64 KiB
Synergising Network Analysis Tradecraft
Network Tradecraft Advancement Team (NTAT)
Collaborative Agile NTAT Empowering Pioneering
DSD GCHQ GCSB NSA
Overview
- What is the NTAT?
- 2011-2012 work and accomplishments
Dynamic Config
Select values we want
Turn ip into ip range
Make decimal IP for filter
Geo from ATLAS
Dummy3 Remove 5 eyes & wrong coSelect values 2
Select values 3
Tag reserved ips
Dummy2
TC Init
Get HTTP for MMG > CC IPs (not browsers)
Dummy1
Remove reserved IPs
CC to lower
Dummy4
Make an aggregation field by concatenating
Wildcard url-keep first level folders only
Select values
Sort by ip 3
Group ip. port
Sort rows 3
Output app server list Output PS requirements
Count
Existing port scan results
Sort rows
Add port Information (ATHENA)
Rename fields to friendly names
Sort by ip 2
Port scan required?
NTAT
TOP SECRET//SI
Tradecraft?
Tradecraft
- "The development of methods, techniques, algorithms and processes in order to generate Intelligence, and developing the ability to apply this knowledge either manually or through automation. Tradecraft is developed from experience, research, intuition and by the reapplication and redefinition of existing techniques. Industrial- Scale Tradecraft involves data on a large scale."
Network Tradecraft
- Usable knowledge about how to acquire intelligence FROM the network
TOP SECRET//SI
The NTAT
-
Create repeatable, sustainable & shareable tradecraft to enable network analysis
-
Facilitate knowledge collaboration and interchange across the 5-Eyes SIGDEV community
TOP SECRET//SI
The Process
Stage 1 = Fact Finding
Stage 2 = Define Focus (based on Fact Finding)
Stage 3 = Develop Tradecraft
Stage 4 = Document Tradecraft
Stage 5 = Test Documented Tradecraft and Refine
TOP SECRET//SI
Network Convergence Tradecraft
-
Technological convergence – where voice and data services interact with each other on a single device
-
Tradecraft to enable the targeting of handsets in telephony space and CNE exploitation in IP space
-
Improved algorithms for mobile gateway identification and implementation of these algorithms
TOP SECRET//SI
DSD Workshop November 2011
- 2 weeks
- CSE, DSD, GCHQ
- Virtually, via chat room, NSA & GCSB
- Focus on data, techniques & analytic outcomes
https://wiki.dsd/twiki/[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET//SI
DSD Workshop Outcomes
Technique developed to identify wide variety of potential converged data, unique for specific country or mobile network operator
- potentially lead to convergence correlation dataset to help profile targets on-line activity
Documentation of techniques to identify specific components of raw HTTP activity that alludes to the browsing, downloading and installation of smartphone applications
- identified the presence of application servers for mobile network operators and geographical areas
DSD implementation of mobile gateway identification analytic based on FRETTING YETI
- three agencies now running the same analytic provides a richer dataset of mobile gateways
CRAFTY SHACK trial
- NTAT now using CRAFTY SHACK for tradecraft documentation
TOP SECRET//SI
XKS Microplugin: Samsung Protocol
Samsung Protocol
| State | ID | CSc | Device_Model | HTTP_User_Agent | Imei | Latest_Mcc | Mcc | Message_Id | Message_Type | Mnc | Network_Ty | Odc_Versio | Preloaded_apps | Version | Casenotation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 353 | KSA | GT-N7000 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-8 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 50 | 0 | 2.6.084 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapps@2 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 2 | 566 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 3 | 648 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 4 | 649 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-1 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 5 | 1260 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 6 | 1261 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 7 | 1262 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-3 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 8 | 1274 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-4 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 9 | 1 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-5 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 10 | 67 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-5 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 11 | 433 | SKZ | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.148 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 12 | 463 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2350-0 | getPushNotificationMessage Re | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 13 | 1074 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2350-0 | getPushNotificationMessage Re | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 14 | 786 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2309-0 | getDownloadList Request | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | NFDJR00000M0171 | ||||
| 15 | 1110 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2309-0 | getDownloadList Request | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | NFDJR00000M0171 | ||||
| 16 | 664 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2308-0 | getKillList Request | 20 | 0 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 17 | 360 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 20 | 0 | cn.wps.m | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 18 | 362 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 20 | 0 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 19 | 490 | XEU | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 50 | 0 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 20 | 572 | XEU | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 50 | 0 | cn.wps.m | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 21 | 961 | THR | GT-B5512 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2309-0 | getDownloadList Request | 40 | 0 | 2.6.122 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 22 | 964 | XSG | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-5 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.194 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 23 | 965 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2302-2 | upgradeListEx Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.194 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 24 | 968 | XSG | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2160-6 | purchaseDetailEx Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.048 | cn.wps.m | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 25 | 1259 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-2 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 26 | 1344 | XSG | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.048 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 27 | 1400 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2300-0 | countrySearchEx Request | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 28 | 54 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2200-1 | countrySearch Request | 111 | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 29 | 417 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 5060-1 | termInformation Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.048 | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 30 | 488 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
TOP SECRET//SI
CSE Workshop February 2012
- 2 weeks
- CSE, DSD, GCHQ, GCSB, NSA – everyone wanted to experience a Canadian winter!
- Build on the work started at DSD
Winter Nirvana
TOP SECRET//SI
The Reality!
CSE Workshop Outcomes
Refinement of XKS fingerprints to identify mobile bearers, Samsung and Android Marketplace servers
- 17 XKS fingerprints deployed
Documentation of analytics in CRAFTY SHACK
- These analytics are now being implemented across the 5 Eyes
Proving the tradecraft actually works!
- Scenario to test the tradecraft and analytics – Op IRRITANT HORN
TOP SECRET//SI
Op IRRITANT HORN
AP Photo
TOP SECRET//SI
Op IRRITANT HORN
Does the tradecraft work?
- Another Arab Spring (only this time, different countries)
- Goal: identify aggregation points for the mobile networks in the countries of interest using the tradecraft developed during the workshops
- Did it work? YES -> the team was able to identify connections from the countries to application and vendor servers in non 5-Eyes countries
- So what? We found some servers....
- Potential MiTM
- Effects
- Harvesting data at rest
- Harvesting data in transit
TOP SECRET//SI
Finding mobile application & vendor update servers
TC Init
Geolocation and Network Information (ATLAS): Date Range, IP Range
Reverse DNS (DANAUS): IP Range
Row Normaliser
Bitterness
Filter rows
IP input
Select valuesIP-IP Communication Summaries (HYPERION): Date Range, IP Range
Tradecraft Navigator Output
TOP SECRET//SI
Finding mobile application & vendor update servers
TC Init
Congo
[REDACTED]
Geolocation and
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
cuba store.cubava.cu
cuba store.cubava.cu
senegal srv_applis.sar.sn
IP input
Senegal
[REDACTED]
Select valuesIP-IP Communic
Sudan
[REDACTED]
morocco boungeontelephone.com
switzerland download-force.com
bahamas supportapple.com
cuba store.cubava.cu
netherlands mobile.ero-advertising.com
russia lady.marketgid.info
TOP SECRET//SI
Crafty
shack
Change view
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
Search this wiki
Go Search
Browse ▾ Search ▾ Create ▾ Help ▾ MediaWiki ▾
Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
Page Discussion
History / Edit
SECRET
Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
5 EYES | CSEC | DSD | GCHQ | GCSB | NSA | Factbox
Metadata
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Alternatives:
* Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
What does the tradecraft achieve?
* This tradecraft will provide a list of servers that have been seen communicating with a mobile network.
In what situations would this tradecraft be most useful?
* To identify mobile application servers for a specific network
* To identify any server that may be useful for collection purposes
Describe any problems, caveats or things to watch out for
* The list of servers returned depends on the the IP range and collection sources utilized. Success of this tradecraft may require additional
research to identify other IP ranges or requesting other agencies to check their collection to identify different servers.
Links that can help you to implement this tradecraft
Created by: [REDACTED]
Agency: NSA
Email Address: [REDACTED]
Difficulty:
Acceptance state: Limited
Input(s): Ontology Network block, Ontologylp address
Output(s): Ontologylp address, Ontology ASN,
Ontology Network block, Ontology Hostname,
Ontology User Agent String,
Ontology Geographic selector
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Input(s): Ontology Network block, Ontologylp address
Output(s): Ontologylp address, Ontology ASN,
Ontology Network block, Ontology Hostname,
Ontology User Agent String,
Ontology Geographic selector
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Alternatives:
* Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
5 EYES Tradecraft Steps (document underlying analytic, do not include tools)
The IP ranges utilized for the initial implementation of this tradecraft were the Inter PLMN Backbone IP ranges obtained from IR21 documents. For
other methods of identifying mobile IP blocks, see the invoked tradecraft listed above.
Step 1) Take IP ranges or individual addresses identified as being related to mobile network communications.
Step 2) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each IP address. This should include: Network Owner name,
Carrier name, ASN, Continent, Country, Region, City, LatLong, and anyother related details that your system can obtain
Step 3) Obtain Internet communication events related to the IP addresses. These events should minimally include: source information, To
IP, From IP, TCP Direction, and HTTP User-Agent
Step 4) Sort the results and dedup them. This step depends on your collection sources
Step 5) Filter out server communications that have user-agents that aren't useful. Further analysis is needed to identify the non-useful
user-agents (cheat sheet needed). Ex friendly-scanner
Step 6) Check the TCP Direction field:
* If Server to Client, grab the From IP information
* If Client to Server, grab the To IP information
* If Server to Server, grab both the To and From IP information
* If Unknown, capture in an error log
Step 7) Sort and dedup again based on Server IP information. TCP Direction info is no longer needed.
Step 8) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each Server IP. This is done for the servers that were not in
the original IP Blocks.
Step 9) Remove any servers that are not useful. This may include 5-Eyes servers.
Step 10) Output
* List of Servers
* List of related User Agents
* List of related hostnames
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Comments (2) | Show comments
Average article quality based on 1 rating(s)
Last updated 24/2/2012 by [REDACTED]
Category: Tradecraft
CRAFTY SHACK - "It's not tradecraft until it's documented!
CSEC" [edit]
TOP SECRET//SI
Identifying servers communicating with an MNO
100%
Start
Select Input CSV File CSV File Input
TC Init
Main Stream
Add Sequence
Remove Duplicates Normaliser SrcIP Dst Select Values
Lookup Stream No Enrichment Found
Link Buffer
Mux
Demux
Enriched?
Distribute
Lookup DstIP Enrichment
Bob
TDI Online Events (PEITHO)
ATLAS Geo and Network Info
Dedup
Is User Agent friendly scanner?
ATLAS Geo and Network Info 2
Mux 2
Select values 2
Unique rows Is Server Client?
Is Client Server?
Initial IP and delete extras
US = friendly-scanner
Demux 2
Server within Range?
Split Fields
Sort rows
Server Client
Client-Server
Is Server Server?
Reformat 2
Alice
Reformat
5-Eye places
Remove 5-Eyes
Iggy
Sort UA Blocks
Unique UA Blocks
Select values 3
UserAgentData
Combine
Copy data
Unknown_Direction
Servers with Host
Unique rows 22
Sort rows 2
Unique rows 2
convert
create dash
concatinate
Sort rows 22
Servers
convert 2 Reverse DNS (DANAUS): IP Range
Google Earth
TOP SECRET//SI
Profiling mobile application servers
This tradecraft will accept a CSV file of known apps server hostnames. It will then perform reverse DNS
queries to obtain the IP addresses of the apps servers. With the IP addresses, geolocation and
network provider queries will be performed on all app server IP addresses. The IP addresses are
then used to search for TDI events associated with those IP addresses. The result is a list of the apps
servers with IP addresses, geolocation and provider details, as well as TDI events seen connecting
to those apps servers. The TDI events are also queried to determine their geolocation and provider
details.
Start
Define the input
CSV file input
TC Init
Forward DNS (DANAUS) Hostname
Filter to remove "too common" results in DNS e.g. google, bank, iTunes, etc.
Dummy (do nothing)
Filter rows
Geolocation and Network Information (ATLAS): Date Range, IP Range
Sort the rows to pass only unique TDIs
Results
Just apps server details
Sort rows
Apps Servers with Hostname, Geo and Network Details
TDI Online Events (PEITHO): Date Range, IP Range
Filter for CLIENT_TO_SERVER comms
Sort rows 2
Filter rows 2 Geolocation and Network Information - Client to Server Comms
Results
All TDI events for each app server
TDI Events for Apps Servers Dummy (do nothing) 2
Geo and Network of clients
Results
EVERYTHING!
Each app server with IP address, geo and network details AND
all TDI events for each app server with the geo and network details of the client side comms
TOP SECRET//SI
Profiling mobile application servers
Search - Search - Splunk 4.3.1 - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
http://magneto.sigint.cs[REDACTED]
Most Visited NTAT Wikis XKEYSCORE CSE IntelliWiki IntelliWiki CEO GCHQ Wiki NSA Wiki DSD Wiki GCSB Wiki CRAFTY SHACK NAC Training Material SCORPIOFORE sam-mmap GlobalComms Home PLINKO MASTERSHAKE BLAZING SADDLES Splunk
Disable Cookies CSS Forms Images Information Miscellaneous Outline Resize Tools View Source Options
Approved Fingerprints | Search Search - Splunk 4.3.1 |
splunk > Search
Summary Search Status Dashboards & Views Searches & Reports
Search
source="E:\\Splunk\\NTAT[REDACTED] All time
236 matching events
Save Create
Hide Zoom out
Linear scale 1 bar = 1 millisecond
1 51 41 000 PM
Field discovery is: On
Hide
236 events over all time
Export Options
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 next > 10 per page
2 selected fields Edit
- HTTP_User_Agent
- source
38 interesting fields
Application ▼ 9:11 "pws.ipoynt.com","EONBLUE","A","pws.ipoynt.com" [REDACTED] q9 ne[REDACTED] [REDACTED] "canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
ASN 1 51 41 000 PM 2024","MA30099",[REDACTED] ,"IMSI","webmai[REDACTED] realm = it[REDACTED] [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","[REDACTED] [REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0
Configuration/CLDC-1.1 VendorID/600","",[REDACTED] [REDACTED] -BlackBerry852[REDACTED] ,"bahrain","bh","al-manamah",[REDACTED]
Carrier E:\Splunk\NTA[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0
Case_Notation
▼ 9:11 "pws.ipoynt.com","EONBLUE","A","pws.ipoynt.com" [REDACTED] q9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] "canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
City 1 51 41 000 PM 2024","MA30099",[REDACTED] ,"IMSI","webmai[REDACTED] realm [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry9800[REDACTED]
Client_ASN Configuration/CLDC-1.1 VendorID/600","",[REDACTED] [REDACTED] -BlackBerry980[REDACTED] etisalat etisalat company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
Client_Carrier <12> E:\Splunk\NTA[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration
Client_City ▼ 9:11 "pws.ipoynt.com","EONBLUE","A","pws.ipoynt.com" [REDACTED] q9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] "canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
Client_Country <2> 1 51 41 000 PM 2024","MA30099",[REDACTED] ,"IMSI","webmai[REDACTED] realm [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry8520[REDACTED]
Client_Digraph Configuration/CLDC-1.1 VendorID/600","",[REDACTED] [REDACTED] -BlackBerry852[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0 company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
E:\Splunk\NTA[REDACTED]
Client_Country (categorical)
Client_IP_Range
Client_Owner Appears in 100% of results Charts
Show only events with this field Top values by time ,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
Country Select and show in results Top values overall realm [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry8900[REDACTED]
Digraph BlackBerry890[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0
Values # %
host congo 102 43.22%
hostname saudi arabia 65 27.542% ,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
canada 58 24.576% realm ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry9800[REDACTED]
HTTP_Via cuba 4 1.695% -BlackBerry980[REDACTED] etisalat etisalat company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
identifier peru 2 0.847% ▏ rofile/MIDP-2.0
index india 1 0.424% ▏
Client_Country 1 0.424% ▏ ,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
IP indonesia 1 0.424% ▏ realm ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry8520[REDACTED]
IP_From bahrain 1 0.424% ▏ -BlackBerry852[REDACTED]
IP_To togo 1 0.424% ▏ rofile/MIDP-2.0
linecount
,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
realm ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry9700[REDACTED]
-BlackBerry970[REDACTED] etisalat etisalat company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
rofile/MIDP-2.0
x Find: access Next Previous Highlight all Match case
Done
TOP SECRET//SI
Profiling mobile application servers
Field discovery is: On
Hide
2 selected fields
HTTP_User_Agent (18)
source (1)
38 interesting fields
Application (1)
ASN (4)
Carrier (4)
Case_Notation (1)
City (5)
Client_ASN (1)
Client_Carrier (1)
Client_City (1)
Client_Country (1)
Client_Digraph (1)
Client_IP_Range (1)
Client_Owner (1)
Country (4)
Digraph (4)
host (1)
Hostname (8)
HTTP_Via (1)
Identifier (≥100)
index (1)
IP (B)
IP_From (1)
18 results over all time
Options
Edit
Formatting options
ZTE-G-5213/WAP2.0
Nokia 5310Xpress Mus...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
WinWAP/3.2 Profile/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-SGH-L170/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-SGH-F250/....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-SGH-D600.... 1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-S3500/1.0...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-GT-S3653...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-GT-E2121B....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-GT-C3303...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-GT-C3010....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-GT-B3210/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-C5212/CS...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-B5702/857...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
Opera/9.80 (560: Sy...2.7.81 Version/11.00
Nokia6300/2.0 (06.01...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
Nokia 6233/2.0 (04.5...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
LG-GU230/V10i Obig...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
Client_Owner (categorical)
Appears in 100% of results
Show only events with this field
Select and show in results
Values
warid congo
Charts
Top values by time
Top values overall
# %
102 100%
Top 10 values
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
- Results based on mobile application servers seen in CSE collection
- We have a list of the most popular smartphones for Warid Congo customers and their IMSIs
TOP SECRET//SI
Success Stories
- UCWeb mobile browser identification
- Discovered by GCHQ analyst during DSD workshop
- Chinese mobile web browser – leaks IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI and device characteristics
TOP SECRET//SI
UCWeb
- Led to discovery of active comms channel from [REDACTED]
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The CONVERGENCE team helped discover an active communication channel originating from [REDACTED] that is associated with the [REDACTED] as they are known within the [REDACTED] hierarchy area of responsibility is for covert activities in Europe, North America, and South America. The customer [REDACTED] leveraged a Convergence Discovery capability that enabled the discovery of a covert channel associated with smart phone browser activity in passive collection. The covert channel originates from users who use UCBrowser (mobile phone compact web browser). The covert channel leaks the IMSI, MSISDN, Device Characteristics, and IMEI back to server(s) in [REDACTED]. Initial investigation has determined that perhaps malware can be associated when the covert channel is established. [REDACTED] covert exfil activity identifies SIGINT opportunity where potentially none may have existed before. Target offices that have access to X-KEYSCORE can search within this type of traffic based on their IMSI or IMEI to determine target presence
TOP SECRET//SI
UCWeb – XKS Microplugin
UCWeb
Help Actions | Reports View | Map View |
| State | ID | Datetime | Highlights | Datetime End | Browser Version | Email Address | Handset Model | IMEI | IMSI | Global Title | Platform | Active User/I | Casenotation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | 2012-05-13 02:29:20 | 2012-05-13 02:29:23 | 8.0.3.107 | [REDACTED]@123movies | nokiae90-1 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 9379900100 | java | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 2 | 3 | 2012-05-13 06:00:59 | 2012-05-13 06:01:00 | 8.0.3.107 | [REDACTED]@123movies | nokiae90-1 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 9379900100 | java | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 3 | 4 | 2012-05-13 19:39:11 | 2012-05-13 19:39:11 | 7.9.3.103 | HTC A510e | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | android | E9BDE00000M0000 | ||||
| 4 | 2 | 2012-05-14 12:29:53 | 2012-05-14 12:29:53 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@djgol | Nokia E72-1 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | sis | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 5 | 5 | 2012-05-14 17:46:46 | 2012-05-14 17:46:46 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@mobimasti | NokiaX6-00 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | sis | H5H125221450000 | |||
| 6 | 6 | 2012-05-15 18:28:19 | 2012-05-15 18:28:19 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@mobimasti | NokiaX6-00 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 93781090013 | sis | H5H125221450000 | ||
| 7 | 7 | 2012-05-15 20:02:58 | 2012-05-15 20:02:58 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@mobimasti | NokiaX6-00 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 93781090013 | sis | H5H12522145000 |
TOP SECRET//SI
Vision of Success
-
Shared convergence database with numerous different sources, methods & tradecraft feeding into it
-
Ultimately correlating telephony and Internet TDIs with some degree of confidence
SUCCESS
TOP SECRET//SI
Synergising Network Analysis Tradecraft
Network Tradecraft Advancement Team
(NTAT)
Collaborative Agile NTAT Empowering Pioneering
DSD GCHQ GCSB NSA
Synergising Network Analysis Tradecraft
Network Tradecraft Advancement Team (NTAT)
Collaborative Agile NTAT Empowering Pioneering
DSD GCHQ GCSB NSA
Overview
- What is the NTAT?
- 2011-2012 work and accomplishments
Dynamic Config
Select values we want
Turn ip into ip range
Make decimal IP for filter
Geo from ATLAS
Dummy3 Remove 5 eyes & wrong coSelect values 2
Select values 3
Tag reserved ips
Dummy2
TC Init
Get HTTP for MMG > CC IPs (not browsers)
Dummy1
Remove reserved IPs
CC to lower
Dummy4
Make an aggregation field by concatenating
Wildcard url-keep first level folders only
Select values
Sort by ip 3
Group ip. port
Sort rows 3
Output app server list Output PS requirements
Count
Existing port scan results
Sort rows
Add port Information (ATHENA)
Rename fields to friendly names
Sort by ip 2
Port scan required?
NTAT
TOP SECRET//SI
Tradecraft?
Tradecraft
- "The development of methods, techniques, algorithms and processes in order to generate Intelligence, and developing the ability to apply this knowledge either manually or through automation. Tradecraft is developed from experience, research, intuition and by the reapplication and redefinition of existing techniques. Industrial- Scale Tradecraft involves data on a large scale."
Network Tradecraft
- Usable knowledge about how to acquire intelligence FROM the network
TOP SECRET//SI
The NTAT
-
Create repeatable, sustainable & shareable tradecraft to enable network analysis
-
Facilitate knowledge collaboration and interchange across the 5-Eyes SIGDEV community
TOP SECRET//SI
The Process
Stage 1 = Fact Finding
Stage 2 = Define Focus (based on Fact Finding)
Stage 3 = Develop Tradecraft
Stage 4 = Document Tradecraft
Stage 5 = Test Documented Tradecraft and Refine
TOP SECRET//SI
Network Convergence Tradecraft
-
Technological convergence – where voice and data services interact with each other on a single device
-
Tradecraft to enable the targeting of handsets in telephony space and CNE exploitation in IP space
-
Improved algorithms for mobile gateway identification and implementation of these algorithms
TOP SECRET//SI
DSD Workshop November 2011
- 2 weeks
- CSE, DSD, GCHQ
- Virtually, via chat room, NSA & GCSB
- Focus on data, techniques & analytic outcomes
https://wiki.dsd/twiki/[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
TOP SECRET//SI
DSD Workshop Outcomes
Technique developed to identify wide variety of potential converged data, unique for specific country or mobile network operator
- potentially lead to convergence correlation dataset to help profile targets on-line activity
Documentation of techniques to identify specific components of raw HTTP activity that alludes to the browsing, downloading and installation of smartphone applications
- identified the presence of application servers for mobile network operators and geographical areas
DSD implementation of mobile gateway identification analytic based on FRETTING YETI
- three agencies now running the same analytic provides a richer dataset of mobile gateways
CRAFTY SHACK trial
- NTAT now using CRAFTY SHACK for tradecraft documentation
TOP SECRET//SI
XKS Microplugin: Samsung Protocol
Samsung Protocol
| State | ID | CSc | Device_Model | HTTP_User_Agent | Imei | Latest_Mcc | Mcc | Message_Id | Message_Type | Mnc | Network_Ty | Odc_Versio | Preloaded_apps | Version | Casenotation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 353 | KSA | GT-N7000 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-8 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 50 | 0 | 2.6.084 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapps@2 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 2 | 566 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 3 | 648 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 4 | 649 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-1 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 5 | 1260 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 6 | 1261 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 7 | 1262 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-3 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 8 | 1274 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-4 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 9 | 1 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-5 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 10 | 67 | AUT | GT-P7500 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 250 | 2306-5 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 01 | 0 | 3.0.021 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 11 | 433 | SKZ | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.148 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 12 | 463 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2350-0 | getPushNotificationMessage Re | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 13 | 1074 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2350-0 | getPushNotificationMessage Re | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 14 | 786 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2309-0 | getDownloadList Request | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | NFDJR00000M0171 | ||||
| 15 | 1110 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2309-0 | getDownloadList Request | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | NFDJR00000M0171 | ||||
| 16 | 664 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2308-0 | getKillList Request | 20 | 0 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 17 | 360 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 20 | 0 | cn.wps.m | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 18 | 362 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 20 | 0 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 19 | 490 | XEU | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 50 | 0 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 20 | 572 | XEU | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2301-0 | getUpgradeNKillCount Request | 50 | 0 | cn.wps.m | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 21 | 961 | THR | GT-B5512 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2309-0 | getDownloadList Request | 40 | 0 | 2.6.122 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 22 | 964 | XSG | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-5 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.194 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 23 | 965 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2302-2 | upgradeListEx Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.194 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 24 | 968 | XSG | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2160-6 | purchaseDetailEx Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.048 | cn.wps.m | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 25 | 1259 | XSG | GT-I9100 | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-2 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | com.sec.android.app.samsungapp | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 26 | 1344 | XSG | GT-I9100 | SAMSUNG-Android | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2306-0 | checkAppUpgrade Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.048 | 1.0a | E9DHL00000M0000 | |
| 27 | 1400 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2300-0 | countrySearchEx Request | 20 | 0 | 3.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 28 | 54 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 2200-1 | countrySearch Request | 111 | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||||
| 29 | 417 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 412 | 5060-1 | termInformation Request | 20 | 0 | 2.6.048 | 1.0 | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 30 | 488 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
TOP SECRET//SI
CSE Workshop February 2012
- 2 weeks
- CSE, DSD, GCHQ, GCSB, NSA – everyone wanted to experience a Canadian winter!
- Build on the work started at DSD
Winter Nirvana
TOP SECRET//SI
The Reality!
CSE Workshop Outcomes
Refinement of XKS fingerprints to identify mobile bearers, Samsung and Android Marketplace servers
- 17 XKS fingerprints deployed
Documentation of analytics in CRAFTY SHACK
- These analytics are now being implemented across the 5 Eyes
Proving the tradecraft actually works!
- Scenario to test the tradecraft and analytics – Op IRRITANT HORN
TOP SECRET//SI
Op IRRITANT HORN
AP Photo
TOP SECRET//SI
Op IRRITANT HORN
Does the tradecraft work?
- Another Arab Spring (only this time, different countries)
- Goal: identify aggregation points for the mobile networks in the countries of interest using the tradecraft developed during the workshops
- Did it work? YES -> the team was able to identify connections from the countries to application and vendor servers in non 5-Eyes countries
- So what? We found some servers....
- Potential MiTM
- Effects
- Harvesting data at rest
- Harvesting data in transit
TOP SECRET//SI
MiTM – exploit the application server and use it as a MiTM platform for handset exploitation
Effects – exploitation of the application servers could make it possible to provide selective misinformation to the targets handsets
Harvesting data at rest – exploitation of the application servers could provide access to wealth of information at rest. The amount and usefulness of this information depends on the application in question
Harvesting data in transit – mobile applications servers often send and receive data that SIGINT agencies find useful (e.g. the Samsung protocol sending client and handsets details to a server in Germany)
Finding mobile application & vendor update servers
TC Init
Geolocation and Network Information (ATLAS): Date Range, IP Range
Reverse DNS (DANAUS): IP Range
Row Normaliser
Bitterness
Filter rows
IP input
Select valuesIP-IP Communication Summaries (HYPERION): Date Range, IP Range
Tradecraft Navigator Output
The results above are from a tradecraft to find servers of applications and vendor updaters servers from given countries, The rationale behind this is to identify servers that target within those countries might visit which could be exploited by CNE to push a phone implant capability.
The tradecraft relies upon 5 tuple data seen from the mobile gateways from target countries and to servers which have matching 'key words' in the hostname. The results above could then be scoped for CNE to see if they would be valid boxes to use an access platform.
TOP SECRET//SI
Finding mobile application & vendor update servers
TC Init
Congo
[REDACTED]
Geolocation and
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
france android-market.l.google.com
cuba store.cubava.cu
cuba store.cubava.cu
senegal srv_applis.sar.sn
IP input
Senegal
[REDACTED]
Select valuesIP-IP Communic
Sudan
[REDACTED]
morocco boungeontelephone.com
switzerland download-force.com
bahamas supportapple.com
cuba store.cubava.cu
netherlands mobile.ero-advertising.com
russia lady.marketgid.info
The results above are from a tradecraft to find servers of applications and vendor updaters servers from given countries, The rationale behind this is to identify servers that target within those countries might visit which could be exploited by CNE to push a phone implant capability.
The tradecraft relies upon 5 tuple data seen from the mobile gateways from target countries and to servers which have matching 'key words' in the hostname. The results above could then be scoped for CNE to see if they would be valid boxes to use an access platform.
TOP SECRET//SI
Crafty
shack
Change view
[REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca
Search this wiki
Go Search
Browse ▾ Search ▾ Create ▾ Help ▾ MediaWiki ▾
Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
Page Discussion
History / Edit
SECRET
Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
5 EYES | CSEC | DSD | GCHQ | GCSB | NSA | Factbox
Metadata
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Alternatives:
* Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
What does the tradecraft achieve?
* This tradecraft will provide a list of servers that have been seen communicating with a mobile network.
In what situations would this tradecraft be most useful?
* To identify mobile application servers for a specific network
* To identify any server that may be useful for collection purposes
Describe any problems, caveats or things to watch out for
* The list of servers returned depends on the the IP range and collection sources utilized. Success of this tradecraft may require additional
research to identify other IP ranges or requesting other agencies to check their collection to identify different servers.
Links that can help you to implement this tradecraft
Created by: [REDACTED]
Agency: NSA
Email Address: [REDACTED]
Difficulty:
Acceptance state: Limited
Input(s): Ontology Network block, Ontologylp address
Output(s): Ontologylp address, Ontology ASN,
Ontology Network block, Ontology Hostname,
Ontology User Agent String,
Ontology Geographic selector
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Input(s): Ontology Network block, Ontologylp address
Output(s): Ontologylp address, Ontology ASN,
Ontology Network block, Ontology Hostname,
Ontology User Agent String,
Ontology Geographic selector
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Alternatives:
* Identify Servers communicating with a Mobile network
5 EYES Tradecraft Steps (document underlying analytic, do not include tools)
The IP ranges utilized for the initial implementation of this tradecraft were the Inter PLMN Backbone IP ranges obtained from IR21 documents. For
other methods of identifying mobile IP blocks, see the invoked tradecraft listed above.
Step 1) Take IP ranges or individual addresses identified as being related to mobile network communications.
Step 2) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each IP address. This should include: Network Owner name,
Carrier name, ASN, Continent, Country, Region, City, LatLong, and anyother related details that your system can obtain
Step 3) Obtain Internet communication events related to the IP addresses. These events should minimally include: source information, To
IP, From IP, TCP Direction, and HTTP User-Agent
Step 4) Sort the results and dedup them. This step depends on your collection sources
Step 5) Filter out server communications that have user-agents that aren't useful. Further analysis is needed to identify the non-useful
user-agents (cheat sheet needed). Ex friendly-scanner
Step 6) Check the TCP Direction field:
* If Server to Client, grab the From IP information
* If Client to Server, grab the To IP information
* If Server to Server, grab both the To and From IP information
* If Unknown, capture in an error log
Step 7) Sort and dedup again based on Server IP information. TCP Direction info is no longer needed.
Step 8) Obtain geolocation information and network ownership information for each Server IP. This is done for the servers that were not in
the original IP Blocks.
Step 9) Remove any servers that are not useful. This may include 5-Eyes servers.
Step 10) Output
* List of Servers
* List of related User Agents
* List of related hostnames
Invokes Tradecraft:
* Find public IP space used by Mobile Devices and Related Servers on the Internet
* Finding Mobile Internet Gateways
Comments (2) | Show comments
Average article quality based on 1 rating(s)
Last updated 24/2/2012 by [REDACTED]
Category: Tradecraft
CRAFTY SHACK - "It's not tradecraft until it's documented!
CSEC" [edit]
TOP SECRET//SI
Identifying servers communicating with an MNO
100%
Start
Select Input CSV File CSV File Input
TC Init
Main Stream
Add Sequence
Remove Duplicates Normaliser SrcIP Dst Select Values
Lookup Stream No Enrichment Found
Link Buffer
Mux
Demux
Enriched?
Distribute
Lookup DstIP Enrichment
Bob
TDI Online Events (PEITHO)
ATLAS Geo and Network Info
Dedup
Is User Agent friendly scanner?
ATLAS Geo and Network Info 2
Mux 2
Select values 2
Unique rows Is Server Client?
Is Client Server?
Initial IP and delete extras
US = friendly-scanner
Demux 2
Server within Range?
Split Fields
Sort rows
Server Client
Client-Server
Is Server Server?
Reformat 2
Alice
Reformat
5-Eye places
Remove 5-Eyes
Iggy
Sort UA Blocks
Unique UA Blocks
Select values 3
UserAgentData
Combine
Copy data
Unknown_Direction
Servers with Host
Unique rows 22
Sort rows 2
Unique rows 2
convert
create dash
concatinate
Sort rows 22
Servers
convert 2 Reverse DNS (DANAUS): IP Range
Google Earth
TOP SECRET//SI
Profiling mobile application servers
This tradecraft will accept a CSV file of known apps server hostnames. It will then perform reverse DNS
queries to obtain the IP addresses of the apps servers. With the IP addresses, geolocation and
network provider queries will be performed on all app server IP addresses. The IP addresses are
then used to search for TDI events associated with those IP addresses. The result is a list of the apps
servers with IP addresses, geolocation and provider details, as well as TDI events seen connecting
to those apps servers. The TDI events are also queried to determine their geolocation and provider
details.
Start
Define the input
CSV file input
TC Init
Forward DNS (DANAUS) Hostname
Filter to remove "too common" results in DNS e.g. google, bank, iTunes, etc.
Dummy (do nothing)
Filter rows
Geolocation and Network Information (ATLAS): Date Range, IP Range
Sort the rows to pass only unique TDIs
Results
Just apps server details
Sort rows
Apps Servers with Hostname, Geo and Network Details
TDI Online Events (PEITHO): Date Range, IP Range
Filter for CLIENT_TO_SERVER comms
Sort rows 2
Filter rows 2 Geolocation and Network Information - Client to Server Comms
Results
All TDI events for each app server
TDI Events for Apps Servers Dummy (do nothing) 2
Geo and Network of clients
Results
EVERYTHING!
Each app server with IP address, geo and network details AND
all TDI events for each app server with the geo and network details of the client side comms
TOP SECRET//SI
Profiling mobile application servers
Search - Search - Splunk 4.3.1 - Mozilla Firefox
File Edit View History Bookmarks Tools Help
http://magneto.sigint.cs[REDACTED]
Most Visited NTAT Wikis XKEYSCORE CSE IntelliWiki IntelliWiki CEO GCHQ Wiki NSA Wiki DSD Wiki GCSB Wiki CRAFTY SHACK NAC Training Material SCORPIOFORE sam-mmap GlobalComms Home PLINKO MASTERSHAKE BLAZING SADDLES Splunk
Disable Cookies CSS Forms Images Information Miscellaneous Outline Resize Tools View Source Options
Approved Fingerprints | Search Search - Splunk 4.3.1 |
splunk > Search
Summary Search Status Dashboards & Views Searches & Reports
Search
source="E:\\Splunk\\NTAT[REDACTED] All time
236 matching events
Save Create
Hide Zoom out
Linear scale 1 bar = 1 millisecond
1 51 41 000 PM
Field discovery is: On
Hide
236 events over all time
Export Options
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 next > 10 per page
2 selected fields Edit
- HTTP_User_Agent
- source
38 interesting fields
Application ▼ 9:11 "pws.ipoynt.com","EONBLUE","A","pws.ipoynt.com" [REDACTED] q9 ne[REDACTED] [REDACTED] "canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
ASN 1 51 41 000 PM 2024","MA30099",[REDACTED] ,"IMSI","webmai[REDACTED] realm = it[REDACTED] [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","[REDACTED] [REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0
Configuration/CLDC-1.1 VendorID/600","",[REDACTED] [REDACTED] -BlackBerry852[REDACTED] ,"bahrain","bh","al-manamah",[REDACTED]
Carrier E:\Splunk\NTA[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0
Case_Notation
▼ 9:11 "pws.ipoynt.com","EONBLUE","A","pws.ipoynt.com" [REDACTED] q9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] "canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
City 1 51 41 000 PM 2024","MA30099",[REDACTED] ,"IMSI","webmai[REDACTED] realm [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry9800[REDACTED]
Client_ASN Configuration/CLDC-1.1 VendorID/600","",[REDACTED] [REDACTED] -BlackBerry980[REDACTED] etisalat etisalat company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
Client_Carrier <12> E:\Splunk\NTA[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0 Configuration
Client_City ▼ 9:11 "pws.ipoynt.com","EONBLUE","A","pws.ipoynt.com" [REDACTED] q9 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] "canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
Client_Country <2> 1 51 41 000 PM 2024","MA30099",[REDACTED] ,"IMSI","webmai[REDACTED] realm [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry8520[REDACTED]
Client_Digraph Configuration/CLDC-1.1 VendorID/600","",[REDACTED] [REDACTED] -BlackBerry852[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0 company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
E:\Splunk\NTA[REDACTED]
Client_Country (categorical)
Client_IP_Range
Client_Owner Appears in 100% of results Charts
Show only events with this field Top values by time ,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
Country Select and show in results Top values overall realm [REDACTED] ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry8900[REDACTED]
Digraph BlackBerry890[REDACTED] rofile/MIDP-2.0
Values # %
host congo 102 43.22%
hostname saudi arabia 65 27.542% ,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
canada 58 24.576% realm ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry9800[REDACTED]
HTTP_Via cuba 4 1.695% -BlackBerry980[REDACTED] etisalat etisalat company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
identifier peru 2 0.847% ▏ rofile/MIDP-2.0
index india 1 0.424% ▏
Client_Country 1 0.424% ▏ ,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
IP indonesia 1 0.424% ▏ realm ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry8520[REDACTED]
IP_From bahrain 1 0.424% ▏ -BlackBerry852[REDACTED]
IP_To togo 1 0.424% ▏ rofile/MIDP-2.0
linecount
,"canada","ca","calgary","CAC-
realm ,"CLIENT_TO_SERVER","","","BlackBerry9700[REDACTED]
-BlackBerry970[REDACTED] etisalat etisalat company mobily","35819","saudi arabia","sa","ar_riya",
rofile/MIDP-2.0
x Find: access Next Previous Highlight all Match case
Done
TOP SECRET//SI
Profiling mobile application servers
Field discovery is: On
Hide
2 selected fields
HTTP_User_Agent (18)
source (1)
38 interesting fields
Application (1)
ASN (4)
Carrier (4)
Case_Notation (1)
City (5)
Client_ASN (1)
Client_Carrier (1)
Client_City (1)
Client_Country (1)
Client_Digraph (1)
Client_IP_Range (1)
Client_Owner (1)
Country (4)
Digraph (4)
host (1)
Hostname (8)
HTTP_Via (1)
Identifier (≥100)
index (1)
IP (B)
IP_From (1)
18 results over all time
Options
Edit
Formatting options
ZTE-G-5213/WAP2.0
Nokia 5310Xpress Mus...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
WinWAP/3.2 Profile/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-SGH-L170/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-SGH-F250/....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-SGH-D600.... 1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-S3500/1.0...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-GT-S3653...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-GT-E2121B....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-GT-C3303...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-GT-C3010....1.101 (GUI) MMP/2.0
SAMSUNG-GT-B3210/...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-C5212/CS...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
SAMSUNG-B5702/857...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
Opera/9.80 (560: Sy...2.7.81 Version/11.00
Nokia6300/2.0 (06.01...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
Nokia 6233/2.0 (04.5...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
LG-GU230/V10i Obig...nfiguration/CLDC-1.1
Client_Owner (categorical)
Appears in 100% of results
Show only events with this field
Select and show in results
Values
warid congo
Charts
Top values by time
Top values overall
# %
102 100%
Top 10 values
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
62907100[REDACTED]
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
- Results based on mobile application servers seen in CSE collection
- We have a list of the most popular smartphones for Warid Congo customers and their IMSIs
TOP SECRET//SI
Success Stories
- UCWeb mobile browser identification
- Discovered by GCHQ analyst during DSD workshop
- Chinese mobile web browser – leaks IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI and device characteristics
TOP SECRET//SI
UCWeb
- Led to discovery of active comms channel from [REDACTED]
(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The CONVERGENCE team helped discover an active communication channel originating from [REDACTED] that is associated with the [REDACTED] as they are known within the [REDACTED] hierarchy area of responsibility is for covert activities in Europe, North America, and South America. The customer [REDACTED] leveraged a Convergence Discovery capability that enabled the discovery of a covert channel associated with smart phone browser activity in passive collection. The covert channel originates from users who use UCBrowser (mobile phone compact web browser). The covert channel leaks the IMSI, MSISDN, Device Characteristics, and IMEI back to server(s) in [REDACTED]. Initial investigation has determined that perhaps malware can be associated when the covert channel is established. [REDACTED] covert exfil activity identifies SIGINT opportunity where potentially none may have existed before. Target offices that have access to X-KEYSCORE can search within this type of traffic based on their IMSI or IMEI to determine target presence
TOP SECRET//SI
UCWeb – XKS Microplugin
UCWeb
Help Actions | Reports View | Map View |
| State | ID | Datetime | Highlights | Datetime End | Browser Version | Email Address | Handset Model | IMEI | IMSI | Global Title | Platform | Active User/I | Casenotation |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1 | 2012-05-13 02:29:20 | 2012-05-13 02:29:23 | 8.0.3.107 | [REDACTED]@123movies | nokiae90-1 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 9379900100 | java | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 2 | 3 | 2012-05-13 06:00:59 | 2012-05-13 06:01:00 | 8.0.3.107 | [REDACTED]@123movies | nokiae90-1 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 9379900100 | java | E9DHL00000M0000 | ||
| 3 | 4 | 2012-05-13 19:39:11 | 2012-05-13 19:39:11 | 7.9.3.103 | HTC A510e | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | android | E9BDE00000M0000 | ||||
| 4 | 2 | 2012-05-14 12:29:53 | 2012-05-14 12:29:53 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@djgol | Nokia E72-1 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | sis | E9DHL00000M0000 | |||
| 5 | 5 | 2012-05-14 17:46:46 | 2012-05-14 17:46:46 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@mobimasti | NokiaX6-00 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | sis | H5H125221450000 | |||
| 6 | 6 | 2012-05-15 18:28:19 | 2012-05-15 18:28:19 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@mobimasti | NokiaX6-00 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 93781090013 | sis | H5H125221450000 | ||
| 7 | 7 | 2012-05-15 20:02:58 | 2012-05-15 20:02:58 | 8.0.4.121 | [REDACTED]@mobimasti | NokiaX6-00 | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | 93781090013 | sis | H5H12522145000 |
TOP SECRET//SI
Vision of Success
-
Shared convergence database with numerous different sources, methods & tradecraft feeding into it
-
Ultimately correlating telephony and Internet TDIs with some degree of confidence
SUCCESS
TOP SECRET//SI
Synergising Network Analysis Tradecraft
Network Tradecraft Advancement Team
(NTAT)
Collaborative Agile NTAT Empowering Pioneering
DSD GCHQ GCSB NSA