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[REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GRIMPLATE

First Steps Toward Identifying Adversarial Use of BitTorrent

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] NSA/R4

Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52 Dated: 20070108 Declassify On: 20370117

The overall briefing is classified TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

Agenda

  • Motivation
  • BitTorrent's TCP and UDP layers
  • DHT overview
  • What does it mean to crawl DHT?
  • Pilot implementation
  • Collaboration

CONFIDENTIAL


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

GRIMPLATE Motivation

  • BitTorrent sessions are seen on a daily basis between NIPRnet hosts and adversary space (PRC, RU, etc.)
  • NTOC has no way of knowing if this is innocuous file sharing or malicious activity.
  • Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is not allowed on NIPRnet, but most commands do not see it as harmful.
  • If we can glean some indication of the type of data that's leaving NIPRnet, we can build a case for shutting this activity down.
  • Interest is not limited to NIPRnet scenario

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

BitTorrent's TCP and UDP Layers

  • TCP
    • Used to exchange pieces of files amongst peers
  • UDP
    • Used to exchange routing messages
      • Who should I ask for file pieces?

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

BitTorrent DHT

  • Nodes: clients participating in DHT
  • Peers: clients participating in piece exchange to share file
  • DHT: distributed key, value store
  • Nodes have 160 bit pseudo-random node ID
  • Keys are 160 bit hash of .torrent file metadata - info_hash
  • Values are list of IP addresses and ports of peers mapped to info_hash

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

Mainline DHT Messages

ping Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”ping”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789″}} ping Response = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:” {“id”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}}

find_node Query = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”find_node”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “target”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}} find_node Response = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “nodes”:”def456...” }}

get_peers Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”get_peers”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}} get_peers Response, with peers = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “token”:”aoeusnth”, “values”: ["axje.u”, “idhtnm″]}} get_peers Response, with closest nodes = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “token”:”aoeusnth”, “nodes”:”def456..." } }

Announce peer = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”announce_peer”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456”, “port” : 6881, "token" : “aoeusnth"}} Response = {“t”:”aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij″}}

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


SECRET //REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

What's it mean to crawl DHT?

  • Goal: Harvest complete node list for entire DHT and peer list for info_hashes found in NIPRNET defensive tools or SIGINT
  • Regular client node lookup is iterative process
    • O (log n) search
    • routing table is starting point
  • Approach:
    • spray find_node messages across DHT and store responses
    • query for peers of info_hashes of interest

SECRET //REL FVEY


SECRET //REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

What does DHT crawler collect?

  • For each node in the DHT:
    • 160 bit node ID
    • IP address
    • Port
  • For targeted info_hashes:
    • List of the node ID, IP address, and port of nodes sharing targeted file
    • Entries may be stale

SECRET //REL FVEY


SECRET //REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

What value is the data?

  • Use "community detection" algorithms to identify swarms that are likely to be malicious
  • Download files being shared by likely malicious swarms
  • Build BitTorrent mitigation case for NIPRnet
  • General SIGINT reporting
  • File download without identification of likely malicious swarms impractical

SECRET //REL FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

Pilot on PACKAGEGOODS Server

  • Deploy modification of existing crawler – dedicated PG server
  • Run analytics on "swarm” metadata to determine malicious activity
  • Experiment with subnet range and ID space and message interval to determine server processing and bandwidth requirements
  • Test if crawler catches info_hashes we see from target in XKS
  • Must we proactively collect peers to address “SIGINT lag"?

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

SIGINT Lag

  • BitTorrent "swarm” may be inactive by the time target info_hash reported by SIGINT system
  • May require preemptive collection of peers
    • DHT has on the order of 8 active million nodes
    • info_hash/DHT address space: 2^160

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


SECRET//REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

Next Steps

  • Enhanced analytics
    • Community discovery
  • Distributed crawler
  • Peer pre-fetch
  • Target file download
    • avoid lending "utility”

SECRET //REL FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY

Prior Work

GCHQ - SEBACIUM POC: [REDACTED]

CES – XKS schema/micro-plugin Prototype analytics POC: [REDACTED]

TAO-ROC – OGC approval for operational tests PACKAGEGOODS connection POC: [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

GRIMPLATE Collaboration

CES - Digital Network Exploitation Applications

[REDACTED]

NTOC V25 - Malicious Activity Discovery-Characterization V45/47 – Technology Development V46 - Technology Planning and Assessment S2B - Office of China and Korea, CNE Access Development Branch S2H – AP Russia Production Center, Russia SIGINT Development Division TAO-ROC - Production Operations Division

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY


CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

"go grimplate"

CONFIDENTIAL


UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RESEARCH DIRECTORATE ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE

Questions

Why am I grim?

UNCLASSIFIED