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TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
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CLOSE ACCESS
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|
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# Wireless LAN / CNE Tool Training Course and Evaluation
|
||||
|
||||
December 15-16, 2010
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Classification
|
||||
|
||||
The overall classification of this presentation is
|
||||
**TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN**
|
||||
|
||||
The majority of the materiel in this presentation is
|
||||
**UNCLASSIFIED**
|
||||
|
||||
Some information though is classified. That information will be marked in the slide title. Consider any nontitle classified slide, unclassified
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Example
|
||||
|
||||
**This is unclassified**
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# (TS//SI//NF)
|
||||
Classified Example
|
||||
|
||||
**This slide would be classified**
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Primary Course Objective
|
||||
|
||||
➢ To familiarize, educate, and certify
|
||||
students in the operational usage of
|
||||
WLAN / IEEE 802.11 CNE tools and
|
||||
techniques to include:
|
||||
➢ BLINDDATE
|
||||
➢ NIGHTSTAND
|
||||
➢ BADDECISION
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Secondary Course Objectives
|
||||
|
||||
➢ Understand the fundamentals of the
|
||||
WLAN / IEEE 802.11 protocol.
|
||||
➢ Learn the end-to-end CNE process for
|
||||
close proximaty WLAN operations.
|
||||
➢ Gain familiarization in WLAN network
|
||||
protocol analysis.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Course Elements
|
||||
|
||||
➢ Lectures
|
||||
➢ Demos / Labs
|
||||
➢ Evaluations
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Agenda
|
||||
|
||||
➢ Review of Fundamentals
|
||||
➢ Introduction to WLAN / 802.11
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➢ BLINDDATE
|
||||
➢ WLAN CNE Operations
|
||||
➢ NIGHTSTAND
|
||||
➢ BADDECISION
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# QUESTIONS?
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
53
data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
53
data/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Wireless LAN / CNE Tool Training Course and Evaluation",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document is a slide deck introducing a \"Close Access\" NSA training course to \"familiarize, educate, and certify students in the operational usage\" of various computer network exploitation tools.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"students",
|
||||
"training",
|
||||
"education",
|
||||
"analysts",
|
||||
"certification",
|
||||
"network exploitation",
|
||||
"WiFi",
|
||||
"course"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-12-15",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"BLINDDATE",
|
||||
"NIGHTSTAND",
|
||||
"BADDECISION"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-08-19",
|
||||
"title": "The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-snowden-documents-confirm/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Biddle, Sam"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Lee, Micah"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3031641/01-Course-Introduction-Nohidden-Redacted.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "1ff712ff8cf339b70d8171b5aaaada2cccb448f14fed45cf7a3fd56659128337",
|
||||
"pages": 10
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Introduction to WLAN / 802.11 Active CNE Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## December 15-16, 2010
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Classification
|
||||
|
||||
The overall classification of this presentation is
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
All slides and materiels contained in this presentation should be considered classified TS//SI//NF
|
||||
(unless otherwise noted)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Section Overview
|
||||
|
||||
- Passive to Active Operations
|
||||
- WLAN CNE Criteria / Assessment
|
||||
- Active CNE Operations
|
||||
- Introduction to FOXACID
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## At The End...
|
||||
|
||||
You should be able to....
|
||||
- Identify Criteria for CNE Assessment.
|
||||
- List the Active CNE Operational Process
|
||||
- Describe the purpose of FOXACID.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Passive to Active Operations
|
||||
|
||||
- Primary Goal: To enable on-net access to target networks via off-net capabilities.
|
||||
- Prerequisite: We need to find the network of interest in order to target it.
|
||||
- Procedure: Conduct passive survey to locate network, then perform active op.
|
||||
- Solution: Utilize BLINDDATE and the appropriate plug-in solution(s).
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Passive to Active Operations
|
||||
|
||||
- Successful operation of BLINDDATE is essential to correct usage of plug-ins.
|
||||
- Two types of plug-ins exist:
|
||||
- Analysis Tool Aids
|
||||
- Active CNE Tools
|
||||
- We will focus on Active CNE Tools:
|
||||
- NIGHTSTAND
|
||||
- HAPPYHOUR
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Active CNE Assessment
|
||||
|
||||
- BLINDDATE used as both a survey and vulnerability analysis tool for 802.11 networks.
|
||||
- Operator needs to know what vulnerabilities, or criteria, to look for in order to utilize the correct Active CNE Tool (if any)
|
||||
- We will focus primarily on criteria necessary to carry out NIGHTSTAND (NS) and BADDECISION (BDN) operations.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Major Assessment Criteria
|
||||
|
||||
- Clients
|
||||
- A client is a prerequisite: If no clients are on the target network, there's nothing to do yet.
|
||||
- Security
|
||||
- Encryption setting (Open, WEP, WPA, WPA2) dictates which capability can be used (if any).
|
||||
- Signal Strength
|
||||
- SNR dictates whether we can perform a successful active CNE operation.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Active CNE Operations
|
||||
|
||||
- What is our end goal?
|
||||
- Provide on-net access via off-net means.
|
||||
- How do we do that?
|
||||
- Redirect the target to the TAO infrastructure.
|
||||
- How do we do that?
|
||||
- Inject payload destined for the target client.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Active CNE Operations
|
||||
|
||||
- What does that do exactly?
|
||||
- Forces the target to covertly contact a FOXACID server.
|
||||
- What is FOXACID suppose to do?
|
||||
- Perform vulnerability analysis and exploitation of the target (if possible).
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Introduction to FOXACID
|
||||
|
||||
- FOXACID is the cover term for a DNT/ROC project to deliver content based exploits (CBE) to web browsers.
|
||||
- The greatest vulnerability to your computer: your web browser.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Introduction to FOXACID
|
||||
|
||||
- FOXACID Servers sit on Internet.
|
||||
- Publicly addressable, DNS resolved.
|
||||
- Utilizes whitelist for security, filtering.
|
||||
- Requires specially crafted URL tag to contact FA Servers (FOXACID Tag).
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Example Tag
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
http://Domain/PluginName/PluginName2/ListBegin/Group/ListEnd/DeploymentIDTLN_MSGID.html
|
||||
|
||||
http://baseball2.2ndhalfplays.com/nested/attribs/bins/1/define/forms9952_z1zzz.html
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## FOXACID Tags
|
||||
|
||||
- Designed to look ambiguous.
|
||||
- Unique for a particular target / operation.
|
||||
- All fields in the tag denote something special...
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Redirection to FOXACID
|
||||
|
||||
- A FOXACID Tag is a special URL pointing to a particular FOXACID Server.
|
||||
- Contacting the FA Server will (hopefully) result in the contactor being exploited.
|
||||
- We want the target to be exploited.
|
||||
- How do we redirect the target to the FOXACID Server without being noticed.
|
||||
- Use NIGHTSTAND or BADDECISION
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## The End.
|
||||
|
||||
## Questions?
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Introduction to WLAN / 802.11 Active CNE Operations",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This NSA powerpoint introduces computer network exploitation (CNE) criteria and assesment as well as active CNE operations. It also introduces the FOXACID program, which is a program to deliver content based exploits to web browsers.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN NSA close access training presentation dated 15-16 December 2010, covering wireless LAN CNE operations for TAO operators conducting off-net physical proximity missions. The document describes the operational workflow from passive wireless survey through active CNE exploitation, with FOXACID as the central exploitation infrastructure.\n\nThe operational concept is described as \"passive to active\" — operators first conduct a passive survey to locate the target network, then transition to active operations. BLINDDATE serves dual roles as both the survey tool and the vulnerability analysis framework for 802.11 networks. Assessment criteria before launching an active operation include confirming clients are present on the network, determining the encryption setting in use (Open, WEP, WPA or WPA2 dictates which capability applies), and measuring signal-to-noise ratio to confirm sufficient signal strength for successful injection.\n\nThe active CNE goal is to redirect the target device to TAO infrastructure without being noticed. This is accomplished by injecting a payload destined for the target client that forces it to covertly contact a FOXACID server. Two active CNE tools are covered: NIGHTSTAND and BADDECISION, with HAPPYHOUR mentioned as a third plug-in option. The criteria for choosing between NIGHTSTAND and BADDECISION operations are described as the primary focus of the assessment section.\n\nFOXACID is introduced as \"the cover term for a DNT/ROC project to deliver content based exploits (CBE) to web browsers.\" FOXACID servers sit on the public internet with publicly addressable, DNS-resolved addresses, and use a whitelist for security and filtering. Access requires a specially crafted FOXACID Tag — a unique URL pointing to a specific FOXACID server, designed to look ambiguous and constructed so that all fields encode operational meaning. An example tag is provided: a URL structured as Domain/PluginName/PluginName2/ListBegin/Group/ListEnd/DeploymentID/TLN_MSGID.html, with the example domain baseball2.2ndhalfplays.com illustrating how tags are designed to appear as ordinary web addresses.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"students",
|
||||
"training",
|
||||
"education",
|
||||
"Tailored Access Operations",
|
||||
"analysts",
|
||||
"vulnerability analysis",
|
||||
"vulnerability exploitation",
|
||||
"vulnerabilities",
|
||||
"certification",
|
||||
"network exploitation",
|
||||
"WiFi",
|
||||
"WEP",
|
||||
"WPA",
|
||||
"WPA2",
|
||||
"course",
|
||||
"passive SIGINT",
|
||||
"active operations",
|
||||
"web browsers",
|
||||
"off-net",
|
||||
"Computer Network Exploitation",
|
||||
"content-based exploit",
|
||||
"CBE",
|
||||
"browser exploitation",
|
||||
"payload injection",
|
||||
"wireless survey",
|
||||
"redirection",
|
||||
"exploit delivery"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-12-15",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"FOXACID",
|
||||
"BLINDDATE",
|
||||
"NIGHTSTAND",
|
||||
"HAPPYHOUR",
|
||||
"BADDECISION"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-08-19",
|
||||
"title": "The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-snowden-documents-confirm/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Biddle, Sam"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Lee, Micah"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3031640/05-Introduction-to-WLAN-CNE-Operations-Redacted.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "c3dcd6d4e9a539d14afebdf5df5b295fb39d2b7bdfa6ffa81a1766bc309b0c3f",
|
||||
"pages": 17
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,589 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Introduction to BADDECISION
|
||||
|
||||
December 15-16, 2010
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Classification
|
||||
|
||||
The overall classification of this presentation is
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
All slides and materiels contained in this presentation should be considered classified TS//SI//NF
|
||||
(unless otherwise noted)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Section Overview
|
||||
|
||||
* BADDECISION Overview
|
||||
* BADDECISION Components
|
||||
* BADDECISION Prerequisites
|
||||
* BADDECISION Operational Flow
|
||||
* BADDECISION Step Through
|
||||
* Instructor-led Demos and Labs
|
||||
* BADDECISION Pros / Cons
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## At The End...
|
||||
|
||||
You should be able to....
|
||||
* Understand BADDECISION Components
|
||||
* Understand the BADDECISION Prereqs.
|
||||
* Conduct a BADDECISION Operation.
|
||||
* List the Pros / Cons of NIGHTSTAND.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Overview
|
||||
|
||||
* BADDECISION is an “802.11 CNE tool that uses a true man-in-the-middle attack and a frame injection technique to redirect a target client to a FOXACID server.”
|
||||
* Takes advantage of shared open medium and the HTTP protocol.
|
||||
* Works for WPA / WPA2!
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Prerequisites
|
||||
|
||||
* Working BLINDDATE Survey!
|
||||
* Client on the Target network
|
||||
* Security Level: WPA / WPA2
|
||||
* Ability to maintain a reliable connection to a target network.
|
||||
* Don't forget FOXACID Tag!
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Components
|
||||
|
||||
* HAPPYHOUR
|
||||
* SECONDDATE
|
||||
* Open Sources Tools
|
||||
* macchanger
|
||||
* wireshark
|
||||
* nmap
|
||||
* ettercap
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
cess Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
SECONDDATE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
ccess Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.2
|
||||
MAC: BB
|
||||
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.1
|
||||
MAC: AA
|
||||
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.3
|
||||
MAC: CC
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.2
|
||||
MAC: BB
|
||||
|
||||
OK
|
||||
|
||||
ccess Point
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.1
|
||||
MAC: AA
|
||||
|
||||
Hey Access Point! Send everything destined for IP 192.168.1.2 to MAC CC.
|
||||
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.3
|
||||
MAC: CC
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
OK
|
||||
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.2
|
||||
MAC: BB
|
||||
|
||||
ccess Point
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.1
|
||||
MAC: AA
|
||||
|
||||
Hey Access Point! Send everything destined for IP 192.168.1.2 to MAC CC.
|
||||
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.3
|
||||
MAC: CC
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.2
|
||||
MAC: BB
|
||||
|
||||
ccess Point
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.1
|
||||
MAC: AA
|
||||
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.3
|
||||
MAC: CC
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Preparation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.2
|
||||
MAC: BB
|
||||
|
||||
ccess Point
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.1
|
||||
MAC: AA
|
||||
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
IP: 192.168.1.3
|
||||
MAC: CC
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
# Overview of Operational Scenario
|
||||
|
||||
* Operator with BLINDDATE System.
|
||||
* FOXACID Tag issued for Target.
|
||||
* Target Client browsing the Internet via web browser :)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Webpage Request
|
||||
|
||||
* Target issues HTTP GET Request to webpage of interest (cnn.com)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Injection
|
||||
|
||||
* Operate uses SECONDDATE to inject a redirection payload at Target Client.
|
||||
* Target Client's original HTTP GET Request continues on it's normal path.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Refresh and Covert Request
|
||||
|
||||
* Injected payload forces Target Client to refresh and send another HTTP GET Request to desired webpage.
|
||||
* Covert Request is issued by Target Client to FOXACID Server.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## FOXACID Request Received
|
||||
|
||||
* FOXACID receives request from entity.
|
||||
* Entity is validated as Target Client by FOXACID Tag.
|
||||
* Response to original HTTP GET Request is dropped (but don't worry, that's good)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
cess Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## FOXACID Browser Survey
|
||||
|
||||
* FOXACID Server instantiates browser survey on Target Client to detect vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
cess Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## FOXACID Browser Survey
|
||||
|
||||
* FOXACID Server instantiates browser survey on Target Client to detect vulnerabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## Survey, Payload, Exploitation
|
||||
|
||||
* Covert communicates continue between FOXACID and Target until found not vulnerabilities or exploited.
|
||||
* Target Client continues normal webpage browsing, completely unaware :)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Targ Client
|
||||
cess Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## WHACKED!
|
||||
|
||||
* That's the ultimate goal.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
FOXACID Server
|
||||
CNN Web Server
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
Target Client
|
||||
Whacked!!!
|
||||
Access Point
|
||||
Operator
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Step Through
|
||||
|
||||
* Let's go through this together...
|
||||
* ... because there are many more pieces!
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Demos and Labs
|
||||
|
||||
* Grab a partner!
|
||||
* One Target Client, one Operator.
|
||||
* Have fun getting whacked!
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## BADDECISION Pros / Cons
|
||||
|
||||
* Pros
|
||||
* Works for WPA/WPA2 networks.
|
||||
* Can reliability see all communications between target and FOXACID.
|
||||
* Cons
|
||||
* Larger signature than NIGHTSTAND.
|
||||
* Requires higher SNR to maintain reliable communications between target and FOXACID.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSE ACCESS
|
||||
|
||||
## The End.
|
||||
|
||||
Questions?
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
69
data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
69
data/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Introduction to BADDECISION",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This presentation details the use of the NSA program BADDECISION, which is a computer network exploitation tool (CNE) that uses a frame injection technique to redirect the target client to a FOXACID server.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN NSA close access training presentation dated 15-16 December 2010, covering the BADDECISION wireless CNE tool. It is a companion document to the WLAN/802.11 Active CNE Operations presentation, providing tool-specific training for one of the two active CNE tools named in that document.\n\nBADDECISION is defined as \"an 802.11 CNE tool that uses a true man-in-the-middle attack and a frame injection technique to redirect a target client to a FOXACID server.\" Its key distinguishing capability over NIGHTSTAND is that it works against WPA and WPA2 encrypted wireless networks — not just open networks — by exploiting the shared open medium and HTTP protocol rather than requiring the operator to decrypt the wireless traffic.\n\nThe tool comprises two NSA-developed components — HAPPYHOUR and SECONDDATE — plus open source tools including macchanger, Wireshark, nmap and ettercap. Prerequisites are a working BLINDDATE survey confirming a client is present on the target network, WPA/WPA2 encryption, ability to maintain a reliable connection, and a valid FOXACID tag for the target.\n\nThe operational flow is described step by step. The operator uses ARP poisoning to position themselves as a man-in-the-middle between the target client and the access point — instructing the access point to send all traffic destined for the target's IP to the operator's MAC address. When the target issues an HTTP GET request to a website, SECONDDATE injects a redirection payload at the target client while allowing the original request to continue. The injected payload forces the target to refresh and issue a covert request to the FOXACID server. FOXACID validates the target via the FOXACID tag, drops the response to the original request, and begins browser vulnerability surveying, proceeding through survey, payload delivery and exploitation while the target continues normal browsing unaware.\n\nThe pros and cons section is significant for the operational comparison it provides: BADDECISION's advantage is WPA/WPA2 compatibility and reliable visibility of all communications between target and FOXACID; its disadvantages are a larger operational signature than NIGHTSTAND and a higher signal-to-noise ratio requirement to maintain reliable communications.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"students",
|
||||
"training",
|
||||
"education",
|
||||
"Tailored Access Operations",
|
||||
"analysts",
|
||||
"HTTP",
|
||||
"vulnerability analysis",
|
||||
"vulnerability exploitation",
|
||||
"vulnerabilities",
|
||||
"certification",
|
||||
"network exploitation",
|
||||
"MITM",
|
||||
"WiFi",
|
||||
"WEP",
|
||||
"WPA",
|
||||
"WPA2",
|
||||
"course",
|
||||
"passive SIGINT",
|
||||
"active operations",
|
||||
"web browsers",
|
||||
"open source"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-12-15",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"BADDECISION",
|
||||
"NIGHTSTAND",
|
||||
"FOXACID",
|
||||
"BLINDDATE",
|
||||
"HAPPYHOUR",
|
||||
"SECONDDATE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-08-19",
|
||||
"title": "The NSA Leak Is Real, Snowden Documents Confirm",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/19/the-nsa-was-hacked-snowden-documents-confirm/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Biddle, Sam"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Lee, Micah"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3031639/07-Introduction-to-BADDECISION-Redacted.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "522f4e04483306dbe10ec1177c57badfe0605d27469b2ce336605ec70f39ca2c",
|
||||
"pages": 31
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load diff
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,814 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
# RT10 Initiative Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Dr. James Heath
|
||||
|
||||
Program Management & Advisors: COL Bob Harms / COL Barb Trent / Michelle Gerhard
|
||||
|
||||
Architects: [REDACTED] / Mark Ross
|
||||
|
||||
Presented by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## Why Innovate?
|
||||
|
||||
* Volume & convergence
|
||||
* Front-end filters data
|
||||
* Reaching limits on legacy systems
|
||||
* Latency
|
||||
* Processing, storing, and query
|
||||
* Difficult to enable tactical operations
|
||||
* Analyst Limitations
|
||||
* Non-integrated tools
|
||||
* Collaboration limited
|
||||
* Knowledge-bases are limited
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 Initiative Overview
|
||||
|
||||
* Real-time, distributed architecture for mobile (tactical) and fixed (national) operational environments
|
||||
* Provides
|
||||
* Access to **more comprehensive** data in near real-time
|
||||
* Integrated analytical workflow with complementary tools
|
||||
* Real-time alerting, both national and tactical
|
||||
* **Integration** across national-to-tactical SIGINT capabilities
|
||||
* Expected Results: Order of magnitude improvements in real-time SIGNIT architecture for the U.S. Cryptologic System, focused on national to tactical intelligence, enabling **better** decisions in **less** time.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
RT10 Iraq Analytics
|
||||
SPIN-5 (1 Oct - 31 Dec 2006)
|
||||
|
||||
Annex A Version 1.6
|
||||
|
||||
Improved Products & Alerts
|
||||
|
||||
Remote Linguistic Support Elements
|
||||
Voice Processing Overflow
|
||||
|
||||
CSTS
|
||||
(TF-24)
|
||||
(4ID)
|
||||
|
||||
Queries and Tasking
|
||||
|
||||
Gists
|
||||
Trnspts
|
||||
|
||||
Voice
|
||||
Queues
|
||||
|
||||
Queries / Tasking Feedback
|
||||
|
||||
"TTP
|
||||
Center
|
||||
|
||||
TTP Testing
|
||||
Evaluate New Algorithms
|
||||
Respond to RFIs (real-time)
|
||||
Conduct Field Refresher Training
|
||||
(Vans in Baghdad)
|
||||
Open Positions: xxx
|
||||
|
||||
Alerts / Refined Data
|
||||
|
||||
CSG
|
||||
|
||||
Sense Making
|
||||
New Knowledge
|
||||
|
||||
Alerts / Refined Data
|
||||
|
||||
NSA-Georgia
|
||||
Target Knowledge
|
||||
Linguistic Support
|
||||
Pre-deployment Training
|
||||
|
||||
MNC-I
|
||||
(CASE)
|
||||
(CORP)
|
||||
(Marines)
|
||||
|
||||
MNF-I
|
||||
Divisions
|
||||
Embassy
|
||||
|
||||
A&P (NSA-W)
|
||||
(Product Line TOPIs)
|
||||
Target Knowledge
|
||||
Tool Knowledge
|
||||
|
||||
TTPs
|
||||
RFIs
|
||||
TNG
|
||||
|
||||
COBRA FOCUS
|
||||
Target Knowledge
|
||||
Linguistic Support
|
||||
|
||||
Tool Tradecraft Ideas
|
||||
New Tool Recommendations
|
||||
|
||||
MOC & Dragon Tamers
|
||||
Initial TTP Development
|
||||
TTP Maturation as needed
|
||||
Pre-deploy Training Base
|
||||
Develop Best Practices
|
||||
Host TTP & Best Practices Library
|
||||
|
||||
SIGINT Development
|
||||
GREEN DRAGON
|
||||
& RAD Elements
|
||||
Tradecraft and Tool Recommendations
|
||||
Analytic/Governance Advice
|
||||
Algorithm (data-mining) development
|
||||
Apply new TTPs at the National Level
|
||||
|
||||
Respond to RFIs
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
(existing process)
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## System Block Diagram – Overview
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Generator #1 [trailer]
|
||||
275KW
|
||||
380V, 3P, 50Hz
|
||||
Primary Power
|
||||
|
||||
Automatic Redundant Power Switchover
|
||||
|
||||
ATS [connex]
|
||||
Auto-Transfer
|
||||
380V, 3P, 50Hz
|
||||
AC
|
||||
Dist Panel
|
||||
|
||||
Generator #2 [trailer]
|
||||
275KW
|
||||
380V, 3P, 50Hz
|
||||
Redundant Power
|
||||
|
||||
Chiller [Connex]
|
||||
40Ton
|
||||
50gpm,
|
||||
50Hz
|
||||
45degF
|
||||
Water
|
||||
|
||||
2nd UPS Connex
|
||||
{100KW Growth}
|
||||
|
||||
100KW UPS
|
||||
208V, 3P, 50Hz
|
||||
|
||||
Processor UPS
|
||||
|
||||
Chiller #1
|
||||
* Chilled Water
|
||||
for Processor
|
||||
System Cooling
|
||||
|
||||
Chiller [Connex]
|
||||
40Ton
|
||||
50gpm,
|
||||
50Hz
|
||||
45degF
|
||||
Water
|
||||
|
||||
'Boot' Van
|
||||
* Security 'Screen'
|
||||
* Fan-out for Water
|
||||
Lines
|
||||
* Controlled
|
||||
Environmental
|
||||
Transition
|
||||
|
||||
CDU:
|
||||
2KW, 208V
|
||||
3P,50Hz
|
||||
|
||||
Chiller #2
|
||||
* Chilled Water for
|
||||
Room Cooling
|
||||
|
||||
'Ops' Van
|
||||
* User Space
|
||||
* 36" Desks = 8 Users
|
||||
* Desktop Workstations with
|
||||
UPS
|
||||
|
||||
2T
|
||||
2T
|
||||
5T
|
||||
|
||||
'Processing' Van
|
||||
* Server Room
|
||||
* Processing Racks (up to 7)
|
||||
* Comms and Support Racks (1)
|
||||
* Closed Loop Cooled Racks
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 Node Architecture
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Tactical Collection
|
||||
|
||||
National Collection
|
||||
|
||||
Ingestion, Validation, Normalization
|
||||
|
||||
GOLDMINER
|
||||
Dimensional Database
|
||||
* DNR
|
||||
* DNI
|
||||
* Other Data
|
||||
|
||||
Phoneme Data/
|
||||
Voice Prints
|
||||
|
||||
User Authentication & Authorization
|
||||
|
||||
RT10 Applications
|
||||
* RT10 Geo-T
|
||||
* Named Area of Interest
|
||||
* RaptorT
|
||||
* ArcGIS x.x
|
||||
* Sorting Hat/Lead
|
||||
* Renoir, Analyst Notebook
|
||||
|
||||
Inline Algorithms
|
||||
(e.g. Dynamite,...)
|
||||
|
||||
Queue Fed Algorithms
|
||||
(e.g. HLT Feed,...)
|
||||
|
||||
Query-Fed Algorithms
|
||||
(e.g. SRC, ...)
|
||||
|
||||
Alert Management and
|
||||
Alert Notification
|
||||
|
||||
VoiceRT
|
||||
|
||||
Action
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
TOPSECRET//COMINT//20291123
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 Iraq SPIN 5 (01 Oct – 31 Dec)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
National Collection
|
||||
* GSM
|
||||
* JUGGERNAUT
|
||||
* MATTERHORN
|
||||
* OBELISK
|
||||
* Billing Records
|
||||
* Precision Geo
|
||||
* Precision Emitters
|
||||
(TDOA/FDOA)
|
||||
|
||||
Ingestion, Validation, Normalization
|
||||
|
||||
GOLDMINER
|
||||
Dimensional Database
|
||||
* GSM
|
||||
* PSTN
|
||||
|
||||
Phoneme Data/
|
||||
Voice Prints
|
||||
|
||||
User Authentication & Authorization
|
||||
|
||||
RT10 Applications
|
||||
* Entity Database
|
||||
* SORTING LEAD
|
||||
* GeoT
|
||||
* SORTING HAT
|
||||
|
||||
Inline Algorithms
|
||||
(e.g. Dynamite,...)
|
||||
|
||||
Queue Fed Algorithms
|
||||
(e.g. HLT Feed,...)
|
||||
|
||||
Alert Management and
|
||||
Alert Notification
|
||||
|
||||
VoiceRT
|
||||
|
||||
Action
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 Deployments
|
||||
|
||||
A world map shows deployment locations indicated by concentric circles:
|
||||
* JIATF-South
|
||||
* Baghdad
|
||||
* Korea
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 in Baghdad, Iraq
|
||||
|
||||
* Baghdad, Iraq
|
||||
* Enable find-fix-finish operations
|
||||
* Provide immediate access to national / tactical collect
|
||||
* Integrate collection with geospatial alerting
|
||||
* Automatically correlate target behavior with collection, ie pattern-of-life
|
||||
* Prototype barrier monitoring systems
|
||||
* Expected results
|
||||
* Near-real-time data and advanced analytical tools provided to in-country units enable tactical decisions
|
||||
* VoiceRT provides alerting on spoken selectors, speaker identification, language identification, and content mining
|
||||
* Checkpoint data provides SIGINT tie to targets
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 Geospatial - GeoT
|
||||
|
||||
* Geospatial awareness
|
||||
* GeoT
|
||||
* Thin client similar to Google Maps and TIVO
|
||||
* Satellite imagery / other map layers
|
||||
* Overlay collection in real-time
|
||||
* Integrated with targeting database
|
||||
* Analyst defines named areas of interest
|
||||
* Can receive alerts when targets are detected in area
|
||||
* Display the health and coverage of SIGINT system
|
||||
* Where are our blind spots?
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## GeoT & Real-Time Collection
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Scenarios | Event Filtering | Decision Support | Alert Management | Tool Management |
|
||||
Enter a Target Name
|
||||
Targets To Watch
|
||||
(Click a Target or Group name to edit properties)
|
||||
[No Groups]
|
||||
|
||||
10:12:47
|
||||
10:41:56
|
||||
|
||||
Wed 30 Aug 06 :: 10:42:46
|
||||
Real Time
|
||||
Done
|
||||
Local intranet
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## GeoT & Collection Status
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
11:32:52
|
||||
12:02:52
|
||||
|
||||
Scenarios | Event Filtering | Decision Support | Alert Management | Tool Management |
|
||||
|
||||
Enter a Target Name
|
||||
Targets To Watch list
|
||||
Click a Target or Group name to edit properties)
|
||||
[No Groups]
|
||||
|
||||
* Draw Area of Interest
|
||||
RT-10 components
|
||||
* GSM
|
||||
* National
|
||||
* Infrastructure
|
||||
* Juggernaut
|
||||
* Obelisk
|
||||
* Air Interface
|
||||
* Matterhorn
|
||||
* Tactical
|
||||
* Air Interface
|
||||
* DRT
|
||||
* Baseline
|
||||
* Iraqna CBR
|
||||
* Atheer CBR
|
||||
* Asia Cell CBR
|
||||
* PSTN
|
||||
* National
|
||||
* Infrastructure
|
||||
* VU
|
||||
Wed 13 Sep 06 :: 12:02:52
|
||||
Real Time
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## Integrated Target Database
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
RT10 Portal - Microsoft Internet Explorer
|
||||
File | Edit | View | Favorites | Tools | Help | Links RealPlayer
|
||||
Gold Miner Beta
|
||||
User Logged in as : [REDACTED] Logout from RT10
|
||||
Welcome | Events | Targets | Browse | Tools | Managers
|
||||
|
||||
Browse Targets
|
||||
Add: Unknown Target Go
|
||||
Priority 4
|
||||
Source: Juggernaut
|
||||
Phone # Conf. 50% IMSI Conf. 50% IMEI Conf. 50% More
|
||||
E-mail Conf. 50% IP Conf. 50% MAC Addr. Conf. 50% More
|
||||
Phone # Conf. 50% Frequency Conf. 50% Serial # Conf. 50% More
|
||||
Address Conf. 50% City Conf. 50% Country Conf. 50% More
|
||||
Notes
|
||||
Cancel Add
|
||||
Expand All | Collapse all
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
| Target Name | Priority | Last Modified | Modified By | Actions |
|
||||
|-------------|----------|---------------|-------------|---------|
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]tion | Source |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | Quadraspectre |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | Goldminer |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | |
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Done Internet
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 Geospatial Integration
|
||||
|
||||
* Logical views
|
||||
* SORTING HAT (R62)
|
||||
* Integrated SIGINT query
|
||||
* Historical SIGINT reports (Innovisions Testflight)
|
||||
* GLOBAL REACH
|
||||
* GOLDMINER / RT10
|
||||
* Social Relationship Clustiner (GCHQ/R62)
|
||||
* Approximates social network analysis
|
||||
* Uses 11 algorithms to qualitatively connect targets
|
||||
* Analyst's Notebook and Renoir (InfoVis)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## SORTING HAT (R62)
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
SORTINGHAT GUI ["Unnamed"] (modified)
|
||||
File Edit View Tools Questions Renoir
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
Search Favorites
|
||||
Workspaces
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
DataSource status: SCRIPTINGDATASOURCE: Scripting DataSource completed successfully
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//TK//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
Start | Inbox - Microsoft... | weekly_rpt_notes... | (U)Sortinghat - N... | Java Console | SORTINGHAT G... | get_all_octave.b | 10:55 AM
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## Social Relationship Clustering (GCHQ/R62)
|
||||
|
||||
### R62 Demonstrator : Social Relationship Clustering
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
12307
|
||||
154089
|
||||
2053
|
||||
6370
|
||||
165943
|
||||
71780
|
||||
4228
|
||||
317
|
||||
10876
|
||||
308
|
||||
83513
|
||||
145795
|
||||
52332
|
||||
14712
|
||||
11383
|
||||
6691
|
||||
15158
|
||||
13330
|
||||
3227
|
||||
4298
|
||||
7657
|
||||
7127
|
||||
1746
|
||||
4269
|
||||
7381
|
||||
13389
|
||||
10150
|
||||
6285
|
||||
507
|
||||
178610
|
||||
7278
|
||||
5329
|
||||
20760
|
||||
3780
|
||||
14845
|
||||
31546
|
||||
3193
|
||||
19349
|
||||
60
|
||||
1393
|
||||
16860
|
||||
692
|
||||
6333
|
||||
3247
|
||||
6320
|
||||
3243
|
||||
20076
|
||||
11142
|
||||
545
|
||||
6414
|
||||
80359
|
||||
19715
|
||||
13718
|
||||
12189
|
||||
9518
|
||||
1396
|
||||
18304
|
||||
15064
|
||||
126
|
||||
3897
|
||||
7103
|
||||
9109
|
||||
2965
|
||||
1594
|
||||
777
|
||||
5197
|
||||
2991
|
||||
16588
|
||||
18348
|
||||
677
|
||||
35499
|
||||
3981
|
||||
1435
|
||||
2930
|
||||
7
|
||||
17016
|
||||
59994
|
||||
3035
|
||||
1698
|
||||
17157
|
||||
5452
|
||||
224
|
||||
6964
|
||||
10088
|
||||
2815
|
||||
8012
|
||||
3413
|
||||
16224
|
||||
45824
|
||||
233
|
||||
222
|
||||
5410
|
||||
1247
|
||||
13954
|
||||
1262
|
||||
9648
|
||||
3648
|
||||
10685
|
||||
12235
|
||||
1476
|
||||
78175
|
||||
1043
|
||||
3218
|
||||
32260
|
||||
7642
|
||||
19
|
||||
11702
|
||||
1859
|
||||
223
|
||||
5973
|
||||
752
|
||||
12313
|
||||
2340
|
||||
9361
|
||||
27122
|
||||
6555
|
||||
759
|
||||
1101
|
||||
6029
|
||||
8580
|
||||
317
|
||||
159144
|
||||
9260
|
||||
111
|
||||
5417
|
||||
10098
|
||||
681
|
||||
1564
|
||||
42259
|
||||
6454
|
||||
83093
|
||||
24104
|
||||
8152
|
||||
13765
|
||||
262
|
||||
41104
|
||||
596
|
||||
1229
|
||||
753
|
||||
2792
|
||||
1142
|
||||
444
|
||||
2767
|
||||
27586
|
||||
19266
|
||||
19194
|
||||
6876
|
||||
871
|
||||
36262
|
||||
875
|
||||
7075
|
||||
1137
|
||||
233
|
||||
|
||||
Scramble Shake Hidden Links Relationships External Clusters Freeze
|
||||
50+ 40 30 20 10 All
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## ANB Integration (InfoVis)
|
||||
|
||||
Renoir w/in SORTING HAT
|
||||
|
||||
Analyst's Notebook
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Germany
|
||||
|
||||
TAMB THOMAS
|
||||
KEMMERER AW
|
||||
SMIRROV
|
||||
|
||||
Ukraine
|
||||
TAM B THOMAS KEMMERER AW SMIRNOV
|
||||
* 49172540081
|
||||
* Germany
|
||||
|
||||
B AW K EMMERER AW SPAG
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## RT10 Geospatial Integration
|
||||
|
||||
* Geospatial transform for a logical view?
|
||||
* Single selector
|
||||
* Last detected activity (or that within area of interest)
|
||||
* All activity (or that within area of interest)
|
||||
* Others: timeline view, color coded based on activity, area of interest, etc.
|
||||
* Graph
|
||||
* Some variation of single selector with graph overlaid
|
||||
* Every instance of activity between two callers
|
||||
* What transformation does the analyst expect?
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## Precise Geolocation of Handset
|
||||
|
||||
* Increasing precision with GSM geolocation
|
||||
* RT10 is situated at front-end
|
||||
* More access to timing advance data
|
||||
* Several RT10 and agency efforts
|
||||
* Manipulate GSM infrastructure to have data from multiple cell towers
|
||||
* SHARPFOCUS-2 (S327)
|
||||
* TOGA (RT10 - NRO/Penn State)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## SHARPFOCUS-2 (S327)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## Automated Analysis
|
||||
|
||||
* SORTING LEAD (R62)
|
||||
* Characterizes GSM behavior
|
||||
* Based on location, time-of-day, callee, etc.
|
||||
* Identifies
|
||||
* When target has multiple phones
|
||||
* When target has swapped phones
|
||||
* When target deviates in behavior
|
||||
* Correlate DNI persona to GSM handset
|
||||
* Enable tactical operations, tracking of DNI targets
|
||||
* Help with internet café geolocation problem
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
## DNI Correlation Example
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Space Time Analysis
|
||||
BAGHDAD, IRAQ
|
||||
Time Inc
|
||||
30 Min
|
||||
15 Min
|
||||
05 Min
|
||||
01 Min
|
||||
Skipping
|
||||
No Skip
|
||||
Skip
|
||||
Skip -3
|
||||
|
||||
Opacity
|
||||
|
||||
2006.01.23 at 08:24:15
|
||||
Pause
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
|
||||
# Questions?
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL
|
||||
103
data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/metadata.json
Normal file
103
data/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "RT10 Initiative Overview",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "Overview document for RT10, \"Real-time, distributed architecture for mobile (tactical) and fixed (national) operational environments\"",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL presentation by Dr. James Heath on the RT10 Initiative, describing the programme before it was renamed RT-RG (Real-Time Regional Gateway). Program management credited to COL Bob Harms, COL Barb Trent and Michelle Gerhard. The document describes the architecture of the RT10 system and its Iraq deployment during SPIN 5 (October-December 2006).\n\nThe presentation frames RT10 as a response to three problems with legacy SIGINT systems: volume and convergence pushing front-end filters to their limits; latency in processing, storage and query preventing tactical support; and analyst limitations from non-integrated tools, limited collaboration and constrained knowledge bases. RT10's solution is a real-time distributed architecture bridging national and tactical environments, promising order-of-magnitude improvements in response time.\n\nThe node architecture is described in detail. GOLDMINER is the dimensional database at the core, ingesting DNR, DNI and other data alongside phoneme data and voice prints. RT10 applications include GeoT, Named Area of Interest, RaptorT, ArcGIS, SORTING HAT, SORTING LEAD, Renoir and Analyst's Notebook. The system supports inline algorithms (Dynamite), queue-fed algorithms (HLT Feed) and query-fed algorithms (SRC). VoiceRT provides alerting on spoken selectors, speaker identification, language identification and content mining.\n\nFor the Iraq SPIN 5 deployment, national GSM collection feeds from JUGGERNAUT, MATTERHORN and OBELISK, alongside billing records and precision geolocation through TDOA/FDOA emitter location. The physical infrastructure is a van-based deployable system comprising a Boot Van, Ops Van with eight user workstations and a Processing Van with up to seven server racks, powered by dual 275KW generators with automatic transfer switching and 40-ton chiller units — a self-contained tactical SIGINT processing facility.\n\nGeoT is described as a thin client similar to Google Maps and TiVo, overlaying real-time SIGINT collection on satellite imagery with named area of interest alerting and SIGINT system health monitoring showing coverage gaps. SORTING HAT integrates historical SIGINT reports from Innovisions Testflight, GLOBAL REACH and GOLDMINER for unified SIGINT querying. Social Relationship Clustering, developed jointly by GCHQ and R62, uses 11 algorithms to approximate social network analysis across collected data.\n\nSORTING LEAD characterises GSM behavioural patterns — location, time of day, callee — to identify when a target has multiple phones, has swapped phones, or has deviated from normal behaviour, and correlates DNI personas to GSM handsets to enable tracking of internet-based targets in the physical world.\n\nSHARPFOCUS-2 (S327) and TOGA (a joint RT10/NRO/Penn State effort) are named as precision GSM geolocation programmes, with RT10's front-end positioning providing access to timing advance data from multiple cell towers for increased location precision. The DNI correlation example shows space-time analysis in Baghdad at one-minute time increments.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"JIATF",
|
||||
"pattern-of-life",
|
||||
"GSM",
|
||||
"PSTN",
|
||||
"internet cafes",
|
||||
"geolocation",
|
||||
"real-time intelligence",
|
||||
"voice processing",
|
||||
"voice analytics",
|
||||
"speaker identification",
|
||||
"language",
|
||||
"linguistics",
|
||||
"social networks",
|
||||
"cell towers"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2006-11-09",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"RT10",
|
||||
"COBRA FOCUS",
|
||||
"GREENDRAGON",
|
||||
"GOLDMINER",
|
||||
"JUGGERNAUT",
|
||||
"MATTERHORN",
|
||||
"OBELISK",
|
||||
"SORTINGHAT",
|
||||
"INFOVIS",
|
||||
"SHARPFOCUS2",
|
||||
"TOGA",
|
||||
"SORTINGLEAD",
|
||||
"GLOBALREACH",
|
||||
"VOICERT",
|
||||
"GOLDMINER",
|
||||
"QUADRASPECTRE",
|
||||
"RENOIR",
|
||||
"ANALYSTSNOTEBOOK",
|
||||
"OCTAVE",
|
||||
"HLT",
|
||||
"DRT",
|
||||
"GEOT",
|
||||
"InnoVisions"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Iraq",
|
||||
"Korea",
|
||||
"Argentina",
|
||||
"Brazil",
|
||||
"Chile",
|
||||
"Colombia",
|
||||
"Costa Rica",
|
||||
"Dominican Republic",
|
||||
"Ecuador",
|
||||
"El Salvador",
|
||||
"Guatemala",
|
||||
"Honduras",
|
||||
"Jamaica",
|
||||
"Mexico",
|
||||
"Panama",
|
||||
"Peru",
|
||||
"Germany",
|
||||
"Ukraine"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Heath, James",
|
||||
"Harms, Bob",
|
||||
"Trent, Barb",
|
||||
"Gerhard, Michelle",
|
||||
"Ross, Mark"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/rt-initiative-overview/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4352002/2006-11-09-Real-Time-Overview.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "c69a707467afc37f5d407e1d00ad9e1becd072c6006ce907ce16f0d0f9aadca6",
|
||||
"pages": 23
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) NSA Georgia Opens New Audio-Forensics Lab
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: Marti Hix Mercer
|
||||
Chief, Corporate Communications, NSAG
|
||||
Run Date: 02/22/2007
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) New lab aims to help analysts fully capitalize on intercepted voice communications from our targets.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) The start of the new year also saw the start of a powerful new capability at NSAG - a new audio-forensics lab funded through the Senior Language Technology Authority (SLTA). The lab -- the first of its kind anywhere within the Extended Cryptologic Enterprise -- initially will serve NSAG, with a vision toward expanding to accomodate external requests. It aims to help solve critical language processing problems confronting Language Analysts. As envisioned, the lab will provide dedicated, on-site, state-of-the-art solutions to address the problems that impair the processing of critical foreign language voice intercept.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) The intent is to provide a capability to language analysts as quickly as possible and support them in the evaluation of that capability. According to [REDACTED] the lab's audio engineer, the lab is in the "early walking" phase of a crawl-walk-run approach. As the audio forensics lab at NSAG succeeds, the SLTA hopes to build similar labs at the other major regional cryptologic centers.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) [REDACTED] in the audio-forensics lab
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) [REDACTED] directly supports NSAG language analysts by enhancing hearability and intelligibility of audio intercepts. He does this by performing audio restoration or audio forensic analysis to help language analysts determine the content and context of high-priority GWOT*-related audio intercepts. [REDACTED] Iso works on fundamental problems associated with speech, speaker identification, age and gender determination, psychological stress in voice, speech intelligibility/comprehension, speech signal enhancement, and masking the effects of noise on speech. Specific goals of the lab are to:
|
||||
|
||||
* Filter and enhance unintelligible/poor-quality voice intercept;
|
||||
* Assist NSAG language analysts or tactical forces with voice/speaker identification to aid in recognition of high value individuals or detainees;
|
||||
* Identify, isolate, and extract background speakers and audio sounds;
|
||||
* Develop signal databases containing speaker, context, background, and other information with the ability to index, sort, and retrieve in real time;
|
||||
* Collaborate in the analysis and processing of complex voice intercept.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) The audio lab provides an unparalleled opportunity to support prototype testing and spiral development. In addition, the lab acts as a test-bed for language processing capabilities developed elsewhere. The lab will partner with the SLTA, the Research Directorate, the Human Language Technology Program Management Office, and Speech Services -- the providers of operational speech technologies ( BABBLEQUEST ) to customers across the Enterprise -- to test capabilities developed from these organizations before placing them in an operational environment.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The audio lab has an open architecture so that it can readily accept new capabilities, tools, and technologies as they are developed. In addition, the lab will be net-centric so that language analysts will be able to collaborate with the lab virtually. Further, if and when similar audio labs are set up elsewhere throughout the SIGINT Enterprise, they can be networked together to leverage and utilize existing capabilities.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Finally, in addition to being a fully functioning audio forensics lab, the room itself is designed to be a showcase for NSAG. Consequently, it reflects an impressive, high-tech, visually appealing environment that is pleasant to work in. [REDACTED] is very much looking forward to working with language experts throughout the Enterprise in order to increase the lab's capacity to improve the Agency's capabilities. As a plaque in the lab states, "Supporting the mission never sounded so good."
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) At work in the lab
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Notes:
|
||||
\* (U) GWOT = Global War on Terrorism
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
|
||||
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "NSA Georgia Opens New Audio-Forensics Lab",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "The document discusses the launch of a new audio-forensics lab at NSAG (National Security Agency Georgia) designed to enhance the processing and analysis of intercepted voice communications. The lab, funded through the Senior Language Technology Authority (SLTA), will focus on resolving language processing challenges for language analysts by improving the intelligibility and quality of foreign-language voice intercepts.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 22 February 2007, authored by Marti Hix Mercer, Chief of Corporate Communications at NSA Georgia. The article announces the opening of a new audio forensics laboratory at NSA Georgia, described as the first such facility anywhere in the Extended Cryptologic Enterprise.\n\nThe lab was funded through the Senior Language Technology Authority (SLTA) and was designed to address critical language processing problems confronting Language Analysts working on voice intercept. Its primary function is enhancing the hearability and intelligibility of poor-quality or unintelligible audio intercepts from GWOT-related collection, with the lab described as being in the \"crawl-walk-run\" early walking phase at time of writing, with a vision toward expanding to serve external requests and eventually building similar labs at other major regional cryptologic centres.\n\nThe specific capabilities of the lab span several areas: filtering and enhancing unintelligible voice intercept; speaker identification to aid recognition of high-value individuals or detainees; identifying, isolating and extracting background speakers and audio sounds; developing signal databases with real-time indexing and retrieval; and collaborating on complex voice intercept analysis. The lab's audio engineer also works on fundamental speech science problems including age and gender determination from voice, psychological stress indicators in speech, speech intelligibility and comprehension, signal enhancement and noise masking effects.\n\nThe lab was designed to function as a test-bed for language processing capabilities developed elsewhere in the enterprise before operational deployment, partnering with the SLTA, the Research Directorate, the Human Language Technology Program Management Office and Speech Services — identified as the provider of operational speech technologies under the name BABBLEQUEST. The facility has an open architecture to accept new tools as developed and a net-centric design allowing language analysts to collaborate with the lab virtually, with provision for networking with future similar labs across the enterprise.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"audio forensics",
|
||||
"NSAG",
|
||||
"voice communications",
|
||||
"SLTA",
|
||||
"language analysis",
|
||||
"language analysts",
|
||||
"voice intercept",
|
||||
"audio intercept",
|
||||
"speech processing",
|
||||
"speaker identification",
|
||||
"age",
|
||||
"gender"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2007-02-22",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI",
|
||||
"TK"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"BABBLEQUEST",
|
||||
"HLT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Mercer, Marti Hix"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/nsa-georgia-opens-new-audio-forensics-lab/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351993/2007-02-22-NSA-Georgia-Opens-New-Audio-Forensics.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "9a3e03173cddf4e2509925da32e45ca922b58ffaf3330865a9173b463a724021",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: Adolf Cusmariu, HLT Operational Technologies (S24211), and
|
||||
[REDACTED] Deputy Chief, Levant Sunni Extremism (S2I24)
|
||||
Run Date: 03/22/2007
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Use of voice-masking devices complicate efforts to "voice ID" SIGINT targets.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Earlier this month, Counterterrorism (S2I) Levant Sunni Extremism language
|
||||
analysts noticed that the intercepts of two prominent Al-Qai'da associated extremists in the
|
||||
Levant contained voice masking; the audio either sounded far too high, or too low in pitch.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) In one instance Saudi-based senior extremist financier Abu-Ubaydah used the
|
||||
voice-masking tool throughout his conversation dealing with his financing the travel of Yemeni
|
||||
suicide bombers to both Lebanon and Iraq. In another instance, Syria-based senior foreign
|
||||
fighter and facilitator Abu-Ghadiyah began in masked mode, went unrecognized by the
|
||||
recipient, turned the masking device off, and both had a good laugh.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Of course, this is no laughing matter, since all efforts to identify any speaker -
|
||||
both human and automated - will fail when voice alteration is used. But why would a caller do
|
||||
this at all? Surely the recipient would also fail to recognize the speaker, so absence of this very
|
||||
human method of sound identification would only induce suspicion and mistrust. Disturbingly,
|
||||
could some terrorists be aware of efforts by SIGINT agencies to identify them by their voices and
|
||||
thus have begun to resort to masking?
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) The devices used to alter voices in the few cases intercepted so far may not have
|
||||
been all that sophisticated. Simple changes in sampling rates done in mathematical software
|
||||
made the digital audiofiles sound more normal; in fact, two specific intercepts may have
|
||||
contained the same speaker. Still, automated detection of such anomalies will be difficult.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) A way to undo masking for an intended recipient would be to use the same device
|
||||
and agree on settings prior to each transmission, so that unmasking could be done near-real
|
||||
time. For example, if the sampling rates were increased by 25% to make the speaker's pitch
|
||||
sound far too low, sampling rate reduction by the same amount at the other end would return a
|
||||
normal voice. Even simpler, if only voice messaging is used, the masked recorded audio could
|
||||
be undone after playback through an (un)masking device.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Because speaker identification services will continue to provide a key piece of the
|
||||
puzzle in tracking and capturing terrorists, voice-masking techniques need to be understood
|
||||
early. Tools developed for other intelligence applications are available and will be acquired to
|
||||
study this emerging problem.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Do you have any comments on this topic? Post them on the SID today blog .
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet
|
||||
without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "This March 2007 post from the internal NSA newsletter SIDToday draws attention to voice-masking technology used by subjects of surveillance to frustrate the agency’s voice-recognition efforts.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"voice masking",
|
||||
"speaker identification",
|
||||
"Human Language Technology",
|
||||
"speech processing",
|
||||
"audio analysis",
|
||||
"language analysts",
|
||||
"surveillance countermeasures",
|
||||
"tradecraft",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"sunni extremism",
|
||||
"levant",
|
||||
"foreign fighters",
|
||||
"terrorism financing",
|
||||
"target identification"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2007-03-22",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Saudi Arabia",
|
||||
"Yemen",
|
||||
"Lebanon",
|
||||
"Iraq",
|
||||
"Syria"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Cusmariu, Adolf",
|
||||
"Ubaydah, Abu",
|
||||
"Ghadiyah, Abu"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/alert-voice-masking-is-discovered-in-sigint/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351994/2007-03-22-Alert-Voice-Masking-Is-Discovered-in.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "d1c9b4fbb7300732f97fe094817de3d03952b13c875c77632c789f7889506d66",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Welcome! Friday, 09 Nov 2012
|
||||
|
||||
* Web search
|
||||
* Agency-all Emails
|
||||
* SID-all Emails
|
||||
* NSA Rolodex
|
||||
* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
|
||||
* SIDtoday Blog
|
||||
* SIDtoday Series
|
||||
* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* SIDtoday Article
|
||||
* Letter to the Editor
|
||||
* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Chief, Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13)
|
||||
Run Date: 07/18/2007
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) In late April 2007, SIGINTers uncovered a message from Usama bin Laden (UBL) intended for al-Qa'ida's #1 man in Iraq: Abu-Ayyub al-Misri. The resulting SIGINT report provided a crucial window into al-Qa'ida's strategic plans and intentions for Iraq and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) The message shed light on UBL's mindset and revealed his knowledge of the current U.S. political situation. Much of the letter presented a timetable for the expansion of the authority of the "Islamic State of Iraq," with UBL apparently believing that they should delay until after an expected US "clash" with Iran or until the US President leaves office or loses authority in Congress. He felt that these events would leave the US in a weak position. Therefore, UBL advised Abu-Ayyub to try to prolong the war until these events took place.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Abu-Ayyub al-Misri, the al-Qa'ida leader in Iraq (AFP photo)
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) In addition, the letter revealed UBL's great anger towards the UAE for allowing Coalition forces to use UAE's airports and seaports. It further identified the new chief of al-Qa'ida's
|
||||
external operations as Abu-'Ubaydah al-Misri, who had been charged with directing al-Qa'ida's plans against the UAE.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) UBL's missive was dated 12 February 2007 and was passed via a communications conduit. The movement of the letter from Pakistan to Iran provided the U.S. Intelligence Community with unique insights into the communications path used by senior al-Qa'ida leaders in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to communicate with al-Qa'ida leaders in Iran and Iraq.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) The full text of the report (3/OO/9464-07) can be found here: UBL report.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) A team of dedicated linguists and analysts in the Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13) collaborated to process this key piece of traffic and partnered with their counterparts in S2I11 (Al-Qa'ida Leadership and Target Pursuit Branch) and S2I2 (CT's Middle East and Iraq Division) to ensure the production of an analytically accurate and comprehensive SIGINT intelligence report.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//REL) The report received rave reviews from senior U.S. policymakers, including the Vice President, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, who retained a copy of the report - a step that was described as "unprecedented."
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) If you have specific questions or comments on this topic, please visit our homepage or contact us at DL S2I13.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED], Chief/S2I13 (Global Jihad Support Network), [REDACTED]s
|
||||
|
||||
(S) This report includes information from FBI FISA collection. Such information, and any information derived therefrom, may only be used in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney General. Any such recipient interested in obtaining authorization for such use in a U.S. legal or administrative proceeding should contact FBI Headquarters. Any further dissemination for any other purpose must be made through NSA. Any reproduction, dissemination, or communication (including, but not limited to, oral briefings) of this information must be accompanied by these restrictions.
|
||||
|
||||
Comments/Suggestions about this article?
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
Information Owner: [REDACTED] S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
|
||||
Page Publisher: [REDACTED], S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
|
||||
Last Modified: 11/09/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/09/2012
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
70
data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/metadata.json
Normal file
70
data/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "SIGINT Obtains Details of Usama bin Laden Message to Top al-Qa'ida Leader in Iraq",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "A 2007 NSA SIDtoday article describing how SIGINT analysts intercepted and decoded a message from Osama bin Laden to al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, revealing bin Laden's strategic thinking on the Iraq war, his anger toward the UAE, and the communications pathway used by senior al-Qaeda figures between Pakistan, Iran, and Iraq.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This internal NSA SIDtoday article, originally published July 18, 2007, describes a significant SIGINT collection success by the Global Jihad Support Network Branch (S2I13): the interception and analysis of a letter written by Osama bin Laden on February 12, 2007, addressed to Abu-Ayyub al-Misri, al-Qaeda's senior leader in Iraq. The letter provided analysts with direct insight into bin Laden's strategic calculus at the time, revealing that he believed the U.S. was likely to enter a military confrontation with Iran, or that the sitting president would lose congressional authority — either of which he expected would leave the U.S. weakened and distracted. On this basis, bin Laden advised al-Misri to prolong the Iraq conflict and delay expanding the authority of the \"Islamic State of Iraq\" until one of these events materialized, offering a rare window into al-Qaeda's long-range strategic patience and its reading of U.S. domestic politics.\n\nThe letter also revealed bin Laden's strong anger toward the United Arab Emirates for permitting Coalition forces to use UAE airports and seaports, and identified Abu-Ubaydah al-Misri as the newly appointed chief of al-Qaeda's external operations, tasked with directing plans against the UAE. Beyond its content, the interception was operationally valuable for what it revealed about al-Qaeda's communications infrastructure: the letter's movement from Pakistan through Iran to Iraq exposed a previously documented communications conduit used by senior al-Qaeda figures in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan to reach leadership in Iran and Iraq. The report was produced collaboratively by S2I13 alongside the Al-Qaeda Leadership and Target Pursuit Branch (S2I11) and CT's Middle East and Iraq Division (S2I2).\n\nThe article notes the report received unusually strong reception among senior U.S. policymakers — including the Vice President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Attorney General, the last of whom retained a personal copy in what was described as an \"unprecedented\" step. A footnote discloses that the report incorporates FBI FISA collection, restricting its use in legal proceedings to cases where the Attorney General has granted advance authorization — a detail that underscores the legal sensitivities surrounding the sourcing of even high-profile counterterrorism intelligence.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"UBL",
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"Islamic State of Iraq",
|
||||
"UAE",
|
||||
"FATA",
|
||||
"communications interception",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"strategic intelligence",
|
||||
"military intelligence",
|
||||
"policymaker reporting",
|
||||
"internal newsletter",
|
||||
"Global Jihad Support Network",
|
||||
"linguists",
|
||||
"intelligence reporting",
|
||||
"Vice President",
|
||||
"Attorney General",
|
||||
"coalition forces",
|
||||
"iraq war"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2007-07-18",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SCQAWK"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Iraq",
|
||||
"United Arab Emirates",
|
||||
"Iran",
|
||||
"Pakistan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"bin Laden, Osama",
|
||||
"al-Masri, Abu Ayyub"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-05-18",
|
||||
"title": "What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden Raid",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Currier, Cora",
|
||||
"Fishman, Andrew",
|
||||
"Williams, Margot"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/18/2007-sidtoday-bin-laden-message/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2082576/2007-07-18-sidtoday-sigint-obtains-deta-r.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "6e43928eb443f163395cd203f469078e6a76da6740d09536b42671ceede20bd5",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
Friday, October 26, 2007
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Tips for a Successful Quick Reaction Capability
|
||||
|
||||
by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Collaboration is a way to get the job done.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//NF) Collaboration is key when you are tasked with a high priority, labor-intensive project. When the Iran Government Branch (S2E41) and the Iran Leadership Branch (S2E43) were asked to participate in a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) for Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad's late September 2007 trip to New York, we went into action to coordinate an effective approach to the task. In our case, QRC meant a short-term increase in special collection to provide time-sensitive information to a defined customer set. Fortunately, we were not new to QRCs, and our experience has taught us the value of collaboration. **We had learned the three most important tips for successfully carrying out a QRC: plan ahead, delegate, and share.**
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Plan Ahead
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//NF) In response to the QRC request, we immediately began to coordinate across the division with the efforts of various other partner offices throughout the Agency as well as with other Intelligence Community agencies. To prepare, S2E41, S2E43, the BLARNEY office, and Tailored Access Operations began working with Oversight and Compliance and the Office of General Counsel to ready the necessary legal documents and obtain authorization for special FISA collection on the Iranian delegation during their stay in New York for the 62nd United Nations General Assembly.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//NF) Concurrently with obtaining the “ok” for the special collection, we had to ensure that the proper procedures would be in place to be able to efficiently tackle the anticipated influx of traffic. The Human Language Technology (HLT – S23) office provided numerous technologies to aid in the coverage:
|
||||
* Speech Activity Detection was run on all incoming traffic to help identify cuts with little-to-no speech to prevent our having to listen to dead air.
|
||||
* Speaker Identification was run to help pinpoint people of significant interest, including the Iranian Foreign Minister.
|
||||
* VoiceRt phonetic keyword searches were developed and run to help uncover key target information, such as the passing of email addresses and discussion of prominent individuals.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//NF) One of the branch's senior language analysts, an Excel spreadsheet guru, put together a detailed list of all 143 delegates, including not only their names and positions in the Iranian government, but their passport numbers, dates of birth and more. In addition, she included the Iranian President's and Foreign Minister's schedules. Collection information and identifications of the various hotel rooms and cell phones were also updated as soon as they were discovered. The analyst kept it updated throughout the day and provided it to everyone involved with the QRC, including the FBI.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Meanwhile, language analysts from S2E41, S2E43, and S23 combined forces to take on the challenges of the significantly increased collection. The voice language analysts relied on one senior voice language analyst who had a knack for finding the way to best organize the traffic using NUCLEON.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Delegate
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) With a limited number of resources and an abundance of traffic to scan, we had to find a way to divide the work so that nothing was missed or duplicated. We were scanning approximately 2000 voice cuts a day, so organization and delegation were key. The team chief created MORPHEON rules, shared queries, shared filters, and tabs to organize and search the voice traffic. The team agreed to divide the traffic by using the filters and creating tab groups in addition to using color-coding, and a limited set of NUCLEON dispositions, e.g., if the SRI (signal-related information) data for a voice cut was red, it meant “to do,” and if blue it was “new,” and if black it had “already been done.” That way, no matter what query or filter a language analyst was using, everyone else could “see” what had been done and what was still left to do.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Some analysts scanned and prioritized while others transcribed and gisted...everyone moved between the two jobs throughout the day as needed. This method made for very efficient scanning, which is paramount when five or six language analysts are working the same traffic at the same time.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Share
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) All the language analysts kept in contact throughout the day and passed on their findings, analyses and highlights via email, phone and often impromptu gatherings. With the group working extended hours, from 0400-2300, the last analyst to leave would gather together the highlights from that day's findings and share it with the other offices involved. Sharing was crucial because no two language analysts scanned the same traffic, so we had to collaborate in order to provide the most comprehensive information to the customers.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*(U) The Iranian President signs a guest book at the UN, September 24, 2007 (Reuters)*
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Results
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Our QRC efforts had several positive outcomes:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The discovery of several new Iranian Foreign Ministry and leadership leads.
|
||||
2. Several reports on topics ranging from Ahmadi-Nejad's sentiments about his speech at Columbia University to last minute plans for the delegation to go to Latin America.
|
||||
3. Several language analysts are now working with the Social Network Analysis office to better understand the connections between many of the Foreign Ministry and Leadership delegates.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Although we are still delving into all of the data gleaned from the QRC, and there are still many uncertainties, one sure thing is it would not have been nearly as successful without the collaborative spirit.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Tips for a Successful Quick Reaction Capability",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "In response to Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s 2007 visit to New York, the NSA’s Iran Government and Leadership branches launched a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) to gather time-sensitive intelligence. The QRC focused on enhanced collection techniques, collaboration across departments, and efficient data management to analyze the extensive communications traffic during the event, resulting in valuable leads on Iranian leadership activities and diplomatic plans.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN SIDToday article dated 26 October 2007. It describes a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) operation conducted jointly by the Iran Government Branch (S2E41), Iran Leadership Branch (S2E43) and the Human Language Technology office (S23) against the Iranian presidential delegation during Ahmadi-Nejad's late September 2007 visit to New York for the 62nd UN General Assembly.\n\nThe legal preparation is documented in notable detail. S2E41, S2E43, the BLARNEY office and Tailored Access Operations worked with NSA's Oversight and Compliance and the Office of General Counsel to obtain FISA authorisation for special collection on the Iranian delegation during their stay in New York — confirming that FISA authority was obtained for surveillance of a foreign head of state's delegation on US soil, with the collection shared with the FBI.\n\nThe Human Language Technology office provided three automated processing capabilities to handle the volume of collection. Speech Activity Detection filtered incoming traffic to remove cuts with little or no speech. Speaker Identification was used to pinpoint persons of interest including the Iranian Foreign Minister. VoiceRt phonetic keyword searches were developed to uncover key target information including the passing of email addresses and discussion of prominent individuals.\n\nThe analytical preparation included a spreadsheet compiled by a senior language analyst covering all 143 members of the Iranian delegation — including names, government positions, passport numbers, dates of birth, hotel room assignments, cell phone numbers and schedule information for the President and Foreign Minister — updated continuously and shared with all QRC participants including the FBI. At peak the operation processed approximately 2,000 voice cuts per day, managed through NUCLEON with MORPHEON rules, shared queries, filters, tab groups and a colour-coded disposition system to coordinate five or six simultaneous language analysts without duplication.\n\nThe results included discovery of new Iranian Foreign Ministry and leadership leads, reports on topics ranging from Ahmadi-Nejad's sentiments about his Columbia University speech to last-minute plans for a Latin American trip, and social network analysis work to map connections between Foreign Ministry and leadership delegates.\n\nIn plain terms this document describes NSA obtaining court authorisation to spy on a foreign president and his entire 143-person delegation while they were on US soil for a UN meeting — intercepting their phone calls, tracking their hotel rooms, and sharing the intelligence with the FBI. The collection of passport numbers and dates of birth for all 143 delegates goes well beyond communications intelligence into the territory of comprehensive personal surveillance of a foreign government delegation on American territory.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"QRC",
|
||||
"Tailored Access Operations",
|
||||
"OGC",
|
||||
"collaboration",
|
||||
"intelligence collection",
|
||||
"FISA",
|
||||
"united nations",
|
||||
"Human Language Technology",
|
||||
"voice analytics",
|
||||
"language analysts",
|
||||
"social network analysis",
|
||||
"speech activity detection",
|
||||
"speaker identification",
|
||||
"phonetic keywords",
|
||||
"Foreign Ministry",
|
||||
"leadership delegates",
|
||||
"diplomats"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2007-10-26",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN//20320108",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"BLARNEY",
|
||||
"NUCLEON",
|
||||
"MORPHEON",
|
||||
"HLT",
|
||||
"VOICERT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Iran"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud",
|
||||
"Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/tips-for-a-successful-quick-reaction-capability/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351995/2007-10-06-Tips-for-a-Successful-Quick-Reaction.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "7c41d5e47d820bea5d91ccf913c84f94c2f15f9297c20f66785fcfe8cec7ebd4",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI/REL) Perseverance Pays Off: Eight-Year SIGINT Effort Culminates in Arrest of Elusive Colombian Terrorist
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: [REDACTED]
|
||||
NSA Texas Transnational Crime and Narcotics (FTS2F2)
|
||||
Run Date: 05/16/2008
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) SIGINTers have targeted Doris Adriana for 8 years; since 2004, they haveissued nearly 800 reports about her activities as a key member of the FARC Colombian terrorist group.Recently SIGINT provided actionable intelligence that resulted in her arrest...
|
||||
|
||||
Doris Adriana
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) After 20 years as a member of the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Nancy Conde Rubio (pictured), alias Doris Adriana, was arrested on 16 February 2008 while crossing the border from Venezuela into Colombia. NSA/CSS Texas (NSAT) Transnational Crime and Narcotics (TCN) division produced intelligence that directly contributed to the arrest of Adriana, the logistics and weapons coordinator for the FARC's 1st Front.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) She was also reportedly the girlfriend of FARC 1st Front Commander "Cesar," who is reputed to be holding
|
||||
numerous high-value hostages, including three US citizens and former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. Adriana, a member of the FARC since the age of 16, is wanted by the U.S. on charges of cocaine trafficking and the kidnapping of the three U.S. hostages. According to Colombian authorities, Adriana took over the 1st Front's narcotrafficking activities after the arrest (and extradition to the US) of another prominent FARC member. Adriana has been a TCN target for the past eight years, and nearly 800 SIGINT reports have been published on her activities since January 2004.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) NSAT/TCN discovered that Adriana was traveling from Venezuela to Colombia and produced a report indicating she would be crossing the border without valid paperwork. This actionable intelligence was provided to the Bogotá Embassy Intelligence Fusion Cell (EIFC), which was then able (through the foreign release process) to hand the information off to Colombian military forces. **TCN's reporting on the target gave Colombian authorities 24 hours of advance notice that Adriana would be attempting a border crossing, critical intelligence needed to bring her into custody.** With her successful capture, TCN is now observing FARC units experiencing logistical difficulties and shortages in food, ammunition
|
||||
and other supplies.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121
|
||||
(DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
61
data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/metadata.json
Normal file
61
data/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Perseverance Pays Off: Eight-Year SIGINT Effort Culminates in Arrest of Elusive Colombian Terrorist",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "In 2008, SIGINT from NSA Texas led to the arrest of Doris Adriana, a key FARC member, after eight years of surveillance. NSA's actionable intelligence provided Colombian authorities with crucial details about her border crossing from Venezuela, resulting in her capture and subsequent prosecution for cocaine trafficking and kidnapping U.S. citizens.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 16 May 2008, authored by NSA Texas Transnational Crime and Narcotics (FTS2F2). It describes the arrest of Nancy Conde Rubio, alias Doris Adriana, as a direct result of NSA SIGINT collection and reporting.\n\nAdriana was the logistics and weapons coordinator for the FARC's 1st Front and had been a SIGINT target for eight years, with nearly 800 SIGINT reports published on her activities since January 2004. She was also reportedly the girlfriend of FARC 1st Front Commander \"Cesar,\" who was holding several high-value hostages including three US citizens and former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt. She had been a FARC member since the age of 16 and was wanted in the US on charges of cocaine trafficking and the kidnapping of the three American hostages.\n\nThe actionable intelligence that led to her arrest was produced by NSA/CSS Texas Transnational Crime and Narcotics division, which discovered Adriana was traveling from Venezuela to Colombia without valid paperwork and produced a report providing 24 hours advance notice of her planned border crossing. This intelligence was passed to the Bogotá Embassy Intelligence Fusion Cell, which used the foreign release process to hand it to Colombian military forces, who arrested her on 16 February 2008. Following her arrest NSA observed FARC units experiencing logistical difficulties and shortages in food, ammunition and other supplies — confirming her operational significance to the organisation.\n\nThe document illustrates the end-to-end intelligence-to-arrest pipeline in a transnational crime and counterterrorism context: sustained long-term SIGINT targeting, actionable intelligence production, foreign release authorisation, Embassy Intelligence Fusion Cell coordination and foreign military action — all within a 24-hour window.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"farc",
|
||||
"NSAT",
|
||||
"TCN",
|
||||
"narcotics",
|
||||
"Bogotá",
|
||||
"EIFC",
|
||||
"border crossing",
|
||||
"terrorism",
|
||||
"border security",
|
||||
"drugs"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-05-16",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Colombia",
|
||||
"Venezuela"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Adriana, Doris",
|
||||
"Rubio, Nancy Conde",
|
||||
"Betancourt, Ingrid"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2017-11-30",
|
||||
"title": "NSA Secretly Helped Convict Defendants in U.S. Courts, Classified Documents Reveal",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsa-surveillance-fisa-section-702/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Aaronson, Trevor"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Williams, Margot",
|
||||
"Cooper, Talya"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/11/30/sidtoday-perseverance-pays-off-eight-year-sigint-effort-culminates-in-arrest-of-elusive-colombian-terrorist/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4310980/2008-05-16-SIDToday-Perseverance-Pays-Off.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "da4c7e8f25d125edac820e781375e45333180c257ddfaa865ee933046c164c69",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U) New RT-RG Overview Video Available on NSANet
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: Corporate Communications, Meade Operations Center (F74)
|
||||
Run Date: 07/30/2008
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) If you have heard of the Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) initiative and want to learn more about it, you are in luck! The Meade Operations Center Dragon TAMERS have created a 10-minute overview video that is available on your desktop. The video outlines RT-RG's goals, capabilities, and benefits. It was created in response to the intense community-wide interest in the RT-RG tool suite and high demand for briefings and demonstrations of the tools and their application.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Now personnel throughout the Enterprise can access this information at their convenience, and refer back to it as needed. The video can also serve as a preparation for NETA-2014 ("RT-RG Tool Suite for GSM Analysis"), to help students gain a context for what they will learn in class.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) For those who require more in-depth knowledge, the Dragon TAMERS have training videos for several of the RT-RG tools (GEO-T, Goldminer, SharkFinn, and SORTINGLEAD). These videos can provide review and reinforcement following NETA-2014, or serve as initial training on the tool suite.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) A Brief Summary
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) RT-RG, formerly called RT-10, is a suite of tools that provides the forward-deployed analyst access to near-real-time metadata and reporting to better support the tactical customer. The tools are web-based for easy access, employ the "find-fix-finish" concept of honing in on a target, and are exponentially faster than traditional analytic tools, enabling expeditionary cryptologists to provide useful products to the customer within a commander's decision cycle. The Dragon TAMERS team is an operational test bed for RT-RG tools, providing valuable feedback to the software developers and training analysts throughout the Enterprise in their use.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Recent Initiatives
|
||||
|
||||
* (S//SI//REL) RT-RG is now operational in Afghanistan. VOICESAIL and GSM collection is getting into both theatres' servers, and developers are currently working on models to include push-to-talk radio collection in the Afghanistan system.
|
||||
* (TS//SI//REL) Additional tools have been developed, and improvements have been made to existing tools -- e.g., SORTINGLEAD has increased functionality for DTMF (dual-tone multiple frequency) analysis.
|
||||
* (S//SI//REL) VoiceRT\* upgrades include DTMF tipping, automatic tipping of specified terms of interest, and speaker identification, which will soon be able to find new voice cuts for a target that match the target's past recordings.
|
||||
* (U) RT-RG training has been formalized in NETA-2014, and students will receive National Cryptologic School credit for completing this course.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) To watch the RT-RG overview or any of the training videos, click here or type "go dragontamers" in your web browser. (If you have trouble accessing these links, click on RT-RG Overview Video.)
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) For previous SIDtoday reporting on RT-RG and the Dragon TAMERS, see How Does the MOC Contribute to RT10?.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Notes:
|
||||
|
||||
* (S//SI//REL) VoiceRT indexes, tags, and searches intercepted voice to enable analysts to find relevant cuts and sort through much larger amounts of traffic based on content.
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI // TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "New RT-RG Overview Video Available on NSANet",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "The NSA's Meade Operations Center released a 10-minute video overview of the Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG), a tool suite designed for forward-deployed analysts. The suite enables faster access to real-time metadata and reporting, improving tactical support for military operations, with new functionalities being developed for use in Afghanistan and beyond.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 30 July 2008, authored by Corporate Communications at the Meade Operations Center (F74). The article announces the availability of a new overview video for the Real-Time Regional Gateway (RT-RG) tool suite, created by the Meade Operations Center Dragon TAMERS team in response to high community demand for briefings and demonstrations.\n\nRT-RG, formerly known as RT-10, is described as a suite of web-based tools providing forward-deployed analysts access to near-real-time metadata and reporting to support tactical military customers. The tools employ a \"find-it-firstest\" concept and are described as exponentially faster than traditional analytic tools, enabling expeditionary cryptologists to produce useful intelligence products within a commander's decision cycle. The Dragon TAMERS team functions as an operational test bed for RT-RG tools, providing feedback to developers and training analysts across the enterprise.\n\nThe recent initiatives section documents the operational status of RT-RG at time of writing. The suite was operational in Afghanistan, with VOICESAIL and GSM collection feeding into theatre servers, and developers working on models to include push-to-talk radio collection. SORTINGLEAD had received increased functionality for DTMF (dual-tone multiple frequency) analysis. VoiceRT upgrades included DTMF tipping, automatic tipping on specified terms of interest, and speaker identification capable of finding new voice cuts matching a target's past recordings. Training had been formalised in NETA-2014 with National Cryptologic School credit awarded on completion.\n\nThe article references four named RT-RG tools available as training videos: GEO-T, Goldminer, SharkFinn and SORTINGLEAD. VoiceRT is separately defined in a footnote as a system that indexes, tags and searches intercepted voice to enable analysts to find relevant cuts and sort through large traffic volumes based on content.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"Maede Operations Center",
|
||||
"Dragon TAMERS",
|
||||
"tool suite",
|
||||
"real-time metadata",
|
||||
"tactical support",
|
||||
"GSM",
|
||||
"DTMF",
|
||||
"NETA"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-07-30",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"RT-RG",
|
||||
"GEO-T",
|
||||
"GOLDMINER",
|
||||
"SORTINGLEAD",
|
||||
"VOICESAIL",
|
||||
"VOICERT",
|
||||
"SHARKFINN",
|
||||
"RT10"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Afghanistan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/sidtoday-real-time-regional-gateway-overview/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351996/2008-07-30-SIDToday-New-RT-RG-Overview-Video.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "1adaea65f41cee593b3cac771480331113216c408ff770462595fc3a8e8d9961",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Longest Shifts: Working Overtime in Pursuit of SIGINT (part 2: conclusion)
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
|
||||
|
||||
Run Date: 09/03/2008
|
||||
|
||||
(U) To mark Labor Day, SIDtoday asked its readers to tell us about the longest shift they ever worked. On Friday we presented part one of the submissions we received; here's part two:
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) When I was still in the Air Force, I was a member of an NSOC Special Support Activity (SSA) team that was assigned to Joint Task Force - South at Fort Clayton, Panama, during Operation Just Cause [the US intervention in Panama] in December 1989 [see background]. Our team included three analysts and two comms maintainers. One of our team members, [REDACTED] had to go over to a U.S. Army SIGINT facility on the other side of Panama the morning before the U.S. operation began and didn't make it back to Fort Clayton in time for H-Hour. The other team member was [REDACTED] and the two of us worked at least 48 hours straight beginning about 12 hours before the operation kicked off and through the first two days and nights. We were, needless to say, very busy.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) After a while, it all became a blur and we eventually had to be ordered to get some sleep. I slept on the floor of an empty office in my sleeping bag for just four hours and woke up feeling very refreshed. I then worked 36 more hours before sleeping again. At that point, reinforcements from the SSA arrived and [REDACTED] returned from his own exciting side-trip, so we finally settled into a much more normal 12-on, 12-off schedule. I was much younger then and I can't even imagine doing something like that now.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) Back in late 2001, I was deployed to Tuzla, Bosnia, as part of Operation Joint Forge. I was the NSA Rep to the intelligence section of the Multinational Division North command, part of SFOR [Stabilization Force]-10. The unit in charge was the 29th Infantry Division (Light), a Maryland/Virginia National Guard unit, and then-Major General H Steven Blum (now chief of the National Guard Bureau) was the commanding General.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) Earlier that year, 6 members of the Algerian-based Armed Islamic Group (GIA) had been taken into custody by the Bosnian government for surveilling the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, and for planning an attack against it. However, because much of the evidence against them came from U.S. intel, the Bosnian government didn't have access to it, and after a couple of months in custody, the six prisoners were scheduled to be released without trial. The U.S. did not want to let them go back into the general population (all had come to Bosnia as foreign fighters against the Serbs, and had married Bosnian women and remained after the war ended), however, and so MG Blum and his staff planned to take the prisoners into U.S. custody as soon as they were released by the Bosnians. The prisoners would be taken from Sarajevo up to Tuzla, normally a 2-to-4-hour trip (depending on road conditions and the amount of traffic). MG Blum wanted SIGINT coverage of the trip to ensure that no attempts were made to ambush the convoy carrying the prisoners.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) My normal day had started, as usual, at 0530 in order to prepare for the 0630 morning intel brief. The prisoners were scheduled for release late in the afternoon, but the actual release was delayed for several hours due to a large demonstration outside the building they were being held in. The convoy did not leave Sarajevo until after midnight. They then decided, for security reasons, to take an alternate route to Tuzla. This trip ended up taking about 8 or so hours, before they safely arrived at Eagle Base. I remained on duty, in contact with Bad Aibling and NSA-Texas (then called Medina RSOC), who were covering the convoy movement, until about 1000 [the next day], when I finally stumbled off to bed.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) The "gentlemen" in question are still guests of the U.S. Government, at Guantanamo Bay.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) While on TDY to Lahore, Pakistan, on an F6 assignment, I served for quite some time as the lone Intelligence Analyst at site, located at the U.S. Consulate. Given the high-priority of the SIGINT mission in Pakistan, it was not uncommon to work about 10-12 hours a day during the week, and slightly less on weekends. The days always seemed to go by rather quickly, with lots of scanning and reporting to do. And given the security situation in Pakistan and the relevant restrictions, there wasn't much else to do other than work.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) However, the various threats to Pakistan's internal and external security would often necessitate a few extra hours spent on the job, with customers asking for the quickest and latest updates on certain events. One day in particular turned out to be much longer than anticipated. On 2 June 2008, terrorists attacked the Danish Embassy in Islamabad with a car bomb, killing at least five people and wounding about 25 others. As soon as the news of this bombing hit the airwaves (thanks, CNN!) we immediately began looking for reflections in traffic.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Just before our scheduled return to the hotel in the evening, our exceptional voice linguist stumbled upon some police communications relaying the casualty report garnered from hospitals around Islamabad. Since the details of the bombings and fatalities were still hazy at this point, any SIGINT was considered valuable, especially since it just so happened that a Danish SIGINT delegation happened to be visiting Ft. Meade for briefings with S2A42, the Pakistan Shop. After receiving the voice transcript, I quickly drafted a First Instance Report (FIR) and then contacted the S2A42 analysts. The report was sanitized for release to Danish 3rd Party partners and was well-received, in addition to other SIGINT reports written across the SIGINT enterprise. By the time my nerves had returned to normal levels, it was about 2100. It had been about 14 hours. Definitely my longest day at the office, but probably my most rewarding as well.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) Without doubt, the longest day I worked at NSA in my 22 years was dayshift in NSOC on 9/11/01 (not in time, but in stress). I was assigned to the Transnational Issues Desk (TRAN) Team 5, on the NSOC watchfloor. I and all my team members watched with disbelief on the NSOC TV as the second hijacked airliner hit the tower. TRAN desk was responsible at the time for interaction with FAA [the Federal Aviation Administration] and Cheyenne Mountain [where NORAD is located], who both reported to me that an airliner was headed for NSA, with the hijack transponder on (turned out to be a mistake). So, between the threat of an airliner hitting NSA (getting 10-minute position updates from FAA and knowing that we in NSOC were unable to leave!) and the incredible number of rumors, circular reporting and coincidences that occurred that day (to include a helicopter crash in Baltimore City!), it turned out to be the very longest day by far of my NSA career!! Even the invasion of Iraq in 2003 pales in comparison!!
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Blizzards and tropical storms have also caused MANY shiftworkers (including me!) much overtime, but even those don't compare to 9/11/01!
|
||||
|
||||
*(U) Editor's note: Here's the same event from a different perspective -- that of someone working in the Pentagon on 9/11:*
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) It wasn't my longest shift in terms of time, but in every other way, my day watch at the Pentagon on 9/11 was certainly the most interesting. The day watch began at 4:30 AM and by 8:15, everyone had the twin tower on their TV, watching the fire. It wasn't until the second plane hit the Pentagon that the floor began to buzz. I was speaking to the NSA Rep to the FBI in New York the very moment the second plane hit the second tower. "This was no accident," the words being spoken by both of us at about the same time, and we hung up.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Soon afterwards, I got a phone call from the wife of one of my soldiers asking if we were ok, and I said, "Yes, why?" She proceeded to tell me the Pentagon was just hit by a plane. In our office, no one knew it or felt it. There are many "mini-stories" on that day at the NMJIC [the National Military Joint Intelligence Center at the Pentagon]. The folks on the floor remained very professional, making all the right calls, and staying calm and collected. While there was panic elsewhere in the Pentagon with people evacuating, the folks at the NMJIC stayed the course throughout the entire day.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Finally, around 10 PM, relief came and my crew and I left the Pentagon. One of my soldiers and I sat outside on the wall, listening to the dead silence and looking at the smoke coming from the other side of the Pentagon. Reagan Airport is normally busy with flights at all hours, yet, this night, there was nothing but silence. We sat there and reflected on that day, and I don't think it really hit either of us until the next day. Althought it wasn't my longest shift in terms of time, it was assuredly a long day...
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(U) In February 2003, I was the senior person on a desk in NSOC and was scheduled to work the 8 hour day shift on the day a major snow storm was predicted to hit the area. That morning, the snow was already falling as I drove to work, and I fully anticipated having to stay extended hours. Before my shift was over, I called the person who was scheduled to relieve me for the swing shift, who lived in the general area, and told him not to bother trying to get to work, because of the current conditions. Eight hours later, I made a similar call to the person who was scheduled to work the mid shift, who lived on the Eastern Shore, because there had been no abatement in the storm. Eight hours later, I worked the second 8 hour day shift for which I was scheduled.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) After working four consecutive 8 hour shifts, for a total of 32 hours, I was as tired as the four or so other people in NSOC who had been there as long as I had been. However, I got a call from the person who was scheduled to work the swing shift, saying that the access from his cul de sac to the street had not been plowed and he would not be able to make it to work. So, as all the other people who had been at work in NSOC for 32 hours were relieved and went home, I got to stay for yet another eight hours, for a total shift of 40 hours. Then when the Eastern Shore resident arrived for his mid shift to relieve me, I was finally able to go out to my car and commence the process of digging my buried car out of the snow so I could make the drive home.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) The drive took quite a while because of the road conditions, but then, when I finally got home, there was no place to park the car, and I had to dig out a place into which I could put the car off of the road, before I could go inside and rest. I was awarded a Star Award the following month for my escapade.
|
||||
|
||||
(U/FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) Two score and some years ago I was team chief of an Air Force mobile maintenance team that serviced Minuteman missiles in their silos around Malmstrom AFB, Great Falls, Montana. The silos were spread across an area twice the size of the state of Maryland, so we spent a lot of time on the road. Quite a few times we worked beyond 16 hours, and were not allowed to drive, so a driver had to be sent out to drive us to the nearest launch control facility, where we could get some food and sleep, and then the next day we drove out to service another site. The codes that we used to authenticate ourselves when we entered a missile silo, which was unmanned, were generated right here at the Agency.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) It's not something that happened at an exotic locale, but it illustrates long hours are put in by all sorts of career fields. Hope you find it entertaining!
|
||||
|
||||
The hours were long, the work rife with stress, but dedication to duty kept us at our desks;
|
||||
That fateful night when our staff was depleted, we stayed and worked til the action was completed:
|
||||
The day started early, as most day shifts do, as the sun closed the day, we were closing our desks, too.
|
||||
We had already worked more than nine hours straight, but as actions go, this one could not wait.
|
||||
The chief was on leave, our deputy in charge, having just returned from assignment at large.
|
||||
(She spent the past year at another location - elsewhere in the IC, promoting collaboration.)
|
||||
We were logging off screens, turning off the lights, when the deputy stepped over to block our flight. " An action arrived with a short suspense," she explained as she threw it over the fence.
|
||||
Sure enough, as our screens flicked back into life, an e-mail popped in with a deadline: COB tonight.
|
||||
The lights went back on, and we went straight to it, to gather the info required to do it.
|
||||
We gathered the numbers, crunched them real good, made sure justifications were well understood;
|
||||
Compiled all the data and with budget defended, our late night adventure now had ended.
|
||||
I remember distinctly the day of that tasking; I worked the day shift, and my husband worked swing.
|
||||
We finished the task at half past nine (up until then, no one noticed the time).
|
||||
With action completed, we called it a day, and that's when I called my husband to say:
|
||||
You just got off work? Well, so did I. Let's grab some dinner, relax and unwind.
|
||||
My eight-to-five day finally ended at ten, and when mission requires, I've done that again.
|
||||
For that's the support our customers expect; from business managers, that's just what they get!
|
||||
While it's no tale of glory, or PCS locale, it lets everyone know long hours are not rare.
|
||||
For every career field holds chance to excel; and everyone has a story to tell.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) On the morning of 8 January 1996, a Sunday, I started off for work early because of the heavy snow that had begun overnight. It was to be first day watch of six in SILKWORTH,* a 24-hour shift operation, where I was a Senior Voice Intercept Analyst. The drive in took me three hours from Littlestown, Pennsylvania, with SUVs and other four-wheeled drive vehicles strewn about the medians and berms of roads such as I-795, I-695 and MD 295 on the way in. While it was slow going in my Toyota Tercel, with several harrowing near misses and struggles with accumulating snow on the roadway, I was able to relieve the waiting mids crew by 0700 -- two hours later than normal. Two women from the previous shift remained to augment manning, as most folks were having trouble getting out of their driveways, let along making it into work. Even folks who lived less than a few miles away could not make it into work.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) As it turned out, a rather select group were able to either get back and forth to work from home or simply stay through several shifts sleeping at first on the floor, and then on cots provided by the Staff Duty Officer in OPS 2A. The cafeteria was unstaffed because its own employees could not reach the building or get supplies, and the agency was closed for regular personnel for some time. It was actually illegal to cross the border between Maryland and Pennsylvania for a couple of days, except for emergency personnel, because of the dangerous road conditions and the number of accidents that had occurred. While several others shared my plight, I believe I was the only one who spent as much continuous time at the job as a result of the situation. I did not leave SILKWORTH until the close of the dayshift on Wednesday, 11 January, returned the next morning, and was stuck again until Saturday, 14 January. My boss, [REDACTED], brought in food for the workers stranded by the snow and took my clothes home to wash them (I had brought only one extra set with me on Sunday) so that I could last out the siege.
|
||||
|
||||
*(U//FOUO) See an article from the "Prognoz" publication from 2001 regarding the closing of SILKWORTH.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Submitted by [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(U) I don't believe that I have a claim to the longest shift, but I did have a (now) humorous experience during DESERT STORM:
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) When the conflict began, I was a Branch Chief in a cryptanalysis branch in Z23. A call had come out for 2nd and 3rd shift processors in support of DESERT STORM. Although my branch was not targeted against that region, I wanted to set an example for our area by volunteering. My choice was to work the 3rd shift (starting at midnight). My plan was to work that shift and then my normal shift in my home branch.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The main glitch was that I lived 75 miles south of Ft. Meade with a travel time (one way) of about 1 1/2 hours (don't tell the State Police). After one round of doing the round trip, I realized that I needed the travel time for sleep, so I packed a sleeping bag and a pillow and slept in the parking lot (don't tell the NSA Police) in my pickup truck which was, fortunately, equipped with a cap over the back.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) For the benefit of my coworkers, I showered and shaved in the runners' locker room (they complained!) in the north corridor of the basement after each of my midnight shifts and arrived bright and shiny in my office each morning, on time like clockwork each day for the first time since very early in my career. The combination of the two shifts was about 17 hours, nowhere near a record, but it was sustained for over 2 months until I was no longer needed. When it was over, I didn't go to Disney World -- I went to bed!
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Editor's note: Many thanks to all who sent in their stories the response was great! Although I couldn't post them all, I have created an entry on the SIDtoday Blog for further postings on the subject. Click HERE .
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Longest Shifts: Working Overtime in Pursuit of SIGINT (part 2: conclusion)",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "To mark Labor Day, SIDtoday shared stories from NSA personnel about their longest shifts. The accounts highlighted the dedication, stress, and sacrifice involved in supporting critical SIGINT operations, from intense 48-hour shifts during military operations to working long hours in extreme conditions like snowstorms or following major events like 9/11.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-09-03",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SILKWORTH",
|
||||
"MINUTEMAN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Panama",
|
||||
"Algeria",
|
||||
"Bosnia and Herzegovina",
|
||||
"Serbia",
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Denmark",
|
||||
"Iraq"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Blum, H. Steven"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-05-16",
|
||||
"title": "NSA Closely Involved in Guantánamo Interrogations, Documents Show",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/nsa-closely-involved-in-guantanamo-interrogations-documents-show/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Currier, Cora"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830615-2008-09-03-SIDToday-Longest-Shifts-Working/"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "3c53218bafe624a837713cc61bcca72cd77563930e1987aa62f55d006f484337",
|
||||
"pages": 5
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Voice Biometrics Capability Proven During Recent Technology Demonstration
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Deputy Chief, Expeditionary Requirements Division (S14R)
|
||||
Run Date: 09/15/2008
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) If a Crime Scene Investigator can recover forensic evidence, such as a portion of a fingerprint, characterize the patterns that make up that print, compare those fragments to a national database, identify a culprit, solve the crime and wrap-up a conviction in less than an hour-long television show, why couldn't the same occur with a voice snippet recorded at an entry control point or even during a patrol in a hostile area? A Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) project, called Coordinate Operational Resources for Voice Exploitation Technology (CORVET), managed by the Expeditionary SIGINT Services Office (ESSO), External Programs Branch, recently demonstrated a solution that promises to do just that.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) About Biometrics
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Over 100 years ago, the Calcutta Anthropometric Bureau in India approved using fingerprints as a means to identify people. The Henry Classification System, developed by Azizul Haque and Hem Chandra Bose, and formalized by the United Kingdom's Edward Richard Henry, was the basis of the world's first accurate method to identify people based on quantifiable physical characteristics. The field of biometrics, which includes fingerprints, has expanded to include iris scans, hand geometry, facial recognition and DNA analysis as methods available for this purpose.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) CORVET's Goals
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The External Programs Branch (S14R2) has been involved in establishing a capability for a new method, or modality, of biometrics using voice characteristics to determine the identity of a subject. In CORVET, a model, based on an initial recording taken from a person of interest, is created and associated with other biometric data from that person and stored in a database. Subsequent voice collections can be compared with the stored models and used to identify the person of interest at a later time. Under these circumstances, voice biometrics will play a pivotal role in Department of Defense's goal of attaining "identity dominance." As a result, the adversary will no longer be able to hide behind false representations.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) CORVET interview station
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Past and Future Steps for the CORVET Project
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) S14R2 serves as the Technical Manager (TM) for CORVET. This project integrates present technology to identify a person based on their voice characteristics. Current efforts combine software developed at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and existing biometric collection hardware to provide a means for warfighters to identify subjects that have had voice biometrics collected and processed. Under the two-year project, the demonstration focuses on detention operations and force-protection scenarios, where the tools' ability to distinguish among the individuals who come and go can be tested. As the capability refines, other scenarios will be explored.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The next step for the CORVET team will be to participate in a "limited utility assessment" (LUA), scheduled to take place at the INSCOM Detainee Training Facility (IDTF) Camp Bullis, San Antonio, Texas, during 22- 26 September 2008. The purpose of the LUA is to conduct a formal, objective assessment of the voice biometric speaker-identification technology capability against stated U.S. Central Command requirements. If successful, CORVET will progress to a final technology demonstration and a final "operational utility assessment" (OUA) scheduled for summer/fall 2009.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) After the OUA, the technology will have matured to the level and rigor required to place the capability into the hands of the warfighter. When the capability and utility are validated, the technology will transition into a "program of record," move into the acquisition phase, and delivered to the warfighter. Ultimately, CORVET provides another arrow in the warfighter's quiver. Its goal is to accelerate the warfighter's ability to find, fix, and finish the enemy.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Possible Applications for SIGINT?
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Current technology integrated for the CORVET project is aimed at supporting ongoing HUMINT operations; however, there are a number of SIGINT applications that stand out as possible benefactors to successful demonstration of this capability. For example, identification of a known subject using a previously unknown communication channel could aid in establishing maps of communication and social networks needed to facilitate counter-terrorism operations.
|
||||
CORVET is taking systematic steps in its approach to enable the SIGINT system. Its vision is to have this intelligence capability provide a two-way windfall: where SIGINT enables HUMINT and similarly, HUMINT enables SIGINT. Once that challenge is achieved, CORVET will provide tremendous warfighter utility.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED] S14R2, [REDACTED]@nsa, [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL_sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Voice Biometrics Capability Proven During Recent Technology Demonstration",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "The Coordinate Operational Resources for Voice Exploitation Technology (CORVET) project, managed by the Expeditionary SIGINT Services Office (ESSO), demonstrated a promising capability for voice biometrics that could be used in security operations to identify individuals based on voice characteristics. Similar to the long-established method of fingerprinting, CORVET aims to create a database of voice models that could be used for identification in various contexts, such as detention and force-protection scenarios.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 15 September 2008, authored by the Deputy Chief of the Expeditionary Requirements Division (S14R). The article describes CORVET (Coordinate Operational Resources for Voice Exploitation Technology), a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration project managed by the External Programs Branch (S14R2) of NSA's Expeditionary SIGINT Services Office.\n\nCORVET's core capability is voice biometrics — creating a voice model from an initial recording of a person of interest, associating it with other biometric data, storing it in a database, and then comparing subsequent voice collections against stored models to identify the same person at a later time. The system integrates software developed at the Air Force Research Laboratory with existing biometric collection hardware. The project framing sits within the Department of Defense's stated goal of attaining \"identity dominance\" — preventing adversaries from hiding behind false identities.\n\nAt time of writing the project was focused on two operational scenarios: detention operations and force protection, where the ability to distinguish individuals entering and leaving controlled areas could be tested. The next planned milestone was a Limited Utility Assessment at the INSCOM Detainee Training Facility at Camp Bullis in San Antonio, Texas, scheduled for 22-26 September 2008, followed by a Final Operational Utility Assessment in summer/fall 2009 and eventual transition to a program of record for acquisition and fielding to warfighters.\n\nThe SIGINT applications section is the most operationally significant content. The article notes that while CORVET was aimed primarily at HUMINT operations, SIGINT applications include identifying a known subject using a previously unknown communication channel — enabling construction of communication maps and social networks for counter-terrorism operations. The stated vision is a two-way capability where SIGINT enables HUMINT and HUMINT enables SIGINT, with voice biometric models derived from detention interviews feeding into SIGINT targeting and vice versa.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"JCTD",
|
||||
"ESSO",
|
||||
"AFRL",
|
||||
"INSCOM",
|
||||
"IDTF",
|
||||
"speaker identification",
|
||||
"biometrics",
|
||||
"humint",
|
||||
"hand geometry",
|
||||
"technology demonstration",
|
||||
"force protection",
|
||||
"DoD",
|
||||
"identity intelligence",
|
||||
"fingerprints",
|
||||
"irs scanning",
|
||||
"DNA"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-09-15",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"CORVET",
|
||||
"JCTD"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"India"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Haque, Azizul",
|
||||
"Bose, Hem Chandra",
|
||||
"Henry, Edward Richard"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/sidtoday-voice-biometrics-capability/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351997/2008-09-15-SIDToday-Voice-Biometrics-Capability.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "65ae6d058f2484894c01c06b723231c109ce9218bdfebd321970598720d441a5",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Does NSA Look Different from the Outside? What's in Store for SIGINT Analysis and Production? -- An Interview with Wayne Murphy
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: The SIDtoday Editor
|
||||
|
||||
Run Date: 08/05/2009
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) SID today sat down this week with SID's new Assistant Deputy Director for Analysis & Production (S2), Wayne Murphy (pictured), who recently returned to the Agency after spending four years working at FBI and participating in a study program. Here's what Mr Murphy had to say:
|
||||
|
||||
1. (U) Did your four years away from NSA give you a different perspective on NSA than you had when working here as an
|
||||
"insider"?
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Yes it did, in a couple of aspects... The most profound insight I gained was an appreciation for how much it means to be part of the NSA workforce. When I was working at the FBI, a lot of our time was spent advancing FBI's presence in the Intelligence Community, to try to put the Bureau's intelligence mission on an equal footing with its well-established law enforcement mission. As an NSAer, I had always taken for granted what it means to do foreign intelligence, because here at the Agency it's just a natural part of what we do. That's a tremendous advantage for NSA. But on the flip side, I came to realize that it's easy to get complacent about NSA's success and capabilities when you are surrounded by amazing people every day, and we can't succumb to that.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) I also developed a tremendous sense of pride in having an association with NSA. People in the Community viewed NSA product as so valuable. To sit in DNI and IC forums and see firsthand how much of value the NSA representative could contribute to the discussions made me proud to have been a part of NSA.
|
||||
|
||||
2. (U) You worked at the FBI as their Assistant Director for Intelligence for 2.5 years, leaving that position about a year ago. What was that experience like?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) It was one of the hardest things I've done in my professional career, but also one of the most enjoyable. To be part of the leadership team at another agency was an extraordinary opportunity. I learned to manage a HUMINT program that was global in scope. I learned to manage an analytic workforce that was working a broader range of issues than I'd experienced here at NSA. Finally, I had to think of the domestic context of the job -- something I hadn't needed to do very much at NSA. So, in those respects, it was very challenging. But I could draw upon my experiences at NSA and (hopefully) used them to good advantage at the Bureau.
|
||||
|
||||
3. (U//FOUO) Post-9/11 you led SID's Counterterrorism Product Line, and you were involved in CT-related issues while at FBI, as well. In your view, what's the key to defeating al-Qa'ida and other international terrorist groups?
|
||||
|
||||
(U) I certainly think the increased level of collaboration across the intelligence and operational communities has been a powerful force-multiplier, but as a nation we've also broadened our strategy to confront these groups in a more comprehensive way. By that I mean that we aren't just targeting them directly, but rather are working to undermine their ability to take hold. So, I believe a balance of force projection and diplomacy is the key to defeating them and their ideology.
|
||||
|
||||
4. (U) What do you think separates a good manager from a poor one?
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Good managers are those who recognize that their responsibility is to create an environment wherein the best that each of their employees can achieve is possible. It's about staying focused on creating a productive environment, rather than trying to control or dictate day-to-day operations. I think one has to be a good listener, and one must take criticism and learn from it. Managers should clear the "noise" out of the system and allow people to concentrate on their duties.
|
||||
|
||||
5. (U//FOUO) Although you've been back at the Fort only a short time, do you have any specific goals in mind for what you would like to achieve as ADDAP? ...any particular areas you'd like to focus on?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) One thing I'd like to be part of is to truly deliver an environment in which S2 employees have a technological base that matches the skills they bring. I think we ask too much of the workforce when we ask them to work around technical applications rather than be enabled by them. The S2 leadership needs to take the time -- and exercise the discipline -- to develop sound requirements for the technology, and work with the developers to help them build capabilities that are matched to our needs.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Also, I would like to contribute to Rick Ledgett's [SID's Deputy Director for Analysis & Production] stated goal of creating an ops [operations] tempo that is more sustainable than we have now. We need to give employees confidence that they can take leave, spend time with family and friends, get training and generally lead a more "normal" life. We've done as well as we have only because people have made extraordinary personal commitments to the mission, but we must learn to operate at a sustainable level.
|
||||
|
||||
6. (U) In terms of analysis and production (small "a" and "p"), what are the greatest strengths and weaknesses of the USSS at this time?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The greatest strength by far is the depth of target knowledge and experience that resides in the NSA workforce, by virtue of the analysts' talent and the persistent nature of our access to our targets'
|
||||
communications. A contrasting weakness is that we haven't come far enough in communicating that experience and knowledge through our products and services. We have much more to offer, and have to find a means to express it.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) This isn't just a matter of adding more comments to SIGINT reports, but also of using A-Space and other forums for communicating that knowledge. If you read a SIGINT report, you derive a specific benefit from it, but if you pick up the phone and talk about it with the analyst who wrote the report, or the linguist who worked with the intercept, you get a much richer experience... you get nuances based on the analyst's experience with the target. That knowledge is very powerful, and we need to find a way to get that information into our products and services.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Another great strength is the operational potential that resides in much of what we do -- the capacity for our understanding of the targets to be much more involved in shaping the decision-space of a broader range of customers. We need to support policy-makers in the same way that we support warfighters; we need to provide intelligence driven by the policy-makers' calendars. In that way, we can provide information in time to affect the decisions they make. We're already doing that to some degree, but I think we can take it up a notch. For decades we thought we knew what the warfighters needed to know, but it was only when we became embedded in their operations that we discovered that there was a lot more we could do for them -- other information we could provide that would help them immensely.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) ...How do we find out what the policy-makers need to know?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) We have to be exposed to them and work more closely with them, so that we can shape the intelligence to their ops tempo. We do need to be careful to keep an ethical divide between intelligence and policy -- we don't want to lose our objectivity -- but we can still get a better understanding of what they really want. For example, they may want to know what the target thinks, not just what he says or does. This is the type of information we've traditionally gotten from HUMINT, but I think we can get it from analyzing SIGINT, too. That kind of detail can be very valuable.
|
||||
|
||||
Officials hold a meeting
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) For example, it's great to know the talking points a foreign official plans to address with his or her US counterpart, but maybe the target shows signs of reluctance about a certain aspect... That nuance would not necessarily be apparent if one were reading the transcript of what he actually said; it is contextual information that in the past would have been left out of a SIGINT report. Nowadays we put such information in assessment reports, and they generate some of the most enthusiastic feedback we receive... Likewise, if we do social-network analysis on a target, we may detect some surprising relationships. We can pass that along to the customers, saying "Just thought you would find this interesting." There is some risk in providing this kind of information, but I believe our workforce has the knowledge and experience to pull it off. There's a range of options we can explore for communicating this information.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Finally, another great strength we possess is the diversity of our workforce and our openness to listening to new ideas and different points of view. There was an atmosphere in the NSA I grew up in that one had to wait his turn to be heard, and acquire a certain amount of experience before participating in the discussion. Nowadays we are open to good ideas from any source, junior or senior, from across the entire workforce.
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Does NSA Look Different from the Outside? What's in Store for SIGINT Analysis and Production? -- An Interview with Wayne Murphy",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "In this SIDtoday interview with Wayne Murphy, the Assistant Deputy Director for Analysis & Production (S2) at NSA, he reflects on his career and vision for the future of SIGINT analysis and production. Having returned to NSA after a stint at the FBI, Murphy provides valuable insights into the importance of collaboration, both within the intelligence community and between intelligence agencies and operational teams.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday interview dated 5 August 2009, conducted by the SIDToday Editor with Wayne Murphy, SID's new Assistant Deputy Director for Analysis and Production (S2). Murphy had recently returned to NSA after four years away — 2.5 years as FBI Assistant Director for Intelligence and a further period in a study program — and the interview covers his observations on NSA from an outside perspective, his goals for S2, and his assessment of the USSS's analytical strengths and weaknesses.\n\nMurphy's most substantive observations concern the gap between NSA's analytical depth and its ability to communicate that knowledge through finished products. He describes NSA's greatest strength as the depth of target knowledge residing in the workforce — enabled by persistent access to target communications — but identifies a contrasting weakness in failing to adequately express that knowledge in products and services. He advocates for analysts communicating nuance and contextual information beyond raw SIGINT report transcripts, including social network analysis findings and assessments of target psychological states — what targets think rather than merely what they say. He cites A-Space as a forum for sharing analyst knowledge and notes that assessment reports incorporating contextual information generate the most enthusiastic customer feedback.\n\nOn the policy support mission, Murphy argues NSA needs to embed more closely with policymakers in the same way it embedded with warfighters — learning their operational tempo and providing intelligence timed to their decision cycles. He explicitly distinguishes this from losing analytical objectivity, framing it as better understanding of what customers actually need.\n\nOn management, Murphy describes Rick Ledgett (SID's Deputy Director for Analysis and Production) as having stated a goal of creating a more sustainable operational tempo, with Murphy wanting to give employees confidence to take leave, seek training and maintain a normal life outside work — an acknowledgement that the post-9/11 operational pace had been maintained only through extraordinary personal commitment by the workforce.\n\nThe interview is notable for its candid institutional self-assessment from a senior NSA official who had spent four years viewing the agency from the outside, and for confirming the names and roles of senior S2 leadership — Wayne Murphy as ADDAP and Rick Ledgett as DDAP — at a specific point in time.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"fbi",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"humint",
|
||||
"DNI",
|
||||
"intelligence community",
|
||||
"policy-makers",
|
||||
"OPTEMPO",
|
||||
"operational tempo",
|
||||
"workforce management",
|
||||
"management",
|
||||
"A-Space"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2009-08-05",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"ASPACE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Murphy, Wayne",
|
||||
"Ledgett, Rick"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-05-16",
|
||||
"title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Maass, Peter"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830623-2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830623/2009-08-05-SIDToday-Does-NSA-Look-Different-From.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "755557b8f11c5ca0c4972a0f5c79f529ac6473d32a57c0ba05e896b805545018",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
347
data/2009-bang/2009-bang.md
Normal file
347
data/2009-bang/2009-bang.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report
|
||||
|
||||
OCR
|
||||
|
||||
Quarterly Report:
|
||||
002/09
|
||||
|
||||
July 2009
|
||||
|
||||
To: Deputy Director Signals Intelligence
|
||||
Info: Director, [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Target telecommunications' networks within GCSB's Area of Responsibility continue to change at a rapid pace with deregulation rampant throughout the South Pacific, and major infrastructure projects dramatically changing the Afghan communications landscape.
|
||||
|
||||
Digicel Pacific, subsidiary of Caribbean-based telecommunications company Digicel, has gone from strength-to-strength in major regional markets such as Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and Samoa, and are currently building Nauru's first mobile phone network. Future plans for pan-Pacific provision of high-capacity international links using underwater cable and Medium Earth Orbit satellite bubble along, potentially providing new options for Pacific Island Governments to greatly increase their populations' connectivity to global communications.
|
||||
|
||||
Acting OCR Team Leader
|
||||
http://www.gcsb[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TARGET TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
|
||||
|
||||
South West Pacific AOR
|
||||
|
||||
1. Solomon Islands
|
||||
|
||||
Solomon Telekom is in a race against time with a new market entrant (almost certainly Digicel) due to launch on 1 April 2010. In the remaining months of 2009 and early 2010
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Solomon Telekom is attempting to triple its GSM user base, double the capacity of its GSM infrastructure as well as resolve long-standing network issues and inefficiencies.
|
||||
|
||||
As part of this push to improve and expand its network coverage, Solomon Telekom has already launched two new GSM towers in June (Kukum and Panatina) and added 1800MHz cells to five existing sites around Honiara. OCR has worked closely with the GCSB Deployed Solutions team and DSD to provide as much information on the changes as possible, thus allowing GCSB and DSD to retain situational awareness as the Solomon Telekom network has expanded and evolved. A result of this collaboration has been the fine tuning of CAPRICA collection to take advantage of as many of the new 1800MHz antennas as possible as well as the levying of a requirement with DSD for dedicated 1800MHz receivers to be deployed at site.
|
||||
|
||||
OCR has also worked closely with DSD over the planned PREBOIL RF survey at GBR, Honiara. To this end a briefing paper was issued on the RF environment of GBR in March and subsequently updated in June. OCR has also been in direct contact with stakeholders in DSD to provide further information as required.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Fiji
|
||||
|
||||
Digicel has rapidly caught up with Vodafone in mobile phone coverage offered on the main islands of Fiji since its launch in October 2008 and plans to introduce 3G services in November this year, Vodafone has relied on its own 3G services and high interconnection fees between telecommunication networks to maintain its greater market share, but these competitive advantages will shortly disappear. Up until now, GCSB's major targets in the Government and RFMF have kept a preference for Vodafone services, but they are increasingly buying into the services of the alternative network.
|
||||
|
||||
OCR assisted DSD's Military Support unit to provide a Target Systems Analysis on the Command, Control and Communications of the Fiji Government, RFMF and Fiji Police Force by collating and reporting information held by SIGDEV, Production and Access areas at GCSB on the communications and operating practices of these organisations. This study concluded that GSM voice and SMS appeared to be the 'tactical' network of choice, in preference to VHF/UHF, or a poorly maintained and very limited RFMF computer network.
|
||||
|
||||
3. South Pacific Regional
|
||||
|
||||
SPIN Cable
|
||||
|
||||
Recent press reports have mentioned new developments to the SPIN project such as Tonga expressing interest and Norfolk Islands being signed on for a spur off an Auckland-Noumea leg of the cable. But, despite the increased press interest, it is still not clear that SPIN will develop into the full-featured cable all the proposals suggest. There are a few reasons for this:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The SPIN cable project is very expensive for Pacific Island Countries (PICS) with landing costs around US$15-$30m and on-going costs usually exceeding US$1m per annum.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Most of the countries who have expressed an interest in SPIN plan to raise the funds to join, in full or partially, from either the EU or the Asia Development Bank. Faced with several countries asking for assistance, it is not clear whether either donor will be prepared to meet this large financial demand.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Disruptive technologies such as the O3b medium earth orbit satellite constellation, due for launch late 2010, are likely to offer much the same speed and bandwidth as a cable but at substantially cheaper initial and ongoing cost.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Astute Pacific Island telecommunications experts have noted that the SPIN project is almost entirely French-owned and run and that the contractual terms do not provide much security for the PICs that sign on.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Samoa
|
||||
|
||||
On 30 March 2009, cable laying ship ILE DE RE completed a month-long cable-laying operation near Samoa. The project saw Samoa and American Samoa connected to the previously defunct PacRim East cable which used to link Hawaii and New Zealand before it was superseded by the Southern Cross Cable. The work appears to have been completed successfully and provides the two Samoas with shared connectivity to the rest of the world of 1Gbps, an approximate 40-fold increase in capacity.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, SIGINT has already lost access to Samoan bearers due to the American Samoa Hawaii (ASH) cable. In all likelihood all but some backup carriers will be off the air by the end of the year.
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET// REL FVEY
|
||||
ILE DE REY
|
||||
Cable laying operations
|
||||
March 2009
|
||||
APIA
|
||||
13:49′00″S
|
||||
171:46′00″W
|
||||
WS
|
||||
|
||||
PAGO PAGO HARBOR
|
||||
14:17'00'S
|
||||
170:40'00"W
|
||||
AQ
|
||||
d. Cable lald between Pago-Pago and Apia
|
||||
a. Transit
|
||||
c. Cable re-laid
|
||||
b. PacRim East lifted
|
||||
NZ JEWSF 039-09
|
||||
|
||||
ELINT tracking of vessel ILE DE RE produced by the Join Electronic Warfare Support Facility - green represents the vessel in transit, red and blue are probable cable operations.
|
||||
|
||||
Digicel
|
||||
|
||||
In late 2008, Digicel was approached by the Government of Nauru with a proposal to assist Digicel to launch in Nauru. The proposal was that Nauru would pay for the installation of
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
GSM hardware in Nauru and the hardware would then be leased back to Digicel, who would
|
||||
run a GSM service in the island state.
|
||||
|
||||
In January the deal was agreed and both sides began the required paperwork. Digicel are likely to launch in Nauru in late 2009.
|
||||
|
||||
Meanwhile, the Government of Kiribati has been slow to reach an acceptable deal with Digicel, which has resulted in Digicel putting off plans for a Kiribati rollout. The key sticking point is whether the network should be run out of Tarawa or Fiji. To make the project economical Digicel want to run and support the network from Fiji, but the Government of Kiribati is insisting the management and support of any Digicel network be managed locally.
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Bangladesh
|
||||
|
||||
6.Revised Target Template
|
||||
|
||||
SIGDEV target templates are always very much a work in progress, with any relevant
|
||||
information being regularly added as a target’s telecommunications environment develops.
|
||||
The Bangladesh target template has recently been extensively overhauled and republished
|
||||
in a new format. The updated Bangladesh target template contains plenty of new
|
||||
information; including information on the Bureau’s CT targets and recent Bangladeshi
|
||||
technology developments, particular attention has been paid to updating the access and
|
||||
exploitation layers: outlining our existing accesses and collection, and also highlighting
|
||||
future key requirements.
|
||||
|
||||
The Bangladesh target template can be accessed by following the link below.
|
||||
http://www.gcsb.govt.nz[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
7. F6 Dhaka Survey
|
||||
|
||||
Internal GSM collection is continuing with the recent extension to the Dhaka F6
|
||||
environmental survey. Site collection resources are in the main being used for the sustained
|
||||
collection of productive GSM emitters. However the changing RF environment has also seen
|
||||
the continuation of survey activity. Resources are also regularly reallocated to revisit
|
||||
network links of interest.
|
||||
|
||||
The value of an internal Bangladesh collection site was recently highlighted with the
|
||||
handset geo-location of a target of interest. Utilising call event data derived solely from F6
|
||||
collection, OCR was able to geo-locate cellular activity from a tasked Pakistani handset
|
||||
operating in Dhaka and also provided an image that was used in GCSB reporting.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
|
||||
GCSB - BZ SIGDEV
|
||||
DHAKA, BANGLADESH - SELECTOR NOTED ACTIVE ON GSM BTS
|
||||
FILE REFERENCE:
|
||||
SDR-014-09
|
||||
|
||||
Projection: Mercator
|
||||
Datum & Sheroid: WGS84
|
||||
Source: MISC
|
||||
|
||||
N
|
||||
|
||||
FULBARIA
|
||||
Water tower
|
||||
CAPTIAN BAZAR ROAD
|
||||
THATARI BAZAR ROAD
|
||||
WARI
|
||||
DAYAGANJ
|
||||
GUPIBAGH ROAD
|
||||
ABDOY DAS ROAD
|
||||
K.M. DAS ROAD
|
||||
26
|
||||
183
|
||||
280
|
||||
218
|
||||
167
|
||||
138
|
||||
AGASADEDUE ROAD
|
||||
S. CHAKARIWARTY ROAD
|
||||
BANGSAL
|
||||
NAWABPUR ROAD
|
||||
HARE STREET
|
||||
NAWAB STREET
|
||||
HABALAK RD.
|
||||
BALA LANE
|
||||
WORKS ROAD
|
||||
335
|
||||
CHOUK BAZAR
|
||||
332
|
||||
NAYABAZAR
|
||||
KAZI
|
||||
ENGLISH
|
||||
ROAD
|
||||
TIPU SULTAN ROAD
|
||||
IMEI Seen active on this BTS 2008-11-12 and 2008-11-20
|
||||
146
|
||||
150
|
||||
Cemetery
|
||||
NARINDA
|
||||
NARINDA ROAD
|
||||
Bangladesh
|
||||
ISLAMPUR ROAD
|
||||
BABU BAZAR
|
||||
19
|
||||
PATUATULI ROAD
|
||||
SADARGHAT ROAD
|
||||
198
|
||||
262
|
||||
334
|
||||
188
|
||||
Water tower
|
||||
SARAT GUPTA ROAD
|
||||
Reservoir
|
||||
JATRA MARI
|
||||
ABDUL RAUF RD
|
||||
LAXMI BAZAR ROAD
|
||||
333
|
||||
KRISHNKESH DAS RD. R.M. DAS RD.
|
||||
Bahadur Shah Park
|
||||
JINJIRA
|
||||
Ferry
|
||||
314
|
||||
Buckland Bund
|
||||
PIYARI DAS ROAD
|
||||
BANGLA BAZAR
|
||||
410
|
||||
SADARGHAT
|
||||
FARASGANJ
|
||||
DISTILLERY ROAD
|
||||
S.K. DAS ROAD
|
||||
DINA NATH SEN ROAD
|
||||
SATIS
|
||||
Gondaria Railway Station
|
||||
|
||||
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
|
||||
This product is for orientation and briefing purposes only
|
||||
and should not be used for navigation.
|
||||
|
||||
CORRECT AS AT: 12 March 2009
|
||||
|
||||
Dimensions scaled from this
|
||||
map may be inaccurate as map
|
||||
georeferenced from VMAP0.
|
||||
|
||||
Legend
|
||||
Grameenphone BTS - 17709/10
|
||||
|
||||
0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
|
||||
Kilometers
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Image: F6 collected geo-location metadata on tasked handset
|
||||
|
||||
Recent analysis of some classified collateral has developed an understanding of the
|
||||
telecommunications systems of the Bangladesh Rapid Action Battalion (RAB). This
|
||||
information will materially add to the SIGINT communities’ knowledge of Bangladeshi
|
||||
telecommunications networks. Analysis of this collateral highlighted comprehensive
|
||||
geographical information, telecommunication transmission paths and signalling information.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
TOP SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
|
||||
GCSB - BANGLADESH SIGDEV
|
||||
RAPID ACTION BATTALION - MICROWAVE STATIONS 300 MHz RANGE
|
||||
FILE REFERENCE:
|
||||
SDA-014-09
|
||||
|
||||
Projection: Mercator
|
||||
Datum & Sheriod: WGS84
|
||||
Source: MISC
|
||||
|
||||
India
|
||||
N
|
||||
|
||||
Rajshahi Police RAB 5 Natore Police
|
||||
|
||||
Pabna Police
|
||||
|
||||
Shibalaya BAF Station
|
||||
RAB 2 RAB 3
|
||||
Bangladesh
|
||||
Faridpur RAB 4
|
||||
India Police HQ
|
||||
Magura Police Faridpur Police Comilla Police
|
||||
Daudkandi BTTB Exchange
|
||||
|
||||
Jessore Police
|
||||
Feni Thana
|
||||
|
||||
Khulna Police RAB 6
|
||||
|
||||
Sitakunda Hill top
|
||||
|
||||
Dampara Chittagong Police RAB 7
|
||||
|
||||
NAMES AND BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
|
||||
This product is for orientation and briefing pupeses only
|
||||
and should not be used for navigation.
|
||||
|
||||
CORRECT AS AT: 19 March 2009
|
||||
|
||||
Dimensions scaled from this
|
||||
map may be inaccurate as map
|
||||
georeferenced from VMAP0.
|
||||
|
||||
Legend
|
||||
RAB Sites 300MHz
|
||||
|
||||
0 5 10 20 30 40 50
|
||||
Kilometers
|
||||
|
||||
Myanmar
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET COMINT//AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US EYES ONLY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Image: RAB Communications network
|
||||
|
||||
With this collateral, F6 was able to place on collection dedicated RAB private voice
|
||||
communication to and from RAB headquarters to various RAB units. Also seen in collection
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
was a limited amount of DNI, including a test of the video teleconferencing system from RAB
|
||||
HQ to RAB-3 HQ.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
H.263 Display
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Image: RAB video teleconferencing intercept
|
||||
|
||||
RAB has been an active target group for the GCSB in the past and this information could
|
||||
well be of high interest for future operations if the domestic security situation in
|
||||
Bangladesh were to deteriorate.
|
||||
|
||||
METADATA ANALYSIS TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
|
||||
|
||||
8. XKEYSCORE
|
||||
|
||||
GCSB received a visit from NSA XKEYSCORE trainers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in March to update our GUI, assist IRONSAND with virtualisation of their XKEYSCORE suite, and train users in anticipation of full-take collection and 2nd party sharing. IRONSAND Engineering have been working to overcome problems in storage capacity, Virtual LAN licensing, competing priorities, and low manning but plan to have full-take collection on Mission carriers running by October. DSD are very keen to share XKEYSCORE data and have already modified their GUI to meet GCSB Compliance expectations. It is hoped that sharing with DSD and GCHQ will be achieved soon after we can offer full-take collection data. GCSB auditors are now trained to audit all queries made, and an audit log is kept to track what proportion of queries have been marked as reviewed to satisfy the Inspector-General.
|
||||
|
||||
NETWORK ANALYSIS TEAM
|
||||
|
||||
9. OCR Integree in DSD's NAC
|
||||
|
||||
To begin the process of developing GCSB's own network analysis capability, [REDACTED] who will be part of the GCSB SIGINT Development network analysis team when it stands up in October 2009, was posted to DSD's NAC for four months (February to May). [REDACTED] was placed initially into Access Analysis, gaining knowledge of DSD's systems and collection capabilities. One month into his deployment, he switched to the Network Infrastructure Analysis section, where he was given specific NAC tasks regarding Indonesian cellular telecommunications provider Telkomsel. Some of the tasks included investigating Call Data Records being sent over FTP, identifying X.25 over TCP communications between
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Telkomsel GSM nodes, and researching Telkomsel iGATE 4000 STM-1 carriers. [REDACTED] benefited from very useful training and information including a one-day SS7 presentation and a three-day VPN course.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
123
data/2009-bang/metadata.json
Normal file
123
data/2009-bang/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This GCSB quarterly report from July 2009 provides a Top Secret review of major telecommunications developments in the South West Pacific, focusing on the intelligence challenges posed by competitive deregulation and new infrastructure projects, while also detailing GCSB's efforts to enhance its collection capabilities, including the fine-tuning of GSM collection in the Solomon Islands, supporting DSD analyses in Fiji, and preparing for full-take XKEYSCORE data sharing with allies.",
|
||||
"long_description": "The GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report (002/09), classified TOP SECRET and releasable to all Five Eyes partners (USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL), details the changing telecommunications landscape within GCSB's Area of Responsibility (AOR) during the second quarter of 2009. The report highlights the rapid expansion of competitor mobile networks, particularly Digicel Pacific, in markets like Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Samoa, which necessitate constant adjustments to SIGINT collection methods. It also notes potential future challenges from high-capacity international links via underwater cables (e.g., SPIN project) and new satellite constellations (O3b).\n\nSpecific operations are analyzed: In the Solomon Islands, GCSB's OCR team collaborated closely with the GCSB Deployed Solutions team and Australia's DSD (Defence Signals Directorate) to track Solomon Telekom's network expansion (specifically new GSM towers and 1800MHz cells). This resulted in fine-tuning existing \"CAPRICA\" collection and levying a requirement for DSD to deploy dedicated 1800MHz receivers. In Fiji, GCSB assisted DSD's Military Support unit with a Target Systems Analysis (TSA) of the Fiji Government, RFMF, and Police Force communications, concluding that \"GSM voice and SMS appeared to be the 'tactical' network of choice.\"\n\nFurthermore, the report details key developments in capability: XKEYSCORE implementation was progressing, with NSA trainers visiting GCSB to upgrade the system and provide training. GCSB was working to solve storage and licensing issues to achieve \"full-take collection\" by October 2009, with a clear intent to immediately pursue XKEYSCORE data sharing with DSD and GCHQ. Finally, GCSB was developing its own network analysis capability by embedding a staff member in DSD's Network Analysis Centre (NAC), where they gained experience on systems and worked on specific intelligence tasks concerning Indonesian provider Telkomsel.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"South Pacific",
|
||||
"Digicel",
|
||||
"Caribbean",
|
||||
"Solomon Telekom",
|
||||
"GSM",
|
||||
"mobile surveillance",
|
||||
"cables",
|
||||
"fiber optic cables",
|
||||
"telecommunications",
|
||||
"Honiara",
|
||||
"DSD",
|
||||
"Vodafone",
|
||||
"SMS",
|
||||
"VHF",
|
||||
"UHF",
|
||||
"Norfolk Island",
|
||||
"Hawaii",
|
||||
"Telekomsel",
|
||||
"teleconference",
|
||||
"video conference",
|
||||
"target template",
|
||||
"SIGDEV"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCSB",
|
||||
"date_created": "2009-07-01",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "report",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"CAPRICA",
|
||||
"PREBOIL",
|
||||
"XKEYSCORE",
|
||||
"IRONSAND"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"France",
|
||||
"New Zealand",
|
||||
"Indonesia",
|
||||
"Fiji",
|
||||
"Tonga",
|
||||
"Vanuatu",
|
||||
"Solomon Islands",
|
||||
"Samoa",
|
||||
"Nauru",
|
||||
"Kiribati",
|
||||
"Bangladesh",
|
||||
"Myanmar",
|
||||
"India"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-04",
|
||||
"title": "New Zealand Spies on Neighbors in Secret \"Five Eyes\" Global Surveillance",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/04/new-zealand-gcsb-surveillance-waihopai-xkeyscore/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan",
|
||||
"Hager, Nicky"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"version": "gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The New Zealand Herald",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-04",
|
||||
"title": "Snowden revelations / The price of the Five Eyes club: Mass spying on friendly nations",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/snowden-revelations-the-price-of-the-five-eyes-club-mass-spying-on-friendly-nations/IIMOU3E4C6LSTHEUIJDVX6OOYE/?c_id=1&objectid=11411759",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Hager, Nicky",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"version": "gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-04-15",
|
||||
"title": "New Zealand Spy Data Shared With Bangladeshi Human Rights Abusers",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/04/15/new-zealand-bangladesh-gcsb-surveillance-human-rights/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan",
|
||||
"Hager, Nicky"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1874070/2009-bang.pdf"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The New Zealand Herald",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-04-16",
|
||||
"title": "Secret documents shine light on GCSB spying in Bangladesh",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11433216",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Hager, Nicky",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1874070/2009-bang.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "f4c6d76c4b09a84932bac57667b717cfbcaeda0e4c5c33942ed3d5eae1d6f070",
|
||||
"pages": 9,
|
||||
"versions": {
|
||||
"gcsb-signit-development-quartery-report": {
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "9cb481af82be9cdb83431ac18492bf437c06a9f2329189e75bce2bb9fabed855"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
GCSB SIGINT Development Quarterly Report
|
||||
|
||||
OCR
|
||||
|
||||
Quarterly Report:
|
||||
002/09
|
||||
|
||||
July 2009
|
||||
|
||||
To: Deputy Director Signals Intelligence
|
||||
Info: Director, [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Target telecommunications' networks within GCSB's Area of Responsibility continue to change at a rapid pace with deregulation rampant throughout the South Pacific, and major infrastructure projects dramatically changing the Afghan communications landscape.
|
||||
|
||||
Digicel Pacific, subsidiary of Caribbean-based telecommunications company Digicel, has gone from strength-to-strength in major regional markets such as Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu and Samoa, and are currently building Nauru's first mobile phone network. Future plans for pan-Pacific provision of high-capacity international links using underwater cable and Medium Earth Orbit satellite bubble along, potentially providing new options for Pacific Island Governments to greatly increase their populations' connectivity to global communications.
|
||||
|
||||
Acting OCR Team Leader
|
||||
http://www.gcsb[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TARGET TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS
|
||||
|
||||
South West Pacific AOR
|
||||
|
||||
1. Solomon Islands
|
||||
|
||||
Solomon Telekom is in a race against time with a new market entrant (almost certainly Digicel) due to launch on 1 April 2010. In the remaining months of 2009 and early 2010
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Solomon Telekom is attempting to triple its GSM user base, double the capacity of its GSM infrastructure as well as resolve long-standing network issues and inefficiencies.
|
||||
|
||||
As part of this push to improve and expand its network coverage, Solomon Telekom has already launched two new GSM towers in June (Kukum and Panatina) and added 1800MHz cells to five existing sites around Honiara. OCR has worked closely with the GCSB Deployed Solutions team and DSD to provide as much information on the changes as possible, thus allowing GCSB and DSD to retain situational awareness as the Solomon Telekom network has expanded and evolved. A result of this collaboration has been the fine tuning of CAPRICA collection to take advantage of as many of the new 1800MHz antennas as possible as well as the levying of a requirement with DSD for dedicated 1800MHz receivers to be deployed at site.
|
||||
|
||||
OCR has also worked closely with DSD over the planned PREBOIL RF survey at GBR, Honiara. To this end a briefing paper was issued on the RF environment of GBR in March and subsequently updated in June. OCR has also been in direct contact with stakeholders in DSD to provide further information as required.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Fiji
|
||||
|
||||
Digicel has rapidly caught up with Vodafone in mobile phone coverage offered on the main islands of Fiji since its launch in October 2008 and plans to introduce 3G services in November this year, Vodafone has relied on its own 3G services and high interconnection fees between telecommunication networks to maintain its greater market share, but these competitive advantages will shortly disappear. Up until now, GCSB's major targets in the Government and RFMF have kept a preference for Vodafone services, but they are increasingly buying into the services of the alternative network.
|
||||
|
||||
OCR assisted DSD's Military Support unit to provide a Target Systems Analysis on the Command, Control and Communications of the Fiji Government, RFMF and Fiji Police Force by collating and reporting information held by SIGDEV, Production and Access areas at GCSB on the communications and operating practices of these organisations. This study concluded that GSM voice and SMS appeared to be the 'tactical' network of choice, in preference to VHF/UHF, or a poorly maintained and very limited RFMF computer network.
|
||||
|
||||
3. South Pacific Regional
|
||||
|
||||
SPIN Cable
|
||||
|
||||
Recent press reports have mentioned new developments to the SPIN project such as Tonga expressing interest and Norfolk Islands being signed on for a spur off an Auckland-Noumea leg of the cable. But, despite the increased press interest, it is still not clear that SPIN will develop into the full-featured cable all the proposals suggest. There are a few reasons for this:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The SPIN cable project is very expensive for Pacific Island Countries (PICS) with landing costs around US$15-$30m and on-going costs usually exceeding US$1m per annum.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Most of the countries who have expressed an interest in SPIN plan to raise the funds to join, in full or partially, from either the EU or the Asia Development Bank. Faced with several countries asking for assistance, it is not clear whether either donor will be prepared to meet this large financial demand.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Disruptive technologies such as the O3b medium earth orbit satellite constellation, due for launch late 2010, are likely to offer much the same speed and bandwidth as a cable but at substantially cheaper initial and ongoing cost.
|
||||
|
||||
4. Astute Pacific Island telecommunications experts have noted that the SPIN project is almost entirely French-owned and run and that the contractual terms do not provide much security for the PICs that sign on.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Samoa
|
||||
|
||||
On 30 March 2009, cable laying ship ILE DE RE completed a month-long cable-laying operation near Samoa. The project saw Samoa and American Samoa connected to the previously defunct PacRim East cable which used to link Hawaii and New Zealand before it was superseded by the Southern Cross Cable. The work appears to have been completed successfully and provides the two Samoas with shared connectivity to the rest of the world of 1Gbps, an approximate 40-fold increase in capacity.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, SIGINT has already lost access to Samoan bearers due to the American Samoa Hawaii (ASH) cable. In all likelihood all but some backup carriers will be off the air by the end of the year.
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET// REL FVEY
|
||||
ILE DE REY
|
||||
Cable laying operations
|
||||
March 2009
|
||||
APIA
|
||||
13:49′00″S
|
||||
171:46′00″W
|
||||
WS
|
||||
|
||||
PAGO PAGO HARBOR
|
||||
14:17'00'S
|
||||
170:40'00"W
|
||||
AQ
|
||||
d. Cable lald between Pago-Pago and Apia
|
||||
a. Transit
|
||||
c. Cable re-laid
|
||||
b. PacRim East lifted
|
||||
NZ JEWSF 039-09
|
||||
|
||||
ELINT tracking of vessel ILE DE RE produced by the Join Electronic Warfare Support Facility - green represents the vessel in transit, red and blue are probable cable operations.
|
||||
|
||||
Digicel
|
||||
|
||||
In late 2008, Digicel was approached by the Government of Nauru with a proposal to assist Digicel to launch in Nauru. The proposal was that Nauru would pay for the installation of
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
GSM hardware in Nauru and the hardware would then be leased back to Digicel, who would
|
||||
run a GSM service in the island state.
|
||||
|
||||
In January the deal was agreed and both sides began the required paperwork. Digicel are likely to launch in Nauru in late 2009.
|
||||
|
||||
Meanwhile, the Government of Kiribati has been slow to reach an acceptable deal with Digicel, which has resulted in Digicel putting off plans for a Kiribati rollout. The key sticking point is whether the network should be run out of Tarawa or Fiji. To make the project economical Digicel want to run and support the network from Fiji, but the Government of Kiribati is insisting the management and support of any Digicel network be managed locally.
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
METADATA ANALYSIS TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES
|
||||
|
||||
8. XKEYSCORE
|
||||
|
||||
GCSB received a visit from NSA XKEYSCORE trainers [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in March to update our GUI, assist IRONSAND with virtualisation of their XKEYSCORE suite, and train users in anticipation of full-take collection and 2nd party sharing. IRONSAND Engineering have been working to overcome problems in storage capacity, Virtual LAN licensing, competing priorities, and low manning but plan to have full-take collection on Mission carriers running by October. DSD are very keen to share XKEYSCORE data and have already modified their GUI to meet GCSB Compliance expectations. It is hoped that sharing with DSD and GCHQ will be achieved soon after we can offer full-take collection data. GCSB auditors are now trained to audit all queries made, and an audit log is kept to track what proportion of queries have been marked as reviewed to satisfy the Inspector-General.
|
||||
|
||||
NETWORK ANALYSIS TEAM
|
||||
|
||||
9. OCR Integree in DSD's NAC
|
||||
|
||||
To begin the process of developing GCSB's own network analysis capability, [REDACTED] who will be part of the GCSB SIGINT Development network analysis team when it stands up in October 2009, was posted to DSD's NAC for four months (February to May). [REDACTED] was placed initially into Access Analysis, gaining knowledge of DSD's systems and collection capabilities. One month into his deployment, he switched to the Network Infrastructure Analysis section, where he was given specific NAC tasks regarding Indonesian cellular telecommunications provider Telkomsel. Some of the tasks included investigating Call Data Records being sent over FTP, identifying X.25 over TCP communications between
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Telkomsel GSM nodes, and researching Telkomsel iGATE 4000 STM-1 carriers. [REDACTED] benefited from very useful training and information including a one-day SS7 presentation and a three-day VPN course.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
|
||||
284
data/200g-iris-access/200g-iris-access.md
Normal file
284
data/200g-iris-access/200g-iris-access.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
|
|||
Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
# Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## Special Source Access
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## 15 mins to cover:
|
||||
|
||||
- What does the environment look like
|
||||
- What does the SSE Roadmap tell us:
|
||||
* Current posture
|
||||
* ..and where do we want to be
|
||||
- Where are we now
|
||||
- Access plans for FY 10/11
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
2
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## Old Cable Map
|
||||
|
||||
### Moving target:
|
||||
|
||||
* More bandwidth being lit on existing cable systems
|
||||
* Several new cable systems being introduced (just in 2010).
|
||||
* As per SSE Roadmap, we need to maintain our investment in the access footprint in order to keep up.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Old Cable Map
|
||||
|
||||
Hibernia Atlantic
|
||||
TAT-14
|
||||
AC-1
|
||||
Tata TGN-Atlantic
|
||||
Apollo
|
||||
Pottington
|
||||
Sylt
|
||||
Blaabjerg
|
||||
Pangea
|
||||
NorSea Com
|
||||
UK-Germany 6
|
||||
TAT-12/13
|
||||
FA-1
|
||||
Yellow/AC-2
|
||||
Tata TGN-Atlantic
|
||||
Apollo
|
||||
TAT-12-13
|
||||
FA-1
|
||||
FLAG Europe-Asia
|
||||
Tata TGN Western Europe
|
||||
SeaMeWe-3
|
||||
|
||||
Funningsfjördur
|
||||
Torshavn
|
||||
Banff
|
||||
Ayre of Caira
|
||||
Dunnet Bay
|
||||
Maywick
|
||||
Sandwick
|
||||
Kårtsø
|
||||
Draupner
|
||||
Ula
|
||||
Ekofisk
|
||||
Valhala
|
||||
Murdoch
|
||||
Dublin
|
||||
Southport
|
||||
Lowestoft
|
||||
Beverwijk
|
||||
Highbridge
|
||||
Plérin
|
||||
Lannion
|
||||
Penmarch
|
||||
Bilbao
|
||||
Lisbon
|
||||
Sesimbra
|
||||
Ses Covetes
|
||||
Barcelona
|
||||
Helsinki
|
||||
Stavsnas
|
||||
Stockholm
|
||||
Tallinn
|
||||
Kardla
|
||||
Ventspils-Faresund-Stockholm
|
||||
Faresund
|
||||
Irevik
|
||||
Ventspils
|
||||
Kattegat
|
||||
Scand. Ring North
|
||||
Sweden-Lithuania
|
||||
Danica North
|
||||
Danica South
|
||||
Copenhagen
|
||||
Scand. Ring South
|
||||
Sventoji
|
||||
Baltica
|
||||
Germany-
|
||||
Denmark-2
|
||||
Fehmarn Bält
|
||||
Norden
|
||||
Circé North
|
||||
Concerto
|
||||
Tangerine
|
||||
St. Velery
|
||||
Circé South
|
||||
Ponta Delgada
|
||||
|
||||
ESAT-2
|
||||
Sirius
|
||||
UK-Ireland (Gbix)
|
||||
Celtic Solas
|
||||
ESAT-1
|
||||
Tata TGN-Northern Europe
|
||||
Ulysses
|
||||
Pan European Crossing
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP 1
|
||||
3
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Old Cable Map
|
||||
|
||||
### Moving target:
|
||||
|
||||
* More bandwidth being lit on existing cable systems
|
||||
* Several new cable systems being introduced (just in 2010).
|
||||
* As per SSE Roadmap, we need to maintain our investment in the access footprint in order to keep up.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP 1
|
||||
1. This is a view of the commercial cable systems transiting the UK. There are around 1600 available 10Gs within these cables.
|
||||
2. This is 25% of all internet traffic
|
||||
3. Although the total percentage processed may seem in the lower percentile range we can actually survey the majority of the 1600.
|
||||
4. This allows us to select the most valuable to switch into our processing systems.
|
||||
5. Advancing techniques will allow a greater rate of processing by using targeted techniques (bulk presence events and TIPC).
|
||||
|
||||
3
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## Current Capability
|
||||
|
||||
* Following the efforts made for the July deliverable, and the progress being made towards the 100 March 2010 target, GCHQs current 10G SSE capability is:
|
||||
- We can intercept/touch: ~800x 10Gs (See note #1)
|
||||
- We can cyclic survey: 188
|
||||
- We can egress to GCHQ processing: 87 (See note #2)
|
||||
* In addition we are working with GERONTIC to agree an IRU which will enable a significant reduction in annual running costs (~£2M saving p.a), along with a further 10x 10G egress.
|
||||
|
||||
Note #1. Does not include CIRCUIT/WAYGOOD
|
||||
Note #2. HIASCO access/egress to Bude complete – awaiting extra ARCANO egress
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
4
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## SSE Roadmap / Future Capability
|
||||
|
||||
* The SSE Roadmap is still valid though needs re-visiting to update/validate the recommended intercept and egress expansion.
|
||||
* Along with TEA and SRT (and ECB) we are developing new relationships to expand our access footprint, to bring the number of 10G bearers:
|
||||
- Intercepted by Mar 2011 to: 1513 (or there abouts...) (+70 if we include CIRCUIT/WG)
|
||||
- Egressed to GCHQ processing systems by Mar 2011 to: 415
|
||||
|
||||
*Eagle eyed will have noticed that this doesn't align with the projected processing and storage profile.*
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## SINO Access Plans for 2010
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
HIASCO
|
||||
New! 12x 10G egress
|
||||
|
||||
PINNAGE
|
||||
Site
|
||||
New!
|
||||
?x 10Gs
|
||||
|
||||
Other
|
||||
Existing
|
||||
Accesses
|
||||
More! LTC
|
||||
|
||||
Plane
|
||||
PROVE
|
||||
New!
|
||||
4x 10G
|
||||
egress each
|
||||
|
||||
New!
|
||||
ODF
|
||||
BUDE
|
||||
150 i/p
|
||||
|
||||
Another
|
||||
Site
|
||||
Investigation
|
||||
|
||||
CHELTENHAM ODF
|
||||
New!
|
||||
80 i/p
|
||||
|
||||
New!
|
||||
Extra 10x 10G
|
||||
egress
|
||||
|
||||
ARCANO
|
||||
|
||||
GRASP
|
||||
|
||||
New!
|
||||
SOSTRUM
|
||||
|
||||
KENNINGTON – 224x 10Gs
|
||||
|
||||
?x 10Gs
|
||||
|
||||
VISAGE
|
||||
|
||||
LITTLE
|
||||
Site
|
||||
New!
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
6
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## SINO Access: Where are we
|
||||
|
||||
* 10 x 10G from HIASCO now available at Bude: awaiting DEBIT CARD commissioning to process
|
||||
* 8 out of 10 additional ARCANO bearers for Bude - on track for March 2010
|
||||
* KENNINGTON agreement complete to enable increased SOSTRUM, GRASP and VISAGE access and egress
|
||||
* PLANE & PROVE sites available:
|
||||
- Egress comms from PROVE to Cheltenham will be in place by March 2010 (PLANE to follow)
|
||||
- Initial capability planned for March includes KEA, SD and FKB
|
||||
* OSDS:
|
||||
- Bude OSDS IOC's today (capability now - 150*)
|
||||
- Cheltenham OSDS upgraded December (capability now - 78)
|
||||
* New relationships and access – PINNAGE and LITTLE progressing but no dates yet.
|
||||
* Assessment of potential RPC-2 (and 3/4) sites underway
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ expandable to 300
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
7
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
Supporting Internet Operations
|
||||
|
||||
## Questions..
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
90
data/200g-iris-access/metadata.json
Normal file
90
data/200g-iris-access/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Supporting Internet Operations - Special Source Access",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "In this document GCHQ outlines its plans for expanding internet operations, focusing on increasing access to 10G bearers and enhancing its intercept and egress capabilities by 2011. The agency highlighted that “25 percent of all internet traffic” transits the U.K. through approximately 1,600 different 10-gigabit cables, and it noted that it could “survey the majority of the 1,600” to “select the most valuable to switch into our processing systems.”",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 GCHQ presentation on Special Source Exploitation (SSE) internet access operations. The document provides a detailed breakdown of GCHQ's bulk cable interception capacity and expansion roadmap, covering both the physical access footprint and the processing infrastructure supporting it.\n\nThe cable environment section establishes the scale of GCHQ's passive collection opportunity. Commercial cable systems transiting the UK carry approximately 1,600 available 10-gigabit circuits representing approximately 25% of all internet traffic. GCHQ can intercept or touch approximately 800 of these 1,600 circuits, cyclically survey 188, and egress 87 to GCHQ processing systems — with the Bude processing facility and Cheltenham identified as the two primary egress destinations. The document notes that while the total percentage processed may seem low, GCHQ can survey the majority of the 1,600 circuits and select the most valuable for switching into processing systems, with advancing techniques including bulk presence events and TIPC enabling a greater processing rate.\n\nThe SSE Roadmap section describes expansion plans developed jointly with TEA, SRT and ECB to bring intercepted bearers to 1,513 and egressed bearers to 415 by March 2011 — up from about 800 intercepted and 87 egressed bearers in the current posture. The document acknowledges this does not align with projected processing and storage capacity, implying a bottleneck at the processing stage.\n\nThe access plans section lists specific named programmes and their status. HIASCO had 10 new 10G bearers available at Bude awaiting DEBIT CARD commissioning. ARCANO had 8 of 10 additional bearers for Bude on track for March 2010. KENNINGTON had completed an agreement enabling increased SOSTRUM, GRASP and VISAGE access and egress. PLANE and PROVE sites were available with egress communications from PROVE to Cheltenham planned for March 2010, with initial capability including KEA, SD and FKB. The Bude OSDS (Optical Splitter/Distribution System or equivalent) had achieved initial operational capability with approximately 150 inputs, and Cheltenham OSDS was upgraded to approximately 78 inputs. PINNAGE and LITTLE were new relationships progressing without confirmed dates. Assessment of potential RPC-2, RPC-3 and RPC-4 sites was underway, with GCHQ expandable to 300.\n\nThe document also references GERONTIC — identified from other Snowden documents as Vodafone Cable/Cable and Wireless — with an IRU (Indefeasible Right of Use) agreement providing approximately £2 million per annum in running cost savings alongside 10 additional 10G egress circuits.\n\nThe \"Old Cable Map\" shows commercial submarine cable systems landing in the UK including Hibernia Atlantic, TAT-14, AC-1, Tata TGN-Atlantic, Apollo, FLAG Europe-Asia, SeaMeWe-3 and numerous others, with landing sites from Bude and Highbridge in the south-west to Banff and Dunnet Bay in Scotland.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"upstream collection",
|
||||
"interception",
|
||||
"SSE",
|
||||
"10G",
|
||||
"cables",
|
||||
"egress",
|
||||
"operational expansion",
|
||||
"telecommunications",
|
||||
"internet backbone",
|
||||
"infrastructure access",
|
||||
"bandiwdth",
|
||||
"fiber optic cables",
|
||||
"traffic analysis"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-01-01",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SINO",
|
||||
"GERONTIC",
|
||||
"HIASCO",
|
||||
"ARCANO",
|
||||
"GRASP",
|
||||
"SOSTRUM",
|
||||
"VISAGE",
|
||||
"LITTLE",
|
||||
"PROVE",
|
||||
"PLANE",
|
||||
"PINNAGE",
|
||||
"DEBIT CARD",
|
||||
"CIRCUIT",
|
||||
"WAYGOOD",
|
||||
"OSDS",
|
||||
"RPC-2"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Norway",
|
||||
"United Kingdom",
|
||||
"Ireland",
|
||||
"Iceland",
|
||||
"Faroe Islands",
|
||||
"Sweden",
|
||||
"Finland",
|
||||
"Estonia",
|
||||
"Lithuania",
|
||||
"Denmark",
|
||||
"Germany",
|
||||
"Poland",
|
||||
"Russia",
|
||||
"Netherlands",
|
||||
"France",
|
||||
"Spain",
|
||||
"Portugal",
|
||||
"Greece",
|
||||
"Italy",
|
||||
"Belgium"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-09-25",
|
||||
"title": "Profiled: From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users' Online Identities",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/25/gchq-radio-porn-spies-track-web-users-online-identities/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/09/25/200g-iris-access/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2432222/200g-iris-access.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "14ab3d6a565572215abd41d9fdcc53a181d3465e61627a5c5190bea53da167a1",
|
||||
"pages": 9
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SID Today
|
||||
|
||||
archives
|
||||
|
||||
Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
|
||||
|
||||
feedback
|
||||
|
||||
* Web search
|
||||
* Agency-all Emails
|
||||
* SID-all Emails
|
||||
* NSA Rolodex
|
||||
* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
|
||||
* SIDtoday Blog
|
||||
* SIDtoday Series
|
||||
* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* SIDtoday Article
|
||||
* Letter to the Editor
|
||||
* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
|
||||
|
||||
(U) 2009: A Watershed Year in the Fight Against Terrorism
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
|
||||
Counterterrorism Mission Management Center (CT MMC)
|
||||
Run Date: 03/11/2010
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) On behalf of the Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism [REDACTED] it is our pleasure to present the Counterterrorism Year in Review for 2009. The past year was a watershed period in the fight against terrorism and radical extremist groups. SIGINT was vital to successes against Al-Qa'ida (AQ) operatives within the United States, in East Africa, in the Arabian Peninsula, and more. For example, SIGINT first identified terrorism suspect Najibullah Zazi's email connection to AQ external operations planners in Pakistan. Without that SIGINT lead on Zazi, his activities might not have come to the attention of the US intelligence and law enforcement communities until he actually conducted a terrorist attack against the US homeland. (Zazi was arrested in September.)
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) We adapted as the terrorist landscape changed. As the war in Iraq began winding down, we ramped up SIGINT support to the Afghanistan surge. With FBI, we hindered an AQ effort to influence the German presidential elections and thereby remove German troops from the coalition in Afghanistan. We helped thwart several Lashkar e-Tayyiba attacks against India. There were successes against AQ East Africa/al-Shabaab militants in Somalia. Additionally, the Islamic Jihad Union lost its leader and deputy leader in a missile strike. Shortly after a senior operational planner of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) made overtures to AQ senior leadership for JI to become AQ's franchise in the Asia Pacific region, he was killed by Indonesian security forces.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) In many cases, NSA provided the vital intelligence that enabled capture/kill operations. In virtually all major IC, DoD and foreign partner successes, SIGINT was critical in developing the leads and pattern of life that eventually led to the successes. Additionally, NSA led the Intelligence Community in building partnerships, capabilities, strategies, and collaboration to ensure future successes.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) We encourage you to read this collection of successes and view them as a measure of NSA's contributions against terrorism. The efforts undertaken by our men and women working CT SIGINT worldwide, and with our partners and customers in the intelligence community, the armed forces and other partners, at home and around the world make all these successes possible. These professionals provide intelligence support needed to protect our troops and ensure operational success. Their dedication, commitment, and professionalism, are unparalleled and we owe them a huge debt of gratitude. They remain our first line of defense in the fight.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) You will find the report HERE. (U.S. only)
|
||||
|
||||
Comments/Suggestions about this article?
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL_sid_comms)."
|
||||
Information Owner: [REDACTED] (email)
|
||||
Page Publisher: [REDACTED] (email)
|
||||
Last Modified: 11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/10/2012
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON:
|
||||
20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "2009: A Watershed Year in the Fight Against Terrorism",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "SIDtoday celebrated “a watershed period in the fight against terrorism and radical extremist groups,” noting that the NSA first discovered Najibullah Zazi’s email connections to Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"fbi",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"intelligence community",
|
||||
"DoD"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-03-11",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SCQAWK"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Iraq",
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Germany",
|
||||
"India",
|
||||
"Somalia",
|
||||
"Indonesia"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Zazi, Najibullah"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2017-11-30",
|
||||
"title": "NSA Secretly Helped Convict Defendants in U.S. Courts, Classified Documents Reveal",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsa-surveillance-fisa-section-702/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Aaronson, Trevor"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Williams, Margot",
|
||||
"Cooper, Talya"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/11/28/sidtoday-2009-a-watershed-year-in-the-fight-against-terrorism/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4310976/2010-03-11-SIDToday-2009-a-Watershed-Year-in-the.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "e7c5417cae781c0a2d2da9bd3fb252244fcdfe018b72f36b947daea78c22d060",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Learning to Love English
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: Chief Warrant Officer John F. Berry
|
||||
|
||||
Run Date: 04/30/2010
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Editor's note: Here are more thoughts on writing from John Berry (pictured), an annual contributor to *SID today*. The entire article is UNCLASSIFIED.
|
||||
|
||||
One of my best experiences in journalism occurred unexpectedly in 1992 when my editor at the *Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel* told me to follow him outside during his hourly smoke break. I was then an intern trying to break into the newspaper business. My editor, always looking for an excuse to light up, took a deep drag and told me I was doing "okay" as a reporter but needed to grow up as a writer.
|
||||
|
||||
Two decades later, after nearly 20 years in newspaper reporting, I consider his advice the moment when I removed my training wheels as a writer and started jumping curbs with English.
|
||||
|
||||
I am Chief Warrant Officer John Berry, an Army Reservist who trains once each year in the Meade Operations Center. After a civilian career in newspapers, I am now a technical writer from Redlands, California. This is my fourth year writing articles about grammar and writing for *SID today*. I am still floored at the interest and feedback those articles generated.
|
||||
|
||||
At the *Sun-Sentinel*, I was stunned by my editor's comment. I was getting my name into a top-notch newspaper and angling for a job there after graduation (I didn't get it). I was also getting some positive feedback from fellow reporters about my performance, so I was dumbstruck by the suggestion.
|
||||
|
||||
My editor's point was this: I was just functioning in the language and I needed to learn an appreciation for it to get ahead in the newspaper world. He suggested several possibilities to clue me in, including reading "On Language,"* a *New York Times* column then written by wordsmith William Safire. I have pretty much read it ever since.
|
||||
|
||||
I later took a course at the University of Florida called "History of the English Language." One requirement was reading "*The Mother Tongue*," a book by Bill Bryson that instilled pride by knowing that I had a fluent grasp on one of the most difficult languages among the estimated 600 now used around the world.
|
||||
|
||||
That book was my shiny-penny-in-the-pool moment when my editor's comments came into focus. Too bad I waited until my mid-20s to figure it out. I wish I had read Bryson's book in high school.
|
||||
|
||||
What makes English stand apart from all other languages is the richness of its vocabulary. To be successful, we need to use a
|
||||
|
||||
SERIES:
|
||||
Berry on Writing
|
||||
|
||||
1. Tips on Writing, for Members of the Military
|
||||
2. A Sequel Worthy of 'The Godfather'?: Writing Tips from a Professional Journalist
|
||||
3. Rice Cakes for Writers
|
||||
4. Learning to Love English
|
||||
|
||||
thesaurus, a book that doesn't even exist for other languages. English abounds in synonyms, which is why we can attach a special nuance to "house" to make it a "home." (Take that, French speakers!)
|
||||
|
||||
The next factor that makes English such an expressive language is its flexibility. We can make an almost endless list of words pull double duty as both nouns and verbs. That list includes "drink, fight, fire, sleep, run, look, act, view..."
|
||||
|
||||
As a technical writer in civilian life, I appreciate the exactness of the language. I first learned how much other languages had problems with clarity while learning Arabic at the Defense Language Institute. In 1998, one of my Jordanian professors told me how much he appreciated how precise he could be in English (he quickly reminded me that Arabic was the language of the poets).
|
||||
|
||||
Bryson didn't mention this in his book, but I derive unlimited amounts of gloating from knowing that English, once among a doggerel backwater of languages centuries ago, is consuming the world at Internet-fast speeds. I love that English absorbed the languages of England's invaders and produced a language that outlived its attackers. (Take that, Germanic tribes!)
|
||||
|
||||
The respect and appreciation for English I learned in college continued throughout nearly two decades of newspaper reporting. As a crime and courts beat reporter, I acquired the confidence to explore new ways of writing stories instead of just relying on the predictable, routine and often boring "formula writing" of how such stories typically appear in the newspaper.
|
||||
|
||||
But breaking out of the "comfort zone" of predictable writing didn't start well. I still remember one editor at my first newspaper, *The News-Press* in Fort Myers, Florida, belly laughing at some of my attempts (he meant well). I remember an editor at my second paper, *The Press-Enterprise* in Riverside, California, wondering whether I even understood basic newspaper writing (I think I was kidding).
|
||||
|
||||
I don't recall my journalism professors telling me that creativity required a thick skin and perseverance; I guess that that was something I just had to learn the hard way.
|
||||
|
||||
In time, my attempts to be creative and different were mimicked by reporters at competing papers (although they would never admit it). Eventually, my stories sailed through the editing process and appeared in the paper almost exactly as they had left my fingers hours before. And all that may never have happened if a chain-smoking editor (he's still alive) hadn't hauled me out onto a sidewalk and told me to evolve.
|
||||
|
||||
To this day, I'm still looking for new and interesting ways to improve. My latest acquisition is "*Grammar Girl*," a smarmy audio book helping writers with numerous mnemonic devices, such as one explaining how to correctly use "that" and "which" in a sentence. I also like *Merriam-Webster's "Word of the Day"*, which sends me an e-mail with a challenging or mystifying word, often taken from the news.
|
||||
|
||||
I've coached several newbie writers in journalism. I can eventually get a sense when they are just functioning in a language and when they are showing some spark. My advice to them was to accept, embrace and love English for what it is instead of fighting all of its confusion and oddities.
|
||||
|
||||
* Since I've got your attention, I want to use this opportunity to cure a grammatical illness at NSA: misplaced punctuation with closing quotations. In American English, periods and commas always come before the closing quotation. Colons and semicolons, although rarely used in these situations, always come after the closing quotation. All other punctuation marks could go either way -- inside the final quotation if it's part of the quoted material or outside if it belongs to the entire sentence.
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Learning to Love English",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "In this SIDtoday article Chief Warrant Officer John Berry reflects on his journey to appreciating the nuances of the English language, from early advice by a mentor in journalism to his experiences as a technical writer.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"English language",
|
||||
"writing",
|
||||
"grammar",
|
||||
"journalism"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-04-30",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"UNCLASSIFIED"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"FOUO"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"series": {
|
||||
"name": "Berry on Writing",
|
||||
"part": 4
|
||||
},
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Berry, John F."
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-05-16",
|
||||
"title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Maass, Peter"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830626-2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830626/2010-04-30-SIDToday-Learning-to-Love-English.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "25d5598d694a1df5e05986368f5ec2ac51277bc12b477cec3dab2a027ecf47c0",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Alvin, Simon, and... Al Qaeda? Finding Modified Voice in SIGINT Traffic
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Researcher, Human Language Technology Research Office (R64)
|
||||
Run Date: 06/02/2010
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Voice modification isn't only employed by the makers of Alvin and the Chipmunks; it is also being used by SIGINT targets in Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In the last several months, multiple targets used voice modification technology to distort their voices, most likely to avoid identification by intelligence agencies.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) In late 2009, CT analysts found two audio cuts associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen that contained voice that had clearly been modified (the talker sounded like a character from Alvin and the Chipmunks). R6 and CES (S31) were asked to help recover the original voice so that the talkers could be identified. Within two weeks, we had created a profile of the modification technique employed by the AQAP handset. CES has deployed a capability (now available at "go saas") to undo the modification.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Next we asked the question: is it possible to automatically discover modified voice in SIGINT traffic? If so, then this could become a powerful tool for target discovery. In the case of AQAP, this is exactly the capability that was required: after the December 25 bombing attempt in Detroit, many AQAP selectors in Yemen went quiet. Some of these targets had used voice modification in late 2009; were they still employing voice modification but on different phone numbers?
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) In response to this requirement, R64 developed a software package called HLT Lite to automatically discover modified voice. HLT Lite makes use of three core human language technology (HLT) algorithms: speech activity detection, anomaly detection, and automatic speaker recognition. HLT Lite was deployed to the Special Collection Service (SCS) site in Yemen on 9 March, 2010 to search for modified voice in JUGGERNAUT data. After being operational for only 30 minutes, HLT Lite discovered a cut containing modified voice. Since then, HLT Lite has scanned over 1,000,000 audio cuts and discovered at least 80 confirmed examples of modified voice. Four phone numbers have been tasked and many others remain to be analyzed.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Modified voice is not restricted to AQAP in Yemen. We used HLT Lite to search 500,000 NUCLEON cuts and discovered 76 examples of modified voice across several Product Lines, including Afghanistan/Taliban, Sunni Extremism, Lashkar-e Tayyiba, and Southwest Asia Narcotics. So if you hear SIGINT traffic that sounds distorted, it may not be garbled or corrupted ... it may actually be modified! You can listen to examples of modified voice here.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Does this article sound familiar? Long-time SID today readers will remember the March 2007 article "Alert: Voice Masking Is Discovered in SIGINT."
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Note: The above image is a spectrogram of modified voice from a cut associated with AQAP in Yemen. Have comments on this topic? Post them on the SIDtoday Blog.
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Alvin, Simon, and... Al Qaeda? Finding Modified Voice in SIGINT Traffic",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "This SIDtoday article discusses the use of voice modification technology by Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups to evade identification in SIGINT traffic. It highlights the development of the HLT Lite software by R64, which can automatically detect modified voices in intercepted communications, enabling the identification of targets even when traditional voice recognition fails.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 2 June 2010, authored by a researcher in the Human Language Technology Research Office (R64). The article describes the discovery of voice modification technology in SIGINT collection and the development of an automated detection capability in response.\n\nThe operational trigger was the discovery in late 2009 of two audio cuts associated with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen containing clearly modified voice — described as sounding like a character from Alvin and the Chipmunks. R64 and CES (S31) were tasked to recover the original voice for speaker identification purposes. Within two weeks a profile of the modification technique used by the AQAP handset had been created, and CES deployed a reversal capability available internally at \"go saas.\"\n\nThe follow-on research question was whether modified voice could be automatically detected in bulk SIGINT traffic for target discovery purposes. This became operationally urgent after the December 25 2009 underwear bombing attempt in Detroit, when many AQAP selectors in Yemen went quiet — raising the question of whether targets had switched to new phone numbers while continuing to use voice modification. In response R64 developed HLT Lite, a software package using three core algorithms: speech activity detection, anomaly detection and automatic speaker recognition. HLT Lite was deployed to the Special Collection Service site in Yemen on 9 March 2010 to search JUGGERNAUT collection data. Within 30 minutes of deployment it had discovered a cut containing modified voice. Over the following period it scanned more than one million audio cuts and found at least 80 confirmed examples, leading to the tasking of four phone numbers with more under analysis.\n\nA broader search of 500,000 NUCLEON cuts found 76 additional examples of modified voice across multiple product lines including Afghanistan/Taliban, Sunni Extremism, Lashkar-e Tayyiba and Southwest Asia Narcotics — establishing that voice modification was not limited to AQAP but was a cross-target phenomenon.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"R64",
|
||||
"voice modification",
|
||||
"HLT Lite",
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"AQAP",
|
||||
"Human Language Technology",
|
||||
"anomaly detection",
|
||||
"speech recognition",
|
||||
"target discovery",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"modified coice",
|
||||
"Alvin and the Chipmunks"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-06-02",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"JUGGERNAUT",
|
||||
"HLT",
|
||||
"NUCLEON"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Yemen",
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Iraq"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/finding-a-modified-voice-in-sigint-traffic/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351998/2010-06-02-SIDToday-Alvin-Simon-and-Al-Qaeda.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "85af9717c8ec3e567cb1054352068399d9b7d12095fc1e271b8d447ece92fe46",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE
|
||||
HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Come to SID's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference and See Your Target in a Whole New Light!
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: Identity Intelligence Tradecraft Center (I2TC, within S2)
|
||||
|
||||
Run Date: 08/12/2010
|
||||
|
||||
i2 Logo
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Are you eager to contribute your expertise, skills, target knowledge, and analytic tradecraft to improve SIGINT against our highest priority targets? **Then come to SID's Identity Intelligence Day in the Friedman Auditorium this September 9th.** Chris Inglis, the Deputy Director, will provide opening remarks and our keynote speaker is VADM (Ret) Mike McConnell (pictured below), former DIRNSA and former Director of National Intelligence. This is an unprecedented opportunity to understand how NSA is bringing all its creative energies to bear on tracking an individual -- and using the power of SIGINT and new research capabilities to understand a "whole life" approach to a target.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) **What exactly is Identity Intelligence (I2)?** It is all about locating, tracking, and maintaining continuity on individuals across space and time.* It's not just the traditional communications we're after: it's taking a "full arsenal" approach that digitally exploits the clues a target leaves behind in their regular activities on the net to compile biographic and biometric information that can help the SIGINT system implement precision targeting. I2 is a crosscutting capability that supports all intelligence activities. The ability to extract identity attributes of foreign persons-of-interest from databases across the United States Government -- regardless of security domain -- is critical to establishing a target's "pattern of life" (habits, appearance, cyber persona, demeanor, etc).
|
||||
|
||||
DNI McConnell
|
||||
|
||||
What's on Tap
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) This conference will address how today's tools, tradecraft, techniques, and partnerships are being used to fill in the gaps of our target knowledge. Multiple sources of identity information are becoming increasingly available: biometrics are improving, biometrics are being linked to other forms of identifying information, and more biographic information is now available on networks of interest. These trends create new opportunities for NSA to leverage its access to a variety of sources and couple it with the creative workforce and powerful analytics we are known for.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) You'll see how NSA fits into a much larger Community effort and the unique, invaluable contributions we're making every day to help others discover and track their targets. You'll also learn through case studies and discussions how we rely on our partners for lead work and the mutually supportive relationships that truly enable operations. We will end the day with a wrap-up of our current challenges and future direction.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) With the exception of one joint discussion with US Intelligence Community partners, the day's offerings are open to all of our cryptologic partners. Contractors may attend with permission of their COR. Register for I2 Day HERE or check us out on the web for more information (" go I2DAY ").
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Notes:
|
||||
|
||||
* (U//FOUO) The official definition of I2 is "the collection, analysis, protection, exploitation, and management of identity attributes and associated technologies and processes in order to locate, track, and maintain continuity on unattributed identities across multiple or disparate instances/incidents, or across space and time."
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Come to SID's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference and See Your Target in a Whole New Light!",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "This SIDtoday article promotes NSA's Identity Intelligence (I2) Day Conference, highlighting the importance of using SIGINT tools and techniques to track individuals across time and space. It emphasizes the growing role of biometrics, biographic data, and digital footprints in identifying and targeting foreign persons of interest, with insights from key speakers and case studies.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 12 August 2010, authored by the Identity Intelligence Tradecraft Center (I2TC, within S2). The article announces SID's Identity Intelligence Day conference scheduled for 9 September 2010 in the Friedman Auditorium, with opening remarks from Deputy Director Chris Inglis and keynote address from retired Vice Admiral Mike McConnell, former DIRNSA and former Director of National Intelligence.\n\nThe article describes Identity Intelligence (I2) as a formal discipline. The official definition given is \"the collection, analysis, protection, exploitation, and management of identity attributes and associated technologies and processes in order to locate, track, and maintain continuity on unattributed identities across multiple or disparate instances/incidents, or across space and time.\" In practice the article describes I2 as a \"full arsenal\" approach that digitally exploits the clues a target leaves behind in regular internet activities to compile biographic and biometric information enabling precision targeting — covering habits, appearance, cyber persona and demeanor as components of a target's \"pattern of life.\"\n\nThe capability described goes substantially beyond traditional communications interception. I2 explicitly involves extracting identity attributes of foreign persons of interest from databases across the entire US Government regardless of security domain — meaning NSA was accessing and correlating identity data from databases held by other agencies including law enforcement, immigration, military and civilian agencies. \n\nThe article notes that biometrics are improving, biometrics are being linked to other identifying information, and more biographic information is available on networks of interest — framing these trends as opportunities for NSA to leverage its access combined with analytics.\n\nThe conference framing reveals the institutional significance of I2 at the time — described as a crosscutting capability supporting all intelligence activities, open to all cryptologic partners with contractor attendance permitted with supervisor approval. The involvement of Chris Inglis and Mike McConnell as speakers signals that I2 was being elevated to a senior leadership priority rather than remaining a technical programme.\n\nIn plain terms this document describes NSA developing a systematic capability to build comprehensive profiles of individuals — combining intercepted communications, biometric data, online behaviour, physical appearance and movement patterns drawn from multiple government databases — to track specific people across time and space even when they change identities, phone numbers or locations. The \"whole life\" framing is explicit in the document and represents a significant expansion beyond traditional signals intelligence toward something closer to total individual surveillance.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"identity intelligence",
|
||||
"biometrics",
|
||||
"target tracking",
|
||||
"cyber persona",
|
||||
"pattern-of-life",
|
||||
"intelligence community",
|
||||
"data exploitation",
|
||||
"precision targeting",
|
||||
"intelligence partnerships",
|
||||
"target knowledge",
|
||||
"biographical data"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-08-12",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Inglis, Chris",
|
||||
"McConnell, Mike"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/come-to-sids-identity-intelligence-conference/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4351999/2010-08-12-Come-to-SIDs-Identity-Intelligence-I2.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "22023fc5a90be9f50bfe6df5f534e7eb6d36d00b23008f06a3d217f8b58fed30",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) SIGINTers Use Human Language Technology to Great Advantage, Isolate Conversation about Threat to US Official
|
||||
FROM: Special Collection Service (SCS) Mexico City
|
||||
Run Date: 09/14/2010
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) SCS Mexico City has been a test bed for human-language technology (HLT) translation and selection software since May 2010. This capability, which the site's chief compares to a cadre of extra scanners, allows language analysts to sift through hundreds of hours of voice cuts in a matter of seconds and select items of potential interest based on keywords or speaker voice recognition. The results have been dramatic.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) US Embassy in Mexico City
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) In all of 2009, the site issued approximately 20 reports based on voice collection. By contrast, in just three months of 2010 (May - July), the site produced 33 reports, all of which were selected using HLT software. Not only does HLT allow site analysts to save hundreds of hours scanning through an impossible volume of voice cuts, it allows the site to focus on the intelligence items of greatest importance to local and national customers.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) The utility of this capability was vividly highlighted on 2 August. The site was informed that a bomb threat had been received by Mexico City's emergency hotline, with the location, make, and tag number of the vehicle where the bomb reportedly had been placed. When Mexico City police responded, they discovered that the vehicle in question belonged to a U.S. Embassy official. Though no bomb was found in or on the car, SCS Mexico City immediately began searching for reflections of this bomb threat, using HLT to sift through over 1,300 voice conversations from 1 and 2 August using the key word "bomba."
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) The filter returned 40 results, and the third hit on the list turned out to be a Mexican Center for Investigation and National Security official investigating the bomb threat. HLT allowed the site to isolate the conversation of interest in less than four minutes, a task that might previously have taken all of the site's linguists the better part of the day to accomplish.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Editor's note: Click HERE for info on HLT Labs, and see also a micro-video .
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "SIGINTers Use Human Language Technology to Great Advantage, Isolate Conversation about Threat to US Official",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "In 2010, the Special Collection Service in Mexico City began using Human Language Technology (HLT) to streamline voice collection and analysis, significantly improving efficiency. By rapidly filtering through large volumes of audio data, HLT helped isolate critical intelligence, such as identifying a conversation related to a bomb threat targeting a U.S. Embassy official, all within minutes instead of hours.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 14 September 2010, authored by Special Collection Service Mexico City. The article describes the operational impact of Human Language Technology translation and selection software deployed at the SCS Mexico City site since May 2010 and highlights a specific operational success on 2 August 2010.\n\nThe productivity impact is stated in concrete terms. In all of 2009 the site issued approximately 20 reports based on voice collection. In just three months with HLT — May through July 2010 — the site produced 33 reports, all selected using HLT software. The site chief compared the capability to having a cadre of extra scanners, allowing language analysts to sift through hundreds of hours of voice cuts in seconds based on keywords or speaker voice recognition.\n\nThe operational case study is the document's most significant content. On 2 August 2010 Mexico City police received a bomb threat specifying the location, make and licence plate of a vehicle where a bomb had reportedly been placed. When police responded they found the vehicle belonged to a US Embassy official. Though no bomb was found, SCS Mexico City immediately began searching for intelligence reflections of the threat, using HLT keyword search on \"bomba\" across more than 1,300 voice conversations from 1 and 2 August. The filter returned 40 results and the third hit was a Mexican Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN) official discussing the bomb threat investigation. The conversation of interest was isolated in under four minutes — a task the article states would previously have taken all of the site's linguists most of a day.\n\nThe document confirms that SCS Mexico City was conducting bulk voice collection against Mexican communications including those of Mexican government security officials, and that HLT keyword and speaker recognition tools were being used operationally to process that collection in near real time.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"Mexico City",
|
||||
"Human Language Technology",
|
||||
"voice intercept",
|
||||
"keyword scanning",
|
||||
"speaker identification",
|
||||
"target discovery",
|
||||
"embassy",
|
||||
"emergency response",
|
||||
"intelligence efficiency",
|
||||
"linguistics"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-09-14",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"HLT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Mexico"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-01-19",
|
||||
"title": "Finding Your Voice: Forget About Siri and Alexa — When It Comes to Voice Identification, the “NSA Reigns Supreme”",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/01/19/voice-recognition-technology-nsa/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Kofman, Ava"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/01/19/siginters-use-human-language-technology-to-great-advantage/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4352000/2010-09-14-SIDToday-SIGINTers-Use-Human-Language.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "02adf74e6a8880ad9ad7a7b4f079152550b8b32b84c67646f40a6b9f1980ef8f",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
|
||||
|
||||
* Web search
|
||||
* Agency-all Emails
|
||||
* SID-all Emails
|
||||
* NSA Rolodex
|
||||
* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
|
||||
* SIDtoday Blog
|
||||
* SIDtoday Series
|
||||
* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* SIDtoday Article
|
||||
* Letter to the Editor
|
||||
* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean?
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
|
||||
|
||||
Run Date: 05/17/2011
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) SIDtoday recently met with Jon Darby (pictured), SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism, to find out what impact the recent killing of Usama bin Laden is likely to have.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Q: (U) In recent years, was Usama bin Laden actually directing al-Qa'ida operations?
|
||||
...or was he just a symbolic or inspirational figure who had no real control over what al-Qa'ida affiliates around the world were doing?
|
||||
|
||||
A: (S//REL) What we're finding from the media seized from his residence is that he was more involved in directing al-Qa'ida operations than we realized. He was definitely more than a symbolic figure. Despite the fact that he was isolated and had to conduct all of his business by courier -- in order to avoid detection -- he was effective as a leader and managed to exert influence. His strategic guidance to al-Qa'ida was to focus on attacking the US.
|
||||
|
||||
2. (U) After 9/11, did NSA ever see reflections of UBL himself or members of his inner circle in SIGINT or did that access shut down completely?
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Our loss of SIGINT access to bin Laden actually occurred prior to 9/11 -- it happened in 1998. After the Embassy bombings in Africa, it was reported in the press that bin Laden was using INMARSAT and we never again saw him in communications. The one possible exception was in late 2001 when we may have gotten intercept of him on the radio in Tora Bora [in Afghanistan]. His #2, Zawahiri, has never been seen in SIGINT. However, people in the al-Qa'ida hierarchy at the level just below that -- the #3 leader and below -- who are responsible for coordinating operations abroad have no choice but to communicate electronically, either personally (sporadically) or via communications cut-outs (preferred), and we have seen reflections of them in SIGINT.
|
||||
|
||||
3. (U) In NSA's assessment, how important is bin Laden's death in terms of weakening al-Qa'ida and terrorism in general?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) We believe this was a very significant blow to al-Qa'ida -- the single biggest blow the US has ever dealt them. Bin Laden was the one-and-only leader of al-Qa'ida, a symbolic and unifying figure. He provided operational guidance to affiliates all over the world.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) It is unclear who will take over that role now that he's gone. Zawahiri comes with baggage -- some members of al-Qa'ida don't like him, and he doesn't have bin Laden's fighter credentials. [Note: Usama bin Laden fought the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980's.] Who will step up? -- it's not clear. There is an opportunity now for us to be assertive in pressing them; they may get careless and leave themselves open for capture.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) We are now mining the media captured during the raid on his residence, looking for lead information. It consists of nearly 3 terabits of data. It will take weeks and months to go through it all. An interagency task force has been put together to analyze the data. NSA is participating on that task force. Here at NSA, the SIGINT Forensics Center and many Product Line analysts both here at Fort Meade and in the extended enterprise are also examining the seized media. There's a lot to go around!
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Is it possible that al-Qa'ida leaders will compete with each other in a struggle for the top leadership spot?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) It is possible. There may be personal animosities between members of the organization that we could possibly exploit to create fissures.
|
||||
|
||||
4. (U) Has the recent success against UBL given us any lessons learned that we can apply in future to other terrorist targets? ... Any revelations?
|
||||
|
||||
(U) There haven't been any major revelations. It was not a surprise that he was living in a populated area -- other al-Qa'ida leaders have been captured in cities in the past. They don't all live in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border].
|
||||
|
||||
(U) I think the biggest lesson from this success is to highlight what we already knew: the power of cooperation across the Intelligence Community. No single source of intelligence alone could have provided enough pieces of the puzzle; it was only through our cooperative efforts that we achieved what we did. SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT all contributed bits and pieces. When SIGINT would run out of leads, HUMINT would provide a clue, and then IMINT would add another key piece of information, and back to SIGINT again. They all played off each other.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) At right: The compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where bin Laden was found.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Then, once the IC had put together a complete picture, we worked seamlessly with the military to bring about the successful raid. We saw the power of a true team effort across the US government. Nowadays we cooperate like this all the time, but for people who didn't understand how far the IC has come since 9/11 in terms of working together, this success was a real eye-opener.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Besides the value of teamwork, another lesson learned is the need to be patient. This was a long and difficult problem and we had to stay focused on it, even though there was no tangible reward for our efforts right away.
|
||||
|
||||
5. (U) Are there any other thoughts you have for the readers?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) We're under no illusions that the death of bin Laden will mean the end of al-Qa'ida... this struggle against violent jihadists could go on for decades. But this was a major blow to al-Qa'ida and it's important for all employees to know that NSA was in the middle of the operation right from the very beginning.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) For example, we played a key role in identifying the compound where bin Laden was found, and during the raid itself we provided force-protection support for the SEALs. In the aftermath of the raid, we have produced SIGINT on the reactions by governments, intelligence services, and terrorists to the operation. We played a critical role... it simply could not have come off without NSA. I am incredibly proud of all the NSAers, past and present, who contributed to this incredible success.
|
||||
|
||||
Comments/Suggestions about this article?
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
Information Owner: [REDACTED], S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
|
||||
Page Publisher: [REDACTED], S0121, [REDACTED], (email)
|
||||
Last Modified: 11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed: 11/10/2012
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "What Does the Death of Usama bin Laden Mean?",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "A 2011 NSA SIDtoday interview with SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism assessing the significance of Osama bin Laden's death, revealing that NSA played a central role in identifying his compound and providing force-protection support during the SEAL raid, while also disclosing that bin Laden had been invisible to SIGINT since 1998.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This internal NSA SIDtoday article, published May 17, 2011, presents a post-raid interview with Jon Darby, SID's Associate Deputy Director for Counterterrorism, offering an immediate internal assessment of the killing of Osama bin Laden and NSA's role in it. Darby reveals that analysis of media seized from bin Laden's Abbottabad compound — nearly 3 terabits of data being processed by an interagency task force including NSA's SIGINT Forensics Center and Product Line analysts at Fort Meade and across the extended enterprise — showed bin Laden was significantly more operationally involved in directing al-Qaeda than previously understood. Despite operating entirely through couriers to avoid detection, he maintained effective strategic leadership and consistently directed al-Qaeda to focus on attacking the United States.\n\nA particularly significant disclosure concerns NSA's SIGINT access to bin Laden himself: the agency lost all signals visibility on him in 1998, following press reporting that he used INMARSAT communications after the African embassy bombings. The article notes that Ayman al-Zawahiri has never appeared in SIGINT at all, while al-Qaeda figures at the #3 level and below — responsible for coordinating external operations — have been observable because they have no choice but to communicate electronically. This candid admission maps the precise boundaries of NSA's counterterrorism SIGINT coverage of al-Qaeda's top leadership over more than a decade.\n\nDarby credits NSA with playing a \"key role\" in identifying the Abbottabad compound and providing force-protection support for the SEAL team during the raid itself, stating the operation \"simply could not have come off without NSA.\" He frames the success as a model of intelligence community cooperation, describing how SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT contributed sequentially and iteratively — each filling gaps left by the others — before handing off to military execution. Looking ahead, Darby expresses cautious optimism about exploiting potential leadership fissures within al-Qaeda following bin Laden's death, notes uncertainty about Zawahiri's ability to unify the organization, and warns that the broader struggle against violent jihadism could continue for decades.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"UBL",
|
||||
"Abbottabad",
|
||||
"SEAL raid",
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"INMARSAT",
|
||||
"1998 embassy bombings",
|
||||
"Tora Bora",
|
||||
"FATA",
|
||||
"courier network",
|
||||
"seized media",
|
||||
"SIGINT Forensics Center",
|
||||
"interagency task force",
|
||||
"force protection",
|
||||
"humint",
|
||||
"imint",
|
||||
"intelligence cooperation",
|
||||
"IC integration",
|
||||
"post-9",
|
||||
"fort meade",
|
||||
"internal newsletter",
|
||||
"leadership changes",
|
||||
"jihad",
|
||||
"strategic assessment",
|
||||
"lessons learned"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-05-17",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
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|
||||
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|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SCQAWK"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Pakistan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"bin Laden, Osama",
|
||||
"Darby, Jon",
|
||||
"al-Zawahiri, Ayman"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-05-18",
|
||||
"title": "What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden Raid",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Currier, Cora",
|
||||
"Fishman, Andrew",
|
||||
"Williams, Margot"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/18/sidtoday-interview-ubl/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2082577/2011-05-17-sidtoday-what-does-the-death-of-usama.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "397fdca7c4874e632f7f9b5d17ab8e6a5c3e04860ef49093967d8c723c8fcde1",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
Welcome! Saturday, 10 Nov 2012
|
||||
|
||||
* Web search
|
||||
* Agency-all Emails
|
||||
* SID-all Emails
|
||||
* NSA Rolodex
|
||||
* SCQAWK: The SID Mailbag
|
||||
* SIDtoday Blog
|
||||
* SIDtoday Series
|
||||
* SIGINT Worldwide VTC
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
* SIDtoday Article
|
||||
* Letter to the Editor
|
||||
* SIGINT-y Social Media Page
|
||||
|
||||
(U) SIGINT Year in Review, November 2011
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: Teresa H. Shea
|
||||
Director, Signals Intelligence Directorate
|
||||
Run Date: 11/22/2011
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Introduction
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Colleagues: As I mark my first anniversary as SIGINT Director, it seems fitting to take a look back on what the SIGINT enterprise accomplished over the past year... and what a year it was! We were challenged with supporting the military campaigns related to the war on terrorism and the crises in the Middle East, natural disasters, global technological changes -- in addition to the ongoing demands of following our enduring targets. Not only did you respond brilliantly to all of these challenges, but you also continued to move forward with long-term enhancements to our capabilities and ways of operating that will pay dividends in the months and years ahead.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) As you read this account of what we accomplished together over the last year, I think you will be reminded that it isn't just one person or group that makes us successful, but rather every element of the Enterprise plays an indispensable role. In addition, we should always remember that we stand on the shoulders of those who have gone before us that built the SIGINT Enterprise. We owe them all a debt of gratitude.
|
||||
|
||||
I. (U) Operations
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) This has been a milestone year in the **war on terrorism**. Certainly the most powerful and enduring accomplishment was the successful strike against Osama Bin Laden. For nearly a decade a dedicated group of SIGINT professionals would not let go of the search, and their persistence paid off in substantive contributions at critical points on the road to Abbottabad. In the end many of you brought your expertise to bear in the final weeks and hours, resulting in a tremendous outcome in our counterterrorism efforts. Even then you didn't rest on your laurels: you played a significant supporting role a few months later in the operations against Atiyah abd-Rahman in Pakistan and Anwar al-Awlaqi in Yemen. Key targets continue to be removed from the battlefield as a result of your outstanding SIGINT contributions.
|
||||
71
data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/metadata.json
Normal file
71
data/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "SIGINT Year in Review, November 2011",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "A 2011 year-in-review message from NSA SIGINT Director Teresa Shea summarizing the directorate's major operational and capability accomplishments over the past year, including SIGINT contributions to the killing of Osama bin Laden, operations against Anwar al-Awlaki and other al-Qaeda figures, and support for military campaigns and crises across the Middle East.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This internal SIDtoday article, published November 22, 2011, is an annual review message from Teresa Shea, Director of the Signals Intelligence Directorate, marking her first anniversary in the role. Writing to the broader SIGINT enterprise, Shea surveys the year's operational highlights across counterterrorism, regional crises, natural disasters, and long-term capability development. The document's most significant operational disclosures concern NSA's direct contributions to a series of lethal counterterrorism operations: the raid that killed Osama bin Laden at Abbottabad, described as the culmination of nearly a decade of persistent SIGINT work; a subsequent operation against senior al-Qaeda figure Atiyah abd-Rahman in Pakistan; and the strike that killed Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen. The framing is explicit — SIGINT contributions led directly to these individuals being \"removed from the battlefield\" — confirming NSA's role as an operational enabler of targeted killing programs.\n\nThe document situates these successes within a broader year of operational pressure, citing simultaneous demands from Middle East crises, natural disasters, and enduring surveillance targets alongside the war on terrorism mission. Shea's message emphasizes the collective nature of the enterprise's success, crediting every element of the SIGINT organization rather than specific units, and frames the year's achievements as building on the institutional legacy of previous generations of SIGINT professionals. The reference to \"long-term enhancements to capabilities and ways of operating\" suggests ongoing investment in collection and processing infrastructure, though specifics are not elaborated in the available excerpt.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"sigint directorate",
|
||||
"year in review",
|
||||
"UBL",
|
||||
"Abbottabad",
|
||||
"targeted killing",
|
||||
"drone strikes",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"war on terrorism",
|
||||
"Al-Qaeda",
|
||||
"middle east",
|
||||
"support operations",
|
||||
"lethal operations",
|
||||
"SIGINT enterprise",
|
||||
"internal newsletter",
|
||||
"leadership message",
|
||||
"capabilities development",
|
||||
"fort meade",
|
||||
"intelligence community",
|
||||
"military support"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-11-22",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SCQAWK"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Yemen",
|
||||
"Pakistan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Shea, Teresa H.",
|
||||
"bin Laden, Osama",
|
||||
"abd-Rahman, Atiyah",
|
||||
"al-Awlaki, Anwar"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-05-18",
|
||||
"title": "What the Snowden Files Say About the Osama Bin Laden Raid",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/05/18/snowden-osama-bin-laden-raid/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Currier, Cora",
|
||||
"Fishman, Andrew",
|
||||
"Williams, Margot"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2015/05/18/sidtoday-2011-review/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2082578/2011-11-22-sidtoday-sigint-year-in-review.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "cd1a825b8d0d5c0265397697bcf7e12860237758188876b76bcf39844553e40e",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Culture Shock: NSA from the Perspective of Summer Interns
|
||||
|
||||
FROM [REDACTED] (left photo) and [REDACTED] (right)
|
||||
NETA2007 (Summer Intelligence Analysis Program) participants
|
||||
Run Date: 07/27/2011
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Editor's intro: What do college students -- whose views of NSA are based on press reports and Hollywood movies -- experience when they report to work at Fort Meade and see the real thing?
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Being idealistic young interns, we were excited about the big find we had just made. We were explaining the trail of SIGINT to our project lead, [REDACTED] so eager to get it all out that we barely stopped for breath between words.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL) "We found this woman, Nadia Lnu, and she's our target's wife, so we're trying to track his movements that way."
|
||||
|
||||
(U) [REDACTED] slowly began to smile as we spoke and finally asked, "Wait... what is her name?"
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) We repeated, "Nadia Lnu, we're not sure if that's how you pronounce it, though."
|
||||
|
||||
(U) [REDACTED] burst out laughing and did not explain himself for what seemed like an eternity. We, the starry-eyed interns, just stared blankly at each other, wondering if this longtime NSA-er had finally cracked. All we could say was, "What? What's wrong?"
|
||||
|
||||
(U) At last he said, "Spell it."
|
||||
|
||||
(U) We responded hesitantly, "L-N-U."
|
||||
|
||||
(U) "That means 'last name unknown.'"
|
||||
|
||||
(U) We fell quiet and we just hung our heads in embarrassment, knowing the story of our rookie acronym mistake would soon be public knowledge to all of S2I6.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) This is just one example of how interns who come to the Agency motivated to soak up all the knowledge they can usually fall flat on their faces on more than one occasion. Acronyms are only one small challenge that interns like us face throughout the 12-week intelligence analysis summer program at the Agency. The NETA2007 Intelligence Analysis Summer Intern program is hosted by the Intelligence Analysis Skill Community (IASC) and the Senior Intelligence Authority (SIA) every year. Twelve undergraduate students are chosen from nearly 800 applicants nationwide, and we spend the summer before our senior year learning about SIGINT tools and working in pairs on real-world analytic projects.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) On the very first day we arrived, we were hit with culture shock. For instance, when we stepped onto the solemnly quiet elevator, an older gentleman turned to us and asked if we were new. We answered yes -- we must have been wearing our insecurities on our sleeves.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) All he replied was, "The only thing you need to know is we don't talk in the elevators; and the extroverts look at other people's shoes." All we could think was what have we gotten ourselves into? Since that incident, every intern in the NETA2007 Summer Intelligence Analysis Program has become acutely aware of how noisy we are in the elevators compared to traditional NSA employees.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) As members of the Intelligence Analysis Program, we expected to come to work this summer and have all the facts and figures readily available at our fingertips. We pictured data flying through cyberspace at supersonic speeds, helping us catch terrorists in the blink of an eye.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Little did we know, you cannot simply hack into someone's Facebook account and steal all their photo albums. You also cannot access any Agency tool you want; but rather, there are hours of coursework and multiple government authorizations involved. Open source research is not as effortless as it seems in the outside world -- especially when you are accustomed to the speed of your stylish MacBook at college.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) We had imagined the formidable NSA Police greeting us every morning at the gate with their large submachine guns. So, there was no disappointment there. However, we also visualized work stations with some of the most advanced computer systems conceivable and high operating speeds, which turns out is not quite the case. So, we pretty much expected the entire Agency to look like the NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center (NTOC). After viewing all the popular media that depicts the NSA as the embodiment of Big Brother, we also did not expect regulations on targeting US persons to be so strict. We kept waiting to hear about the ultra secret -- a mythological level believed to be above top secret -- product line that is permitted to target domestic communications.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Some interns starting out at the NSA expect to be swallowed up by a spooky Big Brother organization but, instead, we find that we are cheerfully welcomed into the government. And, to our surprise, the welcoming committee wasn't wearing trench coats and sunglasses! Interns at the Agency are provided with an immense support network. From the person who interviewed you for the position to your peer mentor and project supervisors, there are plenty of people to turn to. We also have to admit that we did not expect everyone to be so accessible to young interns and willing to help us learn the ropes. NETA2007 also differs from other internship programs because of the way students are encouraged to work together and interact with one another, even outside of work. The Intelligence Analysis Interns develop a deep sense of camaraderie, which improves our overall experience at NSA.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Unlike other undergraduate internships, we are not just sitting in class and fetching coffee for a higher-up employee all summer long. We expected to be let loose to "run barefoot through the ether of raw SIGINT," as the Angry Lawyer from OVSC1800 ("Legal Compliance and Minimization Procedures") would say. Students in the NETA2007 program are exposed to extremely insightful classes that dispel our misconceptions about NSA and teach us how the SIGINT process really operates. We learn about deep-dive research techniques using both open source methods and cutting-edge Agency tools. We work as intelligence analysts for various product lines of our choosing and make a real contribution to their mission. In fact, any office that felt they could use an intern was able to submit a project for consideration and we make it our job to tackle that problem whole-heartedly.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What we are trying to express is that the NSA can be an intimidating place for a young intern. We were initially overwhelmed with a five-page long list of acronyms, a diverse array of tools with baffling names, and a challenge to overcome our assumptions about what we thought the Agency did. However, it is also an extremely rewarding place to work. With ample room for movement throughout different offices and so many diverse targets, a college student thirsting for knowledge would be hard-pressed not to find something that interested them.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) In our opinion, it would be hard to get that rewarding feeling of defending our country anywhere other than the NSA. Sure, we might hide quietly in the background and never be famous, but that feeling of fulfillment from work is hard to replace. And, as [REDACTED] would say, who doesn't love doing the "happy happy joy joy dance of discovery"?
|
||||
|
||||
POC: (U//FOUO) NETA2007, Summer Intelligence Analysis Program
|
||||
Ops 2A, 2A0550, NSTS: 966-2614 / NS: 301-688-1076
|
||||
|
||||
About the Authors:
|
||||
(U) [REDACTED] is an Intelligence Studies major at [REDACTED].
|
||||
[REDACTED] is a Spanish and Chinese major at the [REDACTED]. Both plan to graduate from their respective schools in May of 2012.
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Culture Shock: NSA from the Perspective of Summer Interns",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "Two interns in the 2007 NSA Intelligence Analysis Summer Program share their initial culture shock and misconceptions about the agency, from unrealistic expectations about high-tech tools to the reality of strict regulations and a supportive, collaborative environment.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"internship",
|
||||
"NTOC",
|
||||
"NETA",
|
||||
"Summer Intelligence Analysis Program",
|
||||
"iasc",
|
||||
"Intelligence Analysis Skill Community",
|
||||
"SIA",
|
||||
"Senior Intelligence Authority",
|
||||
"intern"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-07-27",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-05-16",
|
||||
"title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Maass, Peter"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830624-2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830624/2011-7-27-Culture-Shock-NSA-From-the-Perspective.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "717a0683657ec618eb0849a6a1e5949952cb75f00b04970bd87c0395506c9773",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
|
|||
GCHQ
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
# Supporting HMG's Climate Change Ambitions
|
||||
(...or, "A GCO's tales from Cancun")
|
||||
|
||||
27 November – 10 December 2010
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Background
|
||||
|
||||
* International Treaty opened for signature in 1992 as the UNFCCC
|
||||
* Kyoto Protocol agreed in 1997
|
||||
* Defined first commitment period for certain 'developed' countries (2008-12)
|
||||
- It agreed GHG emissions reductions by % of 1990 levels
|
||||
* Second commitment period needed to include commitments for 'developing' countries (a 'KP2')
|
||||
* 192 countries now party to UNFCCC
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Why include Developing Countries?
|
||||
|
||||
In 2010......
|
||||
|
||||
Top 10 economies (by GDP):
|
||||
|
||||
1. USA
|
||||
2. China
|
||||
3. Japan
|
||||
4. India
|
||||
5. Germany
|
||||
6. UK
|
||||
7. Russia
|
||||
8. France
|
||||
9. Brazil
|
||||
10. Italy
|
||||
|
||||
Top 10 CO2 emitters
|
||||
(one unit = 1,000 tonnes)
|
||||
|
||||
USA
|
||||
CHINA
|
||||
RUSSIA
|
||||
JAPAN
|
||||
INDIA
|
||||
GERMANY
|
||||
UK
|
||||
CANADA
|
||||
ITALY
|
||||
MEXICO
|
||||
|
||||
6,000,000
|
||||
5,000,000
|
||||
4,000,000
|
||||
3,000,000
|
||||
2,000,000
|
||||
1,000,000
|
||||
0
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## The Players
|
||||
|
||||
* UK – negotiates as part of EU and plays a leading role
|
||||
* Major developed countries e.g. USA and Canada
|
||||
* Major developing countries – BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, China)
|
||||
* COP hosts (Mexico)
|
||||
* Vulnerable countries – AOSIS, G77
|
||||
* Other influencers e.g. OPEC
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Opposing views and Sticking Points
|
||||
|
||||
* Historic responsibility of developed countries
|
||||
* Emissions reductions seen as a way of slowing growth of emerging powers
|
||||
* Money and technology for developing nations for clean energy, adaptation and mitigation (the Green Fund or „Fast-Start“)
|
||||
* Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)
|
||||
* An agreement binding developed and developing countries
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## The road to Cancun
|
||||
|
||||
* 2007 COP13, Bali: the first time that climate change became a serious intelligence priority – COP13 has to work!
|
||||
* Spring MEF meeting in Paris: our first GCO climate change deployment
|
||||
|
||||
Some lessons learned!
|
||||
|
||||
* 2008 COP14, Poznan: not expected to be a significant gathering
|
||||
* 2009 COP15, Copenhagen or bust (it bust!)
|
||||
|
||||
"The Copenhagen Accord"
|
||||
|
||||
Our first COP climate change GCO deployment
|
||||
|
||||
...a success
|
||||
|
||||
* 2010 COP16, low ambition, low expectation, but hugely important
|
||||
|
||||
The talks must get back on track
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## What's the role for intelligence?
|
||||
|
||||
Political decisions often made in advance
|
||||
|
||||
* What do governments want?
|
||||
* What will they sign up to?
|
||||
* What are the negotiating positions on broad or specific issues?
|
||||
* What are their red lines?
|
||||
* Views about other countries
|
||||
* Who is aligning with who?
|
||||
* Who is lobbying who?
|
||||
* Who are the spoilers?
|
||||
* Are delegates reporting back and getting fresh instructions?
|
||||
* What are they?
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Customers
|
||||
|
||||
* No.10 and Cabinet Office
|
||||
* Department for Energy and Climate Change
|
||||
* FCO
|
||||
- Diplomats
|
||||
- SOSFCA's Special Representative
|
||||
* Department for International Development
|
||||
* Treasury
|
||||
* G20 representatives
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Now...where did I put my sombrero?
|
||||
|
||||
* Why did we decide to send someone to Cancun?
|
||||
- Customers wanted us to be there
|
||||
- High likelihood of relevant, time-sensitive intelligence
|
||||
- First opportunity to show a new ministerial team what we can do
|
||||
* Preparations
|
||||
- Suitable cover within UK delegation
|
||||
- Logistics (kit, rooms, passes, delegate lists, etc)
|
||||
- Introductions with customers
|
||||
- Intelligence requirements
|
||||
- Coordination in HQ
|
||||
* With other teams and SIS
|
||||
* Methodology for delivery
|
||||
* Working patterns
|
||||
* Policy clearance
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Behind the scenes at COP16
|
||||
|
||||
cop16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Oficinas de Delegaciones
|
||||
Delegations Offices
|
||||
|
||||
Oficinas de Delegaciones
|
||||
Delegations Offices
|
||||
|
||||
Sombrero
|
||||
|
||||
1244 - 1255 | 1243 - 1200
|
||||
1144 - 1155 | 1143 - 1100
|
||||
1044 - 1055 | 1043 - 1000
|
||||
|
||||
China
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
UNITED KINGDOM
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Why was Cancun a success?
|
||||
|
||||
* The talks didn't fail and...
|
||||
* Agreed that emissions should peak at 2°C
|
||||
* Anchored emissions reduction pledges from the Copenhagen Accord
|
||||
* Agreed a system of MRV
|
||||
* Green Fund established
|
||||
* Agreed to reduce emissions from deforestation
|
||||
* Set up mechanisms for developed countries to access low carbon technology
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## The future
|
||||
|
||||
* Continue to support negotiations, but...
|
||||
- How are South Africa approaching COP17?
|
||||
- Who is backing Qatar and South Korea in their bids for COP18?
|
||||
- A KP2 is looking unlikely, but...
|
||||
- ...some kind of multi-stage, bolt on agreement is probably achievable
|
||||
- A low carbon economy through efficiency and new technology could help achieve climate change goals...good for the economy and probably trade
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## UK Customers
|
||||
|
||||
* Department for Energy and Climate Change
|
||||
- International negotiations
|
||||
- Domestic and European policies (energy efficiency, achieving a low-carbon economy; meeting 2020 obligations)
|
||||
* Foreign and Commonwealth Office
|
||||
- International diplomacy
|
||||
- Secretary of State's Special Envoy
|
||||
* Ministry of Defence
|
||||
- Regional instability
|
||||
- Resource security (water, food, land)
|
||||
* Department for International Development
|
||||
- Overseas aid
|
||||
- Emergency relief
|
||||
* Her Majesty's Treasury
|
||||
- The Green Fund
|
||||
* Department for Business Innovation & Skills
|
||||
- Supporting UK inward/outward investment and international trade
|
||||
- Developing low carbon technologies
|
||||
- Protecting intellectual property
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## New challenges for intelligence
|
||||
|
||||
* Policy questions
|
||||
|
||||
Fewer disputing science – climate change happening and almost certainly man-made, so...
|
||||
|
||||
- Is low carbon ambition driving government and investor decisions in economies?
|
||||
- Is UNFCCC still important or is private capital shifting to low carbon because costs and scarcity of resource make sense?
|
||||
- Are governments making the link between extreme weather and high commodity prices?
|
||||
- Are governments planning for instability or mass migrations caused by water/food scarcity, lack of natural resources and land-use change?
|
||||
|
||||
* Competing intelligence priorities
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
GCHQ
|
||||
SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
|
||||
COP16 méxico 2010
|
||||
|
||||
## Questions?
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Sombrero Tequila
|
||||
```
|
||||
72
data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/metadata.json
Normal file
72
data/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small2/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Supporting HMG’s Climate Change Ambitions (… or, “A GCO’s tales from Cancun”)",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This joint GCHQ/MI6 presentation from February 2011 documents the process of international climate change negotiations becoming a “serious intelligence priority” for the UK.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"climate change",
|
||||
"climate negotiations",
|
||||
"UN Climate Change Conference",
|
||||
"climate summit",
|
||||
"Cancun",
|
||||
"Copenhagen",
|
||||
"UNFCCC",
|
||||
"Kyoto Protocol",
|
||||
"united nations",
|
||||
"diplomacy",
|
||||
"diplomatic surveillance",
|
||||
"economic intelligence",
|
||||
"intelligence requirements",
|
||||
"intelligence priorities",
|
||||
"energy",
|
||||
"SIS",
|
||||
"UK delegation",
|
||||
"G20"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ, SIS",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-02",
|
||||
"classification": [],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Brazil",
|
||||
"Canada",
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"France",
|
||||
"Germany",
|
||||
"India",
|
||||
"Italy",
|
||||
"Japan",
|
||||
"Korea",
|
||||
"Mexico",
|
||||
"Qatar",
|
||||
"Russia",
|
||||
"South Africa",
|
||||
"United Kingdom",
|
||||
"United States",
|
||||
"South Korea"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Dagbladet Information",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-01",
|
||||
"title": "Disguised as Climate Negotiators",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.information.dk/udland/2014/11/disguised-as-climate-negotiators",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Geist, Anton",
|
||||
"Gjerding, Sebastian",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1350176/20110405-cancun-amp-reqs-redacted-small.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "5ca191299219e43006cd91a224e23fc80d68ad5cdc2cd82f944f141bfd94f0b4",
|
||||
"pages": 23
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET STRAP 1
|
||||
|
||||
| NAME | WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT? | EQUIPMENT / DESCRIPTION |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| RT-RG | A PROGRAMME. To provide direct support to the Global War on Terrorism through the provision of real-time information and intelligence support to 'find, fix and finish' operations around the world. The success of RT-RG in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom led to an expansion of the programme to support operations in Korea and Afghanistan. The success of these deployments will be crucial to the adoption of the RTRG principles into mainstream Sigint doctrine. | Each deployment of RT-RG is tailored to the local environment with systems and processes based on the telecommunications technologies prevalent in the region. As such the approach is data-centric rather than system-centric; each instance of RT-RG is intended to be unique. RT-RG is positioned as an edge node within the overall Sigint architecture. To achieve comprehensive real-time coverage of a region RT-RG relies upon an array of sensors streaming full-take collection into a forward-deployed regional data repository in parallel with offline forwarding to national systems. To fully exploit voice intercept RTRG is trialling new applications to perform keyword based selection and alerting. RT-RG provides access to tactical data sources in theatre via semi automated and manual data ingest into a local RT-RG repository. National sources including events databases and all-source (DOD, CIA, NSA) reporting are also made available for authorised analysts through a national/tactical gateway. Federated query tools support multiple simultaneous cross-referencing of all these data sources, tactical and national, against incoming real-time intercept. These facilities offer huge productivity gains for analysts in rapidly assembling a complete, fully informed picture of their target. |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| ANARCHIST | Conventional Site | Mt Troodos Cyprus |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
|
||||
2 of 9
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exempt on under other UK information regsitration. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ or [REDACTED]
|
||||
<TOP SECRET STRAP 1>
|
||||
OC B TP INFO SUMMARY AS AT27 JUN 11
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Summary of GCHQ Info Wrt OC TSS1 Excerpt",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "GCHQ Summary of RTRG (or RT-TG). The RTRG program provides real-time intelligence support for global operations, particularly in the context of the Global War on Terrorism, using tailored systems that integrate multiple data sources to enhance target identification and analysis. The success of RT-RG in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom led to an expansion of the programme to support operations in Korea and Afghanistan, with new applications for keyword-based selection and alerting on voice intercept being trialled.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET STRAP1 GCHQ document — an excerpt from an OC TSS1 (Operations Centre Top Secret Strap 1) information summary dated 27 June 2011. The document is a reference table listing collection programmes and sites with brief functional descriptions and equipment notes, with the majority of entries redacted in the published version.\n\nTwo entries are visible. The RT-RG entry frames the programme explicitly in the context of the Global War on Terrorism and its \"find, fix and finish\" mission. The GCHQ description confirms RT-RG was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and subsequently expanded to Korea and Afghanistan, with GCHQ noting that success of these deployments would be crucial to adoption of RT-RG principles into mainstream SIGINT doctrine. The technical description emphasises RT-RG's data-centric rather than system-centric architecture — each deployment tailored to local telecommunications technologies, positioned as an edge node within the broader SIGINT architecture, with full-take sensors streaming into a forward-deployed regional data repository in parallel with offline forwarding to national systems. Voice keyword selection and alerting capabilities were being trialled. A national/tactical gateway provided access to events databases and all-source reporting from DoD, CIA and NSA for authorised analysts alongside tactical data sources.\n\nThe ANARCHIST entry identifies a conventional collection site at Mount Troodos in Cyprus — a long-established signals intelligence facility on the highest peak in Cyprus operated jointly by GCHQ and NSA, well positioned to intercept communications across the Eastern Mediterranean, Middle East and into the former Soviet Union. Its identification here as a \"conventional site\" distinguishes it from other entry types in the table which are redacted.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"operation iraqi freedom",
|
||||
"real-time intelligence",
|
||||
"voice intercept",
|
||||
"tactical data",
|
||||
"federated query",
|
||||
"national systems",
|
||||
"all-source analysis",
|
||||
"keyword search",
|
||||
"data repository",
|
||||
"intelligence analysis",
|
||||
"tactical gateway",
|
||||
"productivity gains",
|
||||
"edge network access",
|
||||
"telecommunications",
|
||||
"Mount Troodos",
|
||||
"find fix finish",
|
||||
"full-take collection",
|
||||
"forward deployment"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-11-07",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP 1",
|
||||
"genre": "report",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"RT-RG",
|
||||
"ANARCHIST"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Cyprus",
|
||||
"North Korea",
|
||||
"South Korea",
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Iraq"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2019-05-29",
|
||||
"title": "Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/nsa-data-afghanistan-iraq-mexico-border/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/05/29/gchq-summary-of-rtrg/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6025731/20111107-Summary-of-GCHQ-Info-Wrt-OC-TSS1-Excerpt.pdf"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "NRK",
|
||||
"date_published": "2019-05-29",
|
||||
"title": "Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.nrk.no/dokumentar/xl/norges-hemmelige-krig-i-afghanistan-1.14539055",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Skille, Øyvind Bye",
|
||||
"Døvik, Olav",
|
||||
"Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard",
|
||||
"Fjørtoft, Martin"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "24cc8db4438007af33468e4cd1d5ac11575f47513d516064847bc9f0dbc04740",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Number 9... Number 9...
|
||||
FROM: the SIDtoday Editor
|
||||
Run Date: 03/30/2012
|
||||
|
||||
(U) There are nine justices on the Supreme Court... nine innings in baseball... the " curse of the ninth " [symphony] in classical music... and we can add one more notable "nine" to the list: SID today is about to celebrate its ninth anniversary! (The publication was launched on March 31, 2003.)
|
||||
|
||||
(U) To mark this occasion, we present the tongue-in-cheek **top 9 reasons to read SIDtoday** :
|
||||
|
||||
9. Avoid giving that deer-in-the-headlights look at the office staff meeting when someone refers to a recently posted SID today article and you have no clue what they are talking about.
|
||||
|
||||
slice of vanilla birthday cake
|
||||
|
||||
8. One of these days they'll slip up and publish an article divulging the super-secret SIGINT handshake.
|
||||
|
||||
7. You might find out what those shadowy people on the other side of the partition are really up to.
|
||||
|
||||
6. In her next column, Zelda might address a situation happening in your own office!
|
||||
|
||||
5. Be the first to find out about limited-seating events, so you can quickly snag your spot.
|
||||
|
||||
4. You can see pictures of the high-level managers. That way, if a couple of them happen to come into your office, you won't ask them what their business is here and threaten to call security.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Look busy while you are drinking your morning coffee.
|
||||
|
||||
2. It's more interesting than reading DRYINGPAINT today .
|
||||
|
||||
1. Since there's no centralized SID water cooler (and the beer machines in the cafeteria are long gone), it's how you find out what's going on!
|
||||
|
||||
(U) But seriously, we extend our sincere thanks to everyone who has contributed an article (all 4,543 of them) to SID today these past nine years. Bravo!
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
44
data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/metadata.json
Normal file
44
data/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Number 9... Number 9...",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "SIDtoday is celebrating its ninth anniversary, reflecting on its history and offering a playful \"top 9 reasons to read SIDtoday,\" ranging from staying informed at staff meetings to discovering secret SIGINT handshakes. The publication has played an essential role in keeping the community connected with its regular updates. The document is notable for revealing that in the first nine years of SIDtoday’s life, more than 4,500 stories were posted on the SIDtoday website.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"office culture",
|
||||
"community",
|
||||
"information sharing",
|
||||
"publication history",
|
||||
"staff meetings",
|
||||
"humor"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2012-03-30",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"UNCLASSIFIED"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-05-16",
|
||||
"title": "What It’s Like to Read the NSA’s Newspaper for Spies",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/05/16/what-its-like-to-read-the-nsas-newspaper-for-spies/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Maass, Peter"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2830625-2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2830625/2012-03-30-SIDToday-Number-9-Number-9.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"archive_comment": "The document is not found from The Intercept's SIDtoday archive. The document is only linked in the article.",
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "1f97a5f7218ae7cbf84407beb8d5dee2f6675527653c2ad617b0fef8c2795afd",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
|||
(U//FOUO) MYSTIC's SHELLTRUMPET provides Metadata Gateway for Several SSO systems to RT-RG Texas
|
||||
By [REDACTED] on 2012-06-20 1459
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//NF) Over the course of May/June 2012, SHELLTRUMPET, in close coordination with Real Time-Regional Gateway (RT-RG) and various Special Source Operations
|
||||
(SSO) programs, has provided RT-RG Texas with new accesses to metadata. Specifically, SHELLTRUMPET has enabled DANCINGOASIS and SPINNERET metadata to flow to RT-RG Texas by obfuscating the source information and filtering out
|
||||
metadata from countries of no interest to that area of responsibility (AOR). As a result, even though the two mentioned accesses are generating well over 1B records per day, SHELLTRUMPET reduces this to just ~600M/day for RT-RG Texas ingest. These two accesses now provide RT-RG Texas with 85% of their input volume, which contains
|
||||
60% of the hits on their targets. This week, SHELLTRUMPET will add FAIRVIEW to the flow, which undoubtedly will spike SSO's contributions for RT-RG Texas even higher.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) POC: [REDACTED], MYSTIC Tech Director, [REDACTED].
|
||||
65
data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/metadata.json
Normal file
65
data/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "SSO News on MYSTIC SHELLTRUMPET for June 20, 2012",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "Internal NSA memo describing how SHELLTRUMPET, part of the MYSTIC program, works in conjunction with Real Time-Regional Gateway (RT-RG) and various Special Source Operations (SSO) programs to provide metadata access for RT-RG Texas. The system obfuscates source information and filters irrelevant metadata, enabling RT-RG Texas to efficiently process metadata from DANCINGOASIS and SPINNERET.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This SSO newsletter dated 20 June 2012 describes SHELLTRUMPET's role as a metadata gateway between SSO collection programmes and RT-RG Texas.\n\nSHELLTRUMPET is identified as a component of the MYSTIC programme that acts as an intermediary between large-scale SSO collection systems and RT-RG Texas, performing two key functions: obfuscating source information and filtering out metadata from countries outside RT-RG Texas's area of responsibility. This filtering function is operationally significant — it means RT-RG Texas receives a pre-processed subset of collection rather than raw bulk data, with the source programme identity concealed from the downstream system.\n\nThe scale figures are notable. DANCINGOASIS and SPINNERET together were generating well over one billion metadata records per day at time of writing. SHELLTRUMPET's country filtering reduced this to approximately 600 million records per day for RT-RG Texas ingest. Despite this reduction, these two accesses provided 85% of RT-RG Texas's total input volume and contained 60% of hits on their targets — indicating highly efficient pre-selection. FAIRVIEW was scheduled to be added to the SHELLTRUMPET flow that same week, expected to spike SSO contributions further.\n\nThe document connects several previously identified programmes. DANCINGOASIS is named as one of the SSO accesses whose metadata SHELLTRUMPET sends to RT-RG Texas. SPINNERET is a previously unnamed SSO programme. FAIRVIEW is the major SSO programme providing access through a US telecommunications carrier.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"data processing",
|
||||
"filtering",
|
||||
"source obfuscation"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2012-06-20",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"MYSTIC",
|
||||
"SHELLTRUMPET",
|
||||
"RT-RG",
|
||||
"DANCINGOASIS",
|
||||
"SPINNERET",
|
||||
"FAIRVIEW",
|
||||
"SSO"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2019-05-29",
|
||||
"title": "Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended Up on the Mexico Border",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/nsa-data-afghanistan-iraq-mexico-border/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2019/05/29/sso-news-on-mystic-shelltrumpet-for-june-20-2012/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/6061130/2012-06-20-SSO-News-MYSTIC-S-SHELLTRUMPET.pdf"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "NRK",
|
||||
"date_published": "2019-05-29",
|
||||
"title": "Norges hemmelige krig i Afghanistan",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.nrk.no/dokumentar/xl/norges-hemmelige-krig-i-afghanistan-1.14539055",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Skille, Øyvind Bye",
|
||||
"Døvik, Olav",
|
||||
"Hansen, Ståle Ellingsgard",
|
||||
"Fjørtoft, Martin"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "048caf26c1b9e9ac07cf268daf8d76989d25dc369c7df48be67ffad2d7bfc330",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
SIDtoday
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Attention, SIGINT Analysts: E.O. 12333 Transit Communications -- What Are They?
|
||||
|
||||
FROM: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Deputy Chief, SID Oversight & Compliance (SV)
|
||||
Run Date: 11/07/2012
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) Introduction: This article clarifies the difference between NSA's longstanding authority to collect "transit communications" and FISA Amendment Act (FAA) Section 702 authorizations.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) In 1988, NSA received an "extra" measure of authority to collect communications contained in specific Executive Order 12333 wire communications obtained from service-provider accesses located in the United States. This extra measure of E.O. 12333 authority allows NSA to collect communications that transit the United States from a source located outside of the United States to a destination location also outside of the United States. Based on predetermined selection criteria, service providers identify and forward foreign communications transiting their networks for subsequent processing and selection. This supports transit content collection as well as transit-authorized bulk metadata.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) This E.O. 12333 transit communications authority is different from the FISA Amendments Act Section 702 authorizations, which authorize NSA to acquire communications based on specific selectors about intelligence targets associated with a foreign power, foreign territory, foreign government, foreign-based political organization, individual(s) or group(s) engaged in international terrorism, or individuals or groups engaged in proliferating weapons of mass destruction.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) The Office of Special Source Operations (SSO - S353) within SID accesses and exploits the E.O. 12333 transit communications, which include DNR and DNI (limited) traffic. There are three transit programs currently collecting E.O. 12333 transit communications: US-990, US-983, and US-3273. Data collected under SIGAD US-3251 prior to and including 17 May 2012 also falls under transit authority guidelines.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL) Analysts working with E.O. 12333 transit communications data: please review an informative slide deck, recently updated by SID and OGC, by clicking HERE or by accessing the S2 Analysis and Production website and selecting the "Transit Training Information" hyperlink. (Note: You must have an NSA TOP SECRET PKI certificate in order to access these slides.)
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) POC for this article: [REDACTED] ([REDACTED]), Communications Lead, SV.
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Attention, SIGINT Analysts: E.O. 12333 Transit Communications -- What Are They?",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "This SIDtoday article clarifies the difference between NSA's longstanding authority to collect \"transit communications\" and FISA Amendment Act (FAA) Section 702 authorizations. The Office of Special Source Operations (SSO) manages these transit communications under various programs like US-990, US-983, and US-3273.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 7 November 2012, authored by the Deputy Chief of SID Oversight and Compliance (SV). The article clarifies the legal basis and operational scope of NSA's transit communications collection authority for SIGINT analysts working with this data.\n\nThe article describes an authority granted to NSA in 1988 under Executive Order 12333 — separate from and additional to FISA authorities — permitting collection of foreign communications that transit the United States from an overseas source to an overseas destination. Under this authority, service providers with access points located in the United States identify and forward foreign transit communications to NSA based on predetermined selection criteria, supporting both transit content collection and transit-authorised bulk metadata collection.\n\nThe article draws a clear distinction between this E.O. 12333 transit authority and FAA Section 702 authorisations. Section 702 authorises collection based on specific selectors associated with identified intelligence targets — foreign powers, foreign territories, foreign governments, political organisations, terrorist groups or WMD proliferators. Transit authority by contrast applies to the communications themselves based on their routing characteristics rather than to identified targets, enabling bulk collection of foreign-to-foreign traffic transiting US infrastructure without selector-based targeting.\n\nThe Office of Special Source Operations (SSO, S353) within SID is identified as the office accessing and exploiting E.O. 12333 transit communications. Four SIGADs are named as operating under this authority: US-990, US-983, US-3273, and US-3251 — with US-3251 having operated under transit authority guidelines only up to and including 17 May 2012, suggesting a change in the legal basis or operational status of that programme after that date.\n\nThe document is significant for confirming the existence of a bulk collection authority predating FISA amendments entirely — rooted in a 1988 executive order — that operates through US-based service provider access points to collect foreign-to-foreign transit traffic, and for naming specific SSO programmes operating under that authority.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"transit communications",
|
||||
"Section 702",
|
||||
"bulk metadata",
|
||||
"foreign communications",
|
||||
"SSO",
|
||||
"data collection",
|
||||
"EO 12333",
|
||||
"FAA",
|
||||
"foreign to foreign",
|
||||
"service provider"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2012-11-07",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SSO"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-06-25",
|
||||
"title": "The Wiretap Rooms: The NSA’s Hidden Spy Hubs in Eight U.S. Cities",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/att-internet-nsa-spy-hubs/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/06/26/eo-12333-transit-communications-from-sidtoday/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4560936/2012-11-07-SIDToday-Attention-SIGINT-Analysts-EO.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "e4165135ffda45760d7f96180536d8be9e9c37b112fcc1168289a7e8628c7131",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,194 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
# (S//SI//REL) Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept (LI) Roundtable
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED] S31122
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (U) Definition
|
||||
|
||||
Lawful Intercept (LI) – obtaining communications network data by legal authority for analysis or evidence
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
NWO/AP/SvP's domain
|
||||
LEA
|
||||
domain
|
||||
NWO/AP/SvP's
|
||||
administration
|
||||
function
|
||||
HI1
|
||||
intercept related
|
||||
information (IRI)
|
||||
Network
|
||||
Internal
|
||||
Functions
|
||||
IRI mediation
|
||||
function
|
||||
HI2
|
||||
content of
|
||||
IIF
|
||||
communication (CC)
|
||||
INI
|
||||
CC mediation
|
||||
function
|
||||
HI3
|
||||
LEMF
|
||||
LI handover interface HI
|
||||
|
||||
IIF: internal interception function
|
||||
INI:internal network interface
|
||||
HI1: administrative information
|
||||
HI2: intercept related information
|
||||
HI3: content of communication
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (U) LI Standards
|
||||
|
||||
* CALEA (US)
|
||||
* ETSI (European)
|
||||
* SORM (Russian)
|
||||
* Other
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (TS//SI//REL) Countries of Interest
|
||||
|
||||
* Pakistan
|
||||
* Afghanistan
|
||||
* Iran
|
||||
* Iraq
|
||||
* Yemen
|
||||
* Syria
|
||||
* China
|
||||
* Egypt
|
||||
* Algeria
|
||||
* Mexico
|
||||
* Indonesia
|
||||
* UAE
|
||||
* Saudi Arabia
|
||||
* Russia
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (S//SI//REL) XKS Fingerprints (~60)
|
||||
|
||||
* Aqsacom
|
||||
* ATIS
|
||||
* Ericsson
|
||||
* ETSI
|
||||
* Huawei
|
||||
* Motorola
|
||||
* Nokia
|
||||
* Siemens
|
||||
* Trovicor
|
||||
* Utimaco
|
||||
* ZTE
|
||||
* GENERIC
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (U//FOUO) Access Methods
|
||||
|
||||
* FORNSAT
|
||||
* Microwave (F6)
|
||||
* Special Source Operations (SSO)
|
||||
* Tailored Access Operations (TAO)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (S//SI//REL) Taplists
|
||||
|
||||
* Developing advanced analytics to determine patterns in numbers being tasked
|
||||
* Creating database to store LI-related information
|
||||
* Discovering informal tasking
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (S//SI//REL) Mapping Networks
|
||||
|
||||
* Telecommunication and Internet Service Providers in a region
|
||||
* LI vendors/service providers
|
||||
* IP addresses/ports of usage
|
||||
* Likely transmission medium
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (S//SI//REL) Processing Solution
|
||||
|
||||
* KITTYBINGE
|
||||
* TAO custom solutions
|
||||
* STARPROC
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (S//SI//REL) Types of LI
|
||||
|
||||
* Telecommunication
|
||||
* Internet
|
||||
* Differentiating between regular voice/Internet traffic from tasked traffic. Protocol indications?
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (S//SI//REL) LI Pod
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
## (S//SI//REL) LI Discussion Topics
|
||||
|
||||
* Discovery
|
||||
* Access Methods
|
||||
* Taplist Analytics
|
||||
* Corporate Database
|
||||
* Corporate Processing Solution
|
||||
* Other Issues/Roadblocks
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
99
data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/metadata.json
Normal file
99
data/2012-lawful-intercept-redacted2/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept (LI) Roundtable",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "Top-secret PowerPoint presentation, \"Exploiting Foreign Lawful Intercept Roundtable,\" highlights the agency’s strategy to exploit vulnerabilities in lawful intercept systems from telecom companies, such as Ericsson, Motorola, and Nokia, in countries like Mexico, Indonesia, and Egypt. The presentation also discusses NSA's use of various \"Fingerprints\" for identifying data and its collaboration with industry players and foreign lawful intercept systems.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY presentation by S31122 on exploiting foreign Lawful Intercept infrastructure, describing a Five Eyes roundtable on the topic. The document is significant for confirming that NSA systematically targeted the lawful intercept infrastructure of foreign governments — meaning NSA was intercepting the same communications that foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies were themselves intercepting under their own domestic legal authority, effectively piggybacking on foreign surveillance systems.\n\nThe definition slide establishes the technical framework. Lawful Intercept involves obtaining communications network data by legal authority, with a standardised architecture comprising internal interception functions, mediation functions and handover interfaces (HI1 for administrative information, HI2 for intercept-related information and HI3 for content of communication) connecting network operators to Law Enforcement Agency Monitoring Facilities. The standards landscape covers CALEA in the US, ETSI in Europe, SORM in Russia and various other national frameworks — each representing a different technical implementation that NSA needed to fingerprint and process.\n\nThe fourteen countries of interest are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, China, Egypt, Algeria, Mexico, Indonesia, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia — essentially the full priority target list for NSA's counterterrorism, counterproliferation and geopolitical collection programmes.\n\nApproximately 60 XKeyscore fingerprints had been developed to identify LI-related traffic, covering twelve named vendors: Aqsacom, ATIS, Ericsson, ETSI, Huawei, Motorola, Nokia, Siemens, Trovicor, Utimaco, ZTE and a GENERIC fingerprint. The vendor list is notable — it covers the dominant global suppliers of lawful intercept infrastructure, meaning NSA had fingerprinted the LI systems of the majority of the world's telecommunications networks.\n\nFour access methods are listed: FORNSAT, Microwave (F6), Special Source Operations and TAO. The analytical work described includes developing taplist analytics to identify patterns in numbers being tasked by foreign governments for interception, creating a corporate database for LI-related information, discovering informal tasking, and mapping telecommunications and internet service providers alongside their LI vendors, IP addresses and likely transmission media. Processing solutions named are KITTYBINGE, TAO custom solutions and STARPROC.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"lawful intercept",
|
||||
"telecommunications",
|
||||
"vulnerabilities",
|
||||
"Aqsacom",
|
||||
"ATIS",
|
||||
"Ericsson",
|
||||
"ETSI",
|
||||
"Huawei",
|
||||
"Motorola",
|
||||
"Nokia",
|
||||
"Siemens",
|
||||
"Trovicor",
|
||||
"Utimaco",
|
||||
"ZTE",
|
||||
"GENERIC",
|
||||
"SSO",
|
||||
"Tailored Access Operations",
|
||||
"metadata",
|
||||
"CALEA",
|
||||
"SORM",
|
||||
"Microwave (F6)",
|
||||
"Internet Service Providers",
|
||||
"Special Collection Service",
|
||||
"microwave",
|
||||
"FORNSAT",
|
||||
"taplist analytics"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2012-01-01",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"KITTYBINGE",
|
||||
"STARPROC",
|
||||
"XKEYSCORE",
|
||||
"MICROWAVE",
|
||||
"SSO"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Iran",
|
||||
"Iraq",
|
||||
"Yemen",
|
||||
"Syria",
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"Egypt",
|
||||
"Algeria",
|
||||
"Mexico",
|
||||
"Indonesia",
|
||||
"United Arab Emirates",
|
||||
"Saudi Arabia",
|
||||
"Russia"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-09-28",
|
||||
"title": "A Death in Athens",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/09/28/death-athens-rogue-nsa-operation/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Bamford, James"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Petropoulos, Aggelos",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Kathimerini",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-09-29",
|
||||
"title": "Americans and Greeks started the 2004 wiretaps together",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.ekathimerini.com/in-depth/special-report/202026/americans-and-greeks-started-the-2004-wiretaps-together/#firstPage",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Petropoulos, Aggelos"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "46f23d8e60536eeaa52757421389f586dc6ff4b031668676a538ea76bc677083",
|
||||
"pages": 12
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load diff
135
data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/metadata.json
Normal file
135
data/20150323-CBC-CSEC_Cyber_Threat_Capabilities/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "CSEC Cyber Threat Capabilities",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document details CSEC’s full-spectrum cyber operations architecture, integrating SIGINT and IT Security to conduct both defensive and offensive activities under the guise of “information superiority.” While early sections emphasize detection, anomaly analysis, and collaboration with Five Eyes partners, later portions reveal active measures including network infiltration (implant deployment), command-and-control tracking, traffic manipulation and redirection, DNS interference, and potential disruption or deception operations—illustrating CSEC’s capacity not only to defend Canadian networks but also to surveil, exploit, and influence foreign and domestic digital infrastructure.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"CSEC",
|
||||
"CSE",
|
||||
"ITS",
|
||||
"cyber threat",
|
||||
"anomaly detection",
|
||||
"Computer Network Exploitation",
|
||||
"Computer Network Attack",
|
||||
"offensive cyber operations",
|
||||
"network compromise",
|
||||
"implants",
|
||||
"malware analysis",
|
||||
"deception",
|
||||
"false flags",
|
||||
"traffic manipulation",
|
||||
"traffic redirection",
|
||||
"DNS",
|
||||
"DNS attacks",
|
||||
"command and control",
|
||||
"botnets",
|
||||
"fast flux botnets",
|
||||
"malware cyber situational awareness",
|
||||
"metadata analysis",
|
||||
"deep packet inspection",
|
||||
"Five Eyes",
|
||||
"information superiority",
|
||||
"threat tracking",
|
||||
"counterintelligence",
|
||||
"defensive cyber",
|
||||
"dynamic defense",
|
||||
"network monitoring",
|
||||
"honeypot",
|
||||
"passive SIGINT",
|
||||
"host-based defense",
|
||||
"tipping",
|
||||
"cross-domain operations",
|
||||
"supply chain",
|
||||
"OPSEC",
|
||||
"cybersecurity",
|
||||
"government networks",
|
||||
"adversary networks",
|
||||
"exploitation",
|
||||
"mitigation",
|
||||
"cyber analytics",
|
||||
"joint capabilities",
|
||||
"international collaboration",
|
||||
"covert network monitoring",
|
||||
"IP blacklisting",
|
||||
"traffic quarantine",
|
||||
"SIGINT event store",
|
||||
"data repository",
|
||||
"metadata repositories",
|
||||
"repositories",
|
||||
"protocol analysis",
|
||||
"cryptanalysis",
|
||||
"threat assessment",
|
||||
"tradecraft",
|
||||
"covert overlay networks",
|
||||
"adaptive tradecraft",
|
||||
"network defense"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "CSE",
|
||||
"date_created": "",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO FVEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO FVEY",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"EONBLUE",
|
||||
"CYBERDMZ",
|
||||
"SEEDSPHERE",
|
||||
"PHOTONICPRISM",
|
||||
"SPECIALSOURCE",
|
||||
"SUPERDRAKE",
|
||||
"DARKSPACE",
|
||||
"QUANTUM",
|
||||
"MANDATE",
|
||||
"STREAMING SENTRY",
|
||||
"SSO",
|
||||
"TKB",
|
||||
"COVENANT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Canada",
|
||||
"North Korea",
|
||||
"Switzerland",
|
||||
"Italy",
|
||||
"Japan",
|
||||
"Austria",
|
||||
"Hong Kong"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "CBC News",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Seglins, Dave",
|
||||
"Hildebrandt, Amber",
|
||||
"Pereira, Michael",
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1690224/doc-6-cyber-threat-capabilities.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "b3ab730e61527deaccbcbde7c23bf035f08c2d32743c37a0fd8844ae48182806",
|
||||
"pages": 46
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load diff
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,493 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
|
||||
* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
|
||||
* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
|
||||
* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
|
||||
* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
1
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
?
|
||||
Selection and Filtering
|
||||
A
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Processing and Enrichment
|
||||
Protocol Analysis
|
||||
Crypt Attack
|
||||
Data Repositories
|
||||
Network Analysis
|
||||
Cyber Analysis
|
||||
GoC
|
||||
S.16
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
GOC Intelligence
|
||||
CSIS Counter Intelligence
|
||||
TS SEYES Mitigation
|
||||
Knowledge Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
1. IT Security
|
||||
2. COVENANT
|
||||
3. Special Source
|
||||
4. 5-Eyes Network
|
||||
5. CNE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
|
||||
|
||||
* Globally pervasive threat
|
||||
* Covered by 5-Eyes network
|
||||
* Utilizing encryption
|
||||
* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
|
||||
* Abusing telecommunications protocols
|
||||
* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
|
||||
* Communicate using foreign languages
|
||||
* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
|
||||
* Constantly changing modus operandi
|
||||
* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
|
||||
* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
|
||||
* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
|
||||
* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
|
||||
* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
|
||||
|
||||
* CSEC elements working as one...
|
||||
* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
|
||||
* monitors health and status of government networks
|
||||
* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
|
||||
SEEDSPHERE
|
||||
is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
|
||||
and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
|
||||
|
||||
Mini-Feed
|
||||
|
||||
Today
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
|
||||
* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
|
||||
|
||||
Yesterday
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
|
||||
|
||||
Last Week
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
|
||||
|
||||
### The Wall
|
||||
|
||||
SIENNABLUE wrote:
|
||||
すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
|
||||
てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
|
||||
ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
|
||||
|
||||
See All Photos of Me (230)
|
||||
See All Friends (23)
|
||||
Edit My Profile
|
||||
Share +
|
||||
I am online now
|
||||
|
||||
Friends
|
||||
23 Friends
|
||||
See All
|
||||
DIESELRATTLE
|
||||
SIENNABLUE
|
||||
DOWNGRADE
|
||||
|
||||
Places I've Been (125,234)
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Groups
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
|
||||
lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
|
||||
underground
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
|
||||
|
||||
* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
|
||||
* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
|
||||
* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Cluster throughput (file system)
|
||||
|
||||
400 Mb/s
|
||||
300 Mb/s
|
||||
200 Mb/s
|
||||
100 Mb/s
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
Inbound Outbound
|
||||
|
||||
CPU usage
|
||||
|
||||
100%
|
||||
80%
|
||||
60%
|
||||
40%
|
||||
20%
|
||||
0%
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
System User Total
|
||||
|
||||
764.8 Mb/s
|
||||
611.9 Mb/s
|
||||
458.9 Mb/s
|
||||
305.9 Mb/s
|
||||
153 Mb/s
|
||||
06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
|
||||
|
||||
* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
|
||||
* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
|
||||
|
||||
* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
|
||||
* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
|
||||
* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
|
||||
* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
|
||||
* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
|
||||
* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
|
||||
* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
|
||||
* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
|
||||
|
||||
Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
|
||||
|
||||
1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
7
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Passive Cyber Threat Detection Platform - EONBLUE
|
||||
* Currently deployed alongside traditional DNI Collection (SPECIALSOURCE, Warranted Access, FORNSAT, etc)
|
||||
* Packet Processing capability tailored to Cyber built over a 6+ year period
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Tracking (Deep Packet Inspection signatures for 'known' intrusions)
|
||||
* Cyber Threat Discovery (Anomaly Detection for discovering unknown intrusions)
|
||||
* In 2009 an average of 115,000 Traffic Items collected daily from Canadian and Allied Sources
|
||||
* Collection from allies is crucial to success, but based on IP Address collection (causes over collect, sessionization corrupts data, difficult to analyze with Cyber toolkit)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] Global Network Detection @cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
1
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Holistic Cyber Threat Capability
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
?
|
||||
Selection and Filtering
|
||||
A
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Processing and Enrichment
|
||||
Protocol Analysis
|
||||
Crypt Attack
|
||||
Data Repositories
|
||||
Network Analysis
|
||||
Cyber Analysis
|
||||
S.16
|
||||
GoC
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
Internet
|
||||
GOC Intelligence
|
||||
CSIS Counter Intelligence
|
||||
TS SEYES Mitigation
|
||||
Knowledge Transfer
|
||||
|
||||
1. IT Security
|
||||
2. COVENANT
|
||||
3. Special Source
|
||||
4. 5-Eyes Network
|
||||
5. CNE
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## CSEC – SIGINT Supporting CND
|
||||
|
||||
* Globally pervasive threat
|
||||
* Covered by 5-Eyes network
|
||||
* Utilizing encryption
|
||||
* Subject to CSEC cryptographic attack
|
||||
* Abusing telecommunications protocols
|
||||
* Understood and reverse engineered at CSEC
|
||||
* Communicate using foreign languages
|
||||
* Access to CSEC and partner linguistic community
|
||||
* Constantly changing modus operandi
|
||||
* Uncovered using sophisticated analytics and anomaly detection
|
||||
* Exfiltrate valuable intelligence
|
||||
* That we can collect and use to enhance our repositories
|
||||
* These operations are also directed against GoC networks
|
||||
* Which we can detect and mitigate using both SIGINT and domestic sensors
|
||||
|
||||
* CSEC elements working as one...
|
||||
* providing unparalleled situational awareness of the threat
|
||||
* monitors health and status of government networks
|
||||
* coupled with the ability to stop or mitigate attacks and intrusions directed against networks of importance to the GoC
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
facebook SEEDSHERE Applications Inbox Home Settings Logout Search
|
||||
SEEDSPHERE
|
||||
is exfiltrating information from systems located across the globe
|
||||
and has no plans to stop anytime soon.
|
||||
|
||||
Mini-Feed
|
||||
|
||||
Today
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE downloaded images from the Japanese Embassy in Romania 1:25PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE added the Poison Ivy Application 2:13PM
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE communicated using the Poison Ivy Application 2:47PM
|
||||
* VGhpcyBpcyBhbiBlbmNvZGVkIFN0cmluZyBUaGF0IFJIcXVpcmVzIERIY3J5cHRpb24
|
||||
|
||||
Yesterday
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is abusing the DNS Protocol 4:36PM
|
||||
|
||||
Last Week
|
||||
|
||||
* SEEDSPHERE is taking the day off on Chinese New Year 12:00AM
|
||||
|
||||
### The Wall
|
||||
|
||||
SIENNABLUE wrote:
|
||||
すねみまけゑづぱぶぼろまおあかゆろをでぢび。ね
|
||||
てぽぴ?づてたはほよぷゅごひすせけうおへえ
|
||||
ねか「ネマソカウユブザギゴァネニタセソコタン
|
||||
|
||||
See All Photos of Me (230)
|
||||
See All Friends (23)
|
||||
Edit My Profile
|
||||
Share +
|
||||
I am online now
|
||||
|
||||
Friends
|
||||
23 Friends
|
||||
See All
|
||||
DIESELRATTLE
|
||||
SIENNABLUE
|
||||
DOWNGRADE
|
||||
|
||||
Places I've Been (125,234)
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Groups
|
||||
See All
|
||||
|
||||
Windows Internals, 3322.org, bosee.net,
|
||||
lovequintet.org, lovetrio.com, chinese
|
||||
underground
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
Speaker: [REDACTED]
|
||||
-Added the health and status of Government network bullet
|
||||
* Removed '4th party' and instead mention how it enhances our repositories (will introduce 4th party here)
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Front-end Cyber Tradecraft
|
||||
|
||||
* Deployed high-speed clustered storage to our collection sites
|
||||
* Enables extraction / storing and processing of all HTTP metadata to identify Cyber Threat Anomalies
|
||||
* Leveraged by CSEC's network knowledge engine to facilitate DNS Response harvesting and de-duplication
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Cluster throughput (file system)
|
||||
|
||||
400 Mb/s
|
||||
300 Mb/s
|
||||
200 Mb/s
|
||||
100 Mb/s
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
Inbound Outbound
|
||||
|
||||
CPU usage
|
||||
|
||||
100%
|
||||
80%
|
||||
60%
|
||||
40%
|
||||
20%
|
||||
0%
|
||||
06/11 06/14 06/16 06/18 06/21 06/23 06/25
|
||||
System User Total
|
||||
|
||||
764.8 Mb/s
|
||||
611.9 Mb/s
|
||||
458.9 Mb/s
|
||||
305.9 Mb/s
|
||||
153 Mb/s
|
||||
06/12 06/13 06/13 06/14 06/15 06/16 06/17 06/18 06/19 06/20 06/21 06/22 06/23 06/24 06/25
|
||||
|
||||
* Black Line: Total data into the Cluster
|
||||
* Blue Line: Data Outbound from SAN
|
||||
|
||||
* Data deduplication at sight results in much better use of limited bandwidth
|
||||
* Data into the cluster is balanced across multiple nodes. Each color denotes a separate node, automatically dividing the load amongst all systems
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Fast Flux Botnet Detection – CROSSBOW
|
||||
* A target-discovery algorithm deployed at CSEC SSO sites (currently operational)
|
||||
* Detects botnets that use the DNS protocol for command and control (i.e. the technique runs exclusively on metadata)
|
||||
* Initial planning phase Tipping/Cueing trials between SIGINT/ITS and the 5Eyes (stand-alone source code has been shared with 5Eyes, i.e. through T3IO)
|
||||
* "Throw-away" Cyber Threat Detection Sensor – CRUCIBLE
|
||||
* A low-cost, rapidly-deployed passive cyber threat detection sensor designed for use with TS//SI signatures in a non-SCIF environment (cyber target-tracking capability)
|
||||
* Strength of the sensor is derived primarily by the logical countermeasures (i.e. cryptographic hashes and bloom filters)
|
||||
* POC: [REDACTED] DG ITS Operations [REDACTED]@cse-cst.gc.ca)
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Sample of Fast Flux Activity Detected
|
||||
|
||||
Square nodes: contacted by fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Diamond nodes: fast flux "bots"
|
||||
Oval nodes: suspected fast flux domain
|
||||
|
||||
1 week of detected fast flux activity for a particular fast flux domain at a CSEC access
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT
|
||||
Communications Security Establishment
|
||||
Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications
|
||||
|
||||
## Joint Capability Development
|
||||
### SIGINT / ITS – Cyber Threat Detection
|
||||
|
||||
* Scanning Detection - LODESTONE
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
7
|
||||
102
data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/metadata.json
Normal file
102
data/20150323-CBC-Cyber_Threat_Detection/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "CSEC Cyber Threat Detection",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document details the Communications Security Establishment’s (CSEC) cyber threat detection and intelligence infrastructure, including systems like EONBLUE, CROSSBOW, CRUCIBLE, and LODESTONE, which enable passive monitoring, anomaly detection, and botnet identification through metadata and deep packet inspection. It outlines how CSEC integrates SIGINT, cryptanalysis, and network forensics to detect and mitigate cyber intrusions using both SIGINT and domestic sensors, while collaborating with Five Eyes partners to enhance Canada’s cyber defense and situational awareness. The presentation is duplicated from page 7 onwards - one of the duplicated slide has internal CSE comments.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"CSEC",
|
||||
"CSE",
|
||||
"ITS",
|
||||
"passive collection",
|
||||
"deep packet inspection",
|
||||
"metadata analysis",
|
||||
"anomaly detection",
|
||||
"botnets",
|
||||
"botnet detection",
|
||||
"FastFlux",
|
||||
"DNS",
|
||||
"network analysis",
|
||||
"cryptanalysis",
|
||||
"data deduplication",
|
||||
"HTTP",
|
||||
"Computer Network Exploitation",
|
||||
"cyber operations",
|
||||
"Five Eyes",
|
||||
"GCHQ",
|
||||
"NSA",
|
||||
"DSD",
|
||||
"CSIS",
|
||||
"Government of Canada",
|
||||
"GoC Networks",
|
||||
"threat attribution",
|
||||
"malware tracking",
|
||||
"exfiltration detection",
|
||||
"network monitoring",
|
||||
"infrastructure",
|
||||
"metadata repositories",
|
||||
"protocol analysis",
|
||||
"enrichment",
|
||||
"counterintelligence",
|
||||
"threat detection"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "CSE",
|
||||
"date_created": "",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"EONBLUE",
|
||||
"SPECIALSOURCE",
|
||||
"WARRANTEDACCESS",
|
||||
"COVENANT",
|
||||
"SEEDSPHERE",
|
||||
"DIESELRATTLE",
|
||||
"SIENNABLUE",
|
||||
"DOWNGRADE",
|
||||
"CROSSBOW",
|
||||
"CRUCIBLE",
|
||||
"LODESTONE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Canada",
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"Japan",
|
||||
"Romania"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "CBC News",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Seglins, Dave",
|
||||
"Hildebrandt, Amber",
|
||||
"Pereira, Michael",
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "7f6a79f3fc3db53780d122f0be8b243c14635a989277ed34b87b7b2525959c44",
|
||||
"pages": 14
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
|
||||
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
|
||||
|
||||
National Security Agency/Central Security Service
|
||||
|
||||
Information Paper
|
||||
|
||||
3 April 2013
|
||||
|
||||
Subject: (U//FOUO) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Canada's Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Introduction
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The U.S.-Canada SIGINT relationship dates back to an alliance formed during World War II. In 1949, the relationship was formalized under the CANUSA Agreement signed with CSEC. The basic tenet of CANUSA is cooperation in all aspects of SIGINT except when considered prejudicial to the national interests of one of the parties. The formal Information Assurance (IA) relationship with CSEC is based on a 1986 Memorandum of Agreement. NSA has a close, cooperative relationship with CSEC that both sides would like to see expanded and strengthened.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL TO USA, CAN)) CSEC is a highly valued second party partner. The relationship is driven by our mutual interest in the defense of North America as a whole. Cooperative efforts include the exchange of liaison officers and integrees, joint projects, shared activities and a strong desire for closer collaboration in the area of cyber defense. Since Canada has a limited ability to produce cryptographic devices, it is a large consumer of U.S. IA products.
|
||||
|
||||
(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] NSA civilian, guides the continued success of the CANUSA relationship in Canada. [REDACTED] staff have a close working relationship with [REDACTED] Together they enable productive interactions with Canadian intelligence organizations in support of U.S. Intelligence Community goals.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Key Issues: NSA and CSEC cooperate closely in the following areas:
|
||||
|
||||
* (TS//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) active computer network access and exploitation on a variety of foreign intelligence targets, including CT, Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and Mexico;
|
||||
|
||||
* (U//FOUO) information assurance and critical infrastructure defense; and
|
||||
|
||||
* (U//FOUO) evolving cyber capabilities and network security standards.
|
||||
|
||||
Classified By: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||||
Dated: 20070108
|
||||
Declassify On: 20380401
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What NSA provides to the partner:
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) SIGINT: NSA and CSEC cooperate in targeting approximately 20 high-priority countries [REDACTED] NSA shares technological developments, cryptologic capabilities, software and resources for state-of-the-art collection, processing and analytic efforts, and IA capabilities. The intelligence exchange with CSEC covers worldwide national and transnational targets. No Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) money is allocated to CSEC, but NSA at times pays R&D and technology costs on shared projects with CSEC.
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What the partner provides to NSA:
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI///REL TO USA, CAN) CSEC offers resources for advanced collection, processing and analysis, and has opened covert sites at the request of NSA. CSEC shares with NSA their unique geographic access to areas unavailable to the U.S. [REDACTED] and provides cryptographic products, cryptanalysis, technology, and software. CSEC has increased
|
||||
its investment in R&D projects of mutual interest. [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "NSA Intelligence Relationship with Canada's Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document describes the close, long-standing SIGINT partnership between the NSA and Canada’s CSEC, emphasizing cooperative efforts in global intelligence collection, cyber operations, information assurance, and critical infrastructure defense. It highlights mutual contributions, including CSEC’s unique geographic access, covert sites, cryptographic capabilities, and R&D collaboration, supporting U.S. and North American security objectives.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"CSEC",
|
||||
"CANUSA Agreement",
|
||||
"cyber defense",
|
||||
"Information Assurance",
|
||||
"cryptography",
|
||||
"intelligence sharing",
|
||||
"network security",
|
||||
"cyber operations",
|
||||
"critical infrastructure",
|
||||
"international collaboration",
|
||||
"covert operations",
|
||||
"cryptanalysis",
|
||||
"R&D collaboration",
|
||||
"global surveillance",
|
||||
"U.S.-Canada partnership",
|
||||
"transnational targets",
|
||||
"technology exchange",
|
||||
"high-priority countries"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2013-04-03",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL USA, FVEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY",
|
||||
"genre": "report",
|
||||
"programs": [],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Canada",
|
||||
"Mexico"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "CBC News",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Communication Security Establishment's cyberwarfare toolbox revealed",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Seglins, Dave",
|
||||
"Hildebrandt, Amber",
|
||||
"Pereira, Michael",
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-03-23",
|
||||
"title": "Documents Reveal Canada’s Secret Hacking Tactics",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1690227/odni3march2015-canada-v1-0.pdf"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Metropolitan Books",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-05-13",
|
||||
"title": "No Place to Hide",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.glenngreenwald.net/#BookDocuments",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"version": "no-place-to-hide",
|
||||
"note": "The pages reprinted in the document appendix of No Place to Hide (appendix page 35)."
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "fef7638ba5af29e367393ac35449d94336f280d756dce8d76484ee5af566d282",
|
||||
"pages": 4,
|
||||
"versions": {
|
||||
"no-place-to-hide": {
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "794e2b6440aa808f54ed965639869791bf12ed45bc7aa379b72d1d92f6746d9e"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
|||
ONAL SECURITY AGEN
|
||||
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
National Security Agency/
|
||||
Central Security Service
|
||||
Information Paper
|
||||
|
||||
3 April 2013
|
||||
|
||||
Subject: (U//FOUO) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Canada's Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, CAN
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What NSA provides to the partner:
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) SIGINT: NSA and CSEC cooperate in targeting approximately 20 high-priority countries [REDACTED] NSA shares technological developments, cryptologic capabilities, software and resources for state-of-the-art collection, processing and analytic efforts, and IA capabilities. The intelligence exchange with CSEC covers worldwide national and transnational targets. No Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) money is allocated to CSEC, but NSA at times pays R&D and technology costs on shared projects with CSEC.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What the partner provides to NSA:
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI///REL TO USA, CAN) CSEC offers resources for advanced collection, processing and analysis, and has opened covert sites at the request of NSA. CSEC shares with NSA their unique geographic access to areas unavailable to the U.S. [REDACTED] and provides cryptographic products, cryptanalysis, technology, and software. CSEC has increased its investment in R&D projects of mutual interest.
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
# SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||||
Dated: 20070108
|
||||
Declassify On: 20361201
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
## Corporate Portfolio
|
||||
|
||||
FAIRVIEW
|
||||
* (C) US-990 FAIRVIEW
|
||||
|
||||
BLARNEY
|
||||
* (C) US-984 FISA collection
|
||||
* (C) US-984X* FAA collection
|
||||
|
||||
STORMBREW
|
||||
* (C) US-983 STORMBREW
|
||||
* (C) US-3140 MADCAPOCELOT
|
||||
|
||||
SSO Corporate/TAO Shaping
|
||||
* (C) US-3105S1 DARKTHUNDER
|
||||
* (C) US-3105S1 STEELFLAUTA
|
||||
|
||||
OAKSTAR
|
||||
* (C) US-3206 MONKEYROCKET*
|
||||
* (C) US-3217 SHIFTINGSHADOW
|
||||
* (C) US-3230 ORANGECRUSH
|
||||
* (C) US-3247 YACHTSHOP
|
||||
* (C) US-3251 ORANGEBLOSSOM
|
||||
* (C) US-3273 SILVERZEPHYR
|
||||
* (C) US-3277 BLUEZEPHYR
|
||||
* (C) US-3354 COBALTFALCON
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
||||
## US-3206 MONKEYROCKET
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI) US-3206 (PDDG: 6T) – Operates from a foreign access point under E.O. 12333.
|
||||
|
||||
(C) Expected IOC: Spring 2012
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI) Key Targets: CT-focused – Middle East, Europe, and Asia
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI) DNI Metadata & Content
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "SSO Corporate Portfolio Overview",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document outlines various NSA and SSO programs and initiatives, including their collection methods, operational focuses, and key targets. These programs are part of the corporate portfolio, and the details, including specific SIGINT and metadata collection, are tied to critical intelligence targets like counterterrorism in the Middle East, Europe, and Asia.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"SSO",
|
||||
"EO 12333",
|
||||
"counterterrorism",
|
||||
"middle east",
|
||||
"Europe",
|
||||
"Asia"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"NOFORN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"FAIRVIEW",
|
||||
"BLARNEY",
|
||||
"STORMBREW",
|
||||
"MADCAPOCELOT",
|
||||
"DARKTHUNDER",
|
||||
"STEELFLAUTA",
|
||||
"MONKEYROCKET",
|
||||
"SHIFTINGSHADOW",
|
||||
"ORANGECRUSH",
|
||||
"YACHTSHOP",
|
||||
"ORANGEBLOSSOM",
|
||||
"SILVERZEPHYR",
|
||||
"BLUEZEPHYR",
|
||||
"COBALTFALCON",
|
||||
"SECONDLOOK",
|
||||
"SSO",
|
||||
"OAKSTAR"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2018-03-20",
|
||||
"title": "The NSA Worked to “Track Down” Bitcoin Users, Snowden Documents Reveal",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2018/03/20/the-nsa-worked-to-track-down-bitcoin-users-snowden-documents-reveal/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Biddle, Sam"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2018/03/20/pages-from-second-look-sso20mar2012-wstormbrewmap/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/4408023/Pages-From-SECOND-LOOK-SSO20Mar2012-wStormbrewMap.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "6c4b6e7af6feccfb739d5b2124a931b46dbf0325c261f3e02218bf5c594832a0",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
|||
SECRET//SI//REL USA, GBR
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) WINDSTOP
|
||||
SYSTEM HIGHLIGHTS
|
||||
MVR – New tasking: [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
INCENSER
|
||||
* XKS Upgrade➔1.5.11 (so-2013-01446)
|
||||
|
||||
MUSCULAR
|
||||
* AppID reload 19Apr (IPGeo)
|
||||
|
||||
TRANSIENT THURIBLE
|
||||
* Processing outage & SORTINGHAT outage
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET//SI//REL USA, GBR
|
||||
90
data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/metadata.json
Normal file
90
data/25_apr_2013_sso_weekly_brief/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "WINDSTOP SYSTEM HIGHLIGHTS",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "Secret document describing WINDSTOP program's highlights.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, GBR WINDSTOP system highlights document — a brief operational status update covering four collection programmes under the WINDSTOP umbrella, restricted to US and UK eyes only rather than full Five Eyes.\n\nWINDSTOP is the cover term for a joint NSA/GCHQ programme collecting from major internet cables and infrastructure. The document covers four named collection systems. INCENSER received an XKeyscore upgrade to version 1.5.11 under change order so-2013-01446 — INCENSER is identified from other published Snowden documents as a cable tap programme collecting from a fibre optic cable, believed to be associated with a transatlantic cable landing in the UK. MUSCULAR received an AppID reload on 19 April with IPGeo data — MUSCULAR (DS-200B) is the joint NSA/GCHQ programme tapping Google and Yahoo private fibre links between data centres. TRANSIENT THURIBLE experienced a processing outage alongside a SORTINGHAT outage. A new tasking under MVR is redacted. The inclusion of Borat picture as an apparent informal caption suggests the document was an internal operational status note with a humorous element, but the exact reason for the picture is not specified.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"AppID",
|
||||
"IP geolocation",
|
||||
"cable tapping",
|
||||
"fiber optic cables",
|
||||
"Borat"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2013-04-25",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"SI"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL USA, GBR"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "SECRET//SI//REL USA, GBR",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"WINDSTOP",
|
||||
"MVR",
|
||||
"INCENSER",
|
||||
"XKEYSCORE",
|
||||
"MUSCULAR",
|
||||
"TRANSIENT THURIBLE",
|
||||
"SORTINGHAT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "WDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Restle, Georg"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Channel 4",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"White, Geoff"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "NDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-21",
|
||||
"title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-25",
|
||||
"title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
|
||||
"link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Obermaier, Frederik",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura",
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "4057a417c5ead448378461b606cf1009066ee6936516c6987049359074741575",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
28
data/27_June_08_redacted/27_June_08_redacted.md
Normal file
28
data/27_June_08_redacted/27_June_08_redacted.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
|
||||
The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate
|
||||
content.
|
||||
For GCWiki help contact: [REDACTED] Support page
|
||||
|
||||
MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 27 June 08
|
||||
|
||||
From GCWiki
|
||||
Jump to: navigation, search
|
||||
|
||||
[edit] GRASP
|
||||
|
||||
* Deployment of access equipment scheduled for end August in line with commercial timescales.
|
||||
* Risk review on Monday with GERONTIC to review and work through potential new deployment risks identified
|
||||
by GERONTIC.
|
||||
* Egress funding identified as a possible candidate for funding under released Programme contingency budget.
|
||||
|
||||
[edit] DRUDGE
|
||||
|
||||
* GERONTIC have been given ccts of interest for GERONTIC internal testing of the DRUDGE enabling
|
||||
capability.
|
||||
* If testing successful, this will enable feasibility testing using target system.
|
||||
|
||||
[edit] FAINT
|
||||
|
||||
* WPA being revised to include the GERONTIC remote switching proposal.
|
||||
* No further switches have been deployed this week. All remaining switches planned for deployment before the
|
||||
end of August.
|
||||
84
data/27_June_08_redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
84
data/27_June_08_redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 27 June 08",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "The document outlines the MTI Access Project’s progress, including the deployment of access equipment, risk reviews with GERONTIC, and internal testing of surveillance capabilities like DRUDGE and remote switching. This reflects broader revelations about how companies like Cable & Wireless (now Vodafone) facilitated GCHQ’s mass surveillance, including covert access to telecom networks like FLAG through systems like GERONTIC.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ GCWiki page — a weekly status update for the MTI Access Project, week ending 27 June 2008. The document covers three named access programmes, all involving GERONTIC — identified from other published Snowden documents as the codename for Vodafone Cable (formerly Cable and Wireless), one of GCHQ's primary commercial fibre access partners.\n\nGRASP — deployment of access equipment was scheduled for end of August in line with commercial timescales. A risk review was planned with GERONTIC to work through new deployment risks the company had identified. Egress funding was identified as a candidate for programme contingency budget, suggesting cost pressures on the egress infrastructure needed to carry collected data from the access point to GCHQ processing.\n\nDRUDGE — GERONTIC had been given circuits of interest for internal testing of the DRUDGE enabling capability. If testing was successful this would enable feasibility testing using a target system — suggesting DRUDGE was a new or developing access capability being trialled against live GERONTIC infrastructure before operational deployment.\n\nFAINT — a Work Package Agreement was being revised to include a GERONTIC remote switching proposal, suggesting a change to how traffic would be switched or selected at the access point. No further switches had been deployed that week, with all remaining switches planned for deployment before end of August.\n\nThe document is notable for confirming that GERONTIC was actively involved in the technical planning and risk review of GCHQ access equipment deployment — consistent with the characterisation in other Snowden documents of GERONTIC as a willing commercial partner with dedicated Sensitive Relationship Teams supporting GCHQ access operations rather than a passive target of covert interception.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"GCWiki",
|
||||
"MTI",
|
||||
"Vodafone"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-06-27",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
|
||||
"genre": "wiki",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"GRASP",
|
||||
"GERONTIC",
|
||||
"DRUDGE",
|
||||
"FAINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "WDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Restle, Georg"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Channel 4",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"White, Geoff"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "NDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-21",
|
||||
"title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-25",
|
||||
"title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
|
||||
"link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Obermaier, Frederik",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura",
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "3880801903586439c24d5c1130295e53149a9a818c00c87eacba4f459c4b2d3d",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
252
data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file.md
Normal file
252
data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CERT
|
||||
******************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
|
||||
Photo Information
|
||||
Creation date Tue Apr 26, 2011 02:49:04
|
||||
GMT
|
||||
Uploaded IP [REDACTED] [FJ]
|
||||
Album Profile Pictures
|
||||
Caption
|
||||
Taken date Mon Apr 04, 2011 19:57:52
|
||||
GMT
|
||||
Camera make NIKON
|
||||
Camera model COOLPIX L22
|
||||
|
||||
Comments
|
||||
Date (GMT) User <id> Text
|
||||
Sat Jul 14, 2012 08:06:09 [REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
|
||||
******************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
|
||||
Photo Information
|
||||
Creation date Sat Jun 16, 2012 05:03:15 GMT
|
||||
Uploaded IP [REDACTED] [FJ]
|
||||
Album Tagged Photos
|
||||
Caption My life saver... I luv my car
|
||||
Taken date Sat Jun 16, 2012 08:39:44 GMT
|
||||
Camera make Panasonic
|
||||
Camera model DMC-FT3
|
||||
GPS coordinates [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Tags
|
||||
Date (GMT) Creator Tagged User Status x% y%
|
||||
Sun Jul 15, 2012 06:04:34 Unknown
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON-REL TO USA, NZ
|
||||
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
|
||||
******************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
|
||||
Mr Anthony Fullman
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
Australia
|
||||
|
||||
Your account number: [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Statement period From 26/06/12 to 24/07/12
|
||||
Your credit limit [REDACTED]
|
||||
Your available credit [REDACTED]
|
||||
Your annual interest rate [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
| Opening Balance | Credits | Debits | Closing Balance | Overdue | Current Due |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
|
||||
| Date of Transaction | Date Processed | Card Used | Transaction Details | Credit | Debit |
|
||||
| :------------------ | :------------- | :-------- | :---------------------------------------- | :----- | :----- |
|
||||
| 25/06/12 | 26/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Retro Espresso Ltd Mangere | | $7.00 |
|
||||
| 25/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| [MINIMIZED UK COMPANY] Rental Auckland Nzi| | $20.00 |
|
||||
| 25/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Z Skyway Auckland | | $40.00 |
|
||||
| 25/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| [MINIMIZED US COMPANY]-605 Pt Chevalier | | $20.00 |
|
||||
| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Super Liquor Pt Cheval Pt Chevalier | | $23.99 |
|
||||
| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Countdown Pt Cheval Auckland Nzi | | $58.20 |
|
||||
| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| [MINIMIZED UK COMPANY] Prepay [MINIMIZED US COMPANY] M Auckland| | $60.00 |
|
||||
| 26/06/12 | 27/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Air NZ Online Auckland | | $175.00|
|
||||
| 27/06/12 | 28/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Awpl Auckland | | $24.99 |
|
||||
| 27/06/12 | 28/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Awpl Auckland | $5.00 | |
|
||||
| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| No 1 Shoes Palm Nth Palm North | | $39.99 |
|
||||
| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| No 1 Shoes Palm Nth Palm North | | $17.98 |
|
||||
| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| New World Broadway Palmerston NT | | $86.58 |
|
||||
| 28/06/12 | 29/06/12 | [REDACTED]| Rebel Palmerston Nth Palmerston NT | | $205.99|
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//ORCON-REL TO USA, NZ
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA
|
||||
COLLECTION UNDER FAA FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CERT
|
||||
*********************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*********************************************
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
***
|
||||
PWZA20122200316270000237733
|
||||
|
||||
SIGAD: US-984XN
|
||||
PDDG: AX
|
||||
CASE_NOTATION: P3ESQC120018222
|
||||
DTG: 07AU0222Z12
|
||||
|
||||
Received from:
|
||||
********************
|
||||
Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2012 11:26:53 +1000
|
||||
From: "[REDACTED]" <[REDACTED]@com.au>
|
||||
To: <[REDACTED]@gmail.com>
|
||||
Subject: Expression of Interest - Project Manager (Permanent Role)
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
[OC: The file "Tony CV @ 3 Aug 3012 for AAS.doc" attached to original e-mail has previously been sent to GCSB.]
|
||||
|
||||
***
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||||
Dated: 20070108
|
||||
Declassify On: 20320108
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*********************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA
|
||||
COLLECTION UNDER FAA FOREIGN GOVERNMENT CERT
|
||||
*********************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*********************************************
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]@gmail.com
|
||||
|
||||
***
|
||||
|
||||
PWZA20122211943510001555537
|
||||
|
||||
SIGAD: US-984XN
|
||||
PDDG: AX
|
||||
CASE_NOTATION: P3ASQC120017040
|
||||
DTG: 08AU1911Z12
|
||||
|
||||
Received from: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Subject: Bank account
|
||||
From: [REDACTED]@gmail.com
|
||||
Date: Tue, 26 Jun 2012 17:55:59 +1200
|
||||
To: "[REDACTED]@gmail.com" <[REDACTED]@gmail.com>
|
||||
|
||||
[OC: No text in body of email.]
|
||||
|
||||
[OC: File "Westpac balance.pdf" attached to email has been included as "tpfullman_8 Aug_P3ASQC120017040_Westpac balance_1.jpg" and "tpfullman_8 Aug_P3ASQC120017040_Westpac balance_2.jpg".]
|
||||
|
||||
***
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, NZ//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||||
Dated: 20070108
|
||||
Declassify On: 20320108
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS DERIVED FROM FAA COLLECTION UNDER FAA COUNTERTERRORISM CERT
|
||||
******************************************
|
||||
THIS INFORMATION IS PROVIDED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES IN AN EFFORT TO DEVELOP POTENTIAL LEADS. IT CANNOT BE USED IN AFFIDAVITS, COURT PROCEEDINGS OR SUBPOENAS, OR FOR OTHER LEGAL OR JUDICIAL PURPOSES.
|
||||
*************************************************************
|
||||
|
||||
Westpac
|
||||
www.westpac.co.nz
|
||||
|
||||
Westpac Electronic
|
||||
15 June 2012
|
||||
|
||||
318 Lambton Quay Sub-Branch
|
||||
P.O. BOX 1298
|
||||
Wellington
|
||||
Telephone: 0800 400 600
|
||||
Fax: (04) 498 1786
|
||||
|
||||
Mr A M P Fullman
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
Fiji
|
||||
|
||||
Account name: Fullman Anthony Michael Patric
|
||||
|
||||
Account number: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Last summary date: 15 May 2012
|
||||
This summary date: 15 June 2012
|
||||
Summary number: 110
|
||||
|
||||
OPENING BALANCE [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
| TYPE | NAME OF OTHER PARTY | TRANSACTION PARTICULARS | DATE | MONEY OUT $ | MONEY IN $ | BALANCES |
|
||||
| :------------- | :------------------ | :---------------------- | :----- | :---------- | :--------- | :--------- |
|
||||
| Loan repayment | To [REDACTED] | | 23 May | [REDACTED] | | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| Loan repayment | To [REDACTED] | | 06 Jun | [REDACTED] | | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
|
||||
CLOSING BALANCE [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
CR Credit OD Overdraw
|
||||
|
||||
As soon as you receive this statement, please check the transactions and let us know if anything is incorrect. Any transactions that have been listed under money in or money out within the last few business days of this summary may be subject to clearance. If any of these items are not paid, your balance will be adjusted, and you will be advised in your next statement.
|
||||
|
||||
Your Westpac Electronic pricing
|
||||
|
||||
| | NUMBER OF TRANSACTIONS YOU DID THIS MONTH | WHAT EACH COSTS | WHAT YOU PAID THIS MONTH |
|
||||
| :------------------ | :---------------------------------------- | :-------------- | :----------------------- |
|
||||
| account maintenance | | $3.50 | $0.00 |
|
||||
| transactions | | | |
|
||||
| -eftpos | 0 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
|
||||
| -other electronic | 0 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
|
||||
| -ATM | 0 | $0.00 | $0.00 |
|
||||
| -manual | 0 | $3.00 | $0.00 |
|
||||
| -non-chargeable | 2 | | |
|
||||
| total | 2 | | $0.00 |
|
||||
|
||||
Page 1 of 2
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//RELTO USA, AUS//20320108
|
||||
79
data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/metadata.json
Normal file
79
data/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Tony Fullman NSA file",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document, a series of TOP SECRET intelligence reports from 2012, details the extensive surveillance of Anthony Fullman, a Fiji-born New Zealand citizen and pro-democracy activist. This document shows how the NSA and the New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) utilized the PRISM program (SIGAD: US-984XN) to intercept Fullman’s private communications under a FISA Amendments Act (FAA) certification. The gathered intelligence includes personal photographs with embedded metadata, detailed credit card transaction records, private emails regarding job opportunities, and Westpac bank statements. This document serves as a case study in how \"Five Eyes\" partners share intelligence derived from FAA collection to monitor individuals for political or security reasons.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This document illustrates the tactical application of FAA (FISA Amendments Act) Section 702 collection. The reports explicitly state that the information was derived from \"FAA collection under FAA Counterterrorism Cert\" and \"FAA Foreign Government Cert.\" This legal framework allows the NSA to compel U.S.-based internet service providers to hand over data belonging to non-U.S. persons. In Fullman’s case, this resulted in the interception of metadata from his Nikon and Panasonic cameras, revealing his exact location via GPS coordinates and IP addresses in Fiji and New Zealand.\n\nThis document highlights the granular level of personal detail obtained through SIGINT (Signals Intelligence). One section reveals a comprehensive list of Fullman’s daily expenses, including coffee at \"Retro Espresso Ltd,\" shoe purchases, and groceries at \"New World Broadway.\" By mapping these transactions, intelligence analysts could reconstruct Fullman's movements and social habits with high precision. This document also contains internal \"Case Notations\" (e.g., P3ESQC120018222), and each item is marked as provided \"in an effort to develop potential leads\", not for legal or judicial use.\n\nThis document further exposes the interception of professional and financial documents. The GCSB received copies of Fullman’s CV (\"Tony CV @ 3 Aug 2012\") and Westpac bank balances that were sent as email attachments. Despite the headers' warnings that this information is \"for intelligence purposes\" and \"cannot be used in court proceedings,\" the sheer volume of data collected—ranging from car photos (\"I luv my car\") to loan repayment schedules—demonstrates how the PRISM program captures a \"full-life\" picture of a target. This document underscores the friction between national security surveillance and the privacy rights of individuals targeted under broad certifications.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"bank statements",
|
||||
"financial surveillance",
|
||||
"car",
|
||||
"personal car",
|
||||
"vehicle information",
|
||||
"EXIF",
|
||||
"GPS coordinates",
|
||||
"credit card",
|
||||
"political intelligence",
|
||||
"activism",
|
||||
"email interception",
|
||||
"Gmail",
|
||||
"job application",
|
||||
"pacific islands",
|
||||
"intelligence sharing",
|
||||
"human rights",
|
||||
"pattern-of-life"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2011-08-01",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT",
|
||||
"SI",
|
||||
"ORCON"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA, AUS"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS//20320108",
|
||||
"genre": "report",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"PRISM"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Fiji",
|
||||
"New Zealand",
|
||||
"Australia"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Fullman, Anthony"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-08-14",
|
||||
"title": "The Raid: In Bungled Spying Operation, NSA Targeted Pro-Democracy Campaigner",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/08/14/nsa-gcsb-prism-surveillance-fullman-fiji/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan",
|
||||
"Hager, Nicky"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://www.documentcloud.org/projects/28715-tony-fullman-nsa-file/"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "TVNZ",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-08-15",
|
||||
"title": "Special investigation: Inside one of the SIS's biggest anti-terrorism operations",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.tvnz.co.nz/one-news/new-zealand/special-investigation-inside-one-siss-biggest-anti-terrorism-operations",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Hager, Nicky",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "b5cf75bed25391d8d3f4d4fc9d42034fa654e9790a9731e3ed0862ee0fd7cd60",
|
||||
"pages": 6
|
||||
}
|
||||
21
data/28_November_08_redacted/28_November_08_redacted.md
Normal file
21
data/28_November_08_redacted/28_November_08_redacted.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
|
||||
The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate
|
||||
content.
|
||||
For GCWiki help contact: [REDACTED] Support page
|
||||
|
||||
MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 28 November 08
|
||||
|
||||
From GCWiki
|
||||
Jump to: navigation, search
|
||||
|
||||
[edit] VISAGE
|
||||
* Tasking and Requisition completed.
|
||||
* Payment made to GERONTIC on Thursday 27th (equals a significant chunck of project funding).
|
||||
|
||||
[edit] Project
|
||||
* GERONTIC JMB (Wednesday 26th) - highlights include (Details ECI - please speak to [REDACTED] if you'd like more info):
|
||||
* Update from GERONTIC on their new organisational structure.
|
||||
* Prioritisation of key work (such as BULLROARER Node balancing).
|
||||
* Update from GERONTIC on future access and shaping opportunities.
|
||||
* Review of new cost model for bandwidth delivery (initial indications are that if this were to be applied now, it would reduce the current rental costs by approx 20%).
|
||||
* Project Risk & Issue review held.
|
||||
84
data/28_November_08_redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
84
data/28_November_08_redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 28 November 08",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "The document details the MTI Access Project’s status in November 2008, including a significant payment to GERONTIC, updates on organizational changes, and discussions about future access opportunities and cost reductions. This aligns with broader revelations about GERONTIC’s role in supporting GCHQ's surveillance operations, facilitating access to telecom infrastructure and shaping surveillance strategies.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ GCWiki page — a weekly status update for the MTI Access Project, week ending 28 November 2008, covering one named access programme and a Joint Management Board meeting with GERONTIC.\n\nVISAGE — tasking and requisition had been completed and a significant payment made to GERONTIC on 27 November, described as representing a significant chunk of project funding. This confirms the commercial nature of the arrangement — GCHQ was paying GERONTIC directly for access infrastructure rather than covertly intercepting traffic.\n\nThe Joint Management Board meeting on 26 November between GCHQ and GERONTIC covered four items, all flagged as ECI-protected with a named contact for further details. GERONTIC provided an update on their new organisational structure — relevant to GCHQ's ongoing relationship management. BULLROARER node balancing was identified as a key work priority — BULLROARER appears to be a component of the access or switching infrastructure requiring load balancing across nodes. GERONTIC provided an update on future access and shaping opportunities — confirming that the commercial partner was proactively identifying new collection opportunities for GCHQ rather than simply fulfilling existing requirements. A new cost model for bandwidth delivery was reviewed, with initial indications suggesting it would reduce current rental costs by approximately 20% if applied immediately.\n\nThe document reinforces the picture from other GCHQ access programme documents of GERONTIC as an active commercial partner with its own Joint Management Board structure, providing organisational updates, identifying new opportunities and negotiating cost models — a level of institutional integration well beyond passive compliance with legal orders.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"GERONTIC JMB",
|
||||
"GCWiki",
|
||||
"MTI",
|
||||
"Vodafone"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-11-28",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
|
||||
"genre": "wiki",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"VISAGE",
|
||||
"GERONTIC",
|
||||
"BULLROARER"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "WDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Restle, Georg"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Channel 4",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"White, Geoff"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "NDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-21",
|
||||
"title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-25",
|
||||
"title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
|
||||
"link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Obermaier, Frederik",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura",
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "11737148b9934eb213d1c6d25a63640ab9b62ffa7a2ce1969a7eb0cc57e3ed84",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
69
data/5CBOW/5CBOW.md
Normal file
69
data/5CBOW/5CBOW.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
|
|||
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
|
||||
|
||||
ZAIN INTRANET NETWORK ENGINEERING
|
||||
|
||||
Report No: 26 Date: 10 June 2009
|
||||
|
||||
Case Notations: 5CBOW Freq /Polarity: [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Summary:
|
||||
|
||||
* This informal report has been issued to highlight a C2C carrier Gabon to Belgium.
|
||||
|
||||
* The carrier was sampled using TERRAIN and Srouter
|
||||
|
||||
* ZAIN Corporation (formerly MTC Vodafone) intranet passing Technical data between ZAIN
|
||||
engineers via SMTP email Port 25.
|
||||
|
||||
* WBT45706 issued at SITE requesting 7 days collection, any hits should be viewable
|
||||
via UDAQ.
|
||||
|
||||
* TERRAIN sampling produced the following hit terms from the TERRAIN tacho
|
||||
dictionary.
|
||||
|
||||
Survey Files can be viewed in CARBOY FARNDALE Global Partition filename
|
||||
"5CL03666_928000"
|
||||
|
||||
4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED] @ZAIN.COM"
|
||||
5356 GCHQ 4 "ORANGEMALI TECHNICAL" [REDACTED] @ORANGEMALI.COM
|
||||
4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]@ZAIN.COM" [REDACTED] @ZAIN.COM"
|
||||
4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]D@COMIUM.CI
|
||||
5139 GCHQ 4 "SAUDI TELECOM COMPANY" FRAUD@STC.COM.SA
|
||||
4891 SECON 6 [REDACTED] @SA.ZAIN.COM"
|
||||
4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]@TUNISIETELECOM.TN" "[REDACTED]@TUNISIETELECOM.TN"
|
||||
4894 SECON 7 "MTC TOUCH GSM LEBANON" "[REDACTED]@MTC.COM.LB
|
||||
4806 SECON 9 [REDACTED]@NE.CELTEL.COM
|
||||
4806 SECON 6 [REDACTED]@NG.CELTEL.COM
|
||||
|
||||
Technical Details: Polarity: LHCP
|
||||
Freq: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Modulation: QPSK
|
||||
Symbol Rate: 728.167
|
||||
FEC RASIN: 3/4 TPC
|
||||
Data Rate: 1024
|
||||
Randomiser: A12
|
||||
Protocol stack = Cisco/Ipv4/Icmp/Tcp/Udp/Esp
|
||||
|
||||
Analysis: removal of fas leaves WC1A(960k)
|
||||
|
||||
Can this carrier be tasked on the Collection System? Yes
|
||||
|
||||
1 of 2
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
|
||||
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
|
||||
|
||||
Contact Details [REDACTED] Email: [REDACTED]
|
||||
OPA-BUDE-([REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
WIKI: http://[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
2 of 2
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
<PROTECTIVE MARKING>
|
||||
61
data/5CBOW/metadata.json
Normal file
61
data/5CBOW/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "ZAIN INTRANET NETWORK ENGINEERING",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "2009 GCHQ report documents the sampling and tasking of a satellite data carrier linking Gabon and Belgium that carried the internal corporate intranet of telecom operator Zain (formerly MTC Vodafone), through which engineers exchanged technical data via SMTP email. The intercept surfaced email selectors belonging to staff across multiple telecom operators — including Zain subsidiaries, Orange Mali, Saudi Telecom, MTC Touch (Lebanon), Tunisie Telecom, and Celtel entities in Niger and Nigeria — reflecting the agency’s systematic targeting of telecom employees as a potential entry point into operators’ internal networks.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"Zain",
|
||||
"telecom surveillance",
|
||||
"satellite interception",
|
||||
"internet interception",
|
||||
"email selectors",
|
||||
"corporate espionage",
|
||||
"telecom employees",
|
||||
"roaming",
|
||||
"intranet",
|
||||
"Orange Mali",
|
||||
"Saudi Telecom",
|
||||
"MTC Touch",
|
||||
"Celtel",
|
||||
"network reconnaissance"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2009-06-10",
|
||||
"classification": [],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "PROTECTIVE MARKING",
|
||||
"genre": "other",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"TERRAIN",
|
||||
"SROUTER",
|
||||
"CARBOY",
|
||||
"FARNDALE",
|
||||
"UDAQ"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Gabon",
|
||||
"Belgium",
|
||||
"Saudi Arabia",
|
||||
"Lebanon",
|
||||
"Tunisia"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Le Monde",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-12-08",
|
||||
"title": "Comment les services de renseignement font la chasse aux employés des télécoms",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/08/comment-les-services-de-renseignement-font-la-chasse-aux-employes-des-telecoms_5045496_4408996.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Untersinger, Martin",
|
||||
"Leloup, Damien"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229458/5CBOW.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "337d2c29c639265fa5848c681178447ddf59bf8d44d83ad3c5256afd5ac8ac69"
|
||||
}
|
||||
88
data/5DBIY/5DBIY.md
Normal file
88
data/5DBIY/5DBIY.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
|
|||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
SIERRA LEONE - BELGIUM
|
||||
|
||||
Report No: 25 Date: 28/05/2009
|
||||
|
||||
Case Notations: 5DBIY (Sierra Leone - Belgium) Polarity/Freq: [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
5DBIZ (Belgium – Sierra Leone)
|
||||
|
||||
Summary:
|
||||
|
||||
* This informal report has been issued to highlight the possible intelligence value of two C2C
|
||||
carriers, providing links between Sierra Leone and Belgium on satellite INTELSAT 9F3 (5D).
|
||||
|
||||
* Both carriers were input to TERRAIN with numerous hits noted on each carrier, listed below.
|
||||
|
||||
Results:
|
||||
|
||||
5DBIY
|
||||
Hits noted as follows:
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
4378 SECON 7 "OLES@OVH.NET" "OLES@OVH.NET"
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
1 of 3
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
5DBIZ
|
||||
Hits noted as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
[REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Analysis:
|
||||
|
||||
Both carriers are employing 20 strapped timeslots of C2C (1280K).
|
||||
CISCO/IPV4/TCP/SMTP/TELNET/VOIP/VPN/APPLICATION-VOFR/SIP/SNMP/UDP/ICMP
|
||||
|
||||
5DBIY
|
||||
Routername = RT1-FRE1-SL
|
||||
Source IP = [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
5DBIZ
|
||||
Routername = [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
2 of 3
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
Technical Details: Link = 5DBIY and 5DBIZ
|
||||
Modulation – QPSK
|
||||
Symbol rate = 853.333Kbps
|
||||
Data rate = 1280Kbps
|
||||
Fec rate = 3/4
|
||||
Fec Type = VITERBI
|
||||
Overhead = NONE
|
||||
Reed Solomon = None
|
||||
Randomizer = F20 (0,17,20)
|
||||
Differential encoding
|
||||
|
||||
Can this carrier be tasked on the Collection System? Yes, subject to availability of
|
||||
resources
|
||||
|
||||
Contact Details [REDACTED] Email: [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
OPA-BUDE - [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
3 of 3
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
67
data/5DBIY/metadata.json
Normal file
67
data/5DBIY/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "SIERRA LEONE - BELGIUM",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "May 2009 GCHQ report documents the interception of two satellite carriers linking Sierra Leone and Belgium (via INTELSAT 9F3), surveyed using the TERRAIN collection suite, which identified numerous email selectors of interest carried over the link. Among the hits was the email address of “Oles” — Octave Klaba, founder and CEO of OVH, Europe’s largest internet hosting company — flagged as a target alongside diplomatic and political addresses, though his presence on the list reflects metadata collection rather than proof his message contents were intercepted.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"OVH",
|
||||
"cloud computing",
|
||||
"satellite interception",
|
||||
"INTELSAT",
|
||||
"telecommunications",
|
||||
"espionage",
|
||||
"email selectors",
|
||||
"web hosting",
|
||||
"corporate surveillance",
|
||||
"metadata collection"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2009-05-28",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1",
|
||||
"SPOKE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE",
|
||||
"genre": "other",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"TERRAIN"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Sierra Leone",
|
||||
"Belgium"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Klaba, Octave"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Le Monde",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-12-08",
|
||||
"title": "Les renseignements britanniques ont surveillé le patron d’OVH, premier hébergeur européen",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/08/les-renseignements-britanniques-ont-surveille-le-patron-d-ovh-premier-hebergeur-europeen_5045500_4408996.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Leloup, Damien"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229459/5DBIY.pdf"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Le Monde",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-12-08",
|
||||
"title": "Comment les services de renseignement font la chasse aux employés des télécoms",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/08/comment-les-services-de-renseignement-font-la-chasse-aux-employes-des-telecoms_5045496_4408996.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Untersinger, Martin",
|
||||
"Leloup, Damien"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229459/5DBIY.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "38870fb722b4bf845e5032cbdf42baab576026d590d9e28f55926a2886cb1787"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
|
|||
SECRET
|
||||
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
# Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities
|
||||
|
||||
5IARC 2010
|
||||
[REDACTED] CSEC N3C
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
1
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## CND R&D CSEC
|
||||
|
||||
* Most cyber defence R&D resides in Cyber Defence Futures
|
||||
* Not a static picture
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
DCITS
|
||||
DG Cyber Defence
|
||||
Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development
|
||||
Security Posture Assessment
|
||||
Technical Threat and Analysis
|
||||
Cyber Defence Futures
|
||||
Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre
|
||||
DG Cyber Protection
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
2
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Current Focus
|
||||
|
||||
* Current operations are passive
|
||||
- Photonic Prism (aka P2)
|
||||
* Slipstream
|
||||
* Popquiz
|
||||
* Email attachment scanning (via Pony Express)
|
||||
* Snort
|
||||
- Host based intrusion detection
|
||||
* Soon deploying dynamic defence
|
||||
- COTS hardware platform
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
3
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## N3 Research
|
||||
|
||||
* N3 is mostly a consumer of research
|
||||
- Given our resources this is an appropriate model
|
||||
* Very much relationship based
|
||||
- SIGINT
|
||||
- R23
|
||||
- Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
|
||||
- Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
|
||||
- Communications Research Centre (CRC)
|
||||
* Integrees
|
||||
- DRDC
|
||||
- CRC
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
4
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## External Partners
|
||||
|
||||
* R23
|
||||
* SIGINT
|
||||
* *DRDC*
|
||||
* *RMC*
|
||||
* CRC
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
|
||||
|
||||
* MulVal + AssetRank
|
||||
* Joint Network Defence and Management Systems (JNDMS)
|
||||
* ARMOUR
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## MulVAL
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Information about users
|
||||
|
||||
Information about data assets
|
||||
|
||||
Linux security behavior; Windows security behavior; Common attack techniques
|
||||
|
||||
Attack graph
|
||||
|
||||
System admin
|
||||
|
||||
Security expert
|
||||
|
||||
Reasoning System
|
||||
|
||||
Network configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Host configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Apache 1.3.4 bug!
|
||||
|
||||
CERT advisory
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
execCode(databaseServer,oracle_user)
|
||||
8
|
||||
RULE 2 (9) : remote exploit of a server program
|
||||
1 networkServiceInfo(databaseServer,oracle,tcp,1521,oracle_user)
|
||||
7 netAccess(databaseServer,tcp,1521)
|
||||
6
|
||||
RULE 5 (28) : multi-hop access
|
||||
1 hacl(webServer,databaseServer,tcp,1521)
|
||||
5 execCode(webServer,system)
|
||||
4
|
||||
RULE 2 (14) : remote exploit of a server program
|
||||
1 networkServiceInfo(webServer,iis,tcp,80,system)
|
||||
1 vulExists(webServer,iis_vulid,iis,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
|
||||
3 netAccess(webServer,tcp,80)
|
||||
6 RULE 5 (30) : multi-hop access
|
||||
1 hacl(userDesktop,webServer,tcp,80)
|
||||
5 execCode(userDesktop,joeAccount)
|
||||
4
|
||||
RULE 3 (24) : remote exploit for a client program
|
||||
1 isCompetent(joe)
|
||||
1 vulExists(userDesktop,browser_vulid,privEscalation,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
|
||||
3 canAccessMaliciousInput(userDesktop)
|
||||
2
|
||||
RULE 20 (19) : Browsing a website
|
||||
1 hacl(userDesktop,attackerHost,tcp,80)
|
||||
1 isWebBrowser(firefox)
|
||||
1 installed(userDesktop,firefox)
|
||||
1 attackerLocated(attackerHost)
|
||||
1 hasAccount(joe,userDesktop,joeAccount)
|
||||
2 RULE 6 (34) : direct network access
|
||||
1 hacl(attackerHost,webServer,tcp,80)
|
||||
1 vulExists(databaseServer,oracle_vulid,oracle,remoteExploit,privEscalation)
|
||||
|
||||
More dangerous
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## Royal Military College
|
||||
|
||||
* Support ~ 1 grad student per year
|
||||
* Sliding Window Anomaly Detection (SWAD)
|
||||
- Models normal traffic
|
||||
- Applies the concept of hidden Markov model (HMM)
|
||||
- Used to detect covert channels
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## CND Development
|
||||
|
||||
* Mix of internal development and external collaboration
|
||||
* Current CND projects
|
||||
- Some Pony Express
|
||||
- Software modules for COTS hardware (dynamic defence)
|
||||
- Streaming 10 Gb/s sensor (P2)
|
||||
- Analyst data mining tools
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Pony Express
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Client traffic → FlowPony → SMTPPony → MailPony → MetaPony
|
||||
MetaPony → [Metadata + attachments] → ScanPony
|
||||
ScanPony → [Metadata] → AggPony → PonyExpress Output Buffer → SyncPony
|
||||
SyncPony → PonyExpress Output
|
||||
PonyExpress Output → [Metadata + Scan results] → Tonto
|
||||
Tonto → [Formatted Alerts] → Alerts Database
|
||||
|
||||
PoolTable (Scanning Framework):
|
||||
ScanPony → [Unencoded attachments] → Corner Pocket
|
||||
Corner Pocket → Attachment Scanner
|
||||
Attachment Scanner → PoolCue
|
||||
PoolCue → [Scan results] → AggPony
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
11
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Ponies of the PonyExpress
|
||||
|
||||
* **FlowPony** (flowp)
|
||||
- TCP Session reconstruction
|
||||
* **SMTPPon**y (smtpp)
|
||||
- SMTP Parsing & Header Extraction
|
||||
* **MailPony** (mailp)
|
||||
- RFC822 E-mail Parsing & MIME Attachment Extraction
|
||||
* **MetaPony** (metap)
|
||||
- Evaluation & Scoring of Parsed Metadata
|
||||
* **ScanPony** (scanp)
|
||||
- Analysis Pre-Processing & Scan Dispatching
|
||||
* **AggPony** (aggp)
|
||||
- Scan Result Aggregation
|
||||
* **SyncPony** (syncp)
|
||||
- Transfers buffered output from local disk to the SAN
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
12
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Ongoing Sensor Development (Photonic Prism)
|
||||
|
||||
* Integration of in-house and external partner anomaly detection tools and signature based detection
|
||||
- Sliptstream
|
||||
- Popquiz
|
||||
- 8Ball
|
||||
- Snort
|
||||
* Updating our sensors for multiple 10 Gb/s sources
|
||||
* Moving to full streaming with full capture
|
||||
* Data analysis
|
||||
- Improved analyst interface that fuse data from many sources
|
||||
- Custom GUI (based on Eclipse framework)
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
13
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Ongoing Sensor Development (Photonic Prism)
|
||||
|
||||
* Improved Analytics
|
||||
- Better facilities for collaboration
|
||||
- Near real time access to anomaly data
|
||||
- Improved alert/pcap performance
|
||||
- Knowledge database
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
14
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Software modules on COTS Hardware (Dynamic Defence)
|
||||
|
||||
* Internal but close collaboration with NSA
|
||||
* ~~Active~~ Dynamic defence (inline device)
|
||||
* Modules for based device
|
||||
- miniSSL (passive)
|
||||
- SSLfuzzer
|
||||
- DNS
|
||||
- Data Extractor
|
||||
- Synflood
|
||||
* Legal and policy work ongoing
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
15
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## Challenges
|
||||
|
||||
* Lots of standard development work to do
|
||||
* Resources to pull through available research
|
||||
* Length of Research Activities
|
||||
* Translating classified requirements to an unclassified domain
|
||||
* Properly engaging Industry and Academia
|
||||
* Focusing external partners on R&D that is most valuable to us
|
||||
* Policy
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
16
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
# Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities
|
||||
|
||||
5IARC 2010
|
||||
[REDACTED] CSEC N3C
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
1
|
||||
|
||||
Within the Cyber Protection Branch there is an Architecture and Engineering Directorate where most of the Research and Development Activities takes place.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## CND R&D CSEC
|
||||
|
||||
* Most cyber defence R&D resides in Cyber Defence Futures
|
||||
* Not a static picture
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
DCITS
|
||||
DG Cyber Defence
|
||||
Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development
|
||||
Security Posture Assessment
|
||||
Technical Threat and Analysis
|
||||
Cyber Defence Futures
|
||||
Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre
|
||||
DG Cyber Protection
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
2
|
||||
|
||||
The purpose of my talk is to characterize the R&D within CND at CSEC. I can not give a complete picture.
|
||||
|
||||
This is just to provide some context of where cyber defence research resides with CSEC.
|
||||
|
||||
This is a recent *partial* picture.
|
||||
|
||||
It is not static however, the org chart is evolving.
|
||||
|
||||
CTEC is very new and still defining its role.
|
||||
|
||||
Some future changes:
|
||||
|
||||
It is anticipated that **Cyber Defence Operations** and **Capabilities Development** will be become 2 separate directorates.
|
||||
|
||||
Cyber defence futures will be split into 2 sections. Eventually those sections will for the start of the Capabilities Development directorate.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## Current Focus
|
||||
|
||||
* Current operations are passive
|
||||
- Photonic Prism (aka P2)
|
||||
* Slipstream
|
||||
* Popquiz
|
||||
* Email attachment scanning (via Pony Express)
|
||||
* Snort
|
||||
- Host based intrusion detection
|
||||
* Soon deploying dynamic defence
|
||||
- COTS hardware platform
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
3
|
||||
|
||||
At the moment most of our efforts are on incremental improvements on the current sensor.
|
||||
|
||||
Making it ready for > 10 Gb/s systems and beyond.
|
||||
|
||||
Our detection capabilities are based on 4 frameworks:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Slipstream
|
||||
2. Popquiz
|
||||
3. Pony Express
|
||||
4. Snort
|
||||
|
||||
We should soon have our first dynamic defence deployment.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## N3 Research
|
||||
|
||||
* N3 is mostly a consumer of research
|
||||
- Given our resources this is an appropriate model
|
||||
* Very much relationship based
|
||||
- SIGINT
|
||||
- R23
|
||||
- Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
|
||||
- Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)
|
||||
- Communications Research Centre (CRC)
|
||||
* Integrees
|
||||
- DRDC
|
||||
- CRC
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
4
|
||||
|
||||
It's difficult to speak about a research program that is virtual
|
||||
|
||||
We are a small group (but growing) trying to look at a lot of data.
|
||||
|
||||
Given our size, our best return on investment would not come from using current resources for low level research.
|
||||
|
||||
It make more sense to leverage the R&D of some external partners. There is already a large body of work out there that we can benefit from before we need to push it ourselves. This means our R&D program is mostly a relationship based program.
|
||||
|
||||
In fact, this model has already proven to be extremely valuable via the success of popquiz developed by R23 and our email attachment scanner from GCHQ.
|
||||
|
||||
In between in-house and external is the use of integrees.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## External Partners
|
||||
|
||||
* R23
|
||||
* SIGINT
|
||||
* *DRDC*
|
||||
* *RMC*
|
||||
* CRC
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
5
|
||||
|
||||
The next set of slides provides some overview of the research done by our external partners that we are following/tracking/consuming.
|
||||
|
||||
Some is in use (popquiz)
|
||||
|
||||
Some will shortly be in production (Popeyesear)
|
||||
|
||||
Many are "for the future"
|
||||
|
||||
Some chosen examples follow.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)
|
||||
|
||||
* MulVal + AssetRank
|
||||
* Joint Network Defence and Management Systems (JNDMS)
|
||||
* ARMOUR
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
|
||||
|
||||
Defence Research and Development Canada is R&D arm of the Department of National Defence.
|
||||
|
||||
Within DRDC Ottawa is the Network Information Operations (NIO) section.
|
||||
|
||||
Within the Attack Detection and Analysis group, there are 3 projects of particular interest to us:
|
||||
|
||||
Mulasses, JNDMS and ARMOUR
|
||||
|
||||
DRDC also provides us a mechanism for working on NATO R&D projects as they already have a well established relationship with NATO.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## MulVAL
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Information about users
|
||||
|
||||
Information about data assets
|
||||
|
||||
Linux security behavior; Windows security behavior; Common attack techniques
|
||||
|
||||
Attack graph
|
||||
|
||||
System admin
|
||||
|
||||
Security expert
|
||||
|
||||
Reasoning System
|
||||
|
||||
Network configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Host configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Apache 1.3.4 bug!
|
||||
|
||||
CERT advisory
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
|
||||
|
||||
Network based vulnerability analysis project.
|
||||
|
||||
Pure logical based reasoning engine that generates attack graphs. These attack graphs can be huge. A system to prioritize them needed to be created.
|
||||
|
||||
Based on Xinming (Simon) Ou PhD Dissertation from Princeton.
|
||||
|
||||
Simon is currently a professor at Kansa state University where he continues development of Mulval and related projects.
|
||||
|
||||
These are the 5 classes of input that go into MulVAL:
|
||||
|
||||
1. User and data asset information
|
||||
2. Network configuration (hacls) – Basically describe which computers can talk and on which ports
|
||||
3. Host configuration – software running on machines within the netwok
|
||||
4. CERT (or other advisories) that contain information about vulnerabilites
|
||||
5. Security expert information -- Logic to describe what can be accomplished on a computer given credentials
|
||||
|
||||
This input goes into a reasoning system (MulVal) which can then generate attack paths
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
(attack graph as reproduced on slide 8)
|
||||
More dangerous
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
Defence R&D Canada R et D pour la défense, Canada
|
||||
|
||||
Asset rank is an adaptation of the original Google page rank algorithm that can prioritize nodes of an attack graph (or any other logic based graph).
|
||||
|
||||
It is used to prioritize which network conditions (facts) are the most important to fix first in order to harden the network.
|
||||
|
||||
Attack graph:
|
||||
|
||||
Ellipse – AND nodes. True if all the dependencies are true.
|
||||
|
||||
Diamond – OR nodes. True if any of the children nodes are true.
|
||||
|
||||
Box – facts: network/host configuration, installed/running software, vulnerabilities
|
||||
|
||||
Together Mulval + AssetRank ➔ Mulasses!
|
||||
|
||||
Mulasses output is a prioritized list of network configuration properties to be modified to harden the network.
|
||||
|
||||
This project has potential value in network vulnerability shop.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
UNCLASSIFIED
|
||||
|
||||
## Royal Military College
|
||||
|
||||
* Support ~ 1 grad student per year
|
||||
* Sliding Window Anomaly Detection (SWAD)
|
||||
- Models normal traffic
|
||||
- Applies the concept of hidden Markov model (HMM)
|
||||
- Used to detect covert channels
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
9
|
||||
|
||||
Hidden Markov model – State of the system is not visible to the observer, only the output. System is assumed to be a Markov process.
|
||||
|
||||
Markov process – A stochastic process with the Markov property
|
||||
|
||||
Markov property – random phenomenon depends only on the present state of the system, (i.e. does not depend on the past or future state).
|
||||
|
||||
Why we are interested. Detecting covert channels is our business. If it is successful, it may prove to be a very valuable tool.
|
||||
|
||||
Other benefits of RMC collaborations – People! Several RMC students have become CSEC employees. They are cleared, and have a education centred on our mutual interests.
|
||||
|
||||
The current phase of the SWAD project is to built a user interface that is analyst friendly. Much of the work to date has been proof of concept work.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET
|
||||
Communications Security Centre de la sécurité
|
||||
Establishment Canada des télécommunications Canada
|
||||
|
||||
## CND Development
|
||||
|
||||
* Mix of internal development and external collaboration
|
||||
* Current CND projects
|
||||
- Some Pony Express
|
||||
- Software modules for COTS hardware (dynamic defence)
|
||||
- Streaming 10 Gb/s sensor (P2)
|
||||
- Analyst data mining tools
|
||||
|
||||
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
|
||||
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
|
||||
Canada
|
||||
10
|
||||
|
||||
For the next couple of slides I will show some of our recent in-house development efforts.
|
||||
|
||||
We really do not have what I would characterize as **"research"** within Cyber Defence.
|
||||
|
||||
We do hope to get there.
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "A September 2010 CSEC briefing to the Five Eyes 5IARC conference on cyber defence R&D, giving the full PONY EXPRESS email attachment scanning architecture and the PHOTONIC PRISM sensor, with speaker notes in which the presenter concedes CSEC does little research of its own.",
|
||||
"long_description": "A September 2010 briefing by a redacted CSEC N3C presenter to the Five Eyes 5IARC conference, titled \"Cyber Network Defence R&D Activities\" and classified SECRET. The published file contains the deck twice: sixteen slides, followed by a speaker-notes printout covering slides 1 to 10, in which the presenter's own commentary is considerably franker than the slides.\n\nThe briefing locates cyber defence R&D within CSEC's organisation — under DCITS, through DG Cyber Defence and Cyber Defence Operations and Capabilities Development, to the Cyber Defence Futures section, with the Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre described in the notes as \"very new and still defining its role\" and the org chart as \"a recent partial picture\" that is still evolving.\n \nIts central claim is that CSEC does very little research of its own. The notes state plainly that N3 is \"mostly a consumer of research\", that it is \"difficult to speak about a research program that is virtual\", and that the best return comes from leveraging external partners rather than spending a small team's resources on low-level work — naming R23, SIGINT, Defence Research and Development Canada, the Royal Military College of Canada and the Communications Research Centre, supplemented by DRDC and CRC integrees. The model is said to have already proved itself through POPQUIZ, developed by R23, and an email attachment scanner obtained from GCHQ. The closing note is blunter still: \"We really do not have what I would characterize as 'research' within Cyber Defence. We do hope to get there.\"\n \nOperationally the deck states that CSEC's collection posture in 2010 was passive, resting on the PHOTONIC PRISM (P2) sensor and four detection frameworks — SLIPSTREAM, POPQUIZ, PONY EXPRESS and SNORT — alongside host-based intrusion detection, with 8BALL added on a later slide. One slide gives the full PONY EXPRESS architecture for email attachment scanning: client traffic passes through FlowPony (TCP session reconstruction), SMTPPony (SMTP parsing and header extraction), MailPony (RFC822 parsing and MIME attachment extraction), MetaPony (evaluation and scoring of parsed metadata) and ScanPony (analysis pre-processing and scan dispatching), which forwards unencoded attachments into the PoolTable scanning framework via Corner Pocket, the Attachment Scanner and PoolCue; results return through AggPony, an output buffer and SyncPony to a SAN, and are formatted into alerts by Tonto. A further slide names the components with their short forms. This architecture is the basis of the February 2015 CBC and Intercept reporting on CSE's scanning of email sent to the Government of Canada. \n\nThe deck also records work then in progress: updating sensors for multiple 10 Gb/s sources, moving to full streaming with full capture, and a first deployment of \"dynamic defence\" — an inline device built on COTS hardware in close collaboration with NSA, carrying miniSSL, SSLfuzzer, DNS, Data Extractor and Synflood modules, with \"legal and policy work ongoing\". On that slide the word \"Active\" is struck through and replaced by \"Dynamic\", recording the rename in the document itself.\n\nThree slides are reproduced from a DRDC deck under its own UNCLASSIFIED template, covering MulVAL — a logic-based reasoning engine generating attack graphs, based on Xinming (Simon) Ou's Princeton dissertation — and its combination with AssetRank, an adaptation of Google's PageRank that prioritises attack-graph nodes, together called Mulasses, plus JNDMS and ARMOUR. The RMC slide covers Sliding Window Anomaly Detection, which applies hidden Markov models to detect covert channels; the notes add that a secondary benefit of the RMC relationship is recruitment, since several RMC students have become cleared CSEC employees. A closing slide lists the obstacles: resources, the length of research activities, translating classified requirements into an unclassified domain, engaging industry and academia, and policy.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"CSEC",
|
||||
"CSE",
|
||||
"Computer Network Defence",
|
||||
"CND",
|
||||
"cyber defence research",
|
||||
"research and development",
|
||||
"Government of Canada",
|
||||
"GC networks",
|
||||
"email interception",
|
||||
"email attachment scanning",
|
||||
"attachment scanning",
|
||||
"SMTP",
|
||||
"RFC822",
|
||||
"MIME",
|
||||
"TCP session reconstruction",
|
||||
"metadata",
|
||||
"metadata scoring",
|
||||
"passive collection",
|
||||
"full take",
|
||||
"packet capture",
|
||||
"full streaming",
|
||||
"10 Gb",
|
||||
"s",
|
||||
"sensor development",
|
||||
"anomaly detection",
|
||||
"signature-based detection",
|
||||
"intrusion detection",
|
||||
"host-based intrusion detection",
|
||||
"malware",
|
||||
"dynamic defence",
|
||||
"active defence",
|
||||
"inline device",
|
||||
"COTS hardware",
|
||||
"SSL",
|
||||
"SSL fuzzing",
|
||||
"DNS",
|
||||
"synflood",
|
||||
"data extraction",
|
||||
"covert channels",
|
||||
"hidden Markov model",
|
||||
"machine learning",
|
||||
"attack graphs",
|
||||
"vulnerability analysis",
|
||||
"network hardening",
|
||||
"asset prioritisation",
|
||||
"alerting",
|
||||
"pcap",
|
||||
"data mining",
|
||||
"analyst tools",
|
||||
"Eclipse",
|
||||
"knowledge database",
|
||||
"SAN",
|
||||
"external partners",
|
||||
"academic collaboration",
|
||||
"integrees",
|
||||
"NATO",
|
||||
"NSA collaboration",
|
||||
"GCHQ collaboration",
|
||||
"DRDC",
|
||||
"RMC",
|
||||
"CRC",
|
||||
"R23",
|
||||
"legal and policy",
|
||||
"Five Eyes",
|
||||
"5IARC"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "CSE",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "SECRET",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"PHOTONICPRISM",
|
||||
"PONYEXPRESS",
|
||||
"SLIPSTREAM",
|
||||
"POPQUIZ",
|
||||
"8BALL",
|
||||
"SNORT",
|
||||
"POPEYESEAR",
|
||||
"FLOWPONY",
|
||||
"SMTPPONY",
|
||||
"MAILPONY",
|
||||
"METAPONY",
|
||||
"SCANPONY",
|
||||
"AGGPONY",
|
||||
"SYNCPONY",
|
||||
"POOLTABLE",
|
||||
"POOLCUE",
|
||||
"CORNERPOCKET",
|
||||
"TONTO",
|
||||
"MULASSES",
|
||||
"MULVAL",
|
||||
"ASSETRANK",
|
||||
"JNDMS",
|
||||
"ARMOUR",
|
||||
"SWAD",
|
||||
"MINISSL",
|
||||
"SSLFUZZER",
|
||||
"N3C",
|
||||
"N3",
|
||||
"CTEC",
|
||||
"DCITS",
|
||||
"5IARC"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Canada"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "CBC News",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-02-25",
|
||||
"title": "CSE monitors millions of Canadian emails to government",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/cse-monitors-millions-of-canadian-emails-to-government-1.2969687",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Seglins, Dave"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [
|
||||
"Hildebrandt, Amber",
|
||||
"Pereira, Michael",
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn",
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1676540/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.pdf"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2015-02-25",
|
||||
"title": "Canadian Spies Collect Domestic Emails in Secret Security Sweep",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2015/02/25/canada-cse-pony-express-email-surveillance/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Gallagher, Ryan",
|
||||
"Greenwald, Glenn"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1676540/5iiarc-conference-september-2010-csec-briefing.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "adf29ba32d024e2bef92b06040d3146103fc7bdfc0b6cb25226e1042f7a0d15a"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
|
||||
# Significant TRF TROODOS stories over past 6 months
|
||||
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* Regular collects of Heron TP carrying weapons
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
* [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET STRAP1
|
||||
|
||||
Success against Syria
|
||||
|
||||
* 17th Feb 2012 collection on an undocumented frequency of 1208MHz.
|
||||
* Ababil III (Iranian manufactured) UAV from Shayrat Airfield.
|
||||
* Tip-off procedures facilitated co-incident collect from Golf, E Section and MHS on 9th March.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
07:04:06.366
|
||||
30
|
||||
20
|
||||
PAN=075.4
|
||||
TILT=-020.5
|
||||
ZOOM=30X
|
||||
CORT
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL FVEY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
* Site made a further recording on 11th March.
|
||||
* Presidential level interest in further video samples.
|
||||
55
data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
55
data/6-Months-Overview-Redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "Significant TRF TROODOS stories over past 6",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This 2012 top-secret document outlines intelligence gathered by the NSA and GCHQ from the Troodos Communications Facility in Cyprus, which includes regular surveillance of Israeli and Iranian drones over a six-month period, particularly focusing on drone operations and weapons systems. It also mentions significant collections of UAV signals, including the Heron TP drone and Iranian Ababil III, with presidential-level interest in video samples from these operations.",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"israeli",
|
||||
"Iranian",
|
||||
"UAV",
|
||||
"drone surveillance",
|
||||
"weapons systems",
|
||||
"intelligence collection",
|
||||
"NSA-GCHQ cooperation",
|
||||
"presidential interest",
|
||||
"military operations"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2012-01-01",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1",
|
||||
"genre": "slides",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"TROODOS"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Cyprus",
|
||||
"Iran",
|
||||
"Syria",
|
||||
"Israel"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-01-28",
|
||||
"title": "Israeli Drone Feeds Hacked By British and American Intelligence",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2016/01/28/israeli-drone-feeds-hacked-by-british-and-american-intelligence/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Currier, Cora",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/2699852/6-Months-Overview-Redacted.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "4dfaa5e0979ab71439e2a39cc15912d518ef2c652d772524a2549aad012757bc",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
15
data/6_February_09_redacted/6_February_09_redacted.md
Normal file
15
data/6_February_09_redacted/6_February_09_redacted.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT
|
||||
The maximum classification allowed on GCWiki is TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT. Click to report inappropriate
|
||||
content.
|
||||
For GCWiki help contact: [REDACTED] Support page
|
||||
|
||||
MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 6 February 09
|
||||
|
||||
From GCWiki
|
||||
Jump to: navigation, search
|
||||
|
||||
[edit] Project
|
||||
|
||||
* [REDACTED] has joined the MTI Access Team. [REDACTED] role is as a full-time project management integree within GERONTIC.
|
||||
* MTI Bid work progressing for 'Supporting INOC' progressing well for the first IRIS review next week. Details of the scope and progress can be found at Supporting INOC.
|
||||
* RPC1 OSDS Workshop and related meetings.
|
||||
81
data/6_February_09_redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
81
data/6_February_09_redacted/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "MTI Access Project - Weekly Status w/e 6 February 09",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This is a UK TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT GCHQ GCWiki page — a weekly status update for the MTI Access Project, week ending 6 February 2009.\n",
|
||||
"long_description": "Three items are noted. A named GCHQ officer has joined the MTI Access Team in a full-time project management integree role embedded within GERONTIC — confirming that GCHQ was placing its own staff inside Vodafone Cable/Cable and Wireless as dedicated liaison personnel, a level of institutional integration that goes well beyond a standard customer-supplier relationship. MTI bid work for the \"Supporting INOC\" scope was progressing toward an IRIS review the following week, with details linked to a separate GCWiki page. An RPC1 OSDS Workshop and related meetings were scheduled — RPC1 being a collection site designation and OSDS referring to the optical splitter or distribution system providing access to cable traffic, consistent with the GCHQ SSE access expansion documents processed earlier describing RPC sites and OSDS installations at Bude and Cheltenham.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"GCWiki",
|
||||
"MTI",
|
||||
"Vodafone"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2009-02-06",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET STRAP1 COMINT",
|
||||
"genre": "wiki",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"GERONTIC"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "WDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Vodafone – der lange Arm des britischen Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Restle, Georg"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Channel 4",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-20",
|
||||
"title": "Spy cable revealed: how telecoms firm worked with GCHQ",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"White, Geoff"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "NDR",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-21",
|
||||
"title": "Der lange Arm des Geheimdienstes?",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"reporting_only": true
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Süddeutsche Zeitung",
|
||||
"date_published": "2014-11-25",
|
||||
"title": "Snowden-Leaks: How Vodafone-Subsidiary Cable & Wireless Aided GCHQ’s Spying Efforts",
|
||||
"link": "http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Obermaier, Frederik",
|
||||
"Moltke, Henrik",
|
||||
"Poitras, Laura",
|
||||
"Strozyk, Jan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": []
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "9fb89f558624dc77b66e64bfff0048379fa5f3f6661cc6d357b0d61d90392749",
|
||||
"pages": 1
|
||||
}
|
||||
178
data/8BBAA/8BBAA.md
Normal file
178
data/8BBAA/8BBAA.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
|
|||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
8BBAA
|
||||
JORDAN-USA
|
||||
|
||||
Report No: 49 Date: 09/12/2008
|
||||
|
||||
Case Notation: 8BBAA
|
||||
Polarity/Freq: [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
Summary:
|
||||
|
||||
* This informal report has been issued to highlight a link of potential interest for tasking.
|
||||
|
||||
* The physical gateways are JORDAN-USA, however USA is providing a logical gateway to the ROW.
|
||||
|
||||
* The link is a fairly standard E1 employing Timeslot 31 to relay C7, which in turn provides the dialling for this
|
||||
link. Compression is achieved by utilising DTX-360B DCME equipment.
|
||||
|
||||
* Traffic summaries indicate that both terminals are relaying transit data.
|
||||
|
||||
Results:
|
||||
|
||||
TS 31 (HOST)
|
||||
OPC 4-032-0 (Jordan, FAST Link GSM) DPC 3-047-7 (USA, College Park 1 SITA)
|
||||
Link activity as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
4-032-0 to 3-049-5 using CIC range 0003-0127
|
||||
|
||||
Transit calls to various countries include:
|
||||
|
||||
USA, Egypt, Algeria, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria, Chad, Congo, DRC, Angola, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda,
|
||||
South Afica, Greece, Belgium, Cryprus, Bulgaria, Hunary, Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Bosnia Herzegovina,
|
||||
Macedonia, Romania, Poland, Columbia, Venezuela, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, China, Turkey,
|
||||
Pakistan, Afganistan, Iran, Turkmenistan.
|
||||
|
||||
Mapping:
|
||||
|
||||
8BBAA was input to Depthauge
|
||||
|
||||
1 of 5
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP 1 SPOKE
|
||||
C7 BS31 SS7
|
||||
TK3 40320-30495 CIC 0097-0127 TS 01-31
|
||||
(Activity noted in Trunk 7 but no mapping produced for this trunk)
|
||||
(All other trunks inactive ATT)
|
||||
|
||||
Previous map:
|
||||
C7 BS31 SS7 [ISUP/CLI] 40320-30477 [0] JORDAN-UK
|
||||
TK0 INACTIVE
|
||||
TK1 INACTIVE
|
||||
TK2 40320-30404 CIC 0065-0095 TS 01-31
|
||||
TK3 40320-30404 CIC 0097-0127 TS 01-31
|
||||
TK4 INACTIVE
|
||||
TK5 INACTIVE
|
||||
TK6 40325-30404 CIC 0065-0095 TS 01-31
|
||||
TK7 40325-30404 CIC 0097-0127 TS 01-31
|
||||
\** FIRST MAP 140708 **
|
||||
|
||||
Further signalling is being carried by the C7 channel, for which no mapping has yet been obtained.
|
||||
Possibly controls voice on another bearer:
|
||||
BS31 40320-30495 CIC 0003-0096
|
||||
|
||||
A search of the RHS identifies 8B L4036.447 as a candidate for the RLE.
|
||||
Currently in view at Sounder.
|
||||
|
||||
ANALYSIS: -
|
||||
8BBAA was sampled for DNR activity for approximately 96 hours over the period 02/12/2008-05/12/2008 on
|
||||
Drumkit.
|
||||
|
||||
Results – BS31
|
||||
TS31: - Scored 113 hits, which include both tasked and de-tasked numbers listed in Corinth. Of the 113 hits, 16 were
|
||||
scored against 10 currently tasked numbers.
|
||||
|
||||
Hits can be viewed in Drumroll under the following filename:
|
||||
8BBAA0031
|
||||
|
||||
| TNDEntry | TNDOffice | TNDComments | TNDtask | TNDzip | TNDpri |
|
||||
|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
|
||||
2 of 5
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
| | | | | | |
|
||||
|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN GEN DEL LISBON | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN DEP AMBASSADOR ISLAMABAD MOB | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP DEV JO MOBILE | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN DEV | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | ABU MAZIN ASSOC JO MOBILE | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | TARIQ ABBAS SON OF ABU MAZIN | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22A4 | JOD JORDANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON DC | N | - | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | ABU MAZIN ASSOC JO MOBILE | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | JORDANIAN ROYAL COURT | N | 6067 | 0 |
|
||||
|
||||
3 of 5
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
| | | | | | |
|
||||
|------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | YASIR SON OF ABU MAZIN | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | A22H | PALESTINIAN AMBASSADOR SOUTH AFRICA | N | 6039 | 0 |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] |
|
||||
|
||||
Technical Details: Link = 8BBAA
|
||||
Modulation – 8PSK.
|
||||
|
||||
Symbol rate = 780.19 Kbps
|
||||
Data rate = 2048bps
|
||||
Fec rate = 7/8
|
||||
Fec Type = TPC
|
||||
Overhead = None.
|
||||
Reed Solomon = None
|
||||
Absolute encoding.
|
||||
DCME – DTX-360b
|
||||
|
||||
4 of 5
|
||||
|
||||
This information is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and may be subject to exemption under
|
||||
other UK information legislation. Refer disclosure requests to GCHQ on [REDACTED]
|
||||
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE
|
||||
|
||||
This link can be tasked on the system, subject to available resources
|
||||
|
||||
Contact Details [REDACTED] Email: [REDACTED]
|
||||
OPA-BUDE- [REDACTED]
|
||||
98
data/8BBAA/metadata.json
Normal file
98
data/8BBAA/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "JORDAN-USA",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "",
|
||||
"long_description": "",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"Palestinian Authority",
|
||||
"PLO",
|
||||
"satellite interception",
|
||||
"telecommunications",
|
||||
"espionage",
|
||||
"Middle East",
|
||||
"Belgacom",
|
||||
"diplomatic spying",
|
||||
"call interception",
|
||||
"politicians"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "GCHQ",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-12-09",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"SECRET",
|
||||
"STRAP 1",
|
||||
"SPOKE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [],
|
||||
"banner": "SECRET STRAP1 SPOKE",
|
||||
"genre": "other",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"SOUNDER",
|
||||
"CORINTH",
|
||||
"DRUMKIT",
|
||||
"DRUMROLL",
|
||||
"DEPTHGAUGE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Jordan",
|
||||
"Egypt",
|
||||
"Algeria",
|
||||
"Côte d'Ivoire",
|
||||
"Liberia",
|
||||
"Nigeria",
|
||||
"Chad",
|
||||
"Congo",
|
||||
"Democratic Republic of the Congo",
|
||||
"Jordan",
|
||||
"Angola",
|
||||
"Ethiopia",
|
||||
"Somalia",
|
||||
"Kenya",
|
||||
"Uganda",
|
||||
"South Africa",
|
||||
"Greece",
|
||||
"Belgium",
|
||||
"Cyprus",
|
||||
"Bulgaria",
|
||||
"Hungary",
|
||||
"Moldova",
|
||||
"Belarus",
|
||||
"Ukraine",
|
||||
"Bosnia and Herzegovina",
|
||||
"Macedonia",
|
||||
"Romania",
|
||||
"Poland",
|
||||
"Colombia",
|
||||
"Venezuela",
|
||||
"Malaysia",
|
||||
"Philippines",
|
||||
"Singapore",
|
||||
"Thailand",
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"Turkey",
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Afghanistan",
|
||||
"Iran",
|
||||
"Turkmenistan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Abbas, Mahmoud",
|
||||
"Abbas, Yasir"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "Le Monde",
|
||||
"date_published": "2016-12-07",
|
||||
"title": "L’Autorité palestinienne et la Jordanie espionnées par les services américains et britanniques",
|
||||
"link": "http://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2016/12/07/l-autorite-palestinienne-et-la-jordanie-espionnees-par-les-services-americains-et-britanniques_5044883_4408996.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Follorou, Jacques"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3229461/8BBAA.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "dd7b65e1817663165b356cbd0ce89b40349755b014a892c5bd4943a688554a5f"
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
|
|||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the NSA-Ethiopian Relationship
|
||||
FROM: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge, NSA Georgia's Sudan/Horn of Africa Division (FGS2I3)
|
||||
Run Date: 07/07/2010
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) The NSA-Ethiopian SIGINT relationship* continues to thrive.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) I recently had an opportunity to travel to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to conduct training in traffic analysis for our Ethiopian partners in SIGINT. This was my first trip to the Deployed SIGINT Operations Center (DSOC), aka Operation Lion's Pride, and an excellent opportunity for me to interact firsthand with those who work so hard in our behalf.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) My first week in country included a visit to the US Embassy and briefs on each of the three missions conducted at Lion's Pride by the deployed analysts from the 741st MI Battalion. I was familiar with the outstanding work produced by the analysts and the Ethiopian linguists but I didn't have an appreciation of all the hard work that goes into running the site. Working with the partners to process traffic and produce reportable transcripts is enough to keep everyone busy, but the job doesn't end there. The additional duties each of the deployed soldiers has -- from working with vehicle contracts to the maintenance of equipment at the three remote sites -- are just as time-consuming as the mission. The language barrier is significant, and something as simple as arranging to have the grass cut at the site can easily take several hours.
|
||||
|
||||
DSOC
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) I began teaching the class the following week; it was attended by both soldiers from the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) and Ethiopian civilians from the Information Network Security Agency (INSA). The relationship between the ENDF and INSA at the site is similar to the one our own military shares with NSA as the "CSS" part of NSA/CSS.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Everyone in the class was excited and eager to learn. The students' enthusiasm was important, as it helped overcome some of the challenges involved in teaching a group of non-native English speakers with varying degrees of English comprehension and SIGINT analysis experience. The proficiency level of the students ranged from soldiers with no analysis background to professionals who had many years of SIGINT experience and the ability to instantly recognize a Fibonacci sequence. The latter helped immeasurably as they worked with their colleagues in their native Amharic to ensure everyone had full comprehension of the course material.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) The two-week class ended with a graduation ceremony for all 32 students. The ENDF Signal Regiment Commander was on hand to present each of the graduates with a Certificate of Training signed by the INSA Technical Intelligence Director. I felt this cross-organizational recognition was appropriate, as it was symbolic of the cooperative nature of the soldier-civilian relationship at Operation Lion's Pride.
|
||||
|
||||
Ethiopian soldier and civilian pose together
|
||||
class photo
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) Left: Similar to NSA/CSS, soldiers and civilians work hand-in-hand at Lion's Pride. Right: Class photo
|
||||
|
||||
(Click for larger view)
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL) The trip was a great success for two very important reasons. First, this was the first time many of the students had received any type of SIGINT training. The Ethiopians who support Lion's Pride now possess the ability to conduct analysis on HF message externals where none was previously being done. More importantly, however, is the strengthening of the relationship between NSA, the ENDF and INSA. Feedback from Ethiopian leadership of both the DSOC and INSA has been positive and we in Georgia are eager to continue developing the relationship between us and our Ethiopian counterparts.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Notes:
|
||||
|
||||
\* (U) See earlier articles on this topic:
|
||||
* (U//FOUO) In the Intelligence Business, What's the Most Important Language to Understand? ...
|
||||
English! -- An Interview with [REDACTED] (posted 10/24/08)
|
||||
* (S//SI//REL) Third Party Relationship with Ethiopia Fills Intelligence Gap (posted 3/14/07)
|
||||
* (S//SI//REL) NSA, Ethiopians Take SIGINT Partnership to New Level (posted 8/25/06)
|
||||
* (S//SI//REL) Expanding Joint US-Ethiopian SIGINT Collection (posted 4/06/06)
|
||||
* (U) LION'S PRIDE - Fighting Terrorism on the Horn of Africa (posted 3/01/05)
|
||||
|
||||
"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)."
|
||||
Information Owner: [REDACTED] (email)
|
||||
Page Publisher: [REDACTED] (email)
|
||||
Last Modified:
|
||||
11/10/2012 / Last Reviewed:
|
||||
11/10/2012
|
||||
de:
|
||||
DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS
|
||||
TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL
|
||||
DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM
|
||||
1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007
|
||||
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "A Behind-the-Scenes Look at the NSA-Ethiopian Relationship",
|
||||
"type": "SIDTODAY",
|
||||
"description": "This SIDtoday article details the NSA's growing collaboration with Ethiopian security agencies, particularly through the Operation Lion's Pride SIGINT program. It highlights a successful training session where Ethiopian soldiers and civilians learned traffic analysis, strengthening the relationship between the NSA, Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), and the Information Network Security Agency (INSA).",
|
||||
"long_description": "This is a SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY SIDToday article dated 7 July 2010, authored by the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge of NSA Georgia's Sudan/Horn of Africa Division (FGS2I3). The article describes a traffic analysis training visit to the Deployed SIGINT Operations Center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia — codenamed Operation Lion's Pride — and provides the most detailed published description of the NSA-Ethiopian third party SIGINT relationship.\n\nOperation Lion's Pride is described as a joint collection facility staffed by deployed analysts from the US Army's 741st Military Intelligence Battalion working alongside Ethiopian National Defense Forces personnel and civilians from Ethiopia's Information Network Security Agency (INSA). The site has three remote collection locations in addition to the main DSOC. The author draws an explicit parallel between the ENDF/INSA relationship and the NSA/CSS military-civilian structure in the US — confirming the facility mirrors the US model with both military and civilian intelligence personnel integrated into a single collection operation.\n\nThe training class covered traffic analysis of HF message externals and was attended by 32 students from both ENDF and INSA, with proficiency levels ranging from personnel with no analysis background to experienced SIGINT professionals. The training was conducted in English despite the language barrier, with advanced students assisting colleagues in Amharic. A graduation ceremony was held with the ENDF Signal Regiment Commander and the INSA Technical Intelligence Director presenting certificates — both organisations formally recognising the training, confirming the depth of institutional engagement.\n\nThe article notes this was the first time many students had received any SIGINT training, and that Ethiopians at Lion's Pride now had the ability to conduct HF message externals analysis for the first time. The article references five earlier SIDToday articles on the NSA-Ethiopian relationship dating back to 2005, indicating a sustained partnership of at least five years prior to this visit covering expanding collection, capability development and intelligence gap-filling on the Horn of Africa.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"Horn of Africa",
|
||||
"ENDF",
|
||||
"INSA",
|
||||
"DSOC",
|
||||
"training",
|
||||
"partnership",
|
||||
"students"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2010-07-07",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"SI",
|
||||
"TK"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL",
|
||||
"genre": "newsletter",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"LIONSPRIDE"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Ethiopia",
|
||||
"Sudan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Intercept",
|
||||
"date_published": "2017-09-13",
|
||||
"title": "How the NSA Built a Secret Surveillance Network for Ethiopia",
|
||||
"link": "https://theintercept.com/2017/09/13/nsa-ethiopia-surveillance-human-rights/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Turse, Nick"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://theintercept.com/document/2017/09/12/a-behind-the-scenes-look-at-the-nsa-ethiopian-relationship/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/3990988/A-Behind-the-Scenes-Look-at-the-NSA-Ethiopian.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "6eb32aa5fcff47702a93b9c21393f5543521dcf4d837ef879f334c9ad958f216",
|
||||
"pages": 3
|
||||
}
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load diff
190
data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/metadata.json
Normal file
190
data/ACLU_-_2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper/metadata.json
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "NSA Video Games Paper",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "The NSA paper entitled “Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats, and Opportunities in Influence Activities” stresses the risk of leaving gaming communities under-monitored and how the NSA and GCHQ are conducting surveillance in various online games, collecting gamers' chat data, and deploying agents into World of Warcraft and Second Life.",
|
||||
"long_description": "MHS/GCHQ World of Warcraft SIGINT:\n\nThis is a TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY document describing a joint effort by Menwith Hill Station's New Mission Development Center, GCHQ's Global Network Exploitation (OPD-GNE) and Applied Research Special Topics (B18) to exploit World of Warcraft network traffic for SIGINT target development. The NMDC engaged SNORT open source packet-sniffing software running on all FORNSAT survey packet data to filter out WoW packets. GCHQ provided protocol parsing scripts to process the traffic and produce Warcraft metadata, which was forwarded to GCHQ for target development and network knowledge enrichment. GCHQ had correlated target entities to WoW logon events and was identifying accounts, characters and guilds associated with Islamic Extremist Groups, Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Dealing. The document notes WoW's communication infrastructure — character IDs, guilds, channels — as directly analogous to traditional SIGINT target development following emails, chat and buddy lists, with country and time zone information, local IP addresses and realm server addresses available through game metadata.\n\nSAIC Games and Virtual Environments report:\n\nThis is a FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY report produced by SAIC titled \"Games: A Look at Emerging Trends, Uses, Threats and Opportunities in Influence Activities,\" comprising five chapters covering the exploitation and function of games as influence platforms, why games are effective influence tools, plausible scenarios for terrorist use of games, emerging trends in the gaming space, and recommendations for IC counterterrorism efforts in the game space.\n\nThe report was produced for an IC customer — likely NSA or a related agency given its packaging alongside the WoW operational note — and draws on SAIC's Cyber-Influence Conference Series as a primary research source. It systematically analyses how terrorist organisations could exploit online games and virtual worlds for propaganda, recruitment, communications, training, fundraising and money laundering, across game genres including first-person shooters, MMORPGs, alternate reality games, simulation games and strategy games.\n\nKey findings include: GCHQ had already produced exploitation modules for XboxLive and World of Warcraft with reporting expected to begin April 2008; al-Qa'ida target selectors and game executables had been found associated with XboxLive, Second Life, World of Warcraft and other platforms in PINWALE network traffic, TAO databases and forensic data; FBI, CIA and Defense Humint Service all had HUMINT operations in Second Life; Hezbollah's Special Force game used Genesis 3D middleware and was available in Arabic, French, English and Farsi; and Second Life's anonymous SMS capability was identified as a collection gap. The report recommends Protocol Exploitation, SFL and TAO begin profiling databases and game environments for collection and exploitation, and that CT SIGDEV establish an IC-wide deconfliction process for game space operations.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"gaming",
|
||||
"video games",
|
||||
"online games",
|
||||
"chat",
|
||||
"agents",
|
||||
"World of Warcraft",
|
||||
"Second Life",
|
||||
"Xbox",
|
||||
"Computer Network Exploitation",
|
||||
"social network analysis",
|
||||
"ID tracking",
|
||||
"shaping"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2008-01-01",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA, FVEY"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY",
|
||||
"genre": "report",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"PINWALE",
|
||||
"DARWARS",
|
||||
"SFL",
|
||||
"UTT"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [
|
||||
"Bahrain",
|
||||
"China",
|
||||
"Egypt",
|
||||
"Indonesia",
|
||||
"Iran",
|
||||
"Iraq",
|
||||
"Israel",
|
||||
"Japan",
|
||||
"Jordan",
|
||||
"Kazakhstan",
|
||||
"Kuwait",
|
||||
"Lebanon",
|
||||
"Malaysia",
|
||||
"Oman",
|
||||
"Pakistan",
|
||||
"Palestine",
|
||||
"Qatar",
|
||||
"Saudi Arabia",
|
||||
"Singapore",
|
||||
"Sudan",
|
||||
"Syria",
|
||||
"Turkmenistan",
|
||||
"United Arab Emirates",
|
||||
"Uzbekistan"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"people": [
|
||||
"Garite, Matt",
|
||||
"Prasad, Kaira",
|
||||
"Castronova, Edward",
|
||||
"DeBenedictis, Steven",
|
||||
"Robbins, Brian",
|
||||
"Dunin, Elonka",
|
||||
"Estanislao, Jon",
|
||||
"James, Daniel",
|
||||
"Valadares, Jeferson",
|
||||
"Kushner, David",
|
||||
"Ondrejka, Corey",
|
||||
"Bonk, Curtis J.",
|
||||
"Dennen, Vanessa P.",
|
||||
"Lindstrom, Martin",
|
||||
"Yee, Nick",
|
||||
"Jayaganthan, Rengaswamy",
|
||||
"Tawil-Souri, Helga",
|
||||
"Soussi, Alasdair",
|
||||
"Baertlein, Lisa",
|
||||
"Brachman, Jarret M.",
|
||||
"Rolston, David",
|
||||
"Dille, Flint",
|
||||
"Bilson, David S.",
|
||||
"Bray, Hiawatha",
|
||||
"Morgan, Dan",
|
||||
"Henry, Dean",
|
||||
"Halper, Keith",
|
||||
"Pardew, Leslie A.",
|
||||
"Betrus, Anthony D.",
|
||||
"Garite, Matt",
|
||||
"Steinkuehler, Constance A.",
|
||||
"Gupta, Shankar",
|
||||
"Joshi, Mahesh P.",
|
||||
"Fong, Gwenda",
|
||||
"Andersen, John",
|
||||
"Reid, David",
|
||||
"Kramer, Stephen E.",
|
||||
"Brown, Seely",
|
||||
"Thomas, Douglas",
|
||||
"Phillips, Andrea",
|
||||
"Thompson, Brooke",
|
||||
"Alexander, Bryan",
|
||||
"Dena, Christy",
|
||||
"Barlow, Nova",
|
||||
"Weimann, Gabriel",
|
||||
"Mace, Michael",
|
||||
"Knight, Will",
|
||||
"Gibson, Erin",
|
||||
"Langley, Hugh",
|
||||
"Huang, Shih-Lian",
|
||||
"Ruff, Chris",
|
||||
"Gibson, Ben",
|
||||
"Cialdini, Robert B.",
|
||||
"Johnson, Steven",
|
||||
"Tulloch, Paul",
|
||||
"McLundie, Martin",
|
||||
"Galles, Kara",
|
||||
"Berkowitz, Jeff",
|
||||
"May, William",
|
||||
"Leonard, David J.",
|
||||
"Williams, Dmitri"
|
||||
]
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "ProPublica",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-12-09",
|
||||
"title": "World of Spycraft: NSA and CIA Spied in Online Games",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.propublica.org/article/world-of-spycraft-intelligence-agencies-spied-in-online-games",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Elliott, Justin"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://www.propublica.org/documents/item/889134-games",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889134/games.pdf",
|
||||
"version": "nsa-games-paper"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The New York Times",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-12-09",
|
||||
"title": "Spies Infiltrate a Fantasy Realm of Online Games",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/world/spies-dragnet-reaches-a-playing-field-of-elves-and-trolls.html",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Mazzetti, Mark",
|
||||
"Elliott, Justin"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/10/us/politics/games-docs.html?ref=world",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889128/games.pdf"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Guardian",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-12-09",
|
||||
"title": "Xbox Live among game services targeted by US and UK spy agencies",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Ball, James"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/dec/09/nsa-files-games-virtual-environments-paper-pdf",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889129/nsa-games-paper.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "EFF_-_20131209-nyt-nsa_games"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "2013-12-09_NSA_Video_Games_Paper"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "nsa-gchq-spy-games"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "nsa-spy-games"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"archive_comment": "The Guardian only published two pages. ProPublica and The New York Times published the full document (82 pages).",
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "b5d476d87795fccf7ac9b55c7b7f763dfbe76707daa4e049d2da0a76d7bbf5c8",
|
||||
"pages": 82,
|
||||
"versions": {
|
||||
"nsa-games-paper": {
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "4dab8fa803efa108677b6c901e6a26cf1a35cd2fa9ad23994450162406059736"
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI) Topic: Exploiting Terrorist Use of Games & Virtual Environments
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI) Issue: We know that terrorists use many feature-rich Internet communications media
|
||||
for operational purposes such as email, VoIP, chat, proxies, and web forums and it is highly
|
||||
likely they will be making wide use of the many communications features offered by Games and
|
||||
Virtual Environments (GVE) by 2010. The SIGINT Enterprise needs to begin taking action now
|
||||
to plan for collection, processing, presentation, and analysis of these communications. With a
|
||||
few exceptions, NSA can't even recognize the traffic, and therefore it is impossible to even say
|
||||
what percentage of the environment is GVE; let alone determine how targets are using the
|
||||
communications features of GVEs. However, GVEs offer a SIGINT/HUMINT opportunity space
|
||||
and more research is needed to figure out effective exploitation.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI) GVEs today allow individuals to gather with like-minded others online. Many GVES
|
||||
offer communications such as private chat (P2P), group chat, chat to an alias, and broadcast chat
|
||||
-both text and voice. Also many GVEs allow convergent technologies to intermingle such as
|
||||
XboxLive! which can be run via an Xbox360 gaming console and/or connect via a PC to normal
|
||||
MSN chat. Second Life offers the ability to anonymously text to a GSM phone (SMS) and soon
|
||||
they will offer anonymous voice calls so that phone numbers do not have to be known by either
|
||||
party and won't show up in collection. Some GVEs allow third party interfaces which allow
|
||||
limited functionality from a web browser. This overcomes obstacles such as a high-bandwidth
|
||||
requirement and or not being allowed to download software (think Internet café usage). In
|
||||
addition, many GVEs are able to be used via mobile devices connected wirelessly (phones,
|
||||
handhelds, laptops). Connected to the GVEs, specialized forums and other social networking
|
||||
sites have sprung up to provide an additional place to interact, connect, or share. These sites and
|
||||
any others can be advertised in the GVEs, so that if a terrorist web forum has to move locations it
|
||||
can be found by its members again. Areas/groups can be access-restricted, member-only. They
|
||||
are essentially private meeting places, and can be used for planning, comms, and training, etc.
|
||||
GVEs are used for collaboration; Forterra's 3D world is coming to JWICS to do this IC-wide.
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) GVEs have been made that reinforce prejudices and cultural stereotypes while
|
||||
imparting a targeted message or lesson both from the Western point of view and in the Middle
|
||||
East. America's Army is a U.S. Army produced game that is free download from its recruitment
|
||||
page and is acknowledged to be so good at this the army no longer needs to use it for
|
||||
recruitment, they use it for training. The Lebanese Hizballah has taken this concept and the same
|
||||
basic game design and made its own version of the game called Special Forces 2 (SF2), which its
|
||||
press section acknowledges is used for recruitment and training in order to prepare their youth to
|
||||
"fight the enemy", a radicalizing medium; the ultimate goal is to become a suicide martyr. One
|
||||
cannot discount the "fun factor" involved it is important to hold your target audience's
|
||||
attention-- and makes ingesting the message not even noticeable. SF2 features multi-player, on-
|
||||
line text and voice chat for up to 60 players simultaneously, effectively acting like a VPN or
|
||||
private chat forum. SF2 is offered at $10 a copy and so also goes to fund terrorist operations.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI) These games offer realistic weapons training (what weapon to use against what target,
|
||||
what ranges can be achieved, even aiming and firing), military operations and tactics,
|
||||
photorealistic land navigation and terrain familiarization, and leadership skills. While complete
|
||||
military training is best achieved in person, perfection is not always required to accomplish the
|
||||
mission. Some of the 9-11 pilots had never flown a real plane, they had only trained using
|
||||
|
||||
Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||||
Dated: 20070108
|
||||
Declassify On: 20320108
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
|
||||
|
||||
Microsoft's Flight Simulator. When the mission is expensive, risky, or dangerous, it is often a
|
||||
wiser idea to exercise virtually, rather than really blow an operative up assembling a bomb or
|
||||
exposing a sleeper agent to law enforcement scrutiny. Militaries around the world use virtual
|
||||
simulators with great success and the Hizballah has even hooked up a Playstation controller to a
|
||||
laptop in order to guide some of its real missiles. Kuma Wars is a U.S. owned company that
|
||||
offers realistic battle simulation of real battles in Iraq usually one month after they actually
|
||||
happened. The player can re-do maneuvers in a lessons learned way for training, or you can
|
||||
switch sides and see how it works from the opposite side. It also provides real terrain features,
|
||||
such as real road signs from real roads in Iraq, and a simulated night-vision goggles
|
||||
environment.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI) Al Qaida terrorist target selectors and GVE executables have been found associated
|
||||
with XboxLive, Second Life, World of Warcraft, and other GVEs in PINWALE network traffic,
|
||||
TAO databases, and in forensic data. Other targets include Chinese hackers, an Iranian nuclear
|
||||
scientist, Hizballah, and Hamas members. GCHQ has a vigorous effort to exploit GVEs and has
|
||||
produced exploitation modules in XboxLive! and World of Warcraft. After beta testing, they
|
||||
expect reporting to begin in April 2008. The FBI, CIA and the Defense Humint Service all have
|
||||
HUMINT operations in Second Life and other GVEs and are very interested in forming a
|
||||
deconfliction and tipping group that would be able to collaborate on operations.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI) GVEs are an opportunity! We can use games for: CNE exploits, social network
|
||||
analysis, HUMINT targeting, ID tracking (photos, doc IDs), shaping activities, geo-location of
|
||||
target, and collection of comms. It has been well documented that terrorists are OPSEC and tech
|
||||
saavy and are only getting more so over time. These applications and their servers however, are
|
||||
trusted by their users and makes an connection to another computer on the Internet, which can
|
||||
then be exploited. Through target buddylists and interaction found in the gaming and on gaming
|
||||
web sites, social networks can be diagramed and previously unknown SIGINT leads and
|
||||
connections and terrorists cells discovered. GVEs can contain on-line presence indicators,
|
||||
geolocation, and ID tracking can be gleaned and used in apprehension operations.
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI) Recommendation: The amount of GVEs in the world is growing but the specific ones
|
||||
that CT needs to be methodically discovered and validated. Only then can we find evidence that
|
||||
GVEs are being used for operational uses. Protocol Exploitation, SFL, and TAO should begin
|
||||
profiling their databases and the GVEs for collection and exploitation possibilities. Open source
|
||||
(APSTARS) produced GVE lists and selectors should be used to run against UTT and other
|
||||
databases to check for cross matches to develop target selectors. CT SIGDEV along with CT
|
||||
TOPIs will study the collected traffic to find and track targets of interest. There should be a
|
||||
concentrated effort to conduct research into target use of GVEs, and signatures for survey
|
||||
collection should be developed. Targets and specific apps should be chosen to exploit to ensure
|
||||
that terrorists' GVE/social site usage is covered by SIGINT and the system is not left behind the
|
||||
times. All avenues should be taken to develop PES and CNE exploits as GVEs are found on
|
||||
target computers. We need to develop a viewer/db that allows linguist/analysts to
|
||||
view/experience voice/text/video traffic together and archivee the GVE data associated with
|
||||
reporting. which will also be essential for Yahoo, Skype, webcam, VTCs and Biometrics.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI) CT SIGDEV/SSG should establish a process to deconflict IC-wide ops in GVEs and to
|
||||
develop strategy for collaboration. Members from at least CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA and GCHQ
|
||||
should participate to make the coordination significant. Members should have ability to check
|
||||
tasking, traffic, and status of current operations.
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//20320108
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
|
||||
|
||||
| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| b. (U) In association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
|
||||
| A3. (S//SI) The fact that NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM (encrypted or unencrypted). | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291133 | (U) No additional details. |
|
||||
| A4. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can collect GSM calls through the global telecommunications infrastructure. | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
|
||||
|
||||
**B. (U) EQUIPMENT**
|
||||
|
||||
| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| B1. (FOUO) Commerical and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc., when **not** running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and **not** associated with a SIGINT system. | UNCLASSIFIED/ FOUO | N/A | N/A | (U) No association with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. |
|
||||
| B2. (S//SI) Commercial and government equipment that consists of general purpose components, such as receivers, digital signal processors, personal computer, etc, when running or loaded with GSM SIGINT collection software and associated with NSA, SIGINT or Intelligence. | SECRET//COMINT At a minimum | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
|
||||
|
||||
**C. (U) PROCESSING**
|
||||
|
||||
| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| C1. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process **unencrypted** GSM. | SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
|
||||
| C2. (S//SI) The fact that NSA can process **encrypted** GSM when the cryptovariable is **known**. | SECRET//COMINT REL AUS/CAN/GBR/NZL/USA At a mimimum | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | |
|
||||
| C3. (TS//SI) The fact that NSA can process **encrypted A5/1** GSM when the cryptovariable is **unknown**. | TOP SECRET// COMINT REL | 1.4 (c) | 20291123 | (U) Details may require protection via a special access |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
|
||||
|
||||
| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights) | SECRET//COMINT at a minimum | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | |
|
||||
| F3. (S//SI) Reporting locations of GSM users in:<br><br>a. SIGINT product<br>--country<br>--city<br>--VLR Global Title<br>--Location Area Code<br>--Cell ID<br>--Latitude/Longitude | SECRET<br>SECRET<br>SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source. |
|
||||
| b. Technical reports (TACREPs or Klieglights)<br>--country<br>--city<br>--VLR Global Title<br>--Location Area Code<br>--Cell ID<br>--Latitude/Longitude | SECRET<br>SECRET<br>SECRET//COMINT<br>SECRET//COMINT<br>SECRET//COMINT<br>SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source. |
|
||||
| F4. (S//SI) Any reporting from GSM Short Message system (SMS) messages | SECRET//COMINT at a minimum. | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | May be TOP SECRET//COMINT depending on the source. |
|
||||
|
||||
**G. (FOUO) GSM PRECISIONAL ACCURACY**
|
||||
|
||||
| Description of Information | Classification/ Markings | Reason | Declass | Remarks |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| G1. (S//SI) The fact that GSM Cell Towers can be used as a physical- geolocational reference point in relation to a GSM handset of interest: | SECRET//COMINT | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | A GSM handset in relationship to a GSM Cell tower should be portrayed in a 2-3 KM ellipse estimate that takes into consideration urban and rural environmental dependencies (power, terrain and interference). |
|
||||
| G2. (S//SI) The fact of a singular SIGINT GSM handset metadata point with no exact timing | SECRET | 1.4(c) | 20291123 | GEO periodically issues a geospatially presented (ArcView, |
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
|
|||
{
|
||||
"title": "How the NSA Pinpoints a Mobile Device",
|
||||
"type": "REPORTED",
|
||||
"description": "This document is an internal National Security Agency classification guide outlining the agency's abilities to intercept cellular communications.",
|
||||
"long_description": "This top secret NSA classification guide, shared with Five Eyes partners, provides handling instructions for information about the agency's GSM signals intelligence capabilities across collection, equipment, processing, reporting, and geolocation. The document is organized into sections covering general program facts, equipment, processing capabilities, reporting, and geolocation precision — each with specific classification levels calibrated to the sensitivity of the information disclosed.\n\nThe collection section establishes that the mere fact NSA targets, collects, and processes GSM — whether encrypted or unencrypted — is classified Secret/COMINT, as is the fact that collection occurs through the global telecommunications infrastructure. The equipment section draws a precise legal and security distinction: commercial components used for GSM SIGINT collection are unclassified when not loaded with collection software, but become Secret/COMINT at minimum once running NSA-associated software. The processing section reveals a graduated hierarchy of capability sensitivity: processing unencrypted GSM is Secret/COMINT releasable to Five Eyes; processing encrypted GSM with a known cryptovariable is Secret/COMINT at minimum; but the ability to process A5/1 encrypted GSM when the cryptovariable is unknown — meaning NSA can break the most widely used GSM encryption standard without possessing the key — is classified Top Secret/COMINT and may require special access program protection. A5/1 was the standard encryption used by the vast majority of the world's GSM mobile networks, making this capability one of the most significant mobile surveillance disclosures in the document.\n\nThe reporting and geolocation sections detail the classification levels for publishing user location data, with a granular hierarchy ranging from country-level location (Secret) through city, VLR Global Title, Location Area Code, Cell ID, and latitude/longitude coordinates (all Secret/COMINT, potentially Top Secret depending on source). The geolocation precision section establishes that cell tower-based handset location should be represented as a 2-3 kilometer ellipse accounting for urban and rural environmental factors including power, terrain, and interference — providing a rare public benchmark for the accuracy of NSA's GSM geolocation capability.",
|
||||
"tags": [
|
||||
"GSM",
|
||||
"cell phones",
|
||||
"mobile phones",
|
||||
"geospatial data",
|
||||
"cell towers",
|
||||
"handset",
|
||||
"mobile surveillance",
|
||||
"cellular interception",
|
||||
"encryption",
|
||||
"encryption breaking",
|
||||
"cryptographic key",
|
||||
"geolocation",
|
||||
"LAC",
|
||||
"CellID",
|
||||
"VLR",
|
||||
"latitude longitude",
|
||||
"SMS interception",
|
||||
"TACrep",
|
||||
"KLIEGLIGHT",
|
||||
"classification guide",
|
||||
"collection capabilities",
|
||||
"data processing",
|
||||
"equipment",
|
||||
"handset tracking",
|
||||
"mobile networks",
|
||||
"urban rural"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"document": {
|
||||
"creator": "NSA",
|
||||
"date_created": "2006-09-20",
|
||||
"classification": [
|
||||
"TOP SECRET",
|
||||
"COMINT",
|
||||
"MR"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"dissemination": [
|
||||
"REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"banner": "TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL//MR",
|
||||
"genre": "guide",
|
||||
"programs": [
|
||||
"ARCVIEW"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"countries": [],
|
||||
"people": []
|
||||
},
|
||||
"publication": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"publisher": "The Washington Post",
|
||||
"date_published": "2013-12-10",
|
||||
"title": "New documents show how the NSA infers relationships based on mobile location data",
|
||||
"link": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/new-documents-show-how-the-nsa-infers-relationships-based-on-mobile-location-data/",
|
||||
"reporters": [
|
||||
"Soltani, Ashkan",
|
||||
"Gellman, Barton"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"contributors": [],
|
||||
"doc_source": "http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-the-nsa-pinpoints-a-mobile-device/645/",
|
||||
"doc_url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/888710/gsm-classification-guide-20-sept-2006.pdf"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"aka_id": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "2013-12-10_GMS_Classification_Guide"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "EFF_-_20131210-wapo-gsm_classification_guide"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "nsa-gsm-tracking"
|
||||
},
|
||||
{
|
||||
"id": "gsm-classification-guide-20-sept-2006"
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"pdf_sha256": "d73a14649a953b8ba4ccffaac079dd0a4b2f1425d97e21744895009a7ffad501",
|
||||
"pages": 2
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
|
|||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL USA, FVEY
|
||||
|
||||
National Security Agency/
|
||||
Central Security Service
|
||||
|
||||
Information Paper
|
||||
|
||||
3 April 2013
|
||||
|
||||
Subject: (U//FOUO) NSA Intelligence Relationship with Canada's Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)
|
||||
|
||||
(U) Introduction
|
||||
|
||||
(U//FOUO) The U.S.-Canada SIGINT relationship dates back to an alliance formed during World War II. In 1949, the relationship was formalized under the CANUSA Agreement signed with CSEC. The basic tenet of CANUSA is cooperation in all aspects of SIGINT except when considered prejudicial to the national interests of one of the parties. The formal Information Assurance (IA) relationship with CSEC is based on a 1986 Memorandum of Agreement. NSA has a close, cooperative relationship with CSEC that both sides would like to see expanded and strengthened.
|
||||
|
||||
(S//REL TO USA, CAN)) CSEC is a highly valued second party partner. The relationship is driven by our mutual interest in the defense of North America as a whole. Cooperative efforts include the exchange of liaison officers and integrees, joint projects, shared activities and a strong desire for closer collaboration in the area of cyber defense. Since Canada has a limited ability to produce cryptographic devices, it is a large consumer of U.S. IA products.
|
||||
|
||||
(C//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED] NSA civilian guides the continued success of the CANUSA relationship in Canada. [REDACTED] staff have a close working relationship with [REDACTED]. Together they enable productive interactions with Canadian intelligence organizations in support of U.S. Intelligence Community goals.
|
||||
|
||||
Classified By: [REDACTED]
|
||||
Derived From NSA/CSSM 1-52
|
||||
Dated: 20070108
|
||||
Declassify On: 20380401
|
||||
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//NOFORN
|
||||
TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, CAN
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What NSA provides to the partner:
|
||||
|
||||
(S//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) SIGINT: NSA and CSEC cooperate in targeting approximately 20 high-priority countries [REDACTED] NSA shares technological developments, cryptologic capabilities, software and resources for state-of-the-art collection, processing and analytic efforts, and IA capabilities. The intelligence exchange with CSEC covers worldwide national and transnational targets. No Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) money is allocated to CSEC, but NSA at times pays R&D and technology costs on shared projects with CSEC.
|
||||
|
||||
(U) What the partner provides to NSA:
|
||||
|
||||
(TS//SI//REL TO USA, CAN) CSEC offers resources for advanced collection, processing and analysis, and has opened covert sites at the request of NSA. CSEC shares with NSA their unique geographic access to areas unavailable to the U.S. [REDACTED] and provides cryptographic products, cryptanalysis, technology, and software. CSEC has increased its investment in R&D projects of mutual interest.
|
||||
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