snowchive-meta/data/spiegel_-_media-35658/spiegel_-_media-35658.md
2026-11-19 04:39:11 +02:00

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY SIGDEV SIGINT DEVELOPMENT

Case Studies of Integrated Cyber Operation Techniques

MISSION CAPABILITIES T1 CREATING THE FUTURE

National Security Agency / Central Security Service Threat Operations Center

[REDACTED] NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center VS

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U//FOUO) TUTELAGE: Dynamic Defense

  • Inbound Threats Neutered
  • Interactive Threat Controlled
  • Outbound Threat Corrupted
Adversary

Neuter

Exfiltrate Data

Corrupt
Data
Redirect

Victim

NIPRNET

"SLEEP"

Adversary Web Server

NSA Web Server

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(S//REL) Foreign Intelligence in Support of Dynamic Defense

U.S.
Victim
Victim
Victim
mil.

NSA
FBI
DHS

Foreign Intelligence
Adversary
[REDACTED]

Attribution

Access to their tools
  - so that we can defend
Warn other U.S. victims

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U//FOUO) Counter CNE: Support to CND

S//REL) Use CNE to penetrate the operations of foreign cyber actors U) Two major classes of CNE techniques

  • (U) Man-in-the-middle
  • (U) Man-on-the-side U//FOUO) Steal their tools, tradecraft, targets and take
Adversary Penetrated Foreign Host

Adversary Penetrated Foreign Infrastructure

Adversary Home Network

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses

Active Exploitation
Target
Implanted Router
AnySite.com

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses

Active Exploitation

Target
Implanted Router


Network Defense
Good Guys
Bad Guy

CLOUDSHIELD

PANDORASMAYHAM
TURMOIL
TUTELAGE

AnySite.com

(S//REL) TUTELAGE is a man-in-the-middle technique (U//FOUO) Using TUTELAGE to enable active exploitation is integrated cyber operations.


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(S//REL) QUANTUMTHEORY: Man-on-the-Side Active Exploitation

Concerted Use of both Passive + Active SIGINT

  • Implant targets based on 'selectors' and/or behavior

    • e.g. users of al-Mehrab ISP (Mosul) who visit al-Hezbah extremist website
  • Requires target webserver responses be visible to passive SIGINT

  • Requires sufficient delay in target web connection for the hook to "beat" the response back to the target (typically means at least one satellite hop)

  • Requires target's client to be vulnerable to our tools

  • Cycle 3 4 must get to the target before 2 occurs

  • Once 'hooked,' the target is exploited with no time constraints

  • Different QUANTUM effects have different time constraints.

1 Target web connection/request via SATCOM or Fiber 2 Response MHS TARGET DESTINATION 3 SIGINT cue 4 Insert hook in addition to requested data 5 Hook calls to Covert Listening Post (LP): upload robust implant for sustained access

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study

INTERNET

NIPRNET

NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
  • (S//REL) DNS requests entering NIPRnet domain
    • (S//REL) Destination IP not a NIPRnet DNS server
    • (S//REL) Domain name not within NIPRnet
  • (S//REL) DNS behavior of host is suspicious but not dangerous
  • (TS//SI//REL) TAO uses QUANTUMDNS to redirect the requesting host

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY 8


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: An Integrated Cyber Operation

TARGET SPACE

DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?
Local DNS Server
I don't know, I'll ask.
DNS Server
Talk to the root DNS Server
Where's Anysite.mil?
Root DNS Server
Root DNS Server, talk to the DNS Server
Connect to server 1.2.3.4
Where's Anysite.mil?
DNS Server
I Know how to get to Anysite.mil
DNS Server
Where's Anysite.mil?
DNS answer, Anysite.mil found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4
DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?

IP is 1.2.3.4
TAO Server mirrors Anysite.mil

TAO Shooter

LPT-D

NIPRNET

Blocked

If DNS Server found

DNS Server

Anysite.mil Server

Tip Sent

NSA

Command Sent

TURBINE

Implant

Implant Command & Control

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: As Used Against BOXINGRUMBLE

TARGET SPACE

Connect to server 1.2.3.4

IP is 1.2.3.4

TAO C2 mirrors Anysite.mil C2

DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?

DNS answer, Anysite.com found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4

TAO Shooter

LPT-D

NIPRNET

Blocked

Anysite.mil Server

Tip Sent

NSA

TURBINE

Command Sent

Implant

Implant Command & Control

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study

TAO C2 Server

Open Web Proxies

Victims (Bots)

NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
  • (TS//SI//REL) TAO establishes itself as a trusted C2 node
  • (U//FOUO) Captured traffic indicates the existence of a bot net
    • (S//REL) Command and control split into two layers (C2 and C4)
    • (S//REL) C2 layer has a peer-to-peer mesh network topology with direct connection to a C4 node
  • (S//REL) C2 nodes connect directly to victims as well as through open web proxies

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study

Bot Commander

Trusted C4 Nodes 2-3 Nodes

Trusted C2 Nodes ~ 250 Nodes

TAO C2 Server

Open Web Proxies

Victims (Bots) 200k Max ~ 30k Today

NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure

DEFIANTWARRIOR Implant
  • (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can see all bot tasking
  • (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can push tasking
  • (S//REL) BOXINGRUMBLE bots
    • (S//REL) ~ 45% Vietnamese dissidents
    • (S//REL) ~45% Chinese dissidents
    • (S//REL) ~10% Other
  • (TS//SI//REL) Adding BOXINGRUMBLE bots to DEFIANTWARRIOR

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM

TS//SI//REL

Name Description Inception Date Status Operational Success
CNE
QUANTUMINSERT * Man-on-the-Side technique
* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website
* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation
2005 Operational Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means)
QUANTUMBOT * Takes control of idle IRC bots
* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel
Aug 2007 Operational Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted)
QUANTUMBISCUIT * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation
* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity.
Dec 2007 Operational Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses)
QUANTUMDNS * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.
* Targets single hosts or caching name servers.
Dec 2008 Operational Successful (High priority CCI target exploited)
QUANTUMHAND Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook Oct 2010 Operational Successful
QUANTUMPHANTOM Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. Oct 2010 Live Tested N/A
CNA
QUANTUMSKY Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. 2004 Operational Successful
QUANTUMCOPPER File download/upload disruption and corruption. Dec 2008 Live N/A

TS//SI//REL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U//FOUO) QUANTUMSMACKDOWN

Internet
ACK
Shooter

Defensive
TURMOIL

CLOUDSHIELD
RESET

Client

NSA Space

TURBINE

REPOSITORY

NIPRNET
  1. A client requests connection to malicious server. Request is detected by TURMOIL. CLOUDSHIELD terminates client-side connection.
  2. The malicious server's response is blocked by CLOUDSHIELD.
  3. TURMOIL tips TURBINE, which then tasks a shooter to send the acknowledgement to the malicious server.
  4. Malicious server assumes connection and forwards

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U//FOUO) Future Capability: QUANTUMSANDMAN

* Take captured malware and
execute in controlled environment.
* Allow communication through
QUANTUM technique with outside
world
* Will be able to see tasking, get
later stages of malware to provide
disinformation, and send implants.

Internet

Dummy
Victim

Shooter

TURMOIL

NSA Space

ure Malware Test Environment

TURBINE

Victim

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U) Future Work

  • (U//FOUO) Develop lower latency guards

  • (S//REL) Use TUTELAGE inline devices as our "shooter"

  • (U//FOUO) Push decision logic to the edge

  • (U//FOUO) Identify more mission opportunities

  • (U//FOUO) Continue developing and deploying additional QUANTUM capabilities

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY 16


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM

TS//SI//REL

Name Description Inception Date Status Operational Success
CNE
QUANTUMINSERT * Man-on-the-Side technique
* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website
* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation
2005 Operational Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means)
QUANTUMBOT * Takes control of idle IRC bots
* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel
Aug 2007 Operational Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted)
QUANTUMBISCUIT * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation
* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity.
Dec 2007 Operational Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses)
QUANTUMDNS * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.
* Targets single hosts or caching name servers.
Dec 2008 Operational Successful (High priority CCI target exploited)
QUANTUMHAND Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook Oct 2010 Operational Successful
QUANTUMPHANTOM Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. Oct 2010 Live Tested N/A
CNA
QUANTUMSKY Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. 2004 Operational Successful
QUANTUMCOPPER File download/upload disruption and corruption. Dec 2008 Live N/A

TS//SI//REL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY

(U) QUESTIONS?

For more information, please contact:

  • TUTELAGE – [REDACTED], VS ([REDACTED])
  • QUANTUM – [REDACTED], S32X ([REDACTED])
  • TURBINE – [REDACTED], T1412 ([REDACTED])
  • BOXINGRUMBLE – [REDACTED], F22 ([REDACTED])

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY 18