215 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
215 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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NETWORK EXPLOITATION
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# PROFILING SSL AND ATTRIBUTING PRIVATE NETWORKS
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## An introduction to FLYING PIG and HUSH PUPPY
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ICTR - Network Exploitation
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GCHQ
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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TR
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THIS INFORMATION IS EXEMPT UNDER THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 2000 (FOIA) AND MAY BE EXEMPT UNDER OTHER UK INFORMATION LEGISLATION. REFER ANY FOIA QUERIES TO GCHQ ON
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CONTAINS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNED AND/OR MANAGED BY GCHQ. THE MATERIAL MAY BE DISSEMINATED THROUGHOUT THE RECIPIENT ORGANISATION, BUT GCHQ PERMISSION MUST BE OBTAINED FOR DISSEMINATION OUTSIDE THE ORGANISATION.
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GCHQ
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Motivations for FLYING P
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- More and more services used by GCHQ targets are moving to TLS/SSL to increase user confidence, e.g. Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmai
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- Terrorists and cyber criminals are common users of TLS/SSL to hide their comms (not necessarily using the big providers).
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Query by certificate metadata
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```
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FLYING PIG
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```
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Query by certificate metadata
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```
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FLYING PIG
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FLYING PIG
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TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
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```
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Query by server IP
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```
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FLYING PIG
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TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
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```
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Query by server IP
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```
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FLYING PIG
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TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
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```
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Query by client IP
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```
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FLYING PIG
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TLS/SSL KNOWLEDGE BASE
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```
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Query by ne
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```
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YING PIG
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SL KNOWLEDGE BASE
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cation | Query FLYING PIG - general SSL toolkit | Query QUICK ANT - Tor events QFD
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LYING PIG
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ork/certificate field: [REDACTED].0/24
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Client IP Server IP Both
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or: Network [e.g. 1.2.3.0/24]
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or: Server Certificate [e.g. %example.com (use % for wildcards)]
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Network-specific panels:
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General network info
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SSL Clients present in network
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SSL Servers present in network
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HTTP requests to IPs in network
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ery!
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e field search: %mail.ru
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Server IP: 94.100.184.14
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Client IP: [REDACTED].127
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Network:
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etwork info for: [REDACTED].0/24
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ion (?):
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R (M)
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UL (L)
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WHOIS info (?):
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Network: No results. Network type: No results.
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Company: No results. Domain: No results.
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AS info
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Advertis
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AS name
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s in network: [REDACTED].0/24: (?):
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iht click on a client IP to explore it further!
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57 items 10 | 25 | 50 | 100
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Client company info (from GEOFUSION export) First se
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2011-0
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```
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Cyber app
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iginotar certificate authority compromise :
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- Private keys of legitimate certificate authority, Diginotar, stolen by hacker
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- FLYING PIG was used to identify a FI to launch a MITM against
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---
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### How the attack was done:
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```
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┌───────────────────┐
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│ │
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│ Legitimate Google │◄────────────────┐
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│ server │ │
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│ │ │
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└────────▲──────────┘ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ ┌───┴───┐
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│ │ │
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Non-target traffic │ MITM │
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│ │ │
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│ └───▲───┘
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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│ │
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─────Google request────────────►┌───┴────┐ │
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│ │ │
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─────Google request────────────►│ Router ├─────────────────Target traffic
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│ │
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─────Google request────────────►└───▲────┘
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│
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│
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│
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[REDACTED].242
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Logs into router and adds static route for target traffic
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│
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│
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│
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```
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---
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ation using SSL have been fou
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EGION JADE, LEGION RUBY,
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n FLYING PIG using known sig
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---
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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## Results – what do we find?
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* Foreign government networks
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* Airlines
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* Energy companies
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* Financial organisations
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* In cases of good collection, 50-80% of collected private network traffic has been attributed
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* Some false positives can arise if few events correlated, due to factors such as TDIs not being completely unique and public internet proxies giving misleading public IP results
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* Results can frequently be verified using Kerberos etc data
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TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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