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{
"title": "Case Studies of Integrated Cyber Operation Techniques",
"type": "REPORTED",
"description": "",
"long_description": "",
"tags": [],
"document": {
"creator": "NSA",
"date_created": "",
"classification": [
"TOP SECRET",
"COMINT"
],
"dissemination": [
"REL USA, FVEY"
],
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY",
"genre": "slides",
"programs": [
"AURORAVNC",
"TUTELAGE",
"QUANTUM",
"TURBINE",
"BOXINGRUMBLE",
"CLOUDSHIELD",
"PANDORASMAYHAM",
"TURMOIL",
"QUANTUMTHEORY",
"QUANTUMDNS",
"TAOSHOOTER",
"DEFIANTWARRIOR",
"QUANTUMINSERT",
"QUANTUMBOT",
"QUANTUMBISCUIT",
"QUANTUMHAND",
"QUANTUMPHANTOM",
"QUANTUMSKY",
"QUANTUMCOPPER",
"QUANTUMSMACKDOWN",
"QUANTUMSANDMAN",
"FOXACID"
],
"countries": [
"Vietnam",
"China",
"Iraq"
],
"people": []
},
"publication": [
{
"publisher": "Der Spiegel",
"date_published": "2015-01-17",
"title": "The Digital Arms Race: NSA Preps America for Future Battle",
"link": "https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-snowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html",
"reporters": [
"Appelbaum, Jacob",
"Gibson, Aaron",
"Guarnieri, Claudio",
"Müller-Maguhn, Andy",
"Poitras, Laura",
"Rosenbach, Marcel",
"Ryge, Leif",
"Schmundt, Hilmar",
"Sontheimer, Michael"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_url": "https://cdn.prod.www.spiegel.de/media/4d83ded2-0001-0014-0000-000000035658/media-35658.pdf"
},
{
"publisher": "The Intercept",
"date_published": "2014-03-12",
"title": "How the NSA Plans to Infect ‘Millions’ of Computers with Malware",
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/",
"reporters": [
"Gallagher, Ryan",
"Greenwald, Glenn"
],
"contributors": [],
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2014/03/12/one-way-quantum/",
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf",
"version": "there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum",
"note": "The Intercept published only slide 17 of this deck, in March 2014. Its copy of that slide reveals two things Der Spiegel's doesn't: the \"CND\" category heading in the table, and the \"QUANTUMSMACKDOWN\" row under it."
}
],
"aka_id": [],
"pdf_sha256": "cc581eb95a70b9d7dac0c71c00a37b60cdb753d4b06fe5fff01db7f8a0da9d86",
"pages": 18,
"versions": {
"there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum": {
"pdf_sha256": "cfe0cbee3ef870ae637daf4518c652ebe0cd3a59870182330e779d6e242064d3",
"changed_pages": [
1
]
}
}
}

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SIGDEV
SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
# Case Studies of Integrated Cyber Operation Techniques
MISSION CAPABILITIES
T1
CREATING THE FUTURE
National Security Agency / Central Security Service
Threat Operations Center
[REDACTED]
NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center
VS
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) TUTELAGE: Dynamic Defense
* Inbound Threats Neutered
* Interactive Threat Controlled
* Outbound Threat Corrupted
```
Adversary
Neuter
Exfiltrate Data
Corrupt
Data
Redirect
Victim
NIPRNET
"SLEEP"
Adversary Web Server
NSA Web Server
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (S//REL) Foreign Intelligence in Support of Dynamic Defense
```
U.S.
Victim
Victim
Victim
mil.
NSA
FBI
DHS
Foreign Intelligence
Adversary
[REDACTED]
Attribution
Access to their tools
- so that we can defend
Warn other U.S. victims
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) Counter CNE: Support to CND
S//REL) Use CNE to penetrate the operations of foreign cyber actors
U) Two major classes of CNE techniques
* (U) Man-in-the-middle
* (U) Man-on-the-side
U//FOUO) Steal their tools, tradecraft, targets and take
```
Adversary Penetrated Foreign Host
Adversary Penetrated Foreign Infrastructure
Adversary Home Network
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses
```
Active Exploitation
Target
Implanted Router
AnySite.com
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses
```
Active Exploitation
Target
Implanted Router
Network Defense
Good Guys
Bad Guy
CLOUDSHIELD
PANDORASMAYHAM
TURMOIL
TUTELAGE
AnySite.com
```
(S//REL) TUTELAGE is a man-in-the-middle technique
(U//FOUO) Using TUTELAGE to enable active exploitation is integrated cyber operations.
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (S//REL) QUANTUMTHEORY: Man-on-the-Side Active Exploitation
Concerted Use of both Passive + Active SIGINT
* Implant targets based on 'selectors' and/or behavior
- e.g. users of al-Mehrab ISP (Mosul) who visit al-Hezbah extremist website
* Requires target webserver responses be visible to passive SIGINT
* Requires sufficient delay in target web connection for the hook to "beat" the response back to the target (typically means at least one satellite hop)
* Requires target's client to be vulnerable to our tools
* Cycle 3 4 must get to the target before 2 occurs
* Once 'hooked,' the target is exploited with no time constraints
* Different QUANTUM effects have different time constraints.
1 Target web connection/request via SATCOM or Fiber
2 Response
MHS
TARGET DESTINATION
3 SIGINT cue
4 Insert hook in addition to requested data
5 Hook calls to Covert Listening Post (LP): upload robust implant for sustained access
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study
```
INTERNET
NIPRNET
NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
```
* (S//REL) DNS requests entering NIPRnet domain
- (S//REL) Destination IP not a NIPRnet DNS server
- (S//REL) Domain name not within NIPRnet
* (S//REL) DNS behavior of host is suspicious but not dangerous
* (TS//SI//REL) TAO uses QUANTUMDNS to redirect the requesting host
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
8
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: An Integrated Cyber Operation
```
TARGET SPACE
DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?
Local DNS Server
I don't know, I'll ask.
DNS Server
Talk to the root DNS Server
Where's Anysite.mil?
Root DNS Server
Root DNS Server, talk to the DNS Server
Connect to server 1.2.3.4
Where's Anysite.mil?
DNS Server
I Know how to get to Anysite.mil
DNS Server
Where's Anysite.mil?
DNS answer, Anysite.mil found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4
DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?
IP is 1.2.3.4
TAO Server mirrors Anysite.mil
TAO Shooter
LPT-D
NIPRNET
Blocked
If DNS Server found
DNS Server
Anysite.mil Server
Tip Sent
NSA
Command Sent
TURBINE
Implant
Implant Command & Control
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: As Used Against BOXINGRUMBLE
```
TARGET SPACE
Connect to server 1.2.3.4
IP is 1.2.3.4
TAO C2 mirrors Anysite.mil C2
DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?
DNS answer, Anysite.com found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4
TAO Shooter
LPT-D
NIPRNET
Blocked
Anysite.mil Server
Tip Sent
NSA
TURBINE
Command Sent
Implant
Implant Command & Control
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study
```
TAO C2 Server
Open Web Proxies
Victims (Bots)
NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
```
* (TS//SI//REL) TAO establishes itself as a trusted C2 node
* (U//FOUO) Captured traffic indicates the existence of a bot net
- (S//REL) Command and control split into two layers (C2 and C4)
- (S//REL) C2 layer has a peer-to-peer mesh network topology with direct connection to a C4 node
* (S//REL) C2 nodes connect directly to victims as well as through open web proxies
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study
```
Bot Commander
Trusted C4 Nodes 2-3 Nodes
Trusted C2 Nodes ~ 250 Nodes
TAO C2 Server
Open Web Proxies
Victims (Bots) 200k Max ~ 30k Today
NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
DEFIANTWARRIOR Implant
```
* (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can see all bot tasking
* (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can push tasking
* (S//REL) BOXINGRUMBLE bots
- (S//REL) ~ 45% Vietnamese dissidents
- (S//REL) ~45% Chinese dissidents
- (S//REL) ~10% Other
* (TS//SI//REL) Adding BOXINGRUMBLE bots to DEFIANTWARRIOR
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM
TS//SI//REL
| Name | Description | Inception Date | Status | Operational Success |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **CNE** | | | | |
| QUANTUMINSERT | * Man-on-the-Side technique<br>* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website<br>* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation | 2005 | Operational | Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means) |
| QUANTUMBOT | * Takes control of idle IRC bots<br>* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel | Aug 2007 | Operational | Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted) |
| QUANTUMBISCUIT | * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation<br>* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity. | Dec 2007 | Operational | Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses) |
| QUANTUMDNS | * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.<br>* Targets single hosts or caching name servers. | Dec 2008 | Operational | Successful (High priority CCI target exploited) |
| QUANTUMHAND | Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook | Oct 2010 | Operational | Successful |
| QUANTUMPHANTOM | Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A |
| **CNA** | | | | |
| QUANTUMSKY | Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. | 2004 | Operational | Successful |
| QUANTUMCOPPER | File download/upload disruption and corruption. | Dec 2008 | Live | N/A |
TS//SI//REL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) QUANTUMSMACKDOWN
```
Internet
ACK
Shooter
Defensive
TURMOIL
CLOUDSHIELD
RESET
Client
NSA Space
TURBINE
REPOSITORY
NIPRNET
```
1. A client requests connection to malicious server. Request is detected by TURMOIL. CLOUDSHIELD terminates client-side connection.
2. The malicious server's response is blocked by CLOUDSHIELD.
3. TURMOIL tips TURBINE, which then tasks a shooter to send the acknowledgement to the malicious server.
4. Malicious server assumes connection and forwards
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U//FOUO) Future Capability: QUANTUMSANDMAN
```
* Take captured malware and
execute in controlled environment.
* Allow communication through
QUANTUM technique with outside
world
* Will be able to see tasking, get
later stages of malware to provide
disinformation, and send implants.
Internet
Dummy
Victim
Shooter
TURMOIL
NSA Space
ure Malware Test Environment
TURBINE
Victim
```
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U) Future Work
* (U//FOUO) Develop lower latency guards
* (S//REL) Use TUTELAGE inline devices as our "shooter"
* (U//FOUO) Push decision logic to the edge
* (U//FOUO) Identify more mission opportunities
* (U//FOUO) Continue developing and deploying
additional QUANTUM capabilities
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
16
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM
TS//SI//REL
| Name | Description | Inception Date | Status | Operational Success |
| :---------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **CNE** | | | | |
| QUANTUMINSERT | * Man-on-the-Side technique<br>* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website<br>* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation | 2005 | Operational | Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means) |
| QUANTUMBOT | * Takes control of idle IRC bots<br>* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel | Aug 2007 | Operational | Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted) |
| QUANTUMBISCUIT | * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation<br>* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity. | Dec 2007 | Operational | Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses) |
| QUANTUMDNS | * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.<br>* Targets single hosts or caching name servers. | Dec 2008 | Operational | Successful (High priority CCI target exploited) |
| QUANTUMHAND | Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook | Oct 2010 | Operational | Successful |
| QUANTUMPHANTOM | Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A |
| **CNA** | | | | |
| QUANTUMSKY | Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. | 2004 | Operational | Successful |
| QUANTUMCOPPER | File download/upload disruption and corruption. | Dec 2008 | Live | N/A |
TS//SI//REL
---
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U) QUESTIONS?
For more information, please contact:
* TUTELAGE – [REDACTED], VS ([REDACTED])
* QUANTUM – [REDACTED], S32X ([REDACTED])
* TURBINE – [REDACTED], T1412 ([REDACTED])
* BOXINGRUMBLE – [REDACTED], F22 ([REDACTED])
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
## (U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM
TS//SI//REL
| Name | Description | Inception Date | Status | Operational Success |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **CNE** | | | | |
| QUANTUMINSERT | * Man-on-the-Side technique<br>* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website<br>* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation | 2005 | Operational | Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means) |
| QUANTUMBOT | * Takes control of idle IRC bots<br>* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel | Aug 2007 | Operational | Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted) |
| QUANTUMBISCUIT | * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation<br>* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity. | Dec 2007 | Operational | Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses) |
| QUANTUMDNS | * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.<br>* Targets single hosts or caching name servers. | Dec 2008 | Operational | Successful (High priority CCI target exploited) |
| QUANTUMHAND | Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook | Oct 2010 | Operational | Successful |
| QUANTUMPHANTOM | Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A |
| **CNA** | | | | |
| QUANTUMSKY | Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. | 2004 | Operational | Successful |
| QUANTUMCOPPER | File download/upload disruption and corruption. | Dec 2008 | Live | N/A |
| **CND** | | | | |
| QUANTUMSMACKDOWN | Pevents target from downloading implants to DoD computers while capturing malicious payload for analysis | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A |
TS//SI//REL
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY