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SECRET STRAP1
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Intrusion Analysis/JeAC
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The IA team conducts all-source analysis both of emerging and current electronic attack types. It forms part of the Joint Electronic Attack Cell (JeAC). (Other JeAC elements are EITT, JTRIG and the EA Threat Team). SIGINT targeting by the IA team falls under EITT oversight (see Seth's email of 6/12/07). The IA team is responsible for the management and release of eA signatures.
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PoCs: [REDACTED] (Team Leader)
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Main Customers: SS, GCHQ, SIS, HMG, 2nd Parties.
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Sources: where does the material come from?
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* SIGINT
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* HARUSPEX (though most first-line analysis is done by the Incident Response Team)
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* MessageLabs data managed via the HARUSPEX network
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* Tasking of CNE
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* Open Source
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"Target" location
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HARUSPEX sensors monitor attacks against UK systems based on known attack signatures. These signatures typically reflect attack vectors, infrastructure or entity identifiers associated with attacks. While the signatures reflect our knowledge of FIS activities, UK-to-UK traffic may be collected if the attacker is using UK infrastructure.
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SIGINT is used to detect attack activity associated with FIS or Foreign Governments. Selectors include IP addresses, web domains and email addresses. In general these are not associated with the UK, but where UK infrastructure is involved, appropriate SIGINT processes are followed.
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Report Types: How are results reported?
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JeAC reports are issued as standard EPRs via PROSPERO.
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Report Distribution Mechanism
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PROSPERO
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Legal Authorities
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Authorisation varies depending on the source of the information:
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Any CNE will be authorised under ISA and (where necessary) either with a warrant issued under s5 or under s7, depending on where the target is located.
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Use of the SIGINT system is under the direction of EITT - all normal Ops rules apply and intercept will have been acquired under Part I of RIPA.
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Any HARUSPEX information has been lawfully acquired under the LBPR, as for the Response Team.
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Local Policy statements/documentation
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* [REDACTED]'s signature release policy (X/29373/7008/009/000/0 of 26 June 2007)
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1 of 2
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] (non-sec) or email [REDACTED]@gchq
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SECTRE STRAP 1
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SECRET STRAP1
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* [REDACTED]'s email of 6/12/07: "EITT/RCIT is accountable for eA use of the SIGINT system".
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* [REDACTED] of EITT is working with OPPLEG on eA-specific authorisations for CNE (eg. to allow the targeting of UK-based victims).
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* [REDACTED]'s description of the Signature Spreadsheet.
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Auditing arrangements
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The IA team has a fairly small number of selectors in CORINTH. Team members are prompted monthly to check the validity of their selectors. Formal audits are conducted under the auspices of EITT. HRA checking is enforced by the SIGINT system, in that selectors will age off if not re-validated. Use of SIGINT system for eA is covered by 2 MIRANDA numbers, corresponding to the separate JIC requirements for current and emerging electronic threats.
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The team maintains a local spreadsheet of about 1500 eA signatures with associated information on nationality, release, likely false positive rate etc. The Signature Release Policy mentioned above controls the deployment of these signatures on HARUSPEX and their release to external agencies.
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Number of reporters and their skill levels
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There are 6 reporters in the IA team, of whom 2 are trained to Skill level 3 and 2 to Skill Level 2.
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Other available legal/policy training
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Operational Legalities Briefing.
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Status:
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Updated 23/7/08 with input from [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
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2 of 2
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This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED] (non-sec) or email [REDACTED]@gchq
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SECTRE STRAP1
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data/gchq-intrusion-analysis/metadata.json
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data/gchq-intrusion-analysis/metadata.json
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{
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"title": "Intrusion Analysis – GCHQ",
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"type": "REPORTED",
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"description": "An internal GCHQ write-up defines the Intrusion Analysis team’s remit inside the Joint Electronic Attack Cell: all‑source analysis of emerging and active electronic attacks, stewardship of electronic attack signatures, and SIGINT‑driven targeting under EITT oversight. It details sources, reporting channels, legal authorities, and auditing controls that govern how signatures are deployed and how selectors are managed.",
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"long_description": "The Intrusion Analysis (IA) team sits within the Joint Electronic Attack Cell (JeAC) alongside EITT, JTRIG, and the EA Threat Team. Its mission is to analyze current and emerging electronic attack types, manage and release electronic attack (eA) signatures, and conduct SIGINT targeting subject to EITT oversight. Inputs span SIGINT collection, HARUSPEX sensors, MessageLabs data, tasking of computer network exploitation (CNE), and open sources. HARUSPEX monitors UK systems using known attack signatures tied to vectors, infrastructure, or entity identifiers; because foreign actors can stage from UK infrastructure, the write‑up acknowledges that UK‑to‑UK traffic may be collected, with “appropriate SIGINT processes” applied. Selectors include IPs, domains, and email addresses, and results are disseminated as standard JeAC EPRs via PROSPERO.\n\nGovernance and compliance are structured around specific legal authorities and audit mechanisms. CNE actions require ISA authorisation with section 5 or section 7 warrants depending on target location; use of SIGINT is under Part I of RIPA with all normal ops rules, while HARUSPEX information is said to be lawfully acquired under LBPR. EITT directs SIGINT use for eA, maintains formal audits, and enforces HRA checks so selectors age off unless re‑validated. The team keeps a local spreadsheet of roughly 1,500 signatures annotated for nationality, release status, and false‑positive rates, controlled by a signature release policy for deployment to HARUSPEX and external release. Notably, EITT is working with OPPLEG on eA‑specific CNE authorisations “to allow the targeting of UK‑based victims,” underscoring the sensitivity of domestic collection and warrant pathways. Selector management happens in CORINTH, reporting flows through PROSPERO, and oversight references two MIRANDA numbers tied to JIC requirements for current and emerging threats.",
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"tags": [
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"Intrusion Analysis",
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"Joint Electronic Attack Cell",
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"electronic attack",
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"signature development",
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"signature release policy",
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"HARUSPEX sensors",
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"MessageLabs data",
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"SIGINT targeting",
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"EITT oversight",
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"JTRIG",
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"EA Threat Team",
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"CNE tasking",
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"Computer Network Exploitation",
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"selectors",
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"IP addresses",
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"domain selectors",
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"email selectors",
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"PROSPERO reporting",
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"MIRANDA numbers",
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"JIC",
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"LBPR authority",
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"ISA section 5",
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"ISA section 7",
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"RIPA Part I",
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"OPPLEG authorisations",
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"domestic targeting controls",
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"foreign intelligence services",
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"attack vectors",
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"infrastructure mapping",
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"false positive rate management",
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"audit",
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"selector management",
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"reporting",
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"dissemination",
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"all-source analysis",
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"incident response",
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"threat detection",
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"data fusion",
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"oversight",
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"authorization"
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],
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"document": {
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"creator": "GCHQ",
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"date_created": "",
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"classification": [
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"SECRET",
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"STRAP 1"
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],
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"dissemination": [],
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"banner": "SECRET STRAP1",
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"genre": "report",
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"programs": [
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"HARUSPEX",
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"JTRIG",
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"PROSPERO",
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"CORINTH"
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],
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"countries": [],
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"people": []
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},
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"publication": [
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{
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"publisher": "The Intercept",
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"date_published": "2015-06-22",
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"title": "Spies Hacked Computers Thanks to Sweeping Secret Warrants, Aggressively Stretching U.K. Law",
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"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/06/22/gchq-reverse-engineering-warrants/",
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"reporters": [
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"Fishman, Andrew",
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"Greenwald, Glenn"
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],
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"contributors": [],
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"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/06/22/intrusion-analysis-gchq/",
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"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2106822/intrusion-analysis-gchq.pdf"
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}
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],
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"pdf_sha256": "9adf42a463af40657f79b6d960068c9df73ad81a0b967b4cbef1cdb9e57c4ca8",
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"pages": 2
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}
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