40 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
40 lines
1.5 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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June 2010
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SID
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today
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(U) Stealthy Techniques Can Crack Some of SIGINT's
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Hardest Targets
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By: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED] Chief, Access and Target Development (S3261)
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[REDACTED]
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(TS//SI//NF) Not all SIGINT tradecraft involves accessing signals and
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networks from thousands of miles away... In fact, sometimes it is very
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hands-on (literally!). Here's how it works: shipments of computer network
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devices (servers, routers, etc.) being delivered to our targets throughout the world are
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intercepted. Next, they are redirected to a secret location where Tailored Access
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Operations/Access Operations (AO – S326) employees, with the support of the Remote
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Operations Center (S321), enable the installation of beacon implants directly into our
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targets' electronic devices. These devices are then re-packaged and placed back into
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transit to the original destination. All of this happens with the support of Intelligence
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Community partners and the technical wizards in TAO.
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(TS//SI//NF) Such operations involving supply-chain interdiction are some of the most
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productive operations in TAO, because they pre-position access points into hard target
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networks around the world.
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ODSID
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יווייייי
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(TS//SI//NF) Left: Intercepted packages are opened carefully; Right: A “load station”
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implants a beacon
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(TS//SI//NF) In one recent case, after several months a beacon implanted through supply-
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chain interdiction called back to the NSA covert infrastructure. This call back provided
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us access to further exploit the device and survey the network.
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