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{
"title": "Net Defense from Encrypted Communications",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "A NSA Technology Directorate briefing from February 2012 describing BLUESNORT — a capability that repurposes GALLANTWAVE's SSL/TLS decryption pipeline for network defence, re-injecting decrypted traffic into TURMOIL Stage 1 Prime where BLUESNORT detects malware and other malicious activity — representing description of NSA using its own bulk decryption infrastructure for cyber defence as well as intelligence collection.",
"long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY Technology Directorate briefing dated February 2012, published by Der Spiegel under the German title \"BLUESNORT - Ein Programm zur Entschlüsselung von Netzwerkverkehr, um Trojaner und andere Schadsoftware zu erkennen\" (\"BLUESNORT - A programme for decrypting network traffic to detect trojans and other malware\"). The document describes a three-component solution that integrates GALLANTWAVE's SSL/TLS decryption capability with BLUESNORT network intrusion detection for both SIGINT and network defence purposes.\n\nThe driving requirement is SYSREQ10322.2: \"TURMOIL shall reinject decrypted IP traffic into BLUESNORT for malicious network activity detection.\" The solution uses three components working together. First, a GALLANTWAVE application module supporting both network defence and SIGINT use cases, with dynamic targeting via UTT and static targeting file updates. Second, a GALLANTWAVE Reinjection application that takes the decrypted sessions produced by the CA Server and re-injects them into TURMOIL as packetized traffic for detection. Third, BLUESNORT running in TURMOIL Stage 1 Prime, which emits detection events off the decrypted, re-packetized, reinjected data.\n\nThe high level dataflow shows UTT providing targeting to GALLANTWAVE, which passes selected sessions to a CA Server communicating with LONGHAUL for key recovery. Decrypted sessions flow to the GALLANTWAVE Reinjection component which routes them both to XKEYSCORE for SIGINT purposes and to BLUESNORT for malware detection. PITBOSS provides signature updates to BLUESNORT. The Stage 1 Prime diagram shows BLUESNORT sitting alongside DNS Inspector, HIDDENSALAMANDER and other detection components processing the reinjected decrypted traffic, with outputs going to Events and Collect destinations.\n\nAt time of writing the capability was running on MHS DEV ESO T5 and T22 with Transform, Reinjection and Signature Hits confirmed, but signatures required further development to reduce false positives. NTOC was reviewing XKeyscore hits to generate new signatures. Key outstanding issues included ITx connectivity to LONGHAUL at network defence sites, NTOC requirements for separate development and live ITx fabric, hardware funding, firewall rule submissions, and SSH connectivity — with a short-term workaround using BLUEBOX CA Servers at the Pentagon.\n\nThe NCC-3 test event planning table shows CA Reinjection scheduled for two deployment targets in June 2012 and June 2013. DGO is listed as the SIGINT sensor target for June 2012. TTENT is listed as the defensive sensor target for June 2013. The significance of DGO as a deployment target is notable: NSA was planning to extend GALLANTWAVE SSL/TLS decryption and reinjection into DoD's own network infrastructure, meaning the same bulk decryption capability built for foreign intelligence collection was being deployed to detect malware in encrypted traffic on military networks. It should be noted that DGO is also used in other Snowden documents as the abbreviation for DANCINGOASIS (SIGAD US-3171), a separate SSO collection programme — the two uses of the abbreviation are unrelated.\n\nThe near-term schedule shows GALLANTWAVE Reinjection gates completed or in progress through May 2012, with initial live development testing at TURTLEZOO planned for approximately May 2012. The MAILORDER/NiFi (NIAGARAFILES) interface was not yet available, requiring manual static targeting file loading as a mitigation. The detailed architecture diagrams show the internal GALLANTWAVE component chain: GW-FIP, TE-GW, GW-SessionFilter, GW-FragmentFilter, GW-MI (MetadataInjector), GW-LoadManager, CoreSSC, GW-TargetManager and GW-SessionDistributor routing sessions to the CAServer and onward via XKS-Sessions interface to XKEYSCORE, and via the Desessionizer and Packet Injector to Stage 1 Prime.\n\nThe proposed TUTELAGE tasking flow diagram adds further context, showing CES and NTOC analysts using UTT to task network technology targets, with NiFi (NIAGARAFILES) instances at both corporate and NTOC levels passing IP tasking files through NTOC FIREWALL, with SSDM handling local data distribution at the TURMOIL site alongside NiFi Local.\nTaken together the document describes a dual-use architecture where NSA's SSL/TLS bulk decryption capability — built primarily for SIGINT collection — was being extended to serve as a network defence sensor, allowing NTOC to detect malware in encrypted traffic that would otherwise be opaque to intrusion detection systems.",
"tags": [
"Technology Directorate",
"network defense",
"malware detection",
"intrusion detection",
"SSL decryption",
"re-injection",
"dual use",
"SIGINT enabling"
],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "2012-02-01",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"SI"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"TURMOIL",
"BLUESNORT",
"GALLANTWAVE",
"UTT",
"XKEYSCORE",
"PITBOSS",
"LONGHAUL",
"NIAGARAFILES",
"BLUEBOX",
"MAILORDER",
"TURTLEZOO",
"ISLANDTRANSPORT",
"NETFLOW",
"FULLSNORT",
"POPQUIZ",
"CLOUDSHIELD",
"TUMULT",
"TUTELAGE",
"HIDDENSALAMANDER",
"ASDF",
"TUIC",
"BLUESNORT",
"HIDDENSALAMANDER",
"TUIC",
"ISLANDTRANSPORT",
"SSDM",
"CORESSC",
"TTENT",
"FIP",
"PPF"
],
"countries": [],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2014-12-28",
"title": "Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Grothoff, Christian",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Sontheimer, Michael",
"Stöcker, Christian"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/10298b26-0001-0014-0000-000000035534/media-35534.pdf"
}
],
"pdf_sha256": "4bc901d64e3ece9cc32ff3ebbadcb555e1057a4f5e8a690c8196045340028035",
"pages": 16
}

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# (U//FOUO) Net Defense from Encrypted Communications
February 2012
POWERING THE MISSION
TD
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
1
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Increment 3 Requirement
SYSREQ10322.2
(S//REL) TURMOIL shall reinject decrypted IP traffic into BLUESNORT for malicious network activity detection.
2
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Three-Feather Solution
1. GALLANTWAVE application
* Same module supports NetDef and SIGINT
* Supports dynamic update of targeting via UTT
* Supports static target updates
2. GALLANTWAVE Reinjection application
* Same module supports NetDef and SIGINT
* Supports re-injection of decrypt into TURMOIL for detection by BLUESNORT
3. BLUESNORT in Stage 1 Prime application
* Emits events off decrypted, re-packetized, reinjected data
3
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## HIGH Level Data Flow
### Net Defense and SIGINT sites
```
+--------------------------------------------+
| TURMOIL/ |
| Mission |
| Application |
| s +---------------+ |
UTT -------|----------------->| GALLANTWAVE | |
| +---------------+ |
| | |
| v |
| +---------------+ |
| | CA Server |<--------------> LONGHAUL
| +---------------+ |
| | |
| v |
| +---------------+ |
| | GALLANTWAVE | |
| | REINJECTION |---------|-----> XKEYSCORE
| +---------------+ |
| | |
| v |
| +---------------+ |
PITBOSS----|----------------->| BLUESNORT | |
| +---------------+ |
| | |
+-------------------------|------------------+
|
|
v
TIPS (Bluesnort Events)
```
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Status
* Running on MHS DEV ESO T5 and T22
* Transform, Reinjection, Signature Hits confirmed
* Signatures need further development to produce true hits vs. false positives
* NTOC POC reviewing XKS hits to generate new signatures.
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Issues/Risks
1. CA Servers at Net Defense Sites
a) ITx Connectivity to LONGHAUL
b) NTOC requires stand-up of separate dev and live ITx fabric
i. H/W funding may be needed
ii. Need paperwork for update to firewall - submission expected by 25 Feb
c) Expected completion was 29 Feb; now delayed to TBD
d) SSH connectivity
e) Short term: via BLUEBOX CA Servers at Pentagon - done
f) Longer term: via deployment of servers within the NTOC enclave that connect to CA Servers in the field
2. GALLANTWAVE Targeting Challenges
a) MAILORDER/Ni-FI not yet available
b) Mitigation: Manually load static targeting files
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
6
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## CA Capabilities Planned for NCC-3 Test Events
| | DT/OA 2 (June 2012) | | DT/OA 3 (June 2013) | |
|-----------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Capability | Defensive Sensor | SIGINT Sensor | Defensive Sensor | SIGINT Sensor |
| CA Reinjection | No | DGO | TTENT | DGO |
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Near-term Schedule
| Capability | Date |
| :------------------------------ | :--------------- |
| GW-R Gate 2 | Done (15 Feb) |
| GW-R Gate 3 | Done (29 Feb) |
| GW-R Gate 5 | 31 Mar |
| GW-R Deploy to U sites | May |
| ITx Dev Fabric at NetDef sites | 29 Feb + |
| CA Server ssh connectivity | Done via Bluebox |
| Initial Live Dev Test TURTLEZOO | ~May |
| GW-R Core 4.0 | May |
| GW Core 4.0 | May |
| ITx Live Fabric | TBD |
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Players
[REDACTED]
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
## BACKUP SLIDES
---
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
## CCA Capabilities Planned for NCC-3 Test Events
| Capability | DT/OA 2 (June 2012) | | DT/OA 3 (June 2013) | |
| ----------------------------- | ------------------- | ------------------- | ------------------- | ------------- |
| | Defensive Sensor | SIGINT Sensor | Defensive Sensor | SIGINT Sensor |
| NETFLOW | Full Netflow | Pretty Good Netflow | Full Netflow | Full Netflow |
| BLUESNORT (updates) | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| FULL SNORT | Yes | No (Core 4) | Yes | Yes |
| POPQUIZ | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Performance Testing | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Wireless reinjection | N/A | Yes | N/A | Yes |
| CA Reinjection | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cyber Tasking | Yes | Partial | Yes | Partial |
| Updated Cloudshield Interface | Partial | N/A | Yes | Yes |
| Metrics and Monitoring | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
Orange items are being revisited. Requirements without explicit TML Core 4 dependency need mission documentation to justify not being covered in DT/OA 2.
SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
## (S//REL) Dynamic Defense Logical Diagram
```
INTERNET (S//REL)
Network
| ^ Interface
| | +---------+ Normalized Packets
| |---------| TUMULT |---------------- Detect
Active Response-|-------------| Stage 0 |------------- |
| | +---------+ | |
Block, | | ------------+--->->---+
Reroute, | | | TURMOIL |
Alter | | | Stage 1 |
| | +---------+
v | |
+-------------+ Command +--------------+ v Alert
| CloudShield |<----------| COMMAND | Action +----------+
+-------------+ | DISTRIBUTION |<-------------| BUSINESS |
| ^ +--------------+ | LOGIC |
| | +----------+
| | Decide
| |
| |
v | Legend:
+--------------------------------------+
Protected Internal Network | TUMULT | TURMOIL | TUTELAGE | NTOC |
| (T113) | (T112) | (T111) | (VSPO) |
+--------------------------------------+
```
12
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
```
+----------------------------------------------------------+ +----------------------------------------------------+
| | | |
| +--<--+----------+---------------+ | | |
| | FCP |--------->| PacketRouter | | | |
| +-----+ +---------------+ | | |
| | | | | |
| | v | | +----------+ |
| +---------------+ | | | Core SSC | |
| | GW-FIP | | | +----------+ |
| | (FIP) | | | ^ |
| +---------------+ | | +-----------+ | |
| | | | | | [REDACTED ] | |
| | v | | +-----------+ | |
| +----------+ +---------------+ | | | | [REDACTED] |
| | PPF.xxxx | | TE-GW | | | | | | |
| +----------+ +---------------+ | | | v | |
+------------------------|--|------------------------------+ | | +---------------+ | |
+------------------------|--|------------------------------+ | ------->| TargetManager |------- |
| | | | | | (IPCollector | |
| | | | | +---------------+ |
| |--|--------------------- | | | |
| | [REDACTED]<---|-|----------------------- GW-MANAGER |
| v | | +----------------------------------------------------+
| +-------------------+ | |
| | GW-SessionFilter | | |
| +-------------------+ | |
| | (AppId) | |
| | | |
| v | |
| +-------------------+ | |
| | GW-FragmentFilter |--------- |
| +-------------------+ | |
| |(IOPort64)| | |
| | | | |
| v | | |
| +----------+ +-------------------v-+ | |
| | DFAProxy |<--->| GW-MI | | |
| +----------+ | (MetadataInjector) | | |
| +---------------------+ | |
| | | |
| | | |
| v | |
| +------------+ +-------------------+ | |
| | [REDACTED] |<->| GW-LoadManager |<--------- |
| +------------| +-------------------+ |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| +-----------------+ v |
| | TE-STAGE1- | +--------------------------+ |
| | GALLANTWAVE.xxx | | #{GALLANTWAVE-SERVICE} | |
| +-----------------+ +--------------------------+ |
+-----------------------------------------------------------
|
|
v
+----------+
| CAServer |
+----------+
v
+-----------+
| XKEYSCORE |
+-----------+
1) CoreSSC gets UTT updates, triggers loadTargets
2) GW-TargetManager responds to loadTargets request
from CoreSSC, pulls the GW IP addresses from the
Targeting database; issues control-flow messages
for each IP:Port combination and sends periodic
updates for those.
3) FCP responds to control-flow messages by
promoting all packets to/from the targeted IP:port
combinations, and PacketRouter ensures these
packets are sent to GW-FIP for sessionization. GW-
FIP outputs 'raw' SOTF session-fragments to the
TE-GW service on the same host.
4) GW-SessionFilter identifies sessions containing
target technology-of-interest by applying an
appropriate appId tag to each session-fragment.
5) GW-FragmentFilter removes session-fragments not
containing an appropriate appId for the target
technology-of-interest. Additionally, as a work-
around for an issue in FIP 3.1.10, erroneous
session-fragments missing a specific metadata
filed are removed. GW-MI applies SRI obtained
from Dfid Allocator.
6) GW-MI applies SRI obtained from the DFID
allocator.
GW-LoadManager delivers buffered data, upto a
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
---
SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Delivery to both XKEYSCORE and Stage 1 Prime Reinjection
```
+-----------------------------------------+
| TURMOIL |
| SessionReinjection +----------+ |
| | DFAProxy | |
+------------------------------+ | +----------+ |
| GW-SessionManager | | ^ |
| | | | |
| | ^ | |
| --------------| v |
| | | | +---------------+ +-----------------+ | +---------------+
| | | | | Desessionizer |-->| Packet Injector |-|--->| Stage 1 Prime |
| | | | +---------------+ +-----------------+ | +---------------+
+----------+ | +--------------------+ | | Ring Buffer |
| CAServer |----|-->| GW- | | +-----------------------------------------+
+----------+ | | SessionDistributor | |
| +--------------------+ |
| | |
| | | +-----------------------------------------+
| | | | XKS-Sessions |
| | | | |
| ------|-------| |
| | | |
| | | +---------------------+ | +-----------+
| | | | XKSSessionInterface |--------|--->| XKEYSCORE |
| | V +---------------------+ | +-----------+
+------------------------------+ | |
| |
| |
| |
+-----------------------------------------+
```
---
SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## TURMOIL
## Stage 1 Prime Reinjection
```
+----------------------------------------+
| Stage 1 Prime |
| |
| +-----------+ | ------>+--------+
| ------>| BLUESNORT |-----------|---|----->| Events |
| | +-----------+-----------|---|--- +--------+
| | | | | +---------+
Decrypted flow | | | | --->| Collect |
| | +-----------+ | | +---------+
+-------------+ | | | DNS | | |
| Reinjection |-----|-----------------------| Inspector |----|---|-------->
+-------------+ | | | +-----------+ | |
| | | +------------------+ | |
| ---|--->| HiddenSalamander |--------|---|-------->
| | +------------------+ | |
| | | |
| | +---------+ | |
| ---->| etc ... |----------------------
| +---------+ |
| |
+----------------------------------------+
```
---
SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY
## Proposed Tasking Flow for TUTELAGE Cryptanalytic Capability
```
Proposed Tasking Flow
NTOC for TUTELAGE +-----------------------------------------+
CES o Cryptanalytic Capability | CA Server | +----------+
o -|- | | | LONGHAUL |
-|- -> / \ | +-------------+ | +----------+
/ \ | | GALLANTWAVE | | ^
| +-------------+<|-----------|
\ +--------------------------------^---^----+ Key Exchange - ITX
\ | |
v +--------------------------------|---|--------------------------+
+--------------------+ | TURMOIL | | |
| UTT | | | | |
| Network Technology | | IPs promoted for decryption | | |
+--------------------+ | | | |
IP tasking file ^ +----------+ | | | |
response - SSL | | | | +------------------+ | | |
| | | | | DNS Inspector | | | |
v | | | +------------------+ | | |
+--------------------+ | | ASDF - SFTP | +------------------+ | | |
| NiFi | | | <--------------| | HIDDENSALAMANDER | | | |
| Corporate Instance | | | | +------------------+ | | Decrypted data |
+--------------------+ | | Collect | +------------------+ | | |
^ | | <--------------| | CoreSSC |<----------- | |
| | | | +------------------+<-- | +---------------+ |
| | | Events | +------------------+ | | | BLUESNORT | |
| | | <--------------| | BLUESNORT | | ----->| Stage 1 Prime | |
v | | | +------------------+ | +---------------+ |
+--------------------+ | | +-----------------------|----------------------------------------+
| NTOC FIREWALL | | | |
+--------------------+ | | +-----------------------|---------------------------------------+
IP tasking file ^ | NTOC | | | |
response - SSL | | FIREWALL | | +------------+ | |
| | | | | SSDM |<-------- |
| | | | +------------+ |
v | | | ^ |
+--------------------+ | | | v |
| | | | | +------------+ |
| NiFi |<-----------------------|----------|--------------->| | NiFi Local | |
| NTOC Instance | IP tasking file / | | | +------------+ |
| | response - SSL | | | |
+--------------------+ +----------+ +---------------------------------------------------------------+
```