510 lines
No EOL
18 KiB
Markdown
510 lines
No EOL
18 KiB
Markdown
TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
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SIGDEV
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SIGINT DEVELOPMENT
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# Case Studies of Integrated Cyber Operation Techniques
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MISSION CAPABILITIES
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T1
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CREATING THE FUTURE
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National Security Agency / Central Security Service
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Threat Operations Center
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[REDACTED]
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NSA/CSS Threat Operations Center
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VS
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U//FOUO) TUTELAGE: Dynamic Defense
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* Inbound Threats Neutered
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* Interactive Threat Controlled
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* Outbound Threat Corrupted
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```
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Adversary
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Neuter
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Exfiltrate Data
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Corrupt
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Data
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Redirect
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Victim
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NIPRNET
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"SLEEP"
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Adversary Web Server
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NSA Web Server
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (S//REL) Foreign Intelligence in Support of Dynamic Defense
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```
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U.S.
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Victim
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Victim
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Victim
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mil.
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NSA
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FBI
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DHS
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Foreign Intelligence
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Adversary
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[REDACTED]
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Attribution
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Access to their tools
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- so that we can defend
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Warn other U.S. victims
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U//FOUO) Counter CNE: Support to CND
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S//REL) Use CNE to penetrate the operations of foreign cyber actors
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U) Two major classes of CNE techniques
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* (U) Man-in-the-middle
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* (U) Man-on-the-side
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U//FOUO) Steal their tools, tradecraft, targets and take
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```
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Adversary Penetrated Foreign Host
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Adversary Penetrated Foreign Infrastructure
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Adversary Home Network
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses
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```
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Active Exploitation
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Target
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Implanted Router
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AnySite.com
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U) Man-in-the-Middle Has Multiple Uses
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```
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Active Exploitation
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Target
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Implanted Router
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Network Defense
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Good Guys
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Bad Guy
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CLOUDSHIELD
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PANDORASMAYHAM
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TURMOIL
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TUTELAGE
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AnySite.com
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```
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(S//REL) TUTELAGE is a man-in-the-middle technique
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(U//FOUO) Using TUTELAGE to enable active exploitation is integrated cyber operations.
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (S//REL) QUANTUMTHEORY: Man-on-the-Side Active Exploitation
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Concerted Use of both Passive + Active SIGINT
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* Implant targets based on 'selectors' and/or behavior
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- e.g. users of al-Mehrab ISP (Mosul) who visit al-Hezbah extremist website
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* Requires target webserver responses be visible to passive SIGINT
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* Requires sufficient delay in target web connection for the hook to "beat" the response back to the target (typically means at least one satellite hop)
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* Requires target's client to be vulnerable to our tools
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* Cycle 3 4 must get to the target before 2 occurs
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* Once 'hooked,' the target is exploited with no time constraints
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* Different QUANTUM effects have different time constraints.
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1 Target web connection/request via SATCOM or Fiber
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2 Response
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MHS
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TARGET DESTINATION
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3 SIGINT cue
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4 Insert hook in addition to requested data
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5 Hook calls to Covert Listening Post (LP): upload robust implant for sustained access
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study
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```
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INTERNET
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NIPRNET
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NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
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```
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* (S//REL) DNS requests entering NIPRnet domain
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- (S//REL) Destination IP not a NIPRnet DNS server
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- (S//REL) Domain name not within NIPRnet
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* (S//REL) DNS behavior of host is suspicious but not dangerous
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* (TS//SI//REL) TAO uses QUANTUMDNS to redirect the requesting host
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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8
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: An Integrated Cyber Operation
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```
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TARGET SPACE
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DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?
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Local DNS Server
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I don't know, I'll ask.
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DNS Server
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Talk to the root DNS Server
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Where's Anysite.mil?
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Root DNS Server
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Root DNS Server, talk to the DNS Server
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Connect to server 1.2.3.4
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Where's Anysite.mil?
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DNS Server
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I Know how to get to Anysite.mil
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DNS Server
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Where's Anysite.mil?
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DNS answer, Anysite.mil found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4
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DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?
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IP is 1.2.3.4
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TAO Server mirrors Anysite.mil
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TAO Shooter
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LPT-D
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NIPRNET
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Blocked
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If DNS Server found
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DNS Server
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Anysite.mil Server
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Tip Sent
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NSA
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Command Sent
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TURBINE
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Implant
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Implant Command & Control
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (S//REL) QUANTUMDNS: As Used Against BOXINGRUMBLE
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```
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TARGET SPACE
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Connect to server 1.2.3.4
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IP is 1.2.3.4
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TAO C2 mirrors Anysite.mil C2
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DNS query NIPRNET Anysite.mil?
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DNS answer, Anysite.com found and it's IP is 1.2.3.4
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TAO Shooter
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LPT-D
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NIPRNET
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Blocked
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Anysite.mil Server
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Tip Sent
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NSA
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TURBINE
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Command Sent
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Implant
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Implant Command & Control
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study
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```
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TAO C2 Server
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Open Web Proxies
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Victims (Bots)
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NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
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```
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* (TS//SI//REL) TAO establishes itself as a trusted C2 node
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* (U//FOUO) Captured traffic indicates the existence of a bot net
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- (S//REL) Command and control split into two layers (C2 and C4)
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- (S//REL) C2 layer has a peer-to-peer mesh network topology with direct connection to a C4 node
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* (S//REL) C2 nodes connect directly to victims as well as through open web proxies
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U//FOUO) BOXINGRUMBLE Case Study
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```
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Bot Commander
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Trusted C4 Nodes 2-3 Nodes
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Trusted C2 Nodes ~ 250 Nodes
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TAO C2 Server
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Open Web Proxies
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Victims (Bots) 200k Max ~ 30k Today
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NSA and TAO Covert Infrastructure
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DEFIANTWARRIOR Implant
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```
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* (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can see all bot tasking
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* (TS//SI//REL) TAO C2 server can push tasking
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* (S//REL) BOXINGRUMBLE bots
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- (S//REL) ~ 45% Vietnamese dissidents
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- (S//REL) ~45% Chinese dissidents
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- (S//REL) ~10% Other
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* (TS//SI//REL) Adding BOXINGRUMBLE bots to DEFIANTWARRIOR
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM
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TS//SI//REL
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| Name | Description | Inception Date | Status | Operational Success |
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| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
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| **CNE** | | | | |
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| QUANTUMINSERT | * Man-on-the-Side technique<br>* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website<br>* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation | 2005 | Operational | Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means) |
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| QUANTUMBOT | * Takes control of idle IRC bots<br>* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel | Aug 2007 | Operational | Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted) |
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| QUANTUMBISCUIT | * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation<br>* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity. | Dec 2007 | Operational | Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses) |
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| QUANTUMDNS | * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.<br>* Targets single hosts or caching name servers. | Dec 2008 | Operational | Successful (High priority CCI target exploited) |
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| QUANTUMHAND | Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook | Oct 2010 | Operational | Successful |
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| QUANTUMPHANTOM | Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A |
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| **CNA** | | | | |
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| QUANTUMSKY | Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. | 2004 | Operational | Successful |
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| QUANTUMCOPPER | File download/upload disruption and corruption. | Dec 2008 | Live | N/A |
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TS//SI//REL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U//FOUO) QUANTUMSMACKDOWN
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```
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Internet
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ACK
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Shooter
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Defensive
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TURMOIL
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CLOUDSHIELD
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RESET
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Client
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NSA Space
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TURBINE
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REPOSITORY
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NIPRNET
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```
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1. A client requests connection to malicious server. Request is detected by TURMOIL. CLOUDSHIELD terminates client-side connection.
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2. The malicious server's response is blocked by CLOUDSHIELD.
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3. TURMOIL tips TURBINE, which then tasks a shooter to send the acknowledgement to the malicious server.
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4. Malicious server assumes connection and forwards
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U//FOUO) Future Capability: QUANTUMSANDMAN
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```
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* Take captured malware and
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execute in controlled environment.
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* Allow communication through
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QUANTUM technique with outside
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world
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* Will be able to see tasking, get
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later stages of malware to provide
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disinformation, and send implants.
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Internet
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Dummy
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Victim
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Shooter
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TURMOIL
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NSA Space
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ure Malware Test Environment
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TURBINE
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Victim
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```
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U) Future Work
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* (U//FOUO) Develop lower latency guards
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* (S//REL) Use TUTELAGE inline devices as our "shooter"
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* (U//FOUO) Push decision logic to the edge
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* (U//FOUO) Identify more mission opportunities
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* (U//FOUO) Continue developing and deploying
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additional QUANTUM capabilities
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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16
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U) There is More Than One Way to QUANTUM
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TS//SI//REL
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| Name | Description | Inception Date | Status | Operational Success |
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| :---------------- | :----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | :------------- | :----------- | :---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **CNE** | | | | |
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| QUANTUMINSERT | * Man-on-the-Side technique<br>* Briefly hi-jacks connections to a terrorist website<br>* Re-directs the target to a TAO server (FOXACID) for implantation | 2005 | Operational | Highly Successful (In 2010, 300 TAO implants were deployed via QUANTUMINSERT to targets that were un-exploitable by any other means) |
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| QUANTUMBOT | * Takes control of idle IRC bots<br>* Finds computers belonging to botnets, and hijacks the command and control channel | Aug 2007 | Operational | Highly Successful (over 140,000 bots co-opted) |
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| QUANTUMBISCUIT | * Enhances QUANTUMINSERT's man-on-the-side technique of exploitation<br>* Motivated by the need to QI targets that are behind large proxies, lack predictable source addresses, and have insufficient unique web activity. | Dec 2007 | Operational | Limited success at NSAW due to high latency on passive access (GCHQ uses technique for 80% of CNE accesses) |
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| QUANTUMDNS | * DNS injection/redirection based off of A Record queries.<br>* Targets single hosts or caching name servers. | Dec 2008 | Operational | Successful (High priority CCI target exploited) |
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| QUANTUMHAND | Exploits the computer of a target who uses Facebook | Oct 2010 | Operational | Successful |
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| QUANTUMPHANTOM | Hijacks any IP on QUANTUMable passive coverage to use as covert infrastructure. | Oct 2010 | Live Tested | N/A |
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| **CNA** | | | | |
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| QUANTUMSKY | Denies access to a webpage through RST packet spoofing. | 2004 | Operational | Successful |
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| QUANTUMCOPPER | File download/upload disruption and corruption. | Dec 2008 | Live | N/A |
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TS//SI//REL
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---
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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## (U) QUESTIONS?
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For more information, please contact:
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* TUTELAGE – [REDACTED], VS ([REDACTED])
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* QUANTUM – [REDACTED], S32X ([REDACTED])
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* TURBINE – [REDACTED], T1412 ([REDACTED])
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* BOXINGRUMBLE – [REDACTED], F22 ([REDACTED])
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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL USA, FVEY
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18 |