snowchive-meta/data/Hackers-Are-Humans-Too-Partial-Redacted/Hackers-Are-Humans-Too-Partial-Redacted.md
2026-11-19 04:39:11 +02:00

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Hackers are Humans too

Cyber leads to CI leads

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 1


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Introductions

  • [REDACTED]
  • Cyber-counter intelligence
  • My primary focus is MAKERSMARK (Russia)
  • CSEC – Covert Network Threat (CNT) group
    • New name, same Cyber/CI group you know and love
    • Cyber and traditional CI sitting side by side
    • Focused on Foreign Intelligence, not Information Assurance

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 2


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Goals

  • How do we attribute cyber intrusion sets?
  • How do we go beyond the hacking face of a CNE program?
    • Expose management structure, operators
    • Requirements, technological advances
  • This presentation portrays only one method
    • Passive infrastructure tasking/contact chaining
    • Many other are available

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Initial Seed

  • Infrastructure tasking
    • Mostly exposed through malware/content delivery
  • Careful and manual monitoring of anomalous network sessions
  • Nothing fancy
  • Not Web 2.0, but it works

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Overview

  • MAKERSMARK
    • Misuse of Operational Infrastructure
    • Poor OPSEC practices [REDACTED]

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 5


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK (Russian CNE)

Designed by geniuses Implemented by morons

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 6


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK

  • The MAKERSMARK less attributed (LA) systems are really well designed
  • This has not translated into security for MAKERSMARK operators
  • Personal browsing through LA systems
    • Workshops, ORBs, and controllers
  • Development shop infected by crimeware
    • 4th party collection

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 7


TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: Less Attributed Overview

Downlink is collected by MM
Satellite
SIGINT Intercept
Packet Returned to Attack Station
Spoofed Source IP
MAKERSMARK
IP Routes to a Satellite Customer
Satellite ISP Transmitter
Response to Spoofed IP
Destination Server

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: Misuse of Infrastructure

  • Less Attributable infrastructure used for highly attributable purposes:
    • Hosting implant callback servers
    • Live testing of new implant protocols
    • Collecting exfiltration
  • This is not CNE best practices

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: Misuse of LA Systems

  • Personal Social Networking
    • Vkontakt
    • (mail/inbox/bk).ru accounts
  • Personal Email
    • Webmail/POP
    • Personal retrieval through masquerading infrastructure
  • Personal web browsing

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

MAKERSMARK: 4th party collection

  • Implant development shop infected by GUMBLAR botnet
    • Crimeware
    • Sends pharmaceutical spam
  • Exfiltration to Canadian "bullet proof" host
    • HTTP/FTP logins
    • Collection of MM operator browsing habits
    • MM LiveJournal accounts included in collection

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Closing Remarks

  • You have to keep an eye out
    • A lot of value can be lost by not following leads
    • Typically the window to exploit information is short
    • Knowing what to look for is half the battle
  • These exploitation opportunities don't last forever
  • As a CNE program matures, so will its OPSEC

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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA

Communications Security Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité des télécommunications Canada

Questions?

Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information Canada 25