332 lines
No EOL
7.5 KiB
Markdown
332 lines
No EOL
7.5 KiB
Markdown
[REDACTED]
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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# GRIMPLATE
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## First Steps Toward Identifying Adversarial Use of BitTorrent
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED] NSA/R4
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Derived From: NSA/CSSM 1-52
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Dated: 20070108
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Declassify On: 20370117
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The overall briefing is classified
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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CONFIDENTIAL
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## Agenda
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* Motivation
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* BitTorrent's TCP and UDP layers
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* DHT overview
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* What does it mean to crawl DHT?
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* Pilot implementation
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* Collaboration
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CONFIDENTIAL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## GRIMPLATE Motivation
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* BitTorrent sessions are seen on a daily basis between NIPRnet hosts and adversary space (PRC, RU, etc.)
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* NTOC has no way of knowing if this is innocuous file sharing or malicious activity.
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* Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is not allowed on NIPRnet, but most commands do not see it as harmful.
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* If we can glean some indication of the type of data that's leaving NIPRnet, we can build a case for shutting this activity down.
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* Interest is not limited to NIPRnet scenario
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## BitTorrent's TCP and UDP Layers
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* TCP
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* Used to exchange pieces of files amongst peers
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* UDP
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* Used to exchange routing messages
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* Who should I ask for file pieces?
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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---
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## BitTorrent DHT
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* Nodes: clients participating in DHT
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* Peers: clients participating in piece exchange to share file
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* DHT: distributed key, value store
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* Nodes have 160 bit pseudo-random node ID
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* Keys are 160 bit hash of .torrent file metadata - info_hash
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* Values are list of IP addresses and ports of peers mapped to info_hash
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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---
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## Mainline DHT Messages
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ping Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”ping”, “a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789″}}
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ping Response = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:” {“id”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}}
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find_node Query = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”find_node”,
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“a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “target”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}}
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find_node Response = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”, “nodes”:”def456...” }}
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get_peers Query = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”get_peers”,
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“a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456″}}
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get_peers Response, with peers = { "t":"aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”,
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“token”:”aoeusnth”, “values”: ["axje.u”, “idhtnm″]}}
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get_peers Response, with closest nodes = {“t”:”aa”, “y”:”r”, “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij”,
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“token”:”aoeusnth”, “nodes”:”def456..." } }
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Announce peer = {“t":"aa”, “y”:”q”, “q”:”announce_peer”,
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“a”:{“id”:”abcdefghij0123456789”, “info_hash”:”mnopqrstuvwxyz123456”, “port” : 6881,
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"token" : “aoeusnth"}}
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Response = {“t”:”aa”, “y":"r", “r”:{“id”:”0123456789abcdefghij″}}
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UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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---
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SECRET //REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## What's it mean to crawl DHT?
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* Goal: Harvest complete node list for entire DHT and peer list for info_hashes found in NIPRNET defensive tools or SIGINT
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* Regular client node lookup is iterative process
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* O (log n) search
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* routing table is starting point
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* Approach:
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* spray find_node messages across DHT and store responses
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* query for peers of info_hashes of interest
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SECRET //REL FVEY
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---
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SECRET //REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## What does DHT crawler collect?
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* For each node in the DHT:
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* 160 bit node ID
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* IP address
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* Port
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* For targeted info_hashes:
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* List of the node ID, IP address, and port of nodes sharing targeted file
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* Entries may be stale
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SECRET //REL FVEY
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---
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SECRET //REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## What value is the data?
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* Use "community detection" algorithms to identify swarms that are likely to be malicious
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* Download files being shared by likely malicious swarms
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* Build BitTorrent mitigation case for NIPRnet
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* General SIGINT reporting
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* File download without identification of likely malicious swarms impractical
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SECRET //REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## Pilot on PACKAGEGOODS Server
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* Deploy modification of existing crawler – dedicated PG server
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* Run analytics on "swarm” metadata to determine malicious activity
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* Experiment with subnet range and ID space and message interval to determine server processing and bandwidth requirements
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* Test if crawler catches info_hashes we see from target in XKS
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* Must we proactively collect peers to address “SIGINT lag"?
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## SIGINT Lag
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* BitTorrent "swarm” may be inactive by the time target info_hash reported by SIGINT system
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* May require preemptive collection of peers
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* DHT has on the order of 8 active million nodes
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* info_hash/DHT address space: 2^160
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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SECRET//REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## Next Steps
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* Enhanced analytics
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* Community discovery
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* Distributed crawler
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* Peer pre-fetch
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* Target file download
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* avoid lending "utility”
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SECRET //REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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## Prior Work
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GCHQ - SEBACIUM
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POC: [REDACTED]
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CES – XKS schema/micro-plugin
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Prototype analytics
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POC: [REDACTED]
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TAO-ROC – OGC approval for operational tests
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PACKAGEGOODS connection
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POC: [REDACTED]
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## GRIMPLATE Collaboration
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CES - Digital Network Exploitation Applications
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[REDACTED]
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NTOC
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V25 - Malicious Activity Discovery-Characterization
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V45/47 – Technology Development
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V46 - Technology Planning and Assessment
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S2B - Office of China and Korea, CNE Access Development Branch
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S2H – AP Russia Production Center, Russia SIGINT Development Division
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TAO-ROC - Production Operations Division
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL FVEY
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---
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CONFIDENTIAL
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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"go grimplate"
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CONFIDENTIAL
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---
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UNCLASSIFIED
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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RESEARCH DIRECTORATE
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ADVANCING INTELLIGENCE THROUGH SCIENCE
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## Questions
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Why am I grim?
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UNCLASSIFIED |