snowchive-meta/data/Hackers-Are-Humans-Too-Partial-Redacted/Hackers-Are-Humans-Too-Partial-Redacted.md
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TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
# Hackers are Humans too
## Cyber leads to CI leads
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
1
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## Introductions
* [REDACTED]
* Cyber-counter intelligence
* My primary focus is MAKERSMARK (Russia)
* CSEC – Covert Network Threat (CNT) group
* New name, same Cyber/CI group you know and love
* Cyber and traditional CI sitting side by side
* Focused on Foreign Intelligence, not Information Assurance
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
2
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## Goals
* How do we attribute cyber intrusion sets?
* How do we go beyond the hacking face of a CNE program?
* Expose management structure, operators
* Requirements, technological advances
* This presentation portrays only one method
* Passive infrastructure tasking/contact chaining
* Many other are available
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
3
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## Initial Seed
* Infrastructure tasking
* Mostly exposed through malware/content delivery
* Careful and manual monitoring of anomalous network sessions
* Nothing fancy
* Not Web 2.0, but it works
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
4
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## Overview
* MAKERSMARK
* Misuse of Operational Infrastructure
* Poor OPSEC practices
[REDACTED]
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
5
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## MAKERSMARK (Russian CNE)
Designed by geniuses
Implemented by morons
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
6
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## MAKERSMARK
* The MAKERSMARK less attributed (LA) systems are really well designed
* This has not translated into security for MAKERSMARK operators
* Personal browsing through LA systems
* Workshops, ORBs, and controllers
* Development shop infected by crimeware
* 4th party collection
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
7
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## MAKERSMARK: Less Attributed Overview
```
Downlink is collected by MM
Satellite
SIGINT Intercept
Packet Returned to Attack Station
Spoofed Source IP
MAKERSMARK
IP Routes to a Satellite Customer
Satellite ISP Transmitter
Response to Spoofed IP
Destination Server
```
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
8
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## MAKERSMARK: Misuse of Infrastructure
* Less Attributable infrastructure used for highly attributable purposes:
* Hosting implant callback servers
* Live testing of new implant protocols
* Collecting exfiltration
* This is not CNE best practices
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
9
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## MAKERSMARK: Misuse of LA Systems
* Personal Social Networking
* Vkontakt
* (mail/inbox/bk).ru accounts
* Personal Email
* Webmail/POP
* Personal retrieval through masquerading infrastructure
* Personal web browsing
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
10
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## MAKERSMARK: 4th party collection
* Implant development shop infected by GUMBLAR botnet
* Crimeware
* Sends pharmaceutical spam
* Exfiltration to Canadian "bullet proof" host
* HTTP/FTP logins
* Collection of MM operator browsing habits
* MM LiveJournal accounts included in collection
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
11
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## Closing Remarks
* You have to keep an eye out
* A lot of value can be lost by not following leads
* Typically the window to exploit information is short
* Knowing what to look for is half the battle
* These exploitation opportunities don't last forever
* As a CNE program matures, so will its OPSEC
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
24
---
TS//SI//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, and USA
Communications Security
Establishment Canada
Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada
## Questions?
Safeguarding Canada's security through information superiority
Préserver la sécurité du Canada par la supériorité de l'information
Canada
25