pattern (3)
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* Torservers.net/Amazon AWS
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* Exploitation
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* QUANTUM attacks (1, 20, 22)
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* Existing options (8 + 11)
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* Shaping (9 + 16)
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* Web server enabling (10)
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* Nodes (14)
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* Degrade user experience (13 + 18)
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* Nodes
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* Baseline our nodes (21)
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* Tor node flooding
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Analytics: Circuit Reconstruction (S//SI)
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Terrorist with Tor client installed
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Tor entry node
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Tor relay node
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Tor exit node
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Internet site
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ANONYMIZER CLOUD
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* Current: access to **very** few nodes. Success rate negligible because all three Tor nodes in the circuit have to be in the set of nodes we have access to.
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* Difficult to combine meaningfully with passive SIGINT.
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* Goal: expand number of nodes we have access to
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* GCHQ runs Tor nodes under NEWTONS CRADLE (how many?)
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* Other partners?
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* Partial reconstruction (first hops or last hops)?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Analytics:
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## Goes Inta Goes Outta/Low Latency (S//SI)
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Find possible alternative accounts for a target: look for connections to Tor, from the target's suspected country, near time of target's activity.
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* Current: GCHQ has working version (QUICKANT). R has alpha tested NSA's version. NSA's version produced no obvious candidate selectors.
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* Goal: Figure out if QUICKANT works, compare methodologies. Gathering data for additional tests of NSA's version (consistent, random and heavy user)
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Analytics: Cookie Leakage (TS//SI)
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Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not using Tor
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* Current: preliminary analysis shows that some cookies “survive” Tor use. Depends on how target is using Tor (Torbutton/Tor Browser Bundle clears out cookies).
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* Goal: test with cookies **associated** with CT targets
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* Idea: what if we seeded cookies to a target?
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* Investigate Evercookie persistence
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Analytics: Cookie Leakage (TS//SI)
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* DoubleclickID seen on Tor and non-Tor IPs
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Analytics: Dumb Users (EPICFAIL) (S//SI)
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GCHQ QFD that looks for Tor users when they are not using Tor.
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* Current: GCHQ has working QFD based on hard selector (email, web forum, etc) but does not include cookies.
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* Goal: NSA investigating own version (GREAT EXPECTATIONS) that would include cookies.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Analytics: Node Lifespan (S//SI)
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How do I know **WHEN** a particular IP was a Tor node as opposed to **IF** it was a Tor node?
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* Current: detection done once an hour by NTOC. RONIN stores "last seen" and nodes age off slowly with no accurate lifespan.
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* Goal: Working with RONIN to add more details on node lifespan.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Analytics: DNS (TS//SI)
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How does Tor handle DNS requests? Are DNS requests going through Tor? Does this depend on how the target is using Tor?
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* Current: Still investigating.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Technical Analysis: Hidden Services (TS//SI)
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What do we know about Hidden Services?
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* Current: No effort by NSA, some DSD and GCHQ work on ONIONBREATH.
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* Goal:
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* Harvest and enumerate .onion URLs
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* Identify similar HS based on referrer fields
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* Distinguish HS from normal Tor clients
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Technical Analysis: Timing Pattern (TS//SI)
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Send packets back to the client that are detectable by passive accesses to find client IPs for Tor users.
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* Current: GCHQ has research paper and demonstrated capability in the lab.
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* Goal: Can we expand to other owned nodes?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Technical Analysis: torservers.net (TS//SI)
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Investigate the Amazon AWS cloud instances of Tor servers. How are IPs allocated and reassigned once bandwidth limit is reached? Impact on RONIN's ability to detect nodes?
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* Current: GCHQ set up Tor nodes on the AWS cloud during REMATION II.
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[REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Exploitation: QUANTUM (TS//SI)
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* QUANTUM to degrade/deny/disrupt Tor access?
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* QUANTUMCOOKIE – forces clients to divulge stored cookies.
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```
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STAGE 1
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Tor Client (running the Tor browser bundle)
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A client visits a website via TOR
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Encrypted GET Request to www.terrorist.com/bomb.php
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TOR Network
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In the clear GET Request to www.terrorist.com/bomb.php
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www.terrorist.com
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We detect the GET request and respond with a redirect to Hotmail and Yahoo!
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QUANTUM
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STAGE 2
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Tor Client (running the Tor browser bundle)
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The client now sends two GET requests. One to Hotmail and one to Yahoo! Corresponding Cookies will be sent if stored on the client's browser
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Encrypted GET Request to Hotmail.com with MUID
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Encrypted GET Request to Yahoo.com with Y-Cookie
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TOR Network
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In the clear GET Request to Hotmail.com with MUID
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Hotmail
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In the clear GET Request to Yahoo.com with Y-Cookie
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Yahoo!
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```
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Figure 4. A diagram of how the QUANTUM Survey / Cookie technique works
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Exploitation: Existing Options (TS//SI)
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Test current CNE techniques (FA and SHORTSHEET) against Torbutton and TBB users.
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* Current: Torbutton and TBB prevent CNE success. Possible success against "vanilla" Tor/Vidalia.
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* Goal: modifications to initial CNE surveys? Ignore user-agents from Torbutton or TBB? Improve browser fingerprinting? Using javascript instead of Flash?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Exploitation: Shaping (TS//SI)
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* Given CNE access to a target computer can we shape their traffic to "friendly" exit nodes?
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* Route users to a separate “private” Tor network?
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* Stain their traffic or user agent?
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* Instruct target computer to use a service that connects outside Tor and reveal true IP?
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* Current: Can stain user agent working on shaping.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Exploitation: Web Server Enabling (TS//SI)
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Given CNE access to web server modify the server to enable a “timing/counting” attack similar to timing pattern idea.
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* Current: GCHQ has a research paper and demonstrated the technique in the lab.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Exploitation: Nodes (TS//SI)
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Can we exploit nodes?
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Probably not. Legal and technical challenges.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Exploitation: Degrade Tor experience (TS//SI)
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Given CNE access to a web server make it painful for Tor users?
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Given CNE access to a network can we deny/degrade/disrupt Tor users' ?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Nodes: Baseline Our Nodes (TS//SI)
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How many nodes do we have cooperative or direct access to? Can we deploy similar code to these nodes to aid with circuit reconstruction?
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Can we do packet timing attacks using nodes?
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Can we use the nodes to shape traffic flow?
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Can we use the nodes to deny/degrade/disrupt comms to certain sites?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Nodes: Tor Node Flooding (TS//SI)
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Could we set up a lot of really slow Tor nodes (advertised as high bandwidth) to degrade the overall stability of the network?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY
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## Tor Stinks... But it Could be Worse (S//SI)
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* Critical mass of targets use Tor. Scaring them away from Tor might be counterproductive.
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* We can **increase** our success rate and provide more client IPs for individual Tor users.
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* Will **never get 100%** but we don't need to provide true IPs for every target every time they use Tor.
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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY |