882 lines
No EOL
24 KiB
Markdown
882 lines
No EOL
24 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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Target Pursuit
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# Intro to the VPN Exploitation Process
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[REDACTED]
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OTP VPN Exploitation Team
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S31176
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September 13, 2010
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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1
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Overview
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* S31176 and the OTP VPN Exploitation Team
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* How can we help you?
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* VPN and Network Encryption Types
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* Birth of the VPN Adventure
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* Sustained Exploitation
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* Exploitation Successes
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* Conclusions
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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2
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## S31176
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Branch Name:
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Custom Thread Development for
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Network Encryption
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Team Name:
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OTP VPN Exploitation Team
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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3
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Mission Statement
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S31176 provides cryptanalytic support services for many network encryption protocols, including, but not limited to:
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IPSec, SSL, PPTP, SSH and proprietary protocols. We are the front-door of CES for targeted vulnerability assessment
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and custom interim end-to-end exploitation flows for these protocols. In conjunction with various agency SIGDEV
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counterparts and target organizations, we engage in discovery to find TOPI targets of interest. By maintaining
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contact with field sites, TAO, and NCSC, we endeavor to guide and direct development and access through both
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active and passive means in order to make exploitation possible and enable full prosecution of the target...
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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4
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Purpose in a Nutshell
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* Act as your one stop shop for all VPN and network encryption exploitation related issues!
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* Act as a liaison for SIGDEVers and TOPIs to other areas of the VPN community
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* Perform some SIGDEV and target discovery
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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5
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Where are we positioned?
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SID, S
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Data Acquisition, S3
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Cryptanalytic Exploitation Services, S31
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Office of Target Pursuit, S311
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Cryptanalytic Exploitation & Discovery, S3117
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Custom Thread Development for Network Encryption, S31176
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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6
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## S31176 Branch Members
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* [REDACTED] - Collection
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* [REDACTED] - CMP Intern
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* [REDACTED] - Team Lead, IPSec, SSH
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* [REDACTED] - IPSec
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* [REDACTED] - Branch Chief
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* [REDACTED] – Diversity Tour
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* [REDACTED] - CADP Intern
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* [REDACTED] - PPTP
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* [REDACTED] – BLEAKINQUIRY, SSL
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How to Contact us (May be changing soon):
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[REDACTED]
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go vpn-xft
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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7
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Branches within OTP
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* S31171 – PRC, N Korea, SE Asia, Japan
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* S31172 – Iran, Hamas, Iraq, Saudi Arabia
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* S31173 – Africa, Levant, Latin America, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan
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* S31174 – Russia, Counter-Intel, Europe, FTM
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* S31175 – Cross-Target Support Branch
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* S31176 – Custom Thread Development
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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8
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Exploitation in the OTP Branches
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* Each branch has a VPN representative
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* We inform them about attacks, they inform us about targets
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* If you have a target-specific inquiry, they may be able to help
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* S31171 (Eastern and Southeast Asia)
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* [REDACTED], [REDACTED]
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* S31172 (Iran, Iraq, Arabian Peninsula)
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* [REDACTED]), [REDACTED]
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* S31173 (Levant, Central Asia, Africa, Latin America)
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* [REDACTED]
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* S31174 (Russia, Europe, International Targets)
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* [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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9
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## How can we help you?
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Provide Exploitation Support
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* Provide VPN vulnerability analysis
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* Engage Network Security Products, TAO, ESO, etc
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* Convey meaningful feedback to customer
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* Develop sustained exploitation threads when possible
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* Suggest alternative approaches if passive exploitation is unrealistic
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* DECRYPTS, DECRYPTS, DECRYPTS!!!!!!
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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10
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Additional Services
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We can assist with the following:
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* Collection problems
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* Tasking
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* Data flow
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* Plaintext analysis
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* Metadata interpretation
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* Tip-off vulnerable VPN links
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* VPN SIGDEV
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* Target Discovery and Development
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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11
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## How can you help you?
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Glad you asked!
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* Familiarize yourself with appropriate search criteria
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* [REDACTED]
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* Get a BLEAKINQUIRY account
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* If you find VPN-related data, let us know.
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* The existence of a VPN on a network of interest
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* Configuration/setup information about the VPN
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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12
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## BLEAKINQUIRY
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* Metadata database of potentially exploitable VPNs
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* Data Sources
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* TOYGRIPPE metadata testing
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* XKEYSCORE fingerprints
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* Daily VPN exploitation
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* Let us stress..."P-O-T-E-N-T-I-A-L"
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* Want an account?
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* E-mail [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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13
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## BLEAKINQUIRY
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```
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BLEAKINQUIRY - Mozilla Firefox
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File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
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[REDACTED] Google
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BLEAKINQUIRY
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Turn off NKR links Go to CRS Hide Help
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Simple Search | Advanced Search | Batch Search
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Advanced Search
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IP 1:
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IP 2:
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Sigad:
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Case notation:
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Country: CN
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Five-Eyes Defeat (Y): Y
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City:
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Domain:
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Company:
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Modem 1:
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Modem 2:
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Modem comment:
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Modem ID:
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Target name:
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Status (comma list):
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VPN type (comma list):
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Last seen on or after: 20100502
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Last seen on or before:
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Submit Query
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```
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| Class | Status | IP 1 | IP 1 City | IP 1 Company | IP 1 Domain | IP 2 | IP 2 | IP 2 City | IP 2 Company | IP 2 Domain
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|-------|--------|------|-----------|--------------|-------------|------|------|-----------|--------------|----------- |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//NF | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//NF | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//NF | 5 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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| TS//REL | 0 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
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```
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Your search returned over 100 results. To see all results, please download them as CSV.
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Done
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Status Codes
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BLEAKINQUIRY on WikiInfo
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RT documentation is moving to BLEAKINQUIRY's WikiInfo
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page so that it is easier to maintain. This panel will
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continue to show status codes.
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Status Codes
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* 0: potentially exploitable, 1-sided
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* 1: potentially exploitable, missing password
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* 2: potentially exploitable, attack failed
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* 3: potentially exploitable, active op required
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* 4: potentially exploitable, no password required
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* 5: confirmed exploitable, no payload
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* 6: confirmed exploitable, payload successfully
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decrypted
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Country Digraphs
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[REDACTED]
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Five-Eyes Defeat
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The Five Eyes Defeat option is only available via the
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Advanced Search query. For defeating all Five-Eyes
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results, place a 'Y' or 'y' in the 'Five Eyes Defeat'
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box. Any other character(s) will not defeat Five-Eyes
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results.
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NKB-Links Toggle Button
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The "Turn on/off NKB links" button toggles on and off
|
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the NKB lookup capability for IDs. When you click on
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this button, the last query will automatically be
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re-run. Disabling the links makes it easier to
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highlight and select (double click) an individual IP
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for pasting in another document.
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Dynamic Page -- highest possible classification
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Done
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DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007
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DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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14
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Local IPSec Processing
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MAILORDER
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attack script
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CORALREEF
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VULCAN-
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DEATHGRIP
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genericIPSec_wrapper.pl
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PINWALE
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SCISSORS
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TURTLEPOWER
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XKEYSCORE
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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15
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Type 1: IPSec
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* IPSec: IP Security
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* Complete paired IKE
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* Common UDP ports: 500 and 4500
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* Pre-Shared Key (PSK)
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* Router configuration (good source for PSKs)
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* Encrypted Payload (ESP or AH)
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* Next Protocol 50 or 51
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* XKEYSCORE Queries
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* Full log DNI search
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* AppID/Fingerprints: “vpn/*”, “vpn/esp”, “vpn/isakmp”, “vpn/ikev2”, "vpn/ikev2_content"
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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16
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Type 2: PPTP
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* PPTP: Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
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* Paired collect
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* Next Protocol 47 = PPTP payload
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* TCP Port 1723 = PPTP tunnel set up, no payload
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* One-sided collect, client side
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* XKEYSCORE Queries
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* Full log DNI search
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* Enter your IPs/casn/etc of interest
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* AppID/Fingerprint: “vpn/pptp_encr*”
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* Share your results with [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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17
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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|
||
## Type 3: SSL
|
||
|
||
* SSL – Secure Sockets Layer
|
||
* Renamed TLS (Transport Layer Security) but still often referred to as SSL
|
||
* Paired collect – Compare IP's and Ports
|
||
* Server Certificates
|
||
* Port Numbers: 443, 465, 989, 990, 992, 993, and 995
|
||
* XKEYSCORE Queries
|
||
* Full log DNI search or use SSL plugin
|
||
* AppID/Fingerprints: "encryption/ssl/*" or "network_encryption/ssl/*"
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
18
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Type 4: SSH
|
||
|
||
* SSH – Secure Shell
|
||
* Industry-standard networking protocol for securely logging into other machines via a network.
|
||
* Complete paired traffic
|
||
* Port number 22
|
||
* Potentially recover user names and passwords
|
||
* Useful to TAO to access boxes and gather cryptographic information
|
||
* XKEYSCORE Queries
|
||
* Full log DNI search
|
||
* AppID/Fingerprints: “terminal/ssh/*”
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
19
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Birth of the VPN Adventure
|
||
|
||
We receive VPN-related requests from across the Globe
|
||
|
||
* TOPIs
|
||
|
||
* SIGDEV Analysts
|
||
|
||
* OTP Analysts
|
||
|
||
* Cryptologic Centers
|
||
|
||
* Field Sites
|
||
|
||
* Second Parties
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
20
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## The Many Flavors of Requests
|
||
|
||
IPSec, PPTP, SSL, SSH
|
||
Router Information
|
||
IP Links & Ranges
|
||
VPN Metadata
|
||
BLEAKINQUIRY Accounts
|
||
XKEYSCORE Fingerprints
|
||
|
||
VPN EXPLOITATION TEAM
|
||
|
||
Domain Names
|
||
Network Protocols
|
||
Interesting Terms & Names
|
||
Vulnerability Evaluations
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
21
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## 1. Initial Steps
|
||
|
||
VPN Info Found/Question Arises
|
||
[REDACTED]
|
||
Task Assigned to Team Analyst
|
||
Gather Background Info About Request
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
22
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## 2. Consult Repositories
|
||
|
||
* BLEAKINQUIRY – Metadata database of potentially exploitable VPNs
|
||
* TOYGRIPPE – VPN metadata repository
|
||
* PINWALE - Long-term repository for tasked SIGINT collect
|
||
* XKEYSCORE - Processes and databases DNI collect from various field sites
|
||
* Full-take feed (tasked and untasked)
|
||
* VULCANDEATHGRIP - Repository for tasked, full-take VPN collection
|
||
* FOURSCORE – PPTP repository
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
23
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## 3. Scripts: IPSec Focus
|
||
|
||
* Format downloaded repository files
|
||
* Create intermediate processing files
|
||
* Check for potential vulnerabilities
|
||
* Search for PSKs in CORALREEF
|
||
* Run attacks to recover PSK
|
||
* Decrypt traffic
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
24
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## 4. Communicate Results
|
||
|
||
Can we decrypt the VPN traffic?
|
||
* If the answer is “No” then explain how to turn it into a “YES!”
|
||
* If the answer is "YES!” then...
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
25
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Happy Dance!!
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
26
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## YES! We Have Decrypt!
|
||
|
||
* Notify customer of success
|
||
* Send decrypt through post-processing and deliver to TOPI
|
||
* Have TOPI determine the priority level of the resulting plain text
|
||
* Get IPs on sustained collect
|
||
* Set up and transition sustained decryption process to OTP VPN Branch Rep
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
27
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Turn that Frown Upside Down! From "No" to "YES!"
|
||
|
||
* Depends on why we couldn't decrypt it
|
||
* Find Pre-Shared Key
|
||
* Locate complete paired collect
|
||
* Locate both IKE and ESP traffic
|
||
* Have collection sites do surveys for the IP's
|
||
* Find better quality collect with rich metadata
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
28
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Contact Our Friends for Help
|
||
|
||
* Network Security Products
|
||
* Develop decryption algorithms
|
||
* Tailored Access Operations
|
||
* Computer Network Exploitation to create access points
|
||
* Collection Sites
|
||
* Perform surveys for the IPs of interest
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
29
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## More Friends
|
||
|
||
* NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center
|
||
* Manage industrial relationships
|
||
* SIGDEV
|
||
* Develops tools and methods to help you find the traffic you desire
|
||
* OTP VPN Representatives
|
||
* Assist in locating traffic of interest
|
||
* TOPI
|
||
* Target knowledge
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
30
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Sustained Exploitation
|
||
|
||
* Develop sustained exploitation thread AFTER the TOPI confirms the decrypts are interesting
|
||
* TOPI must task IP in CADENCE
|
||
* Task Port and IP
|
||
* UTT does not have boolean logic
|
||
* Categories
|
||
* IPSec: 6640 (protocols) and 6648 (ports)
|
||
* PPTP: 6648 (ports)
|
||
* SSL: 6647 (ports)
|
||
* Get the crypt system title
|
||
* Work with the OTP VPN Regional Branch representative
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
31
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Establish the Data Flow
|
||
|
||
* Establish the correct corporate data flow
|
||
* CES data flow guru [REDACTED]
|
||
* Make sure the correct routing tags and categories are appended to the data
|
||
* Direct tasked traffic to correct data repository
|
||
* PINWALE
|
||
* VULCANDEATHGRIP – IPSec
|
||
* VULCANMINDMELD – SSL
|
||
* FOURSCORE - PPTP
|
||
* Try to avoid relying on XKS workflows due to legal and logistical issues
|
||
* XKEYSCORE – SSH using XKS workflows directed to a file directory
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
32
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Data Flow Integrity
|
||
|
||
* Evaluate data integrity, quality, & quantity
|
||
* Different collectors produce different metadata formats
|
||
* Need rich metadata
|
||
* Need all the pieces (IKE and ESP for IPSec)
|
||
* Ensure that the data is not garbled and headers attached appropriately
|
||
* Check that the data volume is what is expected
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
33
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Collection Sites
|
||
|
||
* Contact Collection Sites if there are data issues
|
||
* Malformed headers
|
||
* Missing metadata
|
||
* Missing payload
|
||
* Garbled data
|
||
* Low volume
|
||
* Single-sided traffic
|
||
* Collection sites sometimes only collect one-side of the VPN traffic
|
||
* Need to collaborate with both sites
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
34
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Decrypt Processing
|
||
|
||
* Decrypt the VPN traffic
|
||
* Create SRI files for decrypts
|
||
* Send the decrypt and SRI files to TURTLEPOWER (IPSec, PPTP) or CAPRI OS (SSL, SSH) for post-processing
|
||
* Decryption of payload
|
||
* Decompression
|
||
* Unrar files
|
||
* Route to appropriate data repository according to the crypt system title and type of decrypt (text, voice, etc)
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
35
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Decrypt Repositories
|
||
|
||
* PINWALE
|
||
* Tasked IPSec, PPTP, and SSL
|
||
* Must be placed in the correct partition according to classification (REL FVEY, NOFORN, FISA)
|
||
* XKEYSCORE
|
||
* SSH - often have router configurations and user credentials which are easier to view in XKS than PINWALE
|
||
* Still developing the process
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
36
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## TOPI Evaluation
|
||
|
||
* Analyst locates the decrypts in PINWALE and/or XKEYSCORE
|
||
* Viewing the decrypts
|
||
* PINWALE,
|
||
* XKEYSCORE
|
||
* AGILITY
|
||
* DNI PRESENTER
|
||
* Contact TURTLEPOWER or CAPRI OS if there are file rendering issues
|
||
* Also try the Unidentified Protocols team in s S31122 for help identifying unknown protocols
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
37
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Thread Monitoring
|
||
|
||
* Responsibility for monitoring these exploitation threads are transferred to the OTP VPN Regional Branch representative
|
||
* After the thread is established and stabilized
|
||
* Trouble shoots decryption and collection issues
|
||
* Set up a cron job to run the decryptor every day
|
||
* Hopefully the TOPI continues to identify and report mission-critical intelligence from these decrypts
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
38
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Success 1: IPSec
|
||
### Follow-the-Money and TAO Targets
|
||
|
||
* TOPI (S2C22) has had a close relationship with TAO for quite some time
|
||
* FTM Target 1
|
||
* Not susceptible to any of NSP's implants
|
||
* TAO got the configuration files which provided us the PSKs to enable passive exploitation
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
39
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Success 1: IPSec
|
||
|
||
* FTM Target 2
|
||
* TAO got on the router through which banking traffic of interest flows
|
||
* NSP had an implant which allows passive exploitation with just ESP
|
||
* Successful exploitation for the past two years
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
40
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Success 2: PPTP
|
||
|
||
* Airlines
|
||
* Iran Air, IRTAA
|
||
* Royal Jordanian Air, JOTAA
|
||
* Transaero Airlines, RUCAC
|
||
* Telecommunications
|
||
* Mir Telematiki (pending system title)
|
||
* Afghani Wimax (pending system title)
|
||
* Government
|
||
* Mexican Diplomatic, MXDBB
|
||
* Pakistani General Intelligence, PKRAQ
|
||
* Turkish Diplomatic, TUDAT
|
||
* Afghanistan Government, AFYAD
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
41
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Success 2: PPTP
|
||
|
||
* Banking and Financial
|
||
* Zaad Financial
|
||
* Ewallet transactions of a principal financial node for Somali terrorist activity
|
||
* Follow-the-Money customer
|
||
* Kabul Bank
|
||
* BNI Banking, Indonesia
|
||
* Formed and owned by the Indonesian government
|
||
* Banking transactions over "Flexy,” Telkom Indonesia's fixed wireless network
|
||
* Other
|
||
* IRGC cyber attacker
|
||
* Nigerian power company's internal network
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
42
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
|
||
## Reminders
|
||
|
||
* If it's not exploitable now, that doesn't mean it won't be later
|
||
* We collaborate and communicate with our friends to produce decrypts
|
||
* Traffic must be both good quality and the correct type
|
||
|
||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||
43 |